Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (116 page)

Deng Readies a New Leadership Structure

Even before martial law was imposed on May 20, Deng was busy considering the new leadership structure that would be announced to the public immediately after order was restored. Deng first took time to reaffirm the decisions of the 13th Party Congress, convened in 1987, before announcing the dismissal of Zhao, for he wanted to make clear to the public that decisions introduced by Zhao would continue: markets would not only remain open but would be expanded. Projects then being carried out by foreign companies, even the large controversial project planned for Yangpu in Hainan (led by the Japanese trading company Kumagaigumi), would continue. It was also announced that there would be a vigorous effort to deal with the problem of official corruption.
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In his effort to regain public support, Deng wanted new leaders who were not identified with the Tiananmen crackdown to be introduced right after the troops took over the square. By May 19, the day before martial law was imposed, Deng, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian had already chosen Jiang Zemin as general secretary; they planned to announce his appointment immediately after the Fourth Plenum.
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Deng had praised Jiang Zemin for his decisive action in skillfully closing down the
World Economic Herald
without causing a big reaction. From 1983 to 1985, Jiang had also served as minister of the Ministry of Electronics Industry and had given briefings to Deng in 1985. Deng, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian had come to know Jiang well during their
winter visits to Shanghai, where Jiang, as first party secretary, had hosted them. He had already served for three years as one of the younger members of the Politburo, so he was also familiar with central party issues. Moreover, Jiang had the combination of firmness, commitment to reform, knowledge of science and technology, and experience in dealing with foreign affairs that Deng considered important for leading China.

Deng, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian also considered the new membership of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Li Ruihuan, party secretary in Tianjin, another effective, reform-minded leader, would be placed on the Standing Committee in charge of propaganda—replacing Hu Qili, who now seemed too close to Zhao. Song Ping, an experienced and popular official who had dealt with difficult organizational issues, was to be added at the suggestion of Chen Yun. And Li Peng, who had proved to be firm in carrying out Deng's wishes, would remain as premier, along with Yao Yilin as vice premier. The new appointments were to be announced immediately and would become official at the next Central Committee plenum.
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Zhao Ziyang would leave the Politburo. Although he did not accuse Zhao of factionalism, Deng said that like Hu Yaobang, Zhao had worked only with a small circle of people.
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Having made his decisions about the new leadership, Deng met with the two continuing members of the Standing Committee, Li Peng and Yao Yilin. It would have been only human if the two were upset at being passed over for the top position of general secretary, so Deng patiently explained to them the need for new faces to maintain national order. He also encouraged them to take practical steps against corruption to show the public that the party leaders were serious about dealing with the problem. At the meeting, Deng explained that Jiang Zemin and the other new leaders would need to take dramatic steps in their first few months of power to show their commitment to reform. Deng believed Jiang should not bring his personal staff with him to his new position; instead he urged everyone to unite around Jiang Zemin and form a strong leadership team.
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Once that new leadership team was in place, Deng would announce his intention to retire completely. He would retain some influence even without any titles, but Jiang Zemin, without the personal authority of the revolutionary leaders, would need authority conferred by official titles in order to lead the country.

Jiang Zemin was unaware of many of these high-level discussions about his future role. Li Peng telephoned Jiang and, without explaining why, told him to fly to Beijing immediately. When Jiang arrived, Li Peng told him that Deng wished to see him. Deng then notified Jiang of his official selection as
paramount leader. In Beijing, Jiang consulted individually with the other two top leaders, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, and began at once to prepare for his new responsibilities.

Jiang Zemin's background made him an appealing choice for leader of the second generation. Born in 1926, Jiang had proved his high intellectual ability by passing the examinations to enter Yangzhou Middle School and later to enter Jiaotong University, one of the top engineering universities in the country. While pursuing his education, he learned some English and also some Russian, which he used during the two years when he was an exchange student in the Soviet Union. He also learned some Romanian. Jiang's uncle, a Communist revolutionary martyr, became Jiang's adopted father after Jiang's own father died when he was thirteen, a turn of events that gave Jiang a personal revolutionary history. Jiang joined the underground Communist Party before 1949. Beginning in 1980, as party secretary and a member of the leading group on foreign investment, under Gu Mu, he gained experience in reform and opening. During his six years as party leader in a Changchun automobile factory (one of China's largest), Jiang also acquired a solid grounding in heavy industry. He became mayor of Shanghai in 1985, party secretary of Shanghai the following year, and a member of the Politburo in 1987.

In selecting their successors, top Chinese leaders were partial to those who came from families of party revolutionaries, especially martyrs, for in a crunch they could be counted on to remain absolutely dedicated to the party. Deng wanted someone thoroughly committed to and knowledgeable about reform, as Jiang had proved he was. He also wanted someone who was firm and skilled at handling crises, as Jiang had been during the 1986 student demonstrations and in closing the
World Economic Herald.
In addition, Deng was looking for someone who could maintain good relations with a variety of people; while in Shanghai and Beijing, Jiang had shown that he could get along with other officials. Indeed, beneath his jovial exterior, Jiang was a smart and mature political manager. Although he never worked in the party structure in Beijing, he used his three years on the Politburo to familiarize himself with party leaders and central party affairs, becoming known as someone who could effectively manage political issues.
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The Hardcore Students Persist, May 20–June 2

Immediately after the failure of the troops to establish martial law in Beijing on May 20, more and more people flocked back to the square, buoyed by
the mood of popular support and outraged at the imposition of martial law. Although some students had grown weary or intimidated and returned to their campuses, they were replaced by new arrivals from the provinces, who continued to flood in.

