Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (119 page)

As much as we scholars, like others concerned about human life and the pursuit of liberty, want to find clear answers that explain the causes of that tragedy, the truth is that none of us can be certain what would have happened had different courses of action been taken. Nor is it possible, only two decades after these events, to make a final judgment on the long-run impact of Deng's decisions. If Chinese people in the decades ahead acquire more freedom, will the path to that freedom be less tortuous than that taken in the former Soviet Union, and will the events of the spring of 1989 have been a major factor? We must admit that we do not know.

What we do know is that in the two decades after Tiananmen, China enjoyed relative stability and rapid—even spectacular—economic growth. Small-scale protests have occurred in large numbers and the leaders have been nervous about the danger of larger outbreaks, but in the first two decades after Tiananmen China avoided any large-scale turmoil. Today hundreds of millions of Chinese are living far more comfortable lives than they were living in 1989, and they enjoy far greater access to information and ideas around the world than at any time in Chinese history. Both educational levels and longevity have continued to rise rapidly. For these reasons and others, Chinese people take far greater pride in their nation's achievements than they did in the previous century.

We also know that the yearnings of Chinese people for more personal freedom and for a more representative government remain deep. Popular discontent due to government corruption has if anything grown since 1989. Many
Chinese worry that without more independent media and a more independent judicial system, it will be difficult to make progress in controlling corruption. And clearly many Chinese leaders who believe Deng was correct in linking rapid economic growth to increased popular support are worried about the ultimate “what if”: what if they fail to make progress in solving these problems before the pace of growth slows?

After June 4, 1989, the mood in Beijing was grim. Deng faced a public more alienated from the party than at any time since Communist rule began. By May 20 it had become clear that the government had lost the support of both its urban residents and its youth, and leaders feared the government might not survive. The use of force on June 4 intimidated the public into compliance, but it had only deepened the chasm between the party and the people. The morale of the military was also low; soldiers felt anything but heroic for having killed innocent civilians to help the party retain power, and recruitment was down. The support for Deng and the Communist Party after the inflation of 1988, the death of Hu Yaobang, and the use of armed troops to clear Tiananmen Square was at a low point, far from the exhilarating high point of 1984.

Deng believed that to regain the support of the public, the party desperately needed to keep the economy growing quickly, but the cautious conservatives who had gained control over economic policy after the inflation of 1988 were holding down growth. The challenges to Communist leadership in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, too, had made many Chinese wonder if communism had a future in China.

At the same time, Western human rights groups and Chinese students abroad were supporting dissidents in China, and Western politicians were imposing sanctions against China. For the Westerners, the killing of innocent students protesting for freedom and democracy in Beijing was a far worse crime than the decisions of their countries that had brought about the deaths of many more civilians in Vietnam, Cambodia, and elsewhere. Western human
rights groups began lecturing Chinese about freedom and regard for human life. High-level Western officials stopped visiting China, and restrictions were placed on the export of technology, especially military technology. Foreign trade and tourism suffered. The drama of the Tiananmen tragedy had so captivated the West that Western TV stations played and replayed pictures of the smashing of the Goddess of Democracy, the carrying out of bloody corpses, and the lone youth trying to stop a tank—images that only strengthened the anti-Chinese mood among foreign governments. Foreign support for dissidents and foreign sanctions against China would not easily dissipate.

Deng believed that foreign support for demonstrators and the imposition of sanctions against China made it far more difficult to maintain control in China. He knew that foreign criticism would win some followers within China. Yet at this critical juncture, as he was both cracking down and bracing for the impact of foreign sanctions, Deng reaffirmed the importance of remaining open. A few days before June 4, when he was readying the PLA to do what he considered necessary to restore order, he said: “We should open to the outside world instead of closing our doors—open wider than before.”
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To regain the trust of the people, he said, he and others must achieve concrete results, investigate quickly, and punish prominent cases of corruption, no matter who is involved. He reiterated that the third generation of leaders must continue the policy of reform and opening.
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Addressing the PLA Generals, June 9, 1989

For several days after June 4, Deng and the leadership remained preoccupied with rounding up those whom they considered responsible for the “turmoil” and cleaning up the city to restore order. Deng did not appear in public, and rumors quickly spread that the leaders were badly split and even that the government was in danger of falling apart. On June 9 Deng broke his silence by addressing the generals who had led the crackdown. Parts of his address were presented on TV, giving the public its first glimpse of a high-level leader since the crackdown. Deng expressed his appreciation to the generals for the crucial role they had played in restoring order. He also used the occasion to tell the public that they, too, should be grateful to the military for its contribution and that the government was stable and its policy would remain unchanged.

Deng began by expressing his sorrow over the deaths of the soldiers and
police who had died while heroically defending the interests of the party and the people during the struggle. He said that given the global atmosphere and the environment in China, such conflict was inevitable. It was fortunate, Deng said, that the conflict had occurred when many experienced senior military leaders—men who had the strength and courage to resolve the issue—were still around. He acknowledged that some comrades did not understand the need for their action, but he expressed confidence that eventually they would come to support the effort. Difficulties arose, Deng claimed, because some bad people who had mixed with students and onlookers had the ultimate goal of overthrowing the Communist Party, demolishing the socialist system, and establishing a bourgeois republic that would be the vassal of the West. Deng asked, “What should we do from now on? . . . In my opinion, we should continue to follow unswervingly the basic line, principles and policies we have formulated.”
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He also repeated the importance of the four cardinal principles: upholding the socialist path, supporting the people's democratic dictatorship, standing behind the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and upholding Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought.
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Talking to Party Leaders

One week later, on June 16, Deng told leading members of the Central Committee that because he personally was withdrawing from his active role, a new third generation of leaders should complete the work of putting down the “rebellion.” They should use the rebellion to call attention to past errors and correct them, but in his view, the basic principles had to remain unchanged. “Only socialism can save China, and only socialism can develop China. Economic development should not slow down. . . . We should do some things to demonstrate that our policies of reform and opening to the outside world will not change but will be further implemented.”
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Deng reaffirmed as well the correctness of the party's strategic goal of quadrupling the economy between 1980 and 2000 and making China a moderately developed country by the middle of the twenty-first century.

