Confronting the Colonies (29 page)

The essence of the committee continued upon the civilian trajectory begun in 1957, albeit now with more of a Foreign Office twist. Not only did the Foreign Office enjoy chairmanship and an extra representative on the committee itself, but the chief of the Assessments Staff and various chairs of the Current Intelligence Groups were seconded diplomats. Although seconded, these young and ambitious diplomatic high-flyers would likely have been loyal to Foreign Office interests, with which their careers ultimately lay. One of the early chiefs of the Assessments Staff was Percy Cradock, who served during the first half of the 1970s. Since his death, the influential Cradock has been described as a ‘Foreign Office mandarin of modern times'. Of razor sharp intellect and often acerbic in his judgements, Cradock went on to become a foreign policy advisor to Margaret Thatcher and a chair of the JIC under John Major.
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Cradock had replaced John Thomson as chief of the Assessments Staff. Like Cradock, Thomson was also a Foreign Office high flier. Both were figures to be reckoned with. Thomson was determined, ambitious and immensely able.
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Compared with 1948, a clear shift away from military dominance had taken place in the composition of the central intelligence machinery. It was quite a different body from the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency. The JIC now examined a broad range of matters—although the military did remain keen consumers.

The JIC's managerial function, particularly in terms of the domestic intelligence organisation, was not executed as strongly as was enshrined in the committee's charter. The committee was formally instructed to ‘give direction to, and to keep under review, the organisation and working of intelligence as a whole at home and overseas […as well as to] coordinate the activities of the United Kingdom joint intelligence organisations overseas'. According to one retired insider, however, a formal management function simply did not exist.
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Yet concerning management of the overseas intelligence structure, the JIC grew in confidence, even if ultimate authority remained wanting. Such aplomb was demonstrated
by the committee's attempts at increasingly direct intervention in colonial intelligence structures from Malaya to Aden. Unlike previous insurgencies, however, Oman was not a British colony.

Despite close links between the Sultanate and London, the ability of the JIC to intervene from Whitehall was limited by fears of neocolonialism and a lack of jurisdiction. Despite the imperial overtones of the counterinsurgency campaign, the fact that action operated under the rhetoric of official Omani sovereignty impeded London's ability to repeat past successes.
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This applied not only to imperial counter-insurgency tactics (which were not necessarily as ‘minimum force' as has since been mythologised), but also to the JIC's ability to intervene in a managerial capacity. The committee continued to exercise management and coordination of the regional British intelligence apparatus. However, its role in reforming Omani intelligence locally was more circumscribed than had been the case regarding internal Adeni affairs. As such, the manner in which the JIC dealt with Oman can perhaps be seen as part of a transition from imperial to post-imperial insurgencies. The JIC now no longer enjoys the managerial role it tried to fashion in the dying days of empire.

The insurgency in Oman coincided with British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. It therefore fell upon the JIC to oversee the regional apparatus during this transitional period, which included the running down of the Joint Intelligence Group, or JIG (Gulf) as well as the military command. Established in 1965 to better coordinate and disseminate intelligence to meet the rising threat of Iraqi and Egyptian subversion, the JIG (Gulf) was similar to overseas JICs but had a more limited geographical focus.
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Its demise impacted upon regional intelligence arrangements and required JIC intervention.

From May 1971, the JIC oversaw reforms and provided the necessary interdepartmental forum to oversee the transition. JIC members, however, considered such work a bureaucratic formal necessity and the Defence Intelligence Staff was left to handle the specifics.
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Illustrating the committee's managerial role however, the JIC did keep regional arrangements under regular review. There appears to have been a working party, perhaps housed within the Defence Intelligence Staff, designed
to consider the regional intelligence structure after Pax Britannica. The JIC issued a number of reports on this subject and it remained on the committee's agenda until the end of the year.
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Unfortunately, papers relating to the new intelligence structures remain classified, but one can broadly conclude that the JIC oversaw and coordinated the transition from London, although the level of JIC passivity is open to debate until the relevant papers are opened. In all likelihood the committee's role was similar to that during the Cypriot insurgency in the 1950s when it was used as an interdepartmental forum to oversee and coordinate without directly managing.

