Confronting the Colonies (33 page)

A second, albeit very different, example of the use of intelligence assessments by policy practitioners relates to the ‘Palace Coup'. Qaboos overthrew his repressive father Sa'id in a near-bloodless coup on 23 July 1970. British connivance has long been suspected in academic literature and memoirs alike, but has lacked empirical evidence. For example, Thomas Mockaitis points to ‘considerable indirect evidence [which] suggests the British actively participated in the plot and perhaps even instigated it', not least because within hours of the coup an SAS information team had produced a new counterinsurgency strategy. Meanwhile, Calvin Allen and W. Lynn Rigsbee claim that Hugh Oldman, the Omani defence secretary, and senior SAF officers coordinated the coup. However, no British officers directly participated.
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It has recently become apparent that certain British officials were aware of the coup in advance. They even held contingency plans involving the use of SAF to ensure that Qaboos assumed power.
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Although much remains classified, archival evidence tantalisingly hints at a JIC hand in British planning. The committee's intelligence assessments provided the intelligence justification for the necessity of the coup, thereby helping to legitimise British involvement in narrow terms of securing Whitehall interests.

Owing to an administrative error, two highly secret FCO files were mistakenly (and temporarily) declassified in 2005. Inside these files, papers confirmed that senior FCO officials knew of the coup in advance. Illustrating Whitehall awareness of local planning, Antony Acland, of the FCO Arabian Department (and future JIC chair), wrote of two contingency plans devised by Hugh Oldman. These plans firstly instructed SAF to switch allegiance to Qaboos if the coup were successful. Secondly, and more strikingly, they instructed SAF to use force to ensure the coup succeeded if it appeared to be failing.
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Meanwhile another local British official, Stewart Crawford (soon-to-be JIC chairman), also wrote back to London. He suspiciously assured the FCO that ‘we would
of course maintain the public position that we had no fore-knowledge' and that the coup should be ‘presented as an internal matter with the British hand concealed or at least deniable'.
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Further evidence comes from John Graham, then commander of the SAF, who has since revealed that the British government approved the potential SAF action.
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Whilst neither of the contingency plans mentioned by Acland were ultimately required, the re-classified files reveal that the British had prior knowledge of the coup and were prepared to take military measures if necessary to ensure the desired outcome.

There is also a potential intelligence angle involving SIS. The documents place Hugh Oldman at the centre of the coup. Oldman, according to Clive Jones, had direct contact with SIS.
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Likewise, Tim Landon, an intelligence officer in Oman involved in the coup, also had links with SIS. Landon was a mysterious figure who had been friends with Qaboos since their time together at Sandhurst. He went on to amass a £200 million fortune in the Gulf. Landon had previously been trained by SIS in London and was ‘deeply involved with British intelligence'.
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Connections, therefore, existed between British officials on the ground, British nationals working for SAF and senior British officials in Whitehall departments and agencies. What remains unclear, however, is the level to which the coup was instigated from below and sanctioned by London, or was instigated at the request of senior Whitehall officials.

Intriguingly, exactly one week before the coup the JIC issued the following intelligence note: ‘A further risk lies in the possibility of a coup against the Sultan or in his assassination which, unless his son Qabus could take power almost at once, could lead to a situation of anarchy and the disintegration of the Sultanate. Such a move against the Sultan could occur at any time'.
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This has clear echoes of FCO and local planning to ensure that Qaboos was installed swiftly following any coup.

British officials in London expressed increasing frustration about the lack of progress in Dhofar. For example, the FCO Arabian Department expressed frustration to the JIC at Sultan Sa'id's ‘inexcusable' lack of logistic support for SAF.
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As the security situation deteriorated, it was realised that Sa'id was ‘an obstacle to victory in Dhofar, and therefore the overall plan to withdraw forces from the region'.
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This was a strong motivation for a change in political leadership. From an intelligence perspective assessing the security situation and future ramifications for British interests, the JIC also strongly emphasised the need for political change in the months prior to the July coup.

