Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (108 page)

The 1986 demonstrations were the first large student demonstrations in China since April 1976, when students had taken to the streets to honor Zhou Enlai and support Deng Xiaoping. On May 29, 1987, some weeks after these Chinese student demonstrations subsided, Zhao Ziyang explained to Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong that when China opened up, its students, who had had no previous contact with the outside world, could not judge what was good or bad. When they saw that the United States and Japan were more advanced, some came to the wrong conclusion, advocating total Westernization for China, without understanding that this was not possible in China where conditions were so different. Zhao admitted that it was not surprising some students had come to this conclusion, because the socialist system before 1978 did have its failures. But Zhao blamed the loosening of party controls for the demonstrations.
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He did not mention the name of the official who was considered responsible for this loosening: Hu Yaobang.

Throughout the twentieth century most Chinese student movements had begun in Beijing; in 1986, however, it began in universities in Anhui's capital, Hefei, and nearby Nanjing and Shanghai—that is, wherever the internationally
famous astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, vice president of the University of Science and Technology in Hefei, spoke. Fang was a dynamic, powerful speaker who energized the crowds wherever he appeared with his radical message. For example, at Tongji University in Shanghai on November 18, 1986, Fang Lizhi said, “Not a single socialist country has succeeded since the end of World War II.” He continued, stating that the current Chinese government was a modern form of feudalism. He described to the audiences how European scientists in the Middle Ages had courageously broken loose from the bounds of dogmatic traditions; he ridiculed Mao for praising the wisdom of the uneducated; and he berated Hu Qiaomu, saying Hu's comments would be welcome if he understood astrophysics, otherwise he should refrain from speaking out. At a public meeting in Anhui, former Anhui party secretary Wan Li, one of the most liberal of the top leaders, tried to curb Fang Lizhi, saying he had already granted Fang Lizhi enough democracy. But Fang Lizhi fired back that Wan Li had not been chosen to be vice premier by the people, so he had no right to decide how much democracy to allow.

It would have been easy for the party to crack down early on Fang Lizhi had he been an ordinary intellectual. But Fang was a brilliant scientist who had become an exemplar of the kind of intellectual China was attempting to cultivate. Fang had entered the physics department of Peking University at age sixteen and became the youngest full professor in China. In late summer 1986 he had just returned from spending several months as a scholar at the Princeton Institute of Advanced Studies. Everywhere Fang Lizhi appeared, he attracted enthusiastic followers. It was not yet the era of the Internet, but listeners sent tapes and transcripts of his speeches to friends elsewhere. On December 4, 1986, after a speech at the University of Science and Technology, student demonstrations exploded in number and scale.

In a session Hu Yaobang chaired of the party Secretariat on December 8, Hu made an effort to mollify the students, admitting that conditions in the universities needed improvement—an admission that conservatives later criticized as being too soft on the demonstrators. The next day, on the anniversary of the December 9, 1935, patriotic student demonstrations, students took to the streets in Wuhan, Xi'an, and Hefei. When coverage of the demonstrations was blocked on Chinese television, students listened avidly to Voice of America and the BBC, which broadcast the news.

When launching his four modernizations, Deng had warned that some would get rich first, but in the view of most students, the people getting rich first were the least deserving—greedy individual entrepreneurs and corrupt
officials—not the morally upright government employees working in the national interest after years of hard study. Students often lived in poor conditions, crowded eight to a small room. Able students who had sacrificed for years to be among the very small percentage to pass the examinations to enter good schools were outraged that the children of high officials received better opportunities and lived in a grander style because of their connections.
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Furthermore, university graduates were then not yet free to choose jobs; they were assigned jobs by the state based in part on reports compiled by the political guides who lived with the students. Many students felt they had no choice but to ingratiate themselves to these political guides, who often appeared to them to be arbitrary, arrogant, and poorly educated.
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After Fang Lizhi lit the spark to rouse students, demonstrations spread to Beijing and some 150 other cities. Local leaders were held responsible for keeping the movement under control. On December 18, when demonstrations expanded in Shanghai, Mayor Jiang Zemin appeared before a mass audience. As he began speaking, some students heckled him and others remained inattentive, so he stopped speaking and asked some of them to come up to podium to express their views. After a number of students responded, Jiang said that the students did not fully understand the differences between the West and China and what they had heard about democracy came only from translations. They should learn more about democracy directly from the sources. He then proceeded to recite by memory the Gettysburg Address in English, a feat that impressed many of the students. Over the next few days, as students busied themselves with examinations and the Shanghai municipal authorities decreed that all public demonstrations required permits, the student demonstrations in Shanghai tapered off without incident.
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Jiang Zemin won high marks from top leaders in Beijing, who admired his ability to end the demonstrations without conflict.

On December 27, Deng Liqun, Wang Zhen, Hu Qiaomu, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, Yu Qiuli, and Yang Shangkun were summoned to Deng's home to report on the student movement. The situation, they reported, was very serious.
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For Deng and other party elders who believed that Hu Yaobang had serious weaknesses, his inability to control the student movement was the last straw. In Deng's view, it was best to act immediately, both on the student movement and on Hu Yaobang's leadership. Deng had not waited until the 12th Party Congress to push aside Hua Guofeng, and now he chose not to wait until the 13th Party Congress to push aside Hu Yaobang.

Deng was aware that pushing Hu aside would create problems because of Hu's widespread public support. His dismissal would raise questions about
Deng's wisdom in originally choosing Hu, just as Mao's split with Lin Biao had caused some to doubt Mao's judgment for trusting Lin Biao so deeply in the first place. Deng also knew that no one could surpass Hu in his dedication to reform and in his ability to inspire enthusiastic supporters among intellectuals and local officials. Deng had been considering removing Hu Yaobang at least since May 1986 when he had asked Deng Liqun his views on Hu and Zhao Ziyang. What Deng could not foresee, however, was the turmoil that Hu's dismissal would cause after Hu's death just two years later.

