Complete Works (66 page)

T
HEAETETUS
: What?

V
ISITOR
: First let’s say that change is completely different from rest. Shall we say that?

T
HEAETETUS
: Yes.

V
ISITOR
: So it is not rest.

T
HEAETETUS
: Not at all.

[256]
V
ISITOR
: But it is, because it shares in
that which is
.

T
HEAETETUS
: Yes.

V
ISITOR
: Then again change is different from the same.

T
HEAETETUS
: Pretty much.

V
ISITOR
: So it is not the same.

T
HEAETETUS
: No.

V
ISITOR
: But still it was the same, we said,
²²
because everything has a share of that.

T
HEAETETUS
: Definitely.

V
ISITOR
: We have to agree without any qualms that change is the same and not the same. When we say that it’s the same and not the same, we aren’t speaking the same way. When we say it’s the same, that’s because [b] it shares in the same in relation to itself. But when we say it’s not the same, that’s because of its association with the different. Because of its association with the different, change is separated from the same, and so becomes not it but different. So that it’s right to say that it’s not
the same
.

T
HEAETETUS
: Of course.

V
ISITOR
: So if change itself ever somehow had a share in rest, there would be nothing strange about labeling it resting?

T
HEAETETUS
: That’s absolutely right, as long as we admit that some kinds will blend with each other and some won’t.

V
ISITOR
: That, though, we demonstrated earlier, before we came to this [c] point, and we showed that by nature it has to be so.
²³

T
HEAETETUS
: Of course.

V
ISITOR
: To repeat,
²⁴
change is different from
different
, just as it’s other than both the same and rest.

T
HEAETETUS
: It has to be.

V
ISITOR
: So in a way it is different and not different, according to what we’ve said.

T
HEAETETUS
: Right.

V
ISITOR
: So what next? Are we going to say that
change
is different from the first three but not from the fourth, in spite of the fact that we’ve agreed that there were five things we were going to investigate? [d]

T
HEAETETUS
: How could we do that? We can’t admit that there are fewer of them than there appeared to be just now.

V
ISITOR
: So shall we go on fearlessly contending that
change
is different from
that which is
?

T
HEAETETUS
: Yes, we should be absolutely fearless.

V
ISITOR
: So it’s clear that
change
really is both something that is not, but also a thing that is since it partakes in
that which is
?

T
HEAETETUS
: That’s absolutely clear.

V
ISITOR
: So it has to be possible for
that which is not
to be, in the case of change and also as applied to all the kinds. That’s because as applied to [e] all of them the nature of
the different
makes each of them not be, by making it different from that which is. And we’re going to be right if we say that all of them
are not
in this same way. And on the other hand we’re also going to be right if we call them beings, because they have a share in that which is.

T
HEAETETUS
: It seems that way.

V
ISITOR
: So as concerning each of the forms that which is is extensive, and that which is not is indefinite in quantity.

T
HEAETETUS
: That seems right.

[257]
V
ISITOR
: So we have to say that
that which is
itself is different from the others.

T
HEAETETUS
: Necessarily.

V
ISITOR
: So even
that which is
is not, in as many applications as there are of the others, since, not being them, it is one thing, namely itself, and on the other hand it is not those others, which are an indefinite number.

T
HEAETETUS
: I suppose so.

V
ISITOR
: So then we shouldn’t even be annoyed about this conclusion, precisely because it’s the nature of kinds to allow association with each other. And if somebody doesn’t admit that, then he needs to win us over from our earlier line of argument for it, in order to win us over from its consequences.

T
HEAETETUS
: That’s entirely fair.

[b] V
ISITOR
: Now let’s look at this.

T
HEAETETUS
: What?

V
ISITOR
: It seems that when we say
that which is not
, we don’t say something contrary to
that which is
, but only something different from it.

T
HEAETETUS
: Why?

V
ISITOR
: It’s like this. When we speak of something as not large, does it seem to you that we indicate the small rather than the equal?

T
HEAETETUS
: Of course not.

V
ISITOR
: So we won’t agree with somebody who says that negation [c] signifies a contrary. We’ll only admit this much: when “not” and “non” are prefixed to names that follow them, they indicate something
other
than the names, or rather, other than the things to which the names following the negation are applied.

T
HEAETETUS
: Absolutely.

V
ISITOR
: If you don’t mind, though, let’s think about this.

T
HEAETETUS
: What?

V
ISITOR
: The nature of the different appears to be chopped up, just like knowledge.

T
HEAETETUS
: Why?

V
ISITOR
: Knowledge is a single thing, too, I suppose. But each part of it that has to do with something is marked off and has a name peculiar to itself. That’s why there are said to be many expertises and many kinds [d] of knowledge.

T
HEAETETUS
: Of course.

V
ISITOR
: And so the same thing happens to the parts of the nature of the different, too, even though it’s one thing.

T
HEAETETUS
: Maybe. But shall we say how?

V
ISITOR
: Is there a part of the different that’s placed over against the beautiful?

T
HEAETETUS
: Yes.

V
ISITOR
: Shall we say that it’s nameless, or does it have a name?