In April 1970, just three months before the coup and with the counter-insurgency campaign floundering, the committee issued a highly critical assessment of Sa'id. In frustrated tones, the JIC lamented that ‘the offer of material inducements to the tribesmen, in combination with a relaxation of the most irksome restrictions, would do something to improve the situation […] but the Sultan's approach to such suggestions is negative, and there is no sign at present of any change in this attitude'. Criticising the prevailing stalemate, the committee repeated that more ‘effective political measures designed to win over the Dhofaris' were necessary, but later again bemoaned how the Sultan remained reluctant to offer inducements and civil development.
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The JIC also criticised Sultan Sa'id personally. They described him as inaccessible and austere. Lashing out, the committee attacked his ‘innate conservatism, his extreme reluctance to spend money and his failure to create adequate administrative machinery (in the country as a whole), combined with his lack of imagination and total unwillingness to acknowledge that opposition may have a justifiable cause'. These personal flaws were, according to the JIC, ‘powerful obstacles' to the implementation of political reform and development. In the same report, the committee praised Qaboos as having ‘potentially a greater appeal for Dhofaris than the Sultan himself'. The JIC went on to argue that ‘if the Sultan were ever to decide to delegate authority in Dhofar to Qabus, this might considerably affect the attitude of the Dhofaris, but this prospect is at present remote'.
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The scathing criticisms quoted above were followed by four suspiciously redacted paragraphs, one of which certainly discussed potential future leadership issues. Commenting on JIC speculation about the death of Sa'id, however, Stewart Crawford and the Joint Intelligence Staff (Gulf) countered that ‘we are not sure that the Sultan's death would necessarily change the situation radically. Qabus might be assassinated together with his father, in which case the change would certainly be radical. On the other hand it may be doubted whether the Dhofari rebels, having tasted comparative success and with active encouragement and assistance from the PRSY, would abandon their separatist aims even with Qabus in the saddle'.
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Interestingly, this suggests some local doubt that the accession of Qaboos would have provided a magic bullet. However, the JIC certainly felt SAF stood a better chance of victory with Sa'id deposed.

In sum, the logic of the JIC's intelligence assessment progressed as follows. The committee highlighted the failures of Sa'id's policies. They strongly criticised Sa'id personally, before emphasising the dangers of the continuing military stalemate. The JIC then praised the virtues of Qaboos (in stark and notable contrast to the assessment of his father) and suggested the benefit of a change in leadership. Intelligence then acknowledged that voluntary abdication was unlikely, before ending on four suspiciously redacted paragraphs. That is not to say that the JIC instigated the coup, rather the committee's assessment could have been used to justify such action.

JIC conclusions are clearly echoed in FCO thinking. For example, Antony Acland wrote: ‘I believe that Qaboos is likely to be a much better bet than the present Sultan, especially as he may well rely heavily, at least in the initial stages of his reign, on HMG's support, encouragement and advice. If so, this will place us in a good position not only to protect our specific interests in the Sultanate, i.e. Masirah and oil, but also to bring about an improvement in general stability'. Acland has further stated that the coup ‘was desirable',
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again expressing similar views to those put forth in the JIC report.

The formerly secret records demonstrate that JIC papers did reach, draw reaction from and were used by the FCO Arabian Department. For example, an FCO background paper circulated in February 1970 acknowledged the JIC assessment (which at this time was still in the draft stage) and warned that ‘the Dhofar insurrection has now reached the proportions of a serious threat and it appears unlikely that the Sultan will be able to overcome the insurrection whilst he continues to pursue his present twin policies of refusing to allocate adequate funds to his armed forces and also refusing to take steps designed to win the local population over to his side'. When discussing future developments, the FCO stated that ‘if the Sultan does not alter his policies soon but remains in power, the outlook is extremely gloomy'. Citing the JIC, it further argued that ‘if the Sultan continues to pursue his present policies he will be unable to win the war in Dhofar'.
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JIC conclusions were thus used to justify and, drawing on the committee's interdepartmental nature, perhaps legitimise FCO assessments. The FCO, however, went further than the JIC. It warned that ‘it seems very possible that unless there is a dramatic change in the Sultan's policies development, administrations, and his armed forces, the government
of the Sultanate will, in a few years, have been overthrown and replaced by a “revolutionary” left wing regime. It is unlikely that such a regime would be well-disposed towards HMG…' This, according to the FCO, could spread throughout the ‘weak shaikhly regimes of the Lower Gulf and it might easily set off a chain reaction of similar revolutions which could extend as far as Bahrain, Kuwait, or even Saudi Arabia'.
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Such doom mongering, based initially on a JIC conclusion but venturing beyond the committee's more limited outlook that ‘the situation could deteriorate further',
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precipitated action.