On December 30, 1986, Deng summoned Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, Hu Qili, Li Peng, and others and announced to them that it was necessary to end the permissiveness toward the student movement. He told them, “When a disturbance breaks out in a place, it is because the leaders there didn't take a firm clear-cut stand. . . . It is essential to adhere firmly to the Four Cardinal Principles; otherwise bourgeois liberalization will spread unchecked.” Hu Yaobang, aware that he was being held responsible for this lack of a “clear-cut stand,” knew that it was time to submit his resignation.

Deng went on to criticize Fang Lizhi:

I have just read Fang Lizhi's speeches. He doesn't sound like a Communist Party member at all. He should be expelled. . . . In developing our democracy . . . we cannot simply copy bourgeois democracy. . . . People in power in the United States . . . actually have three governments . . . the people in the three governments often pull in different directions, and that makes trouble. We cannot have such a system. . . . The struggle against bourgeois liberalization will last for at least 20 years. Democracy can develop only gradually, and we cannot copy Western systems. Bourgeois liberalization means rejection of the Party's leadership; there would be no center around which to unite our one billion people.
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On January 1, 1987, a
People's Daily
editorial stressed the importance of the four cardinal principles and attacked bourgeois liberalization, thus preparing the public for the criticism of Hu Yaobang for failures on both counts. The next day, on January 2, Hu Yaobang formally submitted his resignation as general secretary. Deng Xiaoping contacted Zhao Ziyang, Bo Yibo, Yang Shangkun, Wan Li, and Hu Qili, all senior leaders, and they agreed to accept his resignation. Deng then named them to a committee that would lead planning for the 13th Party Congress and told them to organize immediately “party life meetings” (in effect, closed-door struggle sessions) for January 8,
before Hu Yaobang was to be criticized openly.
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Supporters of Hu Yaobang later complained that using “party life meetings” to criticize Hu violated regular party procedures because the dismissal of such a high-level person required approval first by the Politburo, then by a plenum of the Central Committee, and finally by a party congress. Deng chose instead to let the “party life meetings” build the case against Hu before presenting it to an enlarged meeting of the Politburo.

From 1982 to 1986 the first document of each year (Document No. 1) from the party Secretariat was devoted to agriculture, but the Document No. 1 released on January 6, 1987, to all party members instead summarized the key points in Deng Xiaoping's directives on the student demonstrations. Deng said the struggle against bourgeois liberalization was critical to the future of the country and that people must take a firm stand. Those who refused to respond to “education” would be dealt with severely.
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Within days, the demonstrations came to a halt, with no reports of any deaths.
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On January 6, Deng also met with Hu Yaobang to break the news that “party life meetings” were being held to criticize him. In organizing the meetings, Deng had directed party officials to use “soft treatment.”
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The case against Hu Yaobang, Deng said, was not so serious as to warrant characterizing it as a struggle between two lines of thought or as an attack on factionalism, and the meetings should not be an occasion for personal vilification.
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Yet, given Hu Yaobang's widespread following among high-level liberal party officials, local officials, and intellectuals, Deng believed that to counter Hu's considerable influence a detailed, well-documented case needed to be presented. Hu's most persistent critic, Deng Liqun, was asked to prepare a detailed criticism. Meanwhile, Zhao Ziyang met with Hu Yaobang to tell him that he would be allowed to remain on the Politburo, but he should be mentally prepared for the criticism session that would begin the next day. Zhao also advised Hu that if student demonstrations were to continue, he should take a strong public stance against them.
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From January 10 to January 15, some twenty to thirty top party officials, with Bo Yibo as chair, criticized Hu Yaobang in the “party life meetings” that Deng had called. Neither Deng or Chen Yun, too senior to engage in the fray, took part, and Li Xiannian, who disapproved of the removal of Hu Yaobang, absented himself by staying in Shanghai. Some said that if Marshal Ye had not died (on October 22, 1986), he would have protected Hu Yaobang and never have allowed such criticism sessions to take place.

At the opening session, Hu Yaobang presented his self-criticism. He acknowledged his responsibility in failing to follow Deng's directions to stop
the student demonstrations. “Since November 1986 Deng three times passed on directions . . . about the student disturbances which were the biggest in ten years.” In addition, aware of the specific issues for which he would be criticized, Hu Yaobang gave a serious response to each, admitting his errors, but also trying to defend himself:

• Concerning his failure to uphold the four cardinal principles: “I did speak out some and did grasp some matters, but I failed to seriously grasp the basic principles.”

• On bourgeois liberalization: “I didn't believe the problem was so serious and I felt that if I did my work well, the problem would take care of itself.”

• Regarding spiritual pollution: “After Comrade Xiaoping spoke out, I did not take correct steps in a timely fashion to stop some incorrect thinking and behavior.”

• On preparing officials to be successors: “The party center and especially several old revolutionaries have repeatedly asked me to prepare the successor generation, to promote boldly those with virtue, ability, and experience. I have firmly supported this. In promoting and assigning officials, for decades I have never made myself the center. We have always gone through collective discussions. I have not chosen people with personal connections to me or supported small circles . . . but I still made some mistakes.”

• On meeting with foreigners: “One must be especially prudent. Some branches responsible for receiving foreign guests asked me to see Lu Keng. I did not refuse. That was an error. In talking with him . . . I did not firmly enough refute some things he said.”