Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (27 page)

Just at that time, Deng's plans for the development of the social sciences were coming to fruition. Deng was personally focused on reviving the natural sciences, but he also accepted the need for revitalized work in philosophy and the social sciences. Considering the minefield of political sensitivities in this area, Deng showed courage when he argued that the social sciences were important enough to deserve a separate academy. On August 30, 1975, Hu Qiaomu, with Deng's support, issued State Council Directive No. 142 establishing the philosophy and social science departments of CAS. In that document, Hu laid out plans for developing an independent academy that would later be known as the CASS. Deng also declared that institutes in the social sciences should gradually resume issuing publications, starting with a more general journal intended for nonspecialist audiences that would set out a theoretical basis for their work. To reduce the danger of attack by the Gang of Four, and possibly by Mao as well, Deng ordered that all articles submitted to the journal should first be cleared by the Political Research Office, which would scrutinize them for any comments likely to provoke the radicals. In his letter announcing the publication, Hu Qiaomu took the precaution of announcing that it would follow Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

Hu Qiaomu completed his letter on social science and philosophy work on October 4, and the next day Deng passed it on to Mao, who approved the document, including publication of the first issue of the new journal
The Ideological Frontline
(
Sixiang zhanxian
) on October 6. Shortly thereafter, a forum was held to discuss the journal. After the criticism of Deng in the Politburo on October 25, however, plans for the journal were stopped. The articles never saw the light of day. Hu Qiaomu made an effort to continue the project, but on January 17, 1976, the Political Research Office, under pressure from Mao, issued a statement saying that it would no longer be responsible for supervising philosophy and the social sciences.
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The great enterprise of restoring China's social sciences aborted before it really began.

A Mini “Hundred Flowers” in the Arts and Culture

Deng had to be particularly careful about fostering any sort of change in the cultural sphere because Mao was especially sensitive and mercurial about controlling the arts. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao had allowed Jiang Qing to keep a tight grip on all cultural affairs: no dramas were performed except her model Peking operas, virtually all periodicals ceased publication, and only a handful of short stories and novels were printed. Bookstores sold collections of Mao's works, tales of revolutionary heroes, a small number of school textbooks, and a few books on elementary technology. But there were virtually no customers. Many intellectuals, too, had been sent away to rusticate at “May 7th Cadre Schools,” where they took part in physical labor, studied Mao Zedong Thought, and joined in mutual criticism and self-criticism; they were not given the opportunity to read novels and short stories.

In 1975, however, the mercurial Mao, aware of how few stories and dramas were being produced, complained to Deng that “model Peking operas aren't enough … if people make a little mistake, they are criticized. There is no sign of a hundred flowers. Others aren't allowed to express their opinions. This is not good. People are afraid to write articles, they are afraid to write plays, and there are no novels, no poems or songs.”
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With Mao's permission, Deng immediately directed that Mao's views be printed and distributed within the party. On that same day, July 9, Deng, while acknowledging that he himself was unfamiliar with culture and the arts, called a meeting of the senior members of the Political Research Office and told them to collect publications in the fields of culture, science, and education so they could see to what extent Mao's policy of encouraging a hundred flowers to bloom was being implemented. Their judgment that there was indeed a dearth of cultural activity paved the way for a modest expansion of the range of what was considered permissible in Chinese culture and the arts.
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A few days before he first complained to Deng about the lack of cultural vitality, Mao had asked a secretary to send a letter to the Politburo to declare that Zhou Yang—in effect the ranking cultural czar before the Cultural Revolution—should be released because “locking up leaders in the cultural sphere is not a good way to deal with them.” On July 12, Zhou Yang's wife received word that her husband had been freed, and soon other prominent people once associated with Zhou Yang were also released. A few days later Mao told Jiang Qing that he wanted to see a broader range of works in the
arts and greater leniency for writers. When writers have problems in ideology, he advised, an effort should be made to “cure the patient.”
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Yet Mao allowed the Gang of Four to retain authority over cultural institutions, including the Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Culture, the Political Department of the army, the
People's Daily
, and
Red Flag
. In essence, then, beginning in July 1975 Mao allowed a tug-of-war between the Gang of Four—who remained alert to any criticism of Mao, real or implied—and Deng Xiaoping, who with the support of Hu Qiaomu was promoting a mini-hundred-flowers policy. Every hint that Mao dropped for widening the sphere of permissible activities was quickly followed up by Deng and Hu Qiaomu, who nevertheless proceeded carefully to avoid crossing boundaries that might arouse Mao's concerns.

Not surprisingly, the reentry of Zhou Yang continued to be a source of conflict between the two sides. On July 27 Mao announced that Zhou Yang's problems were not so serious as to be called contradictions between the people and the enemy. The very next day Deng had Mao's statement widely distributed. But the Gang of Four still managed to prevent Zhou Yang's salary and positions from being fully restored. In the tug-of-war, Jiang Qing also blocked Zhou Yang from receiving a special invitation for the National Day celebrations on October 1. When Mao later found out, he complained angrily.
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Other skirmishes erupted over films. Hu Qiaomu came across some documents that showed how the Gang of Four had suppressed a film celebrating workers and some senior leaders, especially Yu Qiuli, whom Jiang Qing disliked. Hu Qiaomu guided the scriptwriter in writing a letter to Mao asking for release of the film. Hu advised the author that the letter should not be emotional but instead should report verifiable, unbiased information that would still lead to the conclusion that the movie should be shown. The scriptwriter took Hu's advice; his letter made clear that in making the film, he had followed Mao's directives about literary works issued at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and the Arts. In particular, the film showed the contributions of workers, and workers took pride in the film and warmly welcomed it.
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A great breakthrough in expanding the range of cultural freedom occurred on July 25 when Mao viewed the film
The Pioneers (Chuangye)
, which lionized Yu Qiuli and the team of workers who had developed the Daqing oil-field and had long been praised by Mao. Hu Qiaomu, judging that Mao would be sympathetic since he had strongly praised the work at Daqing, directed that information about the case be collected. On July 25, Mao, who
had just recovered from an eye operation that greatly improved his vision, saw the movie and was in a very good mood.
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His speech was not clear, so Mao scrawled out his views in several lines of big characters, between five and twelve characters per page, stretched out over six pages. He wrote, “This film doesn't have many errors. I suggest it be shown. It doesn't need overall criticism. To say it has ten errors is a great exaggeration and not beneficial for the party's policy on literature and the arts.”

