Complete Works (69 page)

T
HEAETETUS
: Absolutely.

1
. See
Odyssey
ix.270–71.

2
. See
Odyssey
xvii.483–87… . gods go from town to town disguised as visitors of varied appearance, just like Odysseus on this occasion, to observe the deeds of just and unjust people.

3
. The reference is to the conversation in the
Parmenides.

4
. The word “sophist” (
sophist
ē
s
) is etymologically related to the word “wise” (
sophos
), and so can be taken to connote knowledge and expertise.

5
. In addition to the words bracketed by Burnet, we bracket
doxopaideutik
ē
s
also.

6
. The word here translated by “debating,”
eristikon
, is sometimes translated (or transliterated) “eristic.” It refers to a practice of competitive debating which the sophists made popular in Athens. Plato’s use of the term stigmatizes the practice as not directed at truth.

7
. The text seems faulty here. The general sense, however, is clear.

8
. See Parmenides, frg. 7, ll.1–2. The same lines reoccur, with one slight textual difference, at 258d.

9
. Note that the Greek word for “nothing,”
m
ē
den
, literally means something like “not even one” (
m
ē
de hen
).

10
. Accepting the conjecture
to “to,”
translated by “that which” on the view that it is part of the phrase
to m
ē
on
, which is generally translated by “that which is not.” In Greek the form is singular (in contrast with
ta
, for example, “those which”).

11
. I.e., 237a–238c, reinforced by 238d–239c.

12
. This group includes Parmenides of Elea (the Visitor, of course, comes from there).

13
. The reference here is to Heraclitus, who was Ionian. See frg. 51 (cf. Plato,
Symp
. 187a).

14
. Here Plato refers to Empedocles, who lived in Sicily.

15
. Accepting the emendation of
allos eip
ē
i for allothi p
ē
i
in b5.

16
. Plato is relying on the thought that if the terms “one” and “name” designate one thing (in the sense that he assumes is relevant), then they are interchangeable, even to the point of generating the strange phrase “the one of the name.”

17
. See
Theogony
, esp. 675–715.

18
. Accepting the emendation of inserting
pant
ō
n
after
ont
ō
n
.

19
. These thinkers were introduced at 242c–d, e–243a.

20
. See Aristophanes,
Wasps
, 1017–20.

21
. Alternatively, the two previous sentences can be translated: “So if a person can do that, he’ll adequately discriminate a single form spread out all through many, each of which stands separate from the others, and many forms that are different from each other but are included within a single form that’s outside them; and another single form connected as a unit through many wholes, and many forms that are all marked off in separation.”

22
. Cf. 255a.

23
. At 251a–252c.

24
. Alternatively: “Let’s continue, then:” (On this translation, the Visitor is here taking the next step in his plan announced at 255e8; he has said how change relates to rest and to the same, and now proceeds to say how it relates to the different—after which, c11 ff., he completes the plan by saying how it relates to being. Thus he is not repeating anything already said previously.)

25
. See 234d–e.

26
. This sentence is ambiguous. First, the Greek here uses an idiom which could mean either “says those that are, as they are” or “says those that are, that they are” (cf. 263d). Secondly, the additional explanatory phrase, “about you,” could be taken with “says,” with “are,” or with both.

27
. See 256e5–6.

28
. See 221c–225a.

29
. See 219b.

30
. See
Iliad
vi.211.

STATESMAN

Translated by C. J. Rowe.

This dialogue is a sequel to
Sophist
. Here the unnamed philosopher from Elea
continues his project of expounding his own conceptions of the natures of sophistry
and statesmanship, as intellectual capacities distinct both from one another
and from that of the philosopher. Now, for his account of the statesman,
he takes as his discussion partner—the respondent to the questions he asks in
developing and displaying his views—Socrates’ namesake, a pupil, with
Theaetetus, of the visiting geometer Theodorus, from Cyrene, an important
Greek city on the North African coast. As in
Sophist,
neither Socrates nor
Theodorus takes part in the discussion, except for the brief introductory conversation.

The ‘statesman’—in Greek the
politikos,
whence the Latinized title
Politicus
by which the dialogue is alternatively known—is understood from the
outset as the possessor of the specialist, expert knowledge of how to rule justly
and well—to the citizens’ best interests—in a ‘city’ or
polis,
directing all its
public institutions and affairs. (It is assumed that such knowledge is not only
possible, but that politics should be led by it—assumptions that could be questioned,
of course.) In constructing his ‘divisions,’ the visitor looks simply to
the demand for, and the demands of, this knowledge: he is not defining the capacities
needed in their work by any actual persons whom we (or Greeks of the
time) would ordinarily describe as ‘statesmen’. In fact, a central thesis of the
visitor is that no current city is ruled by such expert statesmen at all. And
since no actual person ruling in a city possesses this knowledge, the best current
government could (paradoxically) only be that directed by an imitator—a
‘sophist’, one who as
Sophist
has explained is aware that he does not
know
the right thing to do, but makes it appear to others that he does; such a government
would have good laws and would enforce them, under this ‘sophist’s’ direction,
but the knowledge of statesmanship itself would only be weakly reflected
in these laws and in the ‘sophist’s’ behavior—it would not actually
reside anywhere in the community.

