Development as Freedom (50 page)

16.
These issues are discussed in my Tanner Lectures at Cambridge in 1985, published in
The Standard of Living
, edited by Geoffrey Hawthorn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

17.
Lagrange thus presented in the late eighteenth century what was probably the first analysis of what came to be known in our times as “the new view of consumption” (Kevin J. Lancaster, “A New Approach to Consumer Theory,”
Journal of Political Economy
74 [1996], and W. M. Gorman, “A Possible Procedure for Analysing Quality Differentials in the Egg Market,”
Review of Economic Studies
47 [1980]). These and related matters are discussed in my
The Standard of Living
(1987).

18.
A distinguished exception is Robert Nozick,
Anarchy, State and Utopia
(New York: Basic Books, 1974).

19.
This was mainly in the context of Adam Smith’s support for legislation against “usury,” and the need to control the turmoil that follows from the overindulgence of speculative investment by those whom Adam Smith called “prodigals and projectors.” See Smith,
Wealth of Nations
, volume 1, book 2, chapter 4, paragraphs 14–15, in the edition of Campbell and Skinner (1976), pp. 356–7. The term “projector” is used by Smith not in the neutral sense of “one who forms a project,” but in the pejorative sense, apparently common from 1616 (according to
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
), meaning, among other things, “a promoter of bubble companies; a speculator; a cheat.” Giorgio Basevi has drawn my attention to some
interesting parallels between Smith’s criticism and Jonathan Swift’s unflattering portrayal of “projectors” in
Gulliver’s Travels
, published in 1726, half a century before
Wealth of Nations
.

20.
The importance of the distinction between “comprehensive outcomes” and “culmination outcomes,” in various different contexts, is discussed in my “Maximization and the Act of Choice,”
Econometrica
65 (July 1997). For the relevance of the distinction in the specific case of the market mechanism and its alternatives, see my “Markets and Freedoms,”
Oxford Economic Papers
45 (1993), and “Markets and the Freedom to Choose,” in
The Ethical Foundations of the Market Economy
, edited by Horst Siebert (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1994). See also chapter 4 of the present work.

21.
J. R. Hicks,
Wealth and Welfare
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), p. 138.

22.
Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman,
Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 125–6.

23.
Fogel and Engerman,
Time on the Cross
(1974), pp. 237–8.

24.
Different aspects of this momentous issue have been examined in Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
Capitalismo e Escravidão no Brasil Meridionel: O negro na sociadade escravocrata do Rio Grande do Sul
(Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1977); Robin Blackburn,
The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848
(London and New York: Verso, 1988); Tom Brass and Marcel van der Linden, eds.,
Free and Unfree Labour
(Berne: European Academic Publishers, 1997); Stanley L. Engerman, ed.,
Terms of Labor: Slavery, Serfdom and Free Labor
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).

25.
Karl Marx,
Capital
, volume 1 (London: Sonnenschein, 1887), chapter 10, section 3, p. 240. See also his
Grundrisse
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973).

26.
V. K. Ramachandran,
Wage Labour and Unfreedom in Agriculture: An Indian Case Study
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 1–2.

27.
An important empirical study of this aspect of bondage and unfreedom, among others, can be found in Sudipto Mundle,
Backwardness and Bondage: Agrarian Relations in a South Bihar District
(New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1979).

28.
On this see
Decent Work: The Report of the Director-General of the ILO
(Geneva: ILO, 1999). This is one of the special emphases in the program of the new director-general, Juan Somavia.

29.
This point of view is forcefully developed in Stephen M. Marglin and Frederique Appfel Marglin, eds.,
Dominating Knowledge
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). On related anthropological insights, see also Veena Das,
Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995).

1.
I have discussed this contrast in an earlier paper, “Development Thinking at the Beginning of the 21st Century,” in
Economic and Social Development into the XXI Century
, edited by Louis Emmerij (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, distributed by Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). See also my “Economic Policy and Equity: An Overview,” in
Economic Policy and Equity
, edited by Vito Tanzi, Ke-young Chu and Sanjeev Gupta (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1999).

2. This chapter served as the basis of a keynote address given at the World Bank Symposium on Global Finance and Development in Tokyo, March 1–2, 1999.

3.
On this see Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen,
Hunger and Public Action
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

4.
On this see World Bank,
The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). See also Vito Tanzi et al.,
Economic Policy and Equity
(1999).

5.
See Hiromitsu Ishi, “Trends in the Allocation of Public Expenditure in Light of Human Resource Development—Overview in Japan,” mimeographed, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 1995. See also Carol Gluck,
Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

6.
On this see Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen,
India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), and the Probe Team,
Public Report on Basic Education in India
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999).

7.
Sudhir Anand and Martin Ravallion, “Human Development in Poor Countries: On the Role of Private Incomes and Public Services,”
Journal of Economics Perspectives
7 (1993).

8.
On this issue see my joint book with Jean Drèze,
India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity
(1995).

9.
Drèze and Sen,
Hunger and Public Action
(1989); see particularly chapter 10.

10.
Even though Kerala is merely a state rather than a country, nevertheless, with its population close to thirty million, it is larger than the majority of countries in the world (including, for example, Canada).