T
HEAETETUS
: It has a name. What we call
not beautiful
is the thing that’s different from nothing other than the nature of the beautiful.

V
ISITOR
: Now go ahead and tell me this.

T
HEAETETUS
: What? [e]

V
ISITOR
: Isn’t it in the following way that
the not beautiful
turns out to be, namely, by being both marked off within one kind of
those that are
, and also set over against one of
those that are
?

T
HEAETETUS
: Yes.

V
ISITOR
: Then it seems that
the not beautiful
is a sort of setting of a being over against a being.

T
HEAETETUS
: That’s absolutely right.

V
ISITOR
: Well then, according to this account, is the beautiful more a being than the not beautiful?

T
HEAETETUS
: Not at all.

V
ISITOR
: So we have to say that both the not large and the large
[258]
equally
are
.

T
HEAETETUS
: Yes.

V
ISITOR
: So we also have to put the not just on a par with the just, in that neither
is
any more than the other.

T
HEAETETUS
: Of course.

V
ISITOR
: And we’ll speak about the others in the same way too, since the nature of the different appeared as being one of
those that are
. And because it
is
, we have to posit its parts as no less beings.

T
HEAETETUS
: Of course.

V
ISITOR
: So it seems that the setting against each other of the nature of a part of the different and the nature of
that which is
is not any less being—if [b] we’re allowed to say such a thing—than
that which is
itself. And it does not signify something contrary to
that which is
but only something different from it.

T
HEAETETUS
: Clearly.

V
ISITOR
: So what shall we call it?

T
HEAETETUS
: Obviously
that which is not
—which we were looking for because of the sophist—is just exactly this.

V
ISITOR
: Then does it have just as much being as any of the others, as you said it did? Should we work up the courage now to say that
that which
is not
definitely is something that has its own nature? Should we say that [c] just as
the large
was large,
the beautiful
was beautiful,
the not large
was not large, and
the not beautiful
was not beautiful, in the same way
that which
is not
also was and is not being, and is one form among the many
that
are
? Do we, Theaetetus, still have any doubts about that?

T
HEAETETUS
: No.

V
ISITOR
: You know, our disbelief in Parmenides has gone even farther than his prohibition.

T
HEAETETUS
: How?

V
ISITOR
: We’ve pushed our investigation ahead and shown him something even beyond what he prohibited us from even thinking about.

T
HEAETETUS
: In what way?

[d] V
ISITOR
: Because he says, remember,

Never shall it force itself on us, that that which is not may be;
Keep your thought far away from this path of searching.

T
HEAETETUS
: That’s what he says.

V
ISITOR
: But we’ve not only shown that
those which are not
are. We’ve also caused what turns out to be the form of
that which is not
to appear. [e] Since we showed that the nature of
the different
is, chopped up among all beings in relation to each other, we dared to say that
that which is not
really is just this, namely, each part of the nature of the different that’s set over against
that which is
.

T
HEAETETUS
: And what we’ve said seems to me completely and totally true.

V
ISITOR
: Nobody can say that this
that which is not
, which we’ve made to appear and now dare to say is, is the contrary of
that which is
. We’ve
[259]
said good-bye long ago to any contrary of
that which is
, and to whether it is or not, and also to whether or not an account can be given of it. With regard to
that which is not
, which we’ve said is, let someone refute us and persuade us that we’ve made a mistake—or else, so long as he can’t do that, he should say just what we say. He has to say that the kinds blend with each other, that
that which is
and
the different
pervade all of them and each other, that
the different
shares in
that which is
and so, because of that sharing, is. But he won’t say that it is that which it shares in, but that it is different from it, and necessarily, because it
is
different from
that which
[b]
is
, it clearly can be
what is not
. On the other hand
that which is
has a share in
the different
, so, being different from all of the others, it is not each of them and it is not all of the others except itself. So
that which is
indisputably is not millions of things, and all of the others together, and also each of them, are in many ways and also are not in many ways.

T
HEAETETUS
: True.

V
ISITOR
: And if anyone doesn’t believe these contrarieties, he has to think about them himself and say something better than what we’ve said. But if he thinks he’s recognized a problem in it and enjoys dragging the [c] argument back and forth, then he’s been carried away by something that’s not worth much of anyone’s attention—to go by what we’ve just been saying, anyway. A thing like that isn’t clever or hard to discover, but the other thing is both difficult and at the same time beautiful.

T
HEAETETUS
: What other thing?

V
ISITOR
: The thing we said earlier. That is, we should leave pointless things like this alone. Instead we should be able to follow what a person says and scrutinize it step by step. When he says that what’s different is the same in a certain way or that what’s the same is different in a certain way, we should understand just what way he means, and the precise [d] respect in which he’s saying that the thing is the same or different. But when someone makes that which is the same appear different in just any old way, or vice versa, or when he makes what’s large appear small or something that’s similar appear dissimilar—well, if someone enjoys constantly trotting out contraries like that in discussion, that’s not true refutation. It’s only the obvious new-born brain-child of someone who just came into contact with
those which are
.
²⁵