The committee also theoretically oversaw the withdrawal of the MI5 security liaison officer from the Gulf in early 1970. This episode once more illustrates the JIC's passivity regarding the activities of domestic agencies. After discussion with the FCO and the relevant officials, Martin Furnival-Jones, the director general of MI5, simply informed the JIC that the security liaison officer, who had been stationed in Bahrain since 1967, ‘was not fully occupied in the post'. He would therefore be withdrawn. Exercising its nominal management and oversight responsibility, the JIC then ‘invited the Security Service to proceed with the proposal to withdraw the [security liaison officer] from the Gulf'. This was largely a formality. The committee clearly only enjoyed an ostensible managerial role when it came to domestic agencies. The JIC, however, did warn that withdrawal of the officer ‘should not be interpreted as signifying that there was any ground for complacency about the security situation in the area'.
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These changes to the regional intelligence organisation impacted upon assessments of Oman, particularly regarding dissemination. The JIG (Gulf), for example, issued regular assessments on Dhofar to London. Specifically at the local level, however (and unlike in previous campaigns), the JIC lacked input in reforming the Omani intelligence apparatus. It offered very little advice from London. Upon accession, Sultan Qaboos initially made few changes to the Omani Intelligence Service and Malcolm Dennison, who had directed the bureau under Sultan Sa'id, remained in place following the coup.
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Reforms in 1972 revamped the service and included the appointment of a new director of intelligence,
the ‘no-nonsense' Ray Nightingale. The most prominent local reforms, however, occurred in 1974 when the Oman Intelligence Services became an independent structure (it was previously part of the Sultan's Land Forces) with the new title of Oman Research Department, signifying a move towards ‘Omanisation' and a change in priorities as the Dhofar war wound down.
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The JIC, however, had little hand in the reforms. The impetus had passed to British military actors and, unlike during previous insurgencies, the JIC neither created working parties to recommend reform nor sent a delegation to inspect the local intelligence structures. When not dealing with colonies, the JIC lost the mandate that it had gradually acquired since 1948.

One could argue that this was surprising for four reasons. Firstly, although not a colony, Oman was heavily dependent on British advice and support regarding defence and security. Secondly, as in Malaya, Cyprus and Aden, intelligence was weak and in need of reform. Intelligence coverage in Dhofar was poor and military operations were consequently based upon flawed information. Meanwhile, Sultan Sa'id remained obtuse and receptive only to information he wanted to hear.
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Thirdly, British personnel were involved in the Omani intelligence services. SIS ran the Omani Intelligence Service in much the same way that British officers directed SAF.
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Additionally, other British actors were directly involved in intelligence reform, including Defence Intelligence Staff personnel deployed directly from London and at least one senior MI5 officer. A security liaison officer was also present throughout 1969.
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Given the involvement of British intelligence personnel, one could argue that Omani local intelligence theoretically fell under the JIC's jurisdiction of overseeing the British intelligence organisation as a whole at home and overseas. Fourthly, the JIC had a growing tradition of reforming intelligence apparatuses to counter insurgencies where British forces were involved. This was particularly the case when intelligence was weak: a realisation that had hit the JIC by early 1970.
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Moreover, there was a growing trend of centralised Whitehall intervention within the realm of intelligence reform. Whilst intelligence reform was vital, it was left to British military actors predominantly operating locally, although there was some input from the Ministry of Defence. Such actors included the defence attaché, the SAS and the DIS in London.