11.
On this see my “From Income Inequality to Economic Inequality,” Distinguished Guest Lecture to the Southern Economic Association, published in
Southern Economic Journal
64 (October 1997), and “Mortality as an Indicator of Economic Success and Failure,” first Innocenti Lecture to UNICEF (Florence: UNICEF, 1995), also published in
Economic Journal
108 (January 1998).

12.
See also Richard A. Easterlin, “How Beneficent Is the Market? A Look at the Modern History of Mortality,” mimeographed, University of Southern California, 1997.

13.
This issue is discussed in Drèze and Sen,
Hunger and Public Action
(1989).

14.
I shall return to this question later on; see also Drèze and Sen,
India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity
(1995).

15.
The need for supplementing and supporting market-friendly policies for economic growth with a rapid expansion of the social infrastructure (such as public health care and basic education) is discussed in some detail, in the context of the Indian economy, in my joint book with Jean Drèze,
India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity
(1995).

16.
See Robert W. Fogel, “Nutrition and the Decline in Mortality since 1700: Some Additional Preliminary Findings,” working paper 1802, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1986; Samuel H. Preston, “Changing Relations between Mortality and Level of Economic Development,”
Population Studies
29 (1975), and “American Longevity: Past, Present and Future,” Policy Brief no. 7, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1996. See also Lincoln C. Chen, Arthur Kleinman and Norma C. Ware, eds.,
Advancing Health in Developing Countries
(New York: Auburn House, 1992); Richard G. Wilkinson,
Unhealthy
Societies: The Afflictions of Inequality
(New York: Routledge, 1996); Richard A. Easterlin, “How Beneficent Is the Market?” (1997).

17.
See J. M. Winter,
The Great War and the British People
(London: Macmillan, 1986).

18.
See R. M. Titmuss,
History of the Second World War: Problems of Social Policy
(London: HMSO, 1950).

19.
On this see R. J. Hammond,
History of the Second World War: Food
(London: HMSO, 1951). See also Titmuss,
History of the Second World War: Problems of Social Policy
(1950).

20.
See Winter,
Great War and the British People
(1986).

21.
The data relate to England and Wales, since the aggregate British figures could not be found. However, since England and Wales form such an overwhelmingly big part of the United Kingdom, not a great deal is lost by this restriction of coverage.

22.
See the works of R. J. Hammond, R. M. Titmuss, and J. M. Winter, cited earlier, and the other works to which they refer, and also the discussion and the references in Drèze and Sen,
Hunger and Public Action
(1989), chapter 10.

23.
I have discussed this in “Development: Which Way Now?”
Economic Journal
92 (December 1982) and
Resources, Values and Development
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), and jointly with Jean Drèze in
Hunger and Public Action
(1989).

1.
The role of informational exclusion and inclusion is discussed in my “On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis,”
Econometrica
45 (October 1977), reprinted in
Choice, Welfare and Measurement
(Oxford: Blackwell; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982; republished, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), and “Informational Analysis of Moral Principles,” in
Rational Action
, edited by Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

2.
See Jeremy Bentham,
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(London: Payne, 1789; republished, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907).

3.
An informational critique of utilitarianism can be found in my “Utilitarianism and Welfarism,”
Journal of Philosophy
7 (September 1979), and “Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984,”
Journal of Philosophy
82 (April 1985).

4.
On the distinctions, see J.C.B. Gosling,
Pleasure and Desire
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); John C. Harsanyi,
Essays in Ethics, Social Behaviour, and Scientific Explanation
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977).

5.
On the methodological issue involved, see my “On Weights and Measures” (1977) and “Informational Analysis of Moral Principles” (1979).

6.
Lionel Robbins was particularly influential in arguing that there could be no scientific basis for the possibility of interpersonal comparison of happiness (“Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,”
Economic Journal
48 [1938]), and his critique had the effect of severely undermining utilitarianism as a mainstream approach in welfare economics.

7.
Bentham,
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(1789); John Stuart Mill,
Utilitarianism
(London, 1861; republished London: Collins/Fontana,
1962); Henry Sidgwick,
The Method of Ethics
(London: Macmillan, 1874); William Stanley Jevons,
The Theory of Political Economy
(London: Macmillan, 1871; reprinted, 5th edition, 1957); Francis Edgeworth,
Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences
(London: Kegan Paul, 1881); Alfred Marshall,
Principles of Economics
(London: Macmillan, 8th edition, 1920); A. C. Pigou,
The Economics of Welfare
(London: Macmillan, 1920).

8.
This is the simplest version of utilitarianism. For some complex and less direct versions, see particularly R. M. Hare,
Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Methods and Point
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); and James Griffin,
Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

9.
The technical issues involved and some limitations of defining utility in the binary framework of choice are discussed in my
Choice, Welfare and Measurement
(1982), and more informally in
On Ethics and Economics
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).

10.
See, for example, Independent Commission on Population and Quality of Life,
Caring for the Future
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); see also Mark Sagoff,
The Economy of the Earth
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), and Kjell Arne Brekke,
Economic Growth and the Environment
(Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1997), among other works.

11.
I have presented my reservations about utilitarianism in, among other places,
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
(San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970; republished, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979);
On Economic Inequality
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973);
Inequality Reexamined
(Oxford: Clarendon Press; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). For powerful critiques of the utilitarian tradition, see John Rawls,
A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” in
Utilitarianism: For and Against
, by J.J.C. Smart and B. Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Robert Nozick,