Foreigners in Beijing who heard Deng's address said that his tone was one of calm confidence; he showed no sign of regret for the actions he had taken and no sense of panic about what might develop.
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Deng appeared to believe that the show of force on June 4 had quieted the opposition, enabling the party and the PLA to establish firm control; indeed, he claimed that the military action had won for China a decade or two of stability. Deng's consistency
nd firm hand reassured many who were worried that China might fall into chaos.

Deng displayed confidence that China, which had experienced nearly complete isolation during the 1950s and 1960s, could withstand the foreign sanctions after 1989. Politics change quickly in democratic countries, he said, and the strict sanctions would not last longer than several years. He believed that foreign businesspeople would pressure their governments to improve relations so that they could once again have access to the Chinese market, and that foreign governments too would again recognize the need for China's cooperation. China should remain firm, encourage its foreign friends to lift sanctions, and be prepared to make good use of every future opportunity.

Deng's estimate proved correct: in November 1990, when U.S. Secretary of State James Baker sought Chinese cooperation to pass a UN Security Council resolution pressuring Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, he negotiated an agreement whereby President Bush would meet Qian Qichen in exchange for China's support.
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Although most sanctions remained in place after this agreement, it was a breakthrough step in restoring working relations between China and the United States.

After his two public talks in June, Deng rarely appeared in public again, and rumors of his illness or death became so persistent that newspapers were forced to print occasional denials. In fact, Deng attended the Fourth Plenum in mid-June, met President Bush's representative Brent Scowcroft in early July, and then went to Beidaihe, the summer resort for high officials.
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The Fourth Plenum, June 23–24, 1989

Members of the Central Committee assembled three weeks after the Tiananmen tragedy for the Fourth Plenum of the 13th Party Congress. There they affirmed that all the moves taken to control the turmoil during the previous two months had been necessary and proper; indeed, the plenum report praised Deng and the senior leaders for the roles they had played in the time of crisis, and praised the troops and armed police for their support. The plenum also formalized changes in the top official roster. Zhao Ziyang was removed from all his posts; Jiang Zemin was named general secretary of the party; and Song Ping and Li Ruihuan were promoted to join Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Yao Yilin, and Qiao Shi as members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The new leadership vowed to continue the same path forged by Deng and his colleagues. In his speech at the plenum, Jiang Zemin reaffirmed
his commitment to the goals of the December 1978 Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress: reform, opening, and the promotion of economic development.
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Yet the big question remained: How would Deng bridge the gap between the expectations of the many Chinese who wanted more freedom, and the unyielding determination of the party elders who felt tight control was needed to preserve order? Deng's strategy would come as no surprise to those who knew him well: he aimed to promote economic growth and strengthen “political education.” That is, he did not respond to the calls of intellectuals for Western-style democratic reforms; rather he sought to persuade the public that the current system was the most appropriate for China at that time.

Passing the Baton to Jiang Zemin

Deng had given a great deal of thought to what it would take for a successor to maintain unity and keep China on the path of reform and opening. In light of the public reaction to the tragedy of June 4, Deng was pleased that they chose someone who had not been involved in the crackdown and could appeal to the public for a fresh start. Although Jiang Zemin had arrived in Beijing before June 4, Deng made sure that Jiang's reputation would be unsullied by Tiananmen by taking personal responsibility for bringing order to Beijing and by making sure Jiang's appointment was not announced until June 24, after he was formally voted party general secretary at the Fourth Plenum.
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By waiting until then to announce his successor, Deng also demonstrated to the party and the public that he was passing the baton with a firm hand, following proper procedures, and not rushing hastily to put a successor in place. The party elders seemed to agree with the need for a strong central figure; although in 1978 they had been reluctant to give Deng many titles for fear that doing so might allow power to become too centralized, in 1989 they readily gave Jiang Zemin the titles so he could acquire the authority necessary to become an effective national leader.

In the weeks after June 4, Deng had reason to be pleased with Jiang Zemin's performance. Jiang learned quickly and established good relations with the party elders who had selected him, including Chen Yun and Li Xiannian as well as Deng. He showed sound political instincts and made good use of the advice of Zeng Qinghong, a well-connected political insider who had worked under Jiang as vice party secretary in Shanghai and had accompanied him to Beijing to serve as vice head of the party's General Office. For many years
Zeng Qinghong's father, Zeng Shan, had engaged in party organization and security work, and Zeng Qinghong knew from him many of the inside stories about party personnel; his mother, Deng Liujin, had been in charge of the Yan'an kindergarten that many of the current leaders had attended as children. Zeng made good use of his personal network to assist Jiang in his political maneuvering in Beijing. There was no way Jiang Zemin could match the sure-footed Deng Xiaoping, who could draw on his decades of firsthand experience in Beijing and his vast background knowledge of his colleagues. So instead Jiang deferred to Zeng and other knowledgeable subordinates to manage the details of these relationships.