Complete Works (370 page)

S
ISYPHUS
: Yes, it is.

S
OCRATES
: Now you wouldn’t try to find out the former, knowing Callistratus, at least if you knew him?

S
ISYPHUS
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: But you might try to find out where he was. [d]

S
ISYPHUS
: Yes, I think you might.

S
OCRATES
: Nor, again, would you try to discover where the man was to be found, if you knew that; in that case, you would go and find him right away, wouldn’t you?

S
ISYPHUS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Apparently, then, it isn’t things which people know that they try to find out, but things they don’t know.

But that argument may strike you as captious, Sisyphus, put forward not with a view to the truth of the matter, but merely as a debating point. If so, look at it this way, and see if you agree with what was just said. [e] You know, don’t you, what happens in geometry: the diagonal is unknown to geometers, yet there’s no question whether it is or is not a diagonal—that’s not what they’re trying to find out at all—but rather, how long it is in relation to the sides of the areas it bisects. Isn’t
that
what they’re trying to find out about the diagonal?

S
ISYPHUS
: I believe so.

S
OCRATES
: And that
is
something unknown, isn’t it?

S
ISYPHUS
: Absolutely.

S
OCRATES
: Or again, take the doubling of the cube. You know, don’t you, that geometers try to find out, by reasoning, how big it is? As for the cube itself, they don’t try to find out whether it’s a cube or not. That much they know, don’t they?

S
ISYPHUS
: Yes.

[389]
S
OCRATES
: Or again, consider the upper air. You surely know that what Anaxagoras and Empedocles and all the rest of the cosmologists are trying to find out is whether it’s infinite or finite.

S
ISYPHUS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: But they don’t ask whether it is air, do they now?

S
ISYPHUS
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: In all such cases, then, our conclusion is as follows: nobody can ever try to find out anything that he knows, only what he doesn’t know. Would you agree with me about that?

S
ISYPHUS
: I would.

[b] S
OCRATES
: Now isn’t this what deliberation seemed to us to be—somebody trying to find out the best course to follow in matters requiring him to take action?

S
ISYPHUS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And we thought that deliberation was trying to find out something concerning practical matters, didn’t we?

S
ISYPHUS
: Yes, of course.

S
OCRATES
: So now it’s time for us to consider what it is that prevents people from finding out what they’re trying to find out.

S
ISYPHUS
: I think it is.

[c] S
OCRATES
: And what should we say it is that prevents them, if not incomprehension?

S
ISYPHUS
: Let’s look into it, for Heaven’s sake.

S
OCRATES
: Absolutely!—we must let out every reef, as they say, and raise full cry.

So now let’s examine the following question together: do you think it’s possible for a man to deliberate about music if he has no knowledge of music, and knows neither how to play the cithara nor how to perform any other kind of music?

S
ISYPHUS
: No, I don’t.

[d] S
OCRATES
: And what about military or nautical expertise? Would someone who knew neither of those subjects be able to deliberate at all about what he should do in either field? Would he be able to deliberate about how to command a force or captain a vessel if he lacked all knowledge of military or nautical matters?

S
ISYPHUS
: No.

S
OCRATES
: And would you expect the same to hold in all other fields? It is quite impossible for someone who doesn’t understand something either to know or to deliberate about what he doesn’t understand.

S
ISYPHUS
: I agree.

S
OCRATES
: But it
is
possible to try to find out what one doesn’t know; isn’t that right?

S
ISYPHUS
: Certainly.[e]

S
OCRATES
: Then trying to find out can no longer be identified with deliberating.

S
ISYPHUS
: Why not?

S
OCRATES
: Because what one tries to find out is evidently something one doesn’t know, whereas apparently no human being can deliberate about what he doesn’t know. Wasn’t that what we just said?

S
ISYPHUS
: It certainly was.

S
OCRATES
: And isn’t that what you Pharsalians were doing yesterday, trying to find out the best things for your city to do, yet not knowing them? Because if you knew them, you surely wouldn’t still have been trying to find them out—just as we don’t try to find out anything else we already know, do we?

S
ISYPHUS
: No, we don’t.

S
OCRATES
: And if one doesn’t know something, Sisyphus, which do you think one should do: try to find it out or learn it?

S
ISYPHUS
: Learn it, for Heaven’s sake; that’s what
I
think.
[390]

S
OCRATES
: And there you’re right. But tell me, is it for the following reason that you think one should learn it rather than try to find it out? One can discover it more quickly and easily by learning it from those who understand it, than by trying to find it out on one’s own, when one doesn’t know it. Or is there some other reason?

S
ISYPHUS
: No, that is the reason.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, why did you people take the trouble to deliberate yesterday on matters you don’t understand, and try to find out the best course of action for the city to take? Why weren’t you learning those things, rather, from someone who understands them, so that you could take the [b] best course of action for the city? Instead, it seems to me that you spent the whole day yesterday sitting there, making things up and divining about matters you didn’t understand, instead of taking the trouble to learn them—I mean those who govern your city, including you.

Perhaps you’ll say that I’ve been jesting at your expense merely for the sake of having a discussion, but that you think nothing has been seriously [c] proved. Yet you’ll certainly have to take this next point seriously, Sisyphus. Suppose it be granted that there is such a thing as deliberation; suppose it does not, as was discovered just now, prove identical with sheer incomprehension,
²
guesswork, or making things up, no different, but just using a grander name for it. In that case, don’t you think there’s a difference between some people and others with respect to deliberating well or being good deliberators, just as some people differ from others in all other areas of expertise—as, for example, some carpenters differ from others, or some [d] doctors from others, or some pipers from others, or as tradesmen in general differ from one another?
³
Just as those experts differ in their respective skills, don’t you think the same applies to deliberating—that there’s a difference between some people and others?