The next day Mao's letter was delivered to Deng Xiaoping while he was holding a meeting of the Political Research Office. Deng interrupted the session to read the letter aloud. Mao wrote that the Ministry of Culture had been too crude, had blocked the showing of a good film, and had obstructed further showings, going against the hundred flowers policy. Deng immediately publicized Mao's letter, setting off great excitement in literature and art circles. The incident marked the first public criticism of the Gang of Four's cultural policy since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Hu Qiaomu, worried about retaining Mao's support, cautioned the scriptwriter not to brag about his success in public; his wife was also advised to send a letter to Mao to express her appreciation.
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Deng lost no time in taking advantage of this breakthrough. He approved another letter to Mao about the movie
The Glow above the Sea (Haixia)
, based on the novel
The Island Militiawoman (Haidao nü minbing)
. From then on, Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun, and even Deng Xiaoping personally helped writers and musicians prepare letters to Mao that might lead Mao to approve greater freedom in the cultural sphere, and in a number of cases they succeeded.

Although it was known that Mao greatly respected Lu Xun, who is widely considered the greatest Chinese writer of the twentieth century, throughout the 1970s Jiang Qing blocked plans to publish Lu Xun's letters and correspondence. In the freer atmosphere of mid-1975, however, a breakthrough seemed possible. Lu Xun's son, Zhou Haiying, also with advice from Hu Qiaomu, drafted a letter to Mao asking permission to publish his father's works. Hu passed the letter to Deng Xiaoping, who forwarded it to Mao. Mao responded: “I agree with Comrade Zhou Haiying's opinion. Print the letter and send it to the Politburo members. Have a discussion, make a decision, and immediately carry it out.” By 1980, all sixteen volumes of Lu Xun's works, including the annotations and notes, had been published.
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In the months after July 1975, Mao's support for expanding cultural affairs left the Gang of Four on the defensive. Wang Hongwen was in Shanghai
and Zhejiang quieting down rebels. Yao Wenyuan complained that after being sent to Shanghai, he was, like any ordinary citizen, “hopping onto the crowded bus for work.”
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Jiang Qing remained in Beijing, but was on a short leash. She could not stop those who appealed to Mao one by one to expand China's cultural offerings.

Journals resumed publication more slowly than novels. In the summer of 1975, it was announced that the magazine
People's Literature (Renmin wenxue)
, which had been closed down in 1966, would soon resume publication. Predictably, the Gang of Four worked to prevent this from occurring—and when thwarted, tried to gain as much influence as possible over the magazine's content. Deng Xiaoping led the struggle for
People's Literature
against the Gang of Four, but after he was criticized beginning in October, the conservative Ministry of Culture gained the upper hand. By the time the first issue appeared in January 1976, Deng had no control over the content of the magazine.
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Zhou Rongxin and the Effort to Revive Higher Education

In the summer of 1975, Deng, his education minister Zhou Rongxin, and several others made a valiant effort to begin the restoration of Chinese higher education. A few universities had remained open during the Cultural Revolution, but they did not remain genuine institutions of higher learning. On July 21, 1968, Mao had directed that universities shorten the time they took to educate students and enroll instead peasants and workers who, after receiving their training, would return to the production line. In June 1970, it was announced that workers, farmers, and soldiers, rather than academics, should take charge of the universities. Factories were attached to all universities so that students could spend part of their time working there. And on August 13, 1971, official directives were issued stating that admission to universities would be by recommendation, not by examination.
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These changes had a devastating effect on higher education in China. In May 1973, when U.S. scientists visited Peking University, the premier university in China, they concluded that science training there was at about the level offered by a U.S. technical junior college.
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Deng's efforts to revive higher education began, in part, with the knowledge that Mao and other radicals would find it difficult to oppose the opening of military universities. During the Cultural Revolution, many personnel from the best military science and technology university, Harbin Military
Industrial University, had been transferred to Changsha. There they had been absorbed into Changsha Industrial University, which had been given leeway to raise its standards.
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A small number of promising intellectuals had been allowed to enter this school and other military universities as a way of cloaking their research as military-related even before civilian institutions resumed their normal operations.

The situation for most other intellectuals was bleak. Shortly after Nixon visited China in 1972, Zhou Peiyuan, the leading academic administrator at Peking University, was asked to report to Zhou Enlai on the state of Chinese science. Zhou Peiyuan was bold enough to report that in all thirty-two areas of science, China had fallen seriously behind.
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Further, a brief glimmer of hope that academics could resume their normal work had ended on New Year's 1975 with the outbreak of Mao's “Criticize Lin [Biao], criticize Confucius”
(pi-Lin, pi-Kong)
campaign.
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Advances in science would be forced to wait.