Axiomatically, conclusions shared by the JIC and the FCO do not necessarily indicate JIC foreknowledge of, or any role in, the July coup. Given the available evidence, however, there is logic in the argument that intelligence assessments emphasised the importance of installing Qaboos swiftly from a security perspective and/or helped provide a legitimate, interdepartmental and consensus-based justification of FCO thinking. After all, as former CIA analyst Paul Pillar notes, ‘intelligence adds authority to any case for a policy'.
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However the existence of interdepartmental consensus could be debated given the FCO dominance within the Assessments Staff at the time and the backing given to the Assessments Staff by the permanent under secretary at the FCO, Denis Greenhill (himself a former JIC chair). This raises potential accusations of FCO use of the perceived objective, interdepartmental and consensus-based nature of the JIC to acquire a badge of credibility and justify FCO designs. Alternatively, as Michael Herman has noted, ‘arguably the British system legitimises a consensus around FCO views'.
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Here it is again apparent that the JIC did not operate in a political vacuum.

Important questions still remain about the overthrow of Sa'id. To what extent was London merely reacting to inevitable events? What was the level of input from London compared to that of local British actors? As far as the JIC was concerned, the extent of the committee's knowledge remains unclear—but it is now known that in the case of a coup, the JIC (like the FCO) wanted Qaboos installed as quickly as possible. Whilst the JIC deemed a coup desirable, there is no evidence that members were aware of the specifics and the JIG (Gulf) seemed to have been taken by surprise when it actually happened.
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It appears instead that the FCO may well have used the JIC assessment to help justify their planning of, or for, the succession of Qaboos, however active or reactive that planning may have been. Speaking to the BBC forty years after the
event, Acland reminisced that ‘we hoped it [the coup] would go well, and in the end it didn't go badly'.
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The JIC, too, reflected warmly on the coup. Eighteen months afterwards, the committee issued a report echoing its earlier criticism of Sa'id before praising Qaboos for allowing a change of counterinsurgency tactics and for embarking upon a ‘substantial building programme' for health, education and infrastructure. Vindicating the coup, the committee concluded that ‘the general situation in Oman has therefore greatly improved'.
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It was fair to assess that the counterinsurgency efforts under Qaboos were an improvement compared to those of his father. But his accession by no means signalled the end of the violence. Whilst he reversed many of Sa'id's repressive policies, it was not until the summer of 1973 that the rebels launched their last major offensive action and Lord Carrington was informed that the rebels had lost the initiative.
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Despite Qaboos's accession, there was clearly a long way to go and, as has been discussed elsewhere in this chapter, this episode did not signal the end of the JIC's interest in Oman.

Despite its close links with London regarding defence and security policy, Oman was not a British colony. The context of counterinsurgency had changed. Firstly, independence could no longer be promised as a political tool. Secondly, the use of British force played an important but more limited role. Thirdly, host states replaced colonial territories. As part of the transition from colonial to post-imperial and modern counterinsurgency,
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the Dhofar rebellion provides an interesting case study to demonstrate the JIC's evolution from its role in the earlier colonial counterinsurgencies—and from which to explore broader issues of strategic intelligence in contemporary counterinsurgency.