Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (30 page)

For more than four decades, Deng had followed Mao's orders and had said what Mao wanted to hear. As a target of attack during the Cultural Revolution and with his eldest son paralyzed, Deng undoubtedly had strong personal feelings about the Cultural Revolution, but he had long separated those feelings from his work on national policy, following Mao's lead without complaint. Why, when he clearly understood Mao's intention, did Deng fail to comply this time? Deng knew that Mao was growing weaker and no longer had the commanding presence to control events as he had earlier; indeed, he did not have long to live. But the answer seems to lie in Deng's estimate of what was needed for China's future. Bo Yibo later said that if Deng had affirmed the Cultural Revolution, he could not have restored order, would not have been able to “seek the true path from facts,” and would not have been able to launch a new reform policy and liberate people's thinking.
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That is, if Deng had approved of the policies of the Cultural Revolution, he would have undone much of the consolidation work and, because he would have been on record as supporting the earlier failed policies, he would have been unable to do what he considered necessary to move the country forward. Some rebels whom he had removed would have returned to power, making his tasks even more difficult, especially in education and science. If Deng was to be given a role in governing after Mao's death, he would need to distance himself from class struggle, to continue the consolidation policies, and to gain full cooperation from those who suffered during the Cultural Revolution and believed it had been a disaster.

If Deng had followed the advice of Zhou Enlai or Chen Yun, he would have bent to Mao's pressure and probably avoided being removed from office. But Deng did not yield. Deng Rong recalls that when, earlier that year, her father began pressing for consolidation, he expected to be criticized and purged, and that he was mentally prepared.
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As painful and uncertain as Deng's fate was at the time, when he returned in 1977 his efforts to distance himself from Mao gave him far greater room to maneuver than if he had yielded in 1975.

Mao and Deng both drew a line in the sand, but in preparing for a large meeting to be held on November 24, 1975, each still acted with some restraint. Mao was aware of the great progress that had been achieved during the year under Deng's leadership, and he approved of much of what Deng had done. He knew that no one else could have provided as much stability as Deng, and that he had no good replacement for him. Furthermore, President Gerald Ford was expected to visit China between December 1 and December 5. Because Zhou Enlai was gravely ill, the previous month Deng had worked with Henry Kissinger to prepare for the Ford visit, and Mao knew of no other party leader versed in foreign policy who could so forcefully and skillfully present China's views on sensitive issues such as U.S. support for Taiwan, the U.S. delay in recognizing China, and U.S. détente with the Soviet Union.

During his first meeting with Ford in early December, Deng used a story from the popular novel
Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo yanyi)
to describe the danger that the United States might concede too much to the Soviet Union. He said that after Cao Cao, emperor of the Wei Kingdom, won the war, the losing general Liu Bei offered to work for him. Cao Cao, suspicious of Liu Bei's loyalty, said, “Liu Bei is like an eagle, which when it is hungry will work for you, but when it is well fed, will fly away.”
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In other words, giving the Soviet Union what it wanted would not work, for once it had what it wanted, it would pursue its own interests. One has to wonder, too, whether Deng, in telling the story, identified with Liu Bei, whose loyalty was being called into question by his leader and who might fly from his leader's grasp.

When he met Ford, Mao acknowledged that China had little weaponry to fight the Soviet Union, only empty cannons, but he confessed: “With regard to cursing, we have some ability.”
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To ratchet up the pressure on Deng, Mao allowed Jiang Qing and her radicals to make full use of that ability. Deng knew that Mao still had the power to determine his fate and that he would also have to work with other leaders who still respected Mao, despite the
errors of the Cultural Revolution. The planned meeting on November 24, scripted by Mao but to be chaired by Deng, would remind senior officials about correct party policy. Three days before the meeting, Deng wrote Mao detailing his suggestions on how he might conduct the meeting, and the next day Mao wrote back approving of his suggestions. Mao also directed that some younger officials be invited, since they too needed to have a correct understanding of policy. Both Mao and Deng knew, however, that most of the “young officials” were former rebels, some of whom might well exercise their ability to curse Deng. Mao soon reconsidered his decision, and the next day he wrote that there was no rush to educate young officials. That could be saved for a later meeting.
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In attacking Deng, Mao avoided going all out—for now.

At the November 24 meeting to “sound the alert”
(da zhaohu)
, more than 130 senior officials assembled to receive instructions on how to “avoid making new mistakes,” namely, how to stop following the path that Deng had been pursuing. In accordance with Mao's directions for conducting the meeting, Deng read Mao's letter out loud. In it, Mao criticized Liu Bing for trying to overthrow Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi, and said that Liu Bing's letter was in fact aimed at Mao who supported Chi and Xie. Deng's name was not mentioned, but because he was the one who had forwarded Liu Bing's letter to Mao, it was obvious to those assembled that Mao was criticizing Deng. At that meeting, when called on to give his response to Mao's letter, Deng tried to walk a narrow line, not affirming the Cultural Revolution but still following Mao's directions. He said that Mao wanted officials to take the correct attitude toward the Cultural Revolution and that Mao's saying that “class struggle is the key link” was the fundamental tenet of the party.
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In effect, he acknowledged what Mao had said was party policy, but did not say he agreed with it. The written summary of the meeting was approved by Mao and on November 26 it was sent to high-level party officials and military officers throughout the country. Even though Deng's name was not mentioned, readers understood he was in deep trouble.
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Criticism of Deng Expands, December 1975–January 8, 1976

