Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (107 page)

One person who almost lost out at the time was Deng Liqun, whom intellectuals blamed for the campaign against spiritual pollution (although some acknowledged that Deng Xiaoping was ultimately responsible). Shortly after the National Party Representatives Conference, Deng Xiaoping approved a notice, distributed on September 28, 1985, announcing that Deng Liqun would no longer head the Research Office of the party Secretariat. The assumption among politically astute intellectuals was that he was being held responsible for the unpopular political campaign. Ordinarily, it was expected that the Politburo Standing Committee members would have been notified before such a move; in this case they were not.
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But within half an hour after the notice was distributed, it was rescinded, presumably by Chen Yun. In fact, it would be two years before Deng Liqun's Research Office was finally abolished; meanwhile, Deng Liqun remained in office.

Political Reform, 1986–1987

On June 10, 1986, at a meeting with Zhao Ziyang, Yu Qiuli, Wan Li, and others, Deng spoke of three major issues to deal with: agriculture, foreign currency, and political reform. It was the first time he had talked of political reform since 1980. Deng said, “Early in 1980 it was suggested that we reform the political structure, but no concrete measures to do so were worked out. Now it is time for us to place political reform on the agenda. Otherwise, organizational overlapping, overstaffing, bureaucratism, sluggishness, endless disputes over trifles, and the repossession of powers devolved to lower levels will retard economic restructuring and economic growth.” He added that the number of official organizations and personnel had to be reduced so as to decrease the heavy burdens on the state budget.
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At last, the time seemed right. The
Bashanlun
conference of 1985 had
marked the end of the basic study of economic system reform, and some changes in the political system were needed to mesh with the new economic system. In 1980, Deng and his fellow officials had been worried about the risk of demonstrations like those sweeping Eastern Europe. In 1986, they were worried about the new wave of democratic demonstrations in Asian countries following the “people power” movement that had driven out President Marcos earlier that year and had led Chiang Ching-kuo to announce, three months prior to Deng's meeting in June, that he was undertaking a study of political reform. Was it not wise to show the public, at home and abroad, that the mainland was just as open as Taiwan?

In dealing with protests, Deng, like other Chinese Communist leaders, tried to maintain tight control while alleviating the cause of the complaints. As news of demonstrations spread abroad, Deng continued to explain to the Chinese public that the socialist system of public ownership was superior to bourgeois democracy; he pointed to the capitalists' exploitation of workers and to the difficulties of making timely decisions in countries where there was a separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. But Deng also was determined to stay ahead of the popular movements by introducing timely political reform. He therefore directed that China undertake serious study of political systems to determine which systems endure for the long term, which systems collapse, and why.

It was logical to select as head of the study group for political system reform a person who would have a major role in implementing future political reform. If Hu Yaobang were to be Deng's successor, he would have been the logical choice to lead the study group, but by May 1986 Deng had already told Hu Yaobang that he would step down as chairman of the CMC after the 13th Party Congress, to be held in the fall of 1987. When Hu Yaobang responded as expected, saying he would step down as general secretary, Deng told Hu he could continue working, but in a lesser role. Deng explained that it was too early to determine whether Hu might become chairman of the CMC or chairman of the state.
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By then, Zhao Ziyang had already been assigned overall responsibility for preparing the documents for the 13th Party Congress; many anticipated that there was a good chance that during the congress he would become the top leader for the daily work of the party. In September 1986, when Deng gave Zhao the responsibility to study political reform, the assumption was that he might well be given responsibility to implement it in the future. The selection of Zhao was also appropriate because with his think tanks he had already
managed research into various economic systems. Zhao's experience in guiding the study of economic reform made it appropriate for him to consider the political reforms needed to gear in with the economic changes.

On June 28, 1986, at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, Deng directed that in preparation for the 13th Party Congress to be held a year later, the party Secretariat should draw up a plan for a year-long study of political system reform and then suggest a program for action. “Without political reform,” he cautioned, “economic reform cannot succeed.”
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His staff was to prepare initial drafts of documents by July 1987 to be discussed at the Seventh Plenum that would meet in August or September; that way, the final draft could be announced at the 13th Party Congress.
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In setting the stage for the study of political reform, Deng stressed the desirability of separating the functions of the party from those of the government, an idea that he had supported as early as 1941.
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Indeed, the overlapping system in place had emerged by the 1950s as a way of dealing with the reality that some high government officials who remained after the Communist takeover were not members of the party: in essence, a Communist Party unit had been established in each major government unit to ensure party control. By the 1980s, however, virtually all government officials in important positions were party members, so many felt it was no longer necessary to have party supervision. Moreover, many observed that the extra layer of party supervision made it virtually impossible for the heads of a ministry or province to coordinate in a responsive, flexible way the activities of their respective units. Clearly it was time to streamline the political system.
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In mid-September 1986, then, at Deng's direction, Zhao Ziyang set up the Central Committee Small Group on Political System Reform
(Zhongyang zhengzhi tizhi gaige yantao xiaozu)
, with Hu Qili, Tian Jiyun, Bo Yibo, and Peng Chong as members. The group was given a staff and an office named the Political Reform Office, and Zhao wrote a letter to Politburo Standing Committee members Deng, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and Hu Yaobang with a proposed list of members. In his letter, in accordance with Deng's directives, Zhao laid out the goals of political reform: to contribute to modernization and long-term stability. Bao Tong, who had proved to be an able assistant ever since 1980 when he had been assigned by the Organization Department to work for Zhao, was named head of the office.
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Although Deng had presented a relatively narrow focus for what he wanted from political reform, he gave Zhao Ziyang a broad mandate to study different political systems and to listen to diverse groups of experts within China.
Wu Guoguang, a former
People's Daily
writer who became one of the staff members in the group and later wrote his Ph.D. thesis at Princeton on the political reform efforts in China in 1986–1987, has noted the differences of emphasis between Deng's and Zhao's views of political reform. Deng wanted to achieve efficient administration with highly motivated staff members, whereas Zhao was willing to consider a broader reduction in the party's role in economic and social units. Yet even Deng's narrower focus required that those studying political reform consider ways to raise the morale of staff members, and as the members of the group explored this issue, they inevitably considered mechanisms to ensure that underlings could express their views.
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Between November 1986 and April 1987 the group organized over thirty symposia with various officials and experts.
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Although the final draft of its report required approval by Deng, Zhao Ziyang and Bao Tong could select the specialists to participate in the meetings. They chose experts who were knowledgeable about political reform in the Eastern European countries, Western political history, and the Chinese political structure before and after 1949. The group examined the role of the party, the government, and the National People's Congress (NPC), and heard the views of local officials dealing with various issues in their localities. The group cabled Chinese embassies around the world to collect information on other political systems. And the New China News Agency (Xinhua) and various Communist organizations in Hong Kong assisted in collecting information on political practices throughout the world. Although many foreign experts earlier had been invited to discuss economic system reform, none were asked to discuss the sensitive issue of political reform.