The visitor repeatedly makes plain that, in presenting his views on statesmanship,
he is not concerned merely with questions of political theory. In fact,
his chief concern is to teach us how to improve ourselves in philosophy itself—
to become expert in precisely this ‘method of division’ that he is employing to
make the statesman’s nature clear. So he pauses in his exposition several times
to point up errors being made along the way, and say how to correct them, as
well as to indicate special features of the method and the reasons why they are
needed. Thus we are treated to excursuses on what it is to divide a class at places where there are real subclasses marked off by their own specific natures,
not in some arbitrary and merely conventional way; on which sorts of things
require the preliminary study of ‘models’ in order to understand them fully—
and on the precise nature of such a ‘model’; on the often neglected but crucially
important science of measuring things by reference to ‘due measure’ and
not relatively to given other things exceeding or falling short of them in the relevant
respect—length, weight, size, etc. And we get an elaborate and brilliant
‘myth’ about rule in a former era when gods were personally in charge of human
affairs—necessarily different from the statesmanship we are trying to define,
since that is an expertise possessed, if at all, by human beings. In their
contribution to our understanding of Plato’s later metaphysics, these digressions
can usefully be compared to the long digression in
Sophist
on the natures
of being and not being.

Modern readers are often impatient with the visitor’s use of lengthy ‘divisions’
in expounding his views on the nature of statesmanship. Nonetheless,
this brilliant dialogue presents a fascinating set of ideas about human affairs—‘second thoughts’ about politics quite different from the theory of philosopher-kings
recommended in
Republic,
and looking forward to the system of laws,
and government under them, set out in
Laws.
It richly repays any effort
needed to read it.

J.M.C.

S
OCRATES
: I’m really much indebted to you, Theodorus, for introducing
[257]
me to Theaetetus, and also to our visitor.

T
HEODORUS
: And perhaps,
¹
Socrates, your debt will be three times as great, when they complete both the statesman and the philosopher for you.

S
OCRATES
: Well, yes and no: shall we say, my dear Theodorus, that we’ve heard the best arithmetician and geometer putting it like that?

T
HEODORUS
: How do you mean, Socrates? [b]

S
OCRATES
: Because you assumed that each of the three were to be assigned equal worth, when in fact they differ in value by more than can be expressed in terms of mathematical proportion.

T
HEODORUS
: Well said, Socrates, by our god Ammon;
²
a just rebuke—you’ve remembered your arithmetic very well,
³
to bring me up on my mistake like that. As for you, I’ll get my own back for this on another occasion. But turning to our guest—don’t you give up at all on obliging [c] us, but, whether you choose the statesman first or the philosopher, make your choice and go through him in his turn.

V
ISITOR
: That, Theodorus, is what we must do, since we have tried our hand once, and
⁴
we must not desist until we come to the end of what we have in hand. But I have a question: what should I do about Theaetetus here?

T
HEODORUS
: In what respect?

V
ISITOR
: Should we give him a rest and substitute for him young Socrates here, who trains with him? Or what’s your advice?

T
HEODORUS
: As you say, make the substitution; since they are young, they’ll put up with any sort of exertion more easily if they take a rest.

[d] [O
LDER
] S
OCRATES
: What’s more, my friend, both of them seem somehow to have a certain kinship with me. One of them you all say is like me in
[258]
the way he looks; as for the other, he is called and designated by the same name as I am, and that produces a certain relatedness. Well, we must always be eager to recognize those akin to us by talking to them. With Theaetetus I myself got together in discussion yesterday, and I have just now heard him
⁵
answering questions, whereas neither applies in Socrates’ case; we must take a look at him too. He’ll answer me on another occasion; for now let him answer you.

V
ISITOR
: I’ll go along with that. Socrates, do you hear what Socrates says?

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Yes.

V
ISITOR
: Then do you agree to it?

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Absolutely.

[b] V
ISITOR
: It seems there is no obstacle on your side, and perhaps there should be even less on mine. Well then, after the sophist, it seems to me that the two of us must search for the statesman.
⁶
Now tell me: should we posit in the case of this person too that he is one of those who possess knowledge,
⁷
or what assumption should we make?

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: That’s what we should assume.

V
ISITOR
: In that case we must divide the various sorts of knowledge, as we did when we were considering the previous individual?

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Perhaps so.

V
ISITOR
: But it’s not in the same place, Socrates, that I think I see a cut.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Why not?

[c] V
ISITOR
: It’s in a different place.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Yes, apparently.

V
ISITOR
: So in what direction will one discover the path that leads to the statesman? For we must discover it, and after having separated it from the rest we must impress one character on it; and having stamped a single different form on the other turnings we must make our minds think of all sorts of knowledge there are as falling into two classes.
⁸

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: That, I think, is actually for you to do, visitor, not for me.

V
ISITOR
: But, Socrates, it must also be a matter for you, when it becomes [d] clear to us what it is.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: You’re right.

V
ISITOR
: Well then: isn’t it the case that arithmetic and some other sorts of expertise that are akin to it don’t involve any practical actions, but simply provide knowledge?

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: That’s so.

V
ISITOR
: Whereas for their part the sorts of expertise involved in carpentry and manufacture as a whole have their knowledge as it were naturally bound up with practical actions, and use it to complete those material [e] objects they cause to come into being from not having been before?