The role of the defence attaché indicates a notable difference between local intelligence reform in Oman and Aden. Although the JIC initially
warned that the appointment of a defence attaché ‘might raise delicate local issues',
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the post was secured as regional intelligence structures were run down. Given Oman's non-colonial status, there was no Local Intelligence Committee with which the JIC could engage and, following the demise of the JIG(Gulf), the JIC lacked a means of input into reforming intelligence assessment mechanisms. In the absence of British local joint intelligence organisations, the defence attaché acquired an important role in linking the Omani intelligence structure with London, as well as in coordinating local intelligence by maintaining liaison with key regional figures.
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During previous insurgencies, the JIC had overseen appointments of key intelligence personnel. Such a role apparently evaporated regarding Oman. The JIC, for example, remained silent in the summer of 1974 during negotiations over reform to the Omani Intelligence Service. Instead the defence attaché, communicating with the chiefs of staff, resolved issues relating to the post of director general of Omani intelligence.
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In fact, the JIC had minimal interaction at all with local British figures, including the defence attaché.

The SAS was also directly involved in Omani intelligence reform. They held a remit covering both intelligence gathering and collation, particularly through the operation of firqat bands and subsequent interrogation of defectors. Although the SAS's task to set up an intelligence gathering organisation in Dhofar would have been beyond the JIC's interest in assessment and dissemination, SAS officers also recommended structural reforms. For example, it was suggested that the Sultan's intelligence officer needed to have an assistant. The SAS was also involved in setting out the intelligence requirements for Oman—traditionally an area of JIC responsibility when it came to colonies.
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Information on the SAS's intelligence role was passed to the JIC chairman and SAS intelligence updates were fed into the central intelligence machinery, but (unlike in Aden or Cyprus) the committee held no active management or oversight function. Demonstrating the shifting context, intelligence reform and requirements remained a predominantly military domain. It was military figures who were most active.

That is not to say there was no input from London. The centralised intelligence machine had grown accustomed to at least overseeing, if not intervening, in overseas intelligence reform since 1948. Given the military dimensions of the conflict and strong Ministry of Defence interest, the Defence Intelligence Staff took the lead in Oman. Throughout the
Dhofari conflict, the DIS, particularly DI4 (the DIS directorate responsible for the Middle East), held a lead role in intelligence assessments on the region and provided regular briefs for JIC meetings. DIS officials, for example, briefed the new commander of Dhofar in June 1974 before he took up his position.
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Regarding intelligence reform, a DIS officer, Lieutenant Colonel Southwood, was deployed in Oman in November 1973 accompanied by a senior MI5 officer, Mr Lawrence. Responsible to the deputy chief of the defence staff (intelligence), they formed an intelligence team and advised on the organisation and deployment of the Oman Intelligence Service. The defence attaché noted this visit as ‘essential', and it was swiftly followed by a four-day visit from a DI4 colonel further covering intelligence matters. In addition, another team from the Defence Intelligence Staff visited Oman in December 1973 to discuss the use of British intelligence personnel.
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Tellingly they travelled on the authority of the chiefs of staff and not the JIC. This contrasts earlier experiences when the JIC chairman visited the theatre himself, accompanied by the director of military intelligence (in the case of Cyprus) and by the colonial secretary (to Aden).

Lack of JIC activity can be put down to three factors. Firstly, following the demise of the JIG (Gulf), the JIC lacked a mandate to intervene in the regional intelligence structures. Secondly, because Oman was not a colony, there was no colonial administrative organisation with which the JIC was able to engage. Responsible for local joint intelligence organisations, the JIC lacked a mandate to intervene in a foreign state that did not have a Local Intelligence Committee or any other British intelligence organisation. Thirdly, as a result of Ministry of Defence interest in Oman, intelligence reform fell within the military's jurisdiction. Without the involvement of the now defunct Colonial Office, there was less of an interdepartmental remit and need for interdepartmental coordination of local intelligence reforms. Moreover, the Defence Intelligence Staff, backed by senior military figures, perhaps had more authority than the JIC to implement intelligence reforms effectively, particularly given the limitations of the JIC's supposed managerial role. The broader context of other more immediate defence commitments also perhaps explains the assertive confidence of military intelligence in Oman. In Northern Ireland in 1972, military intelligence had also undertaken a lead role.
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Perhaps military intelligence was going through a particularly assertive phase in the early 1970s and dominated
Omani intelligence reform accordingly, sidelining the JIC in the process. It is not, however, possible to prove a direct link.