Among the speakers at the symposia, there were differing visions of what “political reform” might entail. The term naturally attracted hopeful intellectuals and students, who followed Deng's call to review broad issues about political systems. Even if they took care to reiterate Deng's emphasis on efficiency, intellectuals like Yan Jiaqi, head of the Institute of Political Science at CASS, raised questions far beyond efficient administration. Bao Tong was careful to quote Deng when he made public statements in order to show he was acting within his mandate, but it became clear that both Bao Tong and Zhao Ziyang believed strongly that the party should withdraw from its close supervision of government, businesses, and academic institutions. In fact, they argued, by doing so the party could exert even stronger overall leadership.
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Just as the government could guide the economy indirectly by macroeconomic
controls, so the party could withdraw from daily administration and still provide overall guidance.

In January 1987, after the student demonstrations were curtailed, Hu Yaobang fell, and the campaign against bourgeois liberalization began, Beijing's political atmosphere turned more conservative. Zhao responded to the chill in the air by inviting Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun to the meetings of the Small Group on Political System Reform, thus ensuring that the orthodox senior members would have their views well represented in the discussions.
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The new atmosphere constrained but did not stop the discussions on political reform. On February 4, 1987, Zhao Ziyang proposed expanding the independent role of trade unions to give them more leeway in representing the interests of workers. Even Bo Yibo, who remembered the period before and immediately after 1949 when labor unions had been encouraged to assume more power in order to restrain capitalist trends, could foresee a future in which the party would turn again to independent unions to constrain entrepreneurs in the new free market economy. Researchers also discussed the possibility of encouraging the NPC to change from a body that issued rubber stamps to one that held meaningful discussions representing different views.
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In his talk with President Paul Biya of Cameroon in March 1987, Deng said a political system was sound if it contributed to political stability, national unity, and higher living standards, and continued development of the productive forces.
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There was no mention of expanding freedoms or seeking to hear the voices of the public. Yet when he met Zhao Ziyang on April 28, 1987, Deng made it clear that despite the ongoing attack on bourgeois liberalization, he wanted to continue considering political reforms. Zhao, concerned about the tighter political atmosphere, requested that Deng permit the reprinting of Deng's speech from August 1980, which showed his support for political reform, and Deng agreed.

When he read Zhao's semi-final draft of his political report for the forthcoming party congress, Deng was more specific in rejecting the broader demands for freedom as advocated by intellectuals: “The main goal of our reform is to guarantee the efficiency of the executive organs without too many other interferences. . . . Do not yield to the feelings for democracy. . . . Democracy is only a means [to an end]. Democracy should be talked about in connection with legality. Only through the law will we have a stable environment.”
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The heady hopes of many intellectuals in late 1986 that they could make a real breakthrough in changing the political system were not to be realized
in 1987. After reviewing Deng's comments, Zhao gave a speech on May 13 on plans for the 13th Party Congress. His remarks signaled the end of the campaign against bourgeois liberalization and made it clear that the party congress would include a proposal for political reform. But at least for the time being, political reform did not include steps to expand democratic practices.

The Student Movement and the Fall of Hu Yaobang

In the spring of 1986, Chinese television footage of the “people power” demonstrations in the Philippines that drove the corrupt President Marcos and his wife Imelda from office and ignited student demonstrations all over East Asia was fueling student protests in China as well. In early 1980 there were 3.5 million television sets in China, but by the beginning of 1985, with the explosion of television production, there were already over 40 million.
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In 1986 Chinese TV viewers were aware of developments both within and outside China, including the news that in Taiwan in September 1986 Chiang Ching-kuo had allowed the legal existence of an opposition party. The effect of the foreign student movements and Taiwan elections was electric: Chinese students began calling for “people power” and for Western-style democracy.