Complete Works (365 page)
(
nomothetik
ē
), legislative skill: knowledge of how to produce a good city.
(
nouthet
ē
sis
), admonition: speech which blames with judgment; speech for the sake of keeping someone from a mistake.
(
bo
ē
theia
), help: the prevention of something bad, either present or about to happen.
(
kolasis
), chastisement: treatment given to a soul concerning a past mistake.
(
dunamis
), ability: superiority in word or deed; the state which makes its possessor be able; natural strength.
(
s
ō
izein
), save: to keep safe and sound.
1
. Omitting
echon
in d3.
2
. Reading
epist
ē
m
ē
poi
ē
tik
ē
eudaimonias
after
kak
ō
n
in d6 (a misprint in Burnet).
3
. Accepting the conjecture
adeil
ō
n
for
ad
ē
l
ō
n
in b1.
4
. Accepting the conjecture
proesis
for
prosthesis
in d4–5.
5
. Accepting the conjecture
tou semnotatou
in e2–3.
6
. Accepting the conjecture
t
ō
n en n
ō
i ont
ō
n
for
t
ō
n ont
ō
n
in b8.
7
. Accepting a conjectural transposition of
orth
ē
from c4 to c6.
8
. Reading
summetria pros to mathein
in d4.
9
. Reading
phuse
ō
s
in d6.
10
. Accepting the conjectural restoration
Dik
ē
apophasis … pragmatos amphisb
ē
t
ē
sis peri tou adikein
ē
m
ē
.
11
. Moving the semicolon from after
kin
ē
sis
to after
s
ō
matos
in c5, and deleting
psuch
ē
s
.
12
. Accepting the emendation
ousias empsuchou aïdios mon
ē
in a8.
13
. Emending
nous taxe
ō
s
to
kai nou taxe
ō
s
in e6.
Translated by Andrew S. Becker.
Socrates discusses with a friend several disjointed questions about justice. He makes the following points: it is speech that decides what is just and unjust (though that does not answer the question what the just is); the same acts can be just or unjust, depending on the situation; justice is knowledge of the right time to do things; people who are unjust are unwillingly unjust. All these are familiar Socratic ideas, presented in an unusually bald and unattractive format.
On Justice
verges on incoherence because of its brevity and abrupt transitions. One explanation might be that it is not an original work, but is excerpted or adapted from earlier Socratic literature. The argument that the same actions (even deceiving and stealing) are sometimes just and sometimes unjust, depending on the situation, is urged by Socrates in Xenophon
, Memoirs of Socrates
IV.ii.12–20, and Plato has Socrates use a similar argument for situational ethics (
Republic
331b–d). Xenophon often adapted earlier Socratic texts, in this case apparently the same text or texts as the author or compiler of
On Justice.
That Socrates argued for the propriety of deceiving and stealing was one of the complaints urged by Polycrates in his
Accusation of Socrates,
written in 393/2
B.C.
(a speech now lost but whose contents can be partly inferred from the various replies it provoked, especially the
Apology
of Libanius, the fourth century
A.D.
teacher of rhetoric). If Polycrates was replying to a Socratic source excerpted or adapted by the author of
On Justice,
we can only guess which it was, but the most attractive possibility is a (now lost) dialogue by Antisthenes called
On Law
or
On Rightness and Justice.
Plato’s influence can be felt at one point only: when Socrates argues, apparently needlessly, that since people are unwillingly unjust their unjust conduct must also be unwilling, the author is insisting on a point that Plato felt he needed to insist on at the end of his life
(Laws
860c–e). If the dialogue was intended to support Plato’s view, it can be dated to after the middle of the fourth century
B.C.
,
perhaps well after.
Some manuscripts of
On Justice
list as speakers ‘Socrates, Friend’, others say ‘Socrates, Anonymous’, and one says ‘Socrates, Clinias’; that Socrates is a speaker is clear from the dialogue itself, but the other three appellations are evidently guesses by later scholars. So it seems to have been transmitted during antiquity without any indication of who the speakers were. The same is true of the dialogue labeled
On Virtue;
these two dialogues also lack titles of a normal Platonic sort and may be among those said in ancient lists of Platonic works to be ‘without a heading’. In this translation, we have decided to call the unknown interlocutor ‘Friend’.
D.S.H.
[372]
S
OCRATES
: Can you tell us what the just is, or don’t you think it’s worthwhile to discuss this?
F
RIEND
: I think it would be very worthwhile.
S
OCRATES
: What is the just, then?
F
RIEND
: Well, what could it be, if not what’s established as just by custom?
S
OCRATES
: That’s not the way to answer. If you were to ask me what an eye is, I’d tell you it’s what we see with; and if you demand that I prove it, I’ll prove it. And if you ask me what “soul” is the name of, I’ll tell you it’s what we think with. And if, again, you ask me what voice is, I’ll answer that it’s what we converse with. In this same way, now tell me what the just is, by referring to how we use it, like I’ve now done with these other things.
F
RIEND
: I can’t possibly answer you that way.
S
OCRATES
: Well, since you can’t do it that way, would it perhaps be easier for us to discover it in this sort of way? Now, when we want to distinguish what’s longer and what’s shorter, with what do we examine them? Isn’t it with a measuring-stick?
F
RIEND
: Yes.
[373]
S
OCRATES
: Besides the measuring-stick, what skill do we use? Isn’t it skill in measuring?
F
RIEND
: Right, skill in measuring.
S
OCRATES
: And what about distinguishing what’s light and what’s heavy? Don’t we do that with a scale?
F
RIEND
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: Besides the scale, what skill do we use? Isn’t it skill in weighing?
F
RIEND
: Definitely.
S
OCRATES
: Well, then, when we want to distinguish what’s just and what’s unjust, what instrument do we use to examine them? And, besides this instrument, what skill do we use in dealing with them? Or doesn’t this way make it clear to you either?
F
RIEND
: No.
S
OCRATES
: Well, let’s start again. Whenever we disagree about what’s larger and what’s smaller, who are the ones who decide between us? Aren’t they the ones who measure?
F
RIEND
: Yes.
[b] S
OCRATES
: And whenever we disagree about number, about many and few, who are the ones who decide? Aren’t they the ones who count?
F
RIEND
: Obviously.
S
OCRATES
: Whenever we disagree with each other about what’s just and what’s unjust, to whom do we go? Who are those who decide between us in each case? Tell me.