S
ISYPHUS
: Yes, I do.

S
OCRATES
: Now tell me, don’t all those who deliberate either well or badly deliberate about things that are going to exist in the future?

S
ISYPHUS
: Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: And what’s in the future doesn’t exist yet. Isn’t that right?

S
ISYPHUS
: Of course.

[e] S
OCRATES
: Because otherwise, presumably, it wouldn’t
still
be going to exist in the future, but would exist already, wouldn’t it?

S
ISYPHUS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And if it doesn’t exist yet, it hasn’t yet
⁴
come into being either.

S
ISYPHUS
: No, it hasn’t.

S
OCRATES
: But if it hasn’t even yet come into being, then it doesn’t yet possess any nature of its own either, does it?

S
ISYPHUS
: None at all.

S
OCRATES
: Then those who deliberate well and those who do it badly are all deliberating about matters that neither exist nor have come into being nor possess any nature, whenever they deliberate about what’s in the future. Isn’t that right?

S
ISYPHUS
: It does appear to be.

S
OCRATES
: Now do you think it’s possible for anyone to hit upon the nonexistent either well or badly?

S
ISYPHUS
: What do you mean by that?

S
OCRATES
: I’ll show you what I’m suggesting. Consider a number of
[391]
archers. How would you distinguish which of them was a good marksman and which was a poor one? That’s not hard to tell, is it? You would presumably ask them to aim at some target.

S
ISYPHUS
: Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: And the one who most often succeeded in hitting the target you would judge the winner?

S
ISYPHUS
: I would.

S
OCRATES
: But if there were no target set up for them to aim at, and each [b] just shot wherever he pleased, how could you distinguish between the good marksman and the poor one?

S
ISYPHUS
: I couldn’t.

S
OCRATES
: And wouldn’t you also be at a loss to distinguish good deliberators from bad ones, if they didn’t understand what they were deliberating about?

S
ISYPHUS
: I would.

S
OCRATES
: And if those who deliberate are deliberating about matters in the future, they’re deliberating about matters that don’t exist, aren’t they?

S
ISYPHUS
: Absolutely.

S
OCRATES
: And it’s impossible, isn’t it, for anyone to hit upon the nonexistent. How do you think anyone could ever hit upon what doesn’t exist? [c]

S
ISYPHUS
: It can’t be done.

S
OCRATES
: And since it’s impossible to hit upon the nonexistent, no one who’s deliberating about the nonexistent could actually hit upon it. For the future is something that doesn’t exist, isn’t it?

S
ISYPHUS
: So I believe.

S
OCRATES
: Then since nobody can hit upon what’s in the future, no human being can actually be good or bad at deliberation.

S
ISYPHUS
: Apparently not.

S
OCRATES
: Nor can one person be either a better or a worse deliberator than another, if one cannot, in fact, be more or less successful at hitting upon the nonexistent.

S
ISYPHUS
: Indeed not. [d]

S
OCRATES
: So what standard could people possibly have in mind when they call certain people good or bad deliberators? Don’t you think, Sisyphus, that it would be worth delving into this again some time?

1
. Accepting the deletion of
ouch hostis ei
ē
ho Kallistratos
in c6.

2
. Accepting the conjecture
anepist
ē
mosun
ē
in c4.

3
. Placing a question-mark after
diapherousin
in 390d2, and a comma after
technais
in d3.

4
. Conjecturing
oup
ō
for
hout
ō
s
in e2.

HALCYON

Translated by Brad Inwood. Text: M. D. MacLeod,
Luciani Opera
(Oxford, 1987), vol. IV.

Socrates tells his devoted friend Chaerephon the legend of Halcyon, who was transformed by some heavenly power into a sea bird, the better to search for her much-beloved husband, who had drowned at sea. Chaerephon doubts the truth of the legend, but Socrates argues that his doubt is unfounded; we are ignorant of the limits of divine power, which is unimaginably greater than human power and has shown itself to be capable of tremendous things.

The topic and the setting of this lyrical little dialogue appear to be derived from a passage in Plato’s
Phaedrus
where Socrates also interprets a legend about the transformation of human beings into animals (258e–259d). The association between cosmos, heaven, nature, and divine power is characteristic of Platonism in later times, as is the skeptical stress on the limits of human knowledge, and the affinity between human beings and other animals. The dialogue is elaborately cultivated, both in vocabulary and composition, and is a good example of the artificial style called ‘Asiatic’ by later critics. It was probably composed between 150
B.C.
and 50
A.D.

The ending of
Halcyon
contains a sly allusion to the story of the two wives of Socrates, Xanthippe and Myrto, both of whom, he hopes, will be as devoted to him as Halcyon was to her husband. This story of the bigamy of Socrates goes back to the fourth century
B.C.
at least.

Although many manuscripts attribute
Halcyon
to Plato and an ancient book list records it as being among the works incorrectly ascribed to him, it has virtually disappeared from the Platonic corpus. This is because it was later attributed to Lucian, the second-century
A.D.
orator and dialogue writer, probably by Byzantine scholars who noticed similarities with the methods and themes of Lucian. When the corpus of Platonic works was established for modern times in the sixteenth-century edition of Henri Étienne (Stephanus),
Halcyon
was not printed, and it has normally not been printed in other modern editions of Plato. It is nowadays usually printed only in editions of the Lucianic corpus
.