After the November 26 summary of the November 24 meeting was distributed, the Politburo held a series of additional meetings over the next two months to criticize Deng for his “rightist reversal of verdicts,” which had allowed too many senior officials to return to work. Mao assigned Deng to
continue chairing the meetings at which he was the main target of attack. Deng did open and close the meetings, but otherwise he sat silently while Jiang Qing and her radicals heaped criticism on him and his policies.
Red Flag, People's Daily
, and other media followed up with further criticism. The four who steadfastly supported Deng during these criticisms (referred to as the “four protective Buddhist deities” [
jingang
])—Hu Yaobang, Wan Li, Zhou Rongxin, and Zhang Aiping—were attacked for supporting Deng's efforts to reverse the verdicts. The Political Research Office and the senior officials there, including Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun, and Yu Guangyuan, were also attacked during criticism sessions for their errors in supporting Deng.
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On December 18, Mao Yuanxin forwarded to his uncle the materials critical of Deng, Zhou Enlai, and Ye Jianying that he had been collecting since October, with help from the party committees in Liaoning province, Shanghai, and at Tsinghua and Peking universities, where the radical critics had a strong base. Mao Yuanxin attached a memo asking permission to release the evidence and Mao immediately gave his approval.
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Two days later, the materials were forwarded to high officials in the party and military.
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On the same day, Deng made a brief “self-criticism” without a written text.
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He recalled that when he had taken office in early 1975, production was stagnating in a number of industries and there was serious factional strife. To deal with the problems of factional strife Deng had focused first on the railways, where the problems were quickly resolved. Using the same methods, he then turned to the steel industry to increase production. He said his failures were due not to his eight years of absence during the Cultural Revolution but to his attitude toward the Cultural Revolution. His “self-criticism” was actually, as his daughter points out, a defense of his policies, which he still believed to be correct.
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In hopes of improving his relations with Mao, the next day Deng sent Mao a personal letter, enclosing a transcript of his verbal self-criticism and adding that it was only a preliminary version and that he welcomed Mao's advice on what he should do next. Not surprisingly, Mao regarded Deng's self-criticism as inadequate, and instead of sending him a reply¸ he expanded the campaign against him.
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Immediately after the 1976 New Year, Wang Dongxing called Deng to make sure he had read the New Year's editorial approved by Mao. It declared that achieving stability and unity did not mean neglecting class struggle. Deng understood what Mao expected and he immediately composed by hand another self-criticism, which he submitted on January 3, 1976. He repeated in writing what he had said on December 20,
adding only that before enunciating policies he had sometimes failed to receive Mao's approval. When criticized by Jiang Qing and her radicals during the sessions that followed, Deng stood his ground. He would rather take their punishment than declare that class struggle should continue to be China's central objective. Five days after Deng submitted his self-criticism, Zhou Enlai passed away. Immediately thereafter Deng was replaced by Hua Guofeng.

The Interlude with Kissinger and President Ford

In the meantime, Deng had been given time off from criticism sessions to carry on negotiations with Henry Kissinger and later with President Gerald Ford. During three days of lengthy meetings with Kissinger to prepare the Ford visit, from October 20–22, Deng and Kissinger exchanged views on global developments. Deng scarcely let Kissinger make his initial presentation before pressing him with pointed questions: How much grain are you selling to the Soviet Union? How much modern U.S. equipment and technology are you passing on to the Soviet Union? What is your assessment of the Helsinki Conference (in which the United States was promoting détente between Western Europe and the Communist bloc)? Deng then spelled out the experience of Chamberlain and Daladier trying to appease Hitler on the eve of World War II. The lesson: because Britain and France gave a weak response to Hitler's initial forays, Hitler attacked to the West. To stop a threat, one needs to make a firm response, he advised, and the United States is now giving a weak response. The Soviet Union, he said, is now stronger than the United States and Western Europe combined. The Soviet Union has two weaknesses: it needs grain and technology, and the United States is helping with both, helping resolve its weaknesses and thus increasing the risk of a Soviet attack.
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Zhou had been accused of being a capitulationist, but when attendees at this session would report to Mao, it would be hard to find evidence that Deng could be seen in a similar light.

In the long conversations with Kissinger covering global affairs, Deng kept returning to the dangers of a Soviet advance following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Throughout their discussions, Deng kept up the pressure on Kissinger for the United States to respond more vigorously to the Soviet threat, and Kissinger attempted to explain how much the United States was doing to counter the Soviet threat. Deng was intense and feisty, but he remained within the bounds of diplomatic courtesy.

Deng sat in on Kissinger's meeting with Mao, and Mao, like Deng, focused
on the U.S. failure to respond adequately to the Soviet challenge. In his report on his meetings with Deng and Mao, Kissinger reported to President Ford that the discussions during his visit signaled a troublesome cooling of the U.S.-China relationship, linked to China's perception that the United States was fading in the face of Soviet advance. Kissinger concluded that China, disappointed with the U.S. response, was ready to rely on its own strength to defend itself against the Soviet Union.
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It was a measure of Deng's toughness under pressure that even during long negotiation sessions, he remained intensely focused on the discussions. Neither Kissinger nor any of his staff had any notion that Deng was then under severe political pressure from Mao. In fact, Kissinger concluded from the meeting that because Mao was very sick and incapable of detailed or sustained work, now “Deng is the key official.”
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On November 4, the day Deng first faced criticism at the meeting of eight, Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua called in the head of the U.S. Liaison Office, George H. W. Bush, to request that President Gerald Ford postpone the visit planned for December. But the United States requested the trip go ahead as planned, and on November 13, China confirmed that the trip would take place. Deng was President Ford's main host, welcoming him at the airport one week after he had been the target of attack in the presence of 130 high officials. Deng hosted a welcoming banquet, gave the farewell luncheon, and carried on three lengthy negotiating sessions, in addition to joining Mao when Mao met with Ford.