Dark Forces: The Truth About What Happened in Benghazi (54 page)

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When it reopened in late 2011, the embassy had three Mobile Security Deployment teams, each with six combat-trained security officers, to supplement the roughly seventeen Diplomatic Security officers that were posted to Libya. These numbers were gradually reduced by the time the SST arrived.

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The CIA has denied my Freedom of Information Act request to get that PowerPoint released.

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Some of Wood’s men flew back to Germany, the home of the C-110 counter-terrorism force, and then returned to Libya under Title 10 status to train the Libyan counterterrorism proxy force. Their presence in Tripoli and their actions on the night of September 11 have been widely misunderstood.

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Even foreign journalists found a copy of the REACT plan, along with Ambassador Stevens’ schedule, in the charred ruins of the VIP villa weeks after the attack.

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The Turkish consul general in Benghazi at the peak of the civil war in the spring of 2011 was career diplomat Ali Davudoglu.

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For example, after their deadly encounter with militants on board the
Marvi
Marmara
, the Gaza flotilla ship, the Israelis learned that the Turkish government had trained IHH volunteers in military assault tactics so they could inflict maximum casualties on Israeli commandos.

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The owners of the compound had a separate gate at the far end giving direct access to the Fourth Ring Road. This gate (referred to as the “C3 gate” in the ARB report), just wide enough for a single vehicle, was secured by a full-height metal gate. Just inside the gate, two of the SMC’s armored Toyota Land Cruisers were parked as obstacles.

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As Hicks testified on May 8, 2013, he hadn’t recognized the number because Stevens was using DS agent Scott Wickland’s cell phone. Hicks’ statement in the following account is taken from his congressional testimony.