On the night of May 29, the Goddess of Democracy, a huge styrofoam statue modeled after the American Statue of Liberty, was placed facing the portrait of Mao and unveiled in a ceremony that attracted enormous attention at home and abroad.
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The statue had been made by students from the Central Academy of Fine Arts in three rushed days and carted on pedicabs, piece by piece, to Tiananmen Square. Intended to provide a lasting reminder of the cause of Chinese democracy, it would be smashed to pieces in the cleaning up of the square after June 4.

Meanwhile, the tenor of the movement had begun to change. Railway officials estimated that during the period there had been some 400,000 one-way trips to or from Beijing, but by May 30 more people were leaving than arriving.
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Many of the protestors worried about punishment and wanted to bargain for clemency. By late May, like the Propaganda Department they were opposing, the student leaders began trying to limit the access of reporters to ordinary demonstrators so that they could control the message reaching the public. The message itself was hard to control because the students were not united and because those who emerged as leaders tended to be bold orators who could sway a crowd rather than strategists with a long-term, unified program; the students could not agree on a course of action. In an effort to have at least a minimum of unity, those who remained in the square took the following oath: “I swear to devote my life and my loyalty to protect to the death Tiananmen Square, the capital Beijing, and the republic.”
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The Crackdown, June 3–4

There is no evidence to suggest that Deng showed any hesitation in deciding to send armed troops to Tiananmen Square. At 2:50 p.m. on June 3, he gave the order to Chi Haotian to do whatever was necessary
(yong yiqie de shouduan)
to restore order. Melanie Manion, a perceptive Western scholar who was there at the time, explained Deng's rationale. In her view, it was “highly probable that even had riot control measures cleared the streets on June 3, they would not have ended the protest movement. . . . The protestors would have retreated only temporarily, to rally in even greater force at a later date . . . the force used on June 4 promised to end the movement immediately,
certainly, and once and for all.”
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Deng's family reported that despite all the criticism he received, he never once doubted that he had made the right decision.
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Many observers who saw the dwindling numbers in Tiananmen Square toward the end of May believe it may have been possible to clear it without violence. But Deng was concerned not only about the students in the square but also about the general loosening of authority throughout the country, and he concluded that strong action was necessary to restore the government's authority.
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Two years would pass before the Soviet Union was to collapse, but by 1989 Deng had become convinced that Soviet and Eastern European leaders had not done enough to preserve state and party power. In Poland on April 4, 1989, as a result of the roundtable talks, the labor union Solidarity had taken political control, the presidency had been made an elective office, and the Communist Party had been dissolved. By coincidence, the Polish election was held on June 4, the same day that Chinese troops took over Tiananmen Square. Jiang Zemin, who had studied in the Soviet Union, later praised Deng for having moved boldly to keep China from falling apart as had the Soviet Union.
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In total, some 150,000 troops were positioned on the outskirts of Beijing.
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They had arrived mostly by rail, but ten planeloads of soldiers from the more distant military regions of Chengdu and Guangzhou also arrived on June 1. In case more troops were needed, the Guangzhou airport sold no tickets for six days starting on May 31. Troops had come from five of the seven military regions, but commanders of all the military regions had recorded their approval of the military effort to control the square, so there was no danger that some regions might later express after-the-fact opposition to the suppression of the students. For better or worse, they were in this together.

For the crackdown itself, military strategists, in an effort to prevent roads from being blocked, as early as May 26 started sending small groups of soldiers to infiltrate the neighborhoods of Beijing. Secrecy was key. Some arrived in unmarked trucks, with their weapons hidden. Others came in street clothes, on foot or on bicycles, in groups of three to five, so as to avoid drawing attention. Some stationed near key intersections wore sunglasses and dressed like street toughs. Others were allowed to wear uniforms but appeared to be groups of joggers, out for their regular exercise.
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For several days they continued entering in small numbers, but on Friday, June 2, the number of soldiers arriving increased. In particular, a large group of soldiers gradually assembled inside the Military Museum four miles west of Tiananmen,
which would become an important staging area for troops and equipment. Many especially well-trained troops began to pass through the underground tunnels to position themselves inside the Great Hall of the People, adjacent to Tiananmen Square, where they could be counted on to help clear the square in a disciplined manner. Other soldiers in civilian clothes were located at additional key points around the city, where they could provide intelligence about roadblocks and about any movements by the demonstrators.

On May 19, when the troops had first tried to impose martial law, they had moved at night believing (incorrectly) that people would be in bed, but masses of people swarmed the streets, aided by the light of a full moon. On this second attempt, military leaders chose the night of June 3, the darkest night of the lunar month. The date also seemed promising because if order could be established on June 4, a Sunday, most of the disruption would occur during the weekend, not on a normal work day.

On June 3, Deng acknowledged that once order had been reestablished in Tiananmen Square and Beijing at large, it would take additional months or even years to change people's minds. He was in no hurry and felt no need to blame those who had joined the hunger strike, demonstrated, or petitioned. He told the troops to target only those who were breaking the law and trying to subvert the nation. The logic of the crackdown, he told them, was that China needed a peaceful, stable environment in order to continue its reform and opening, and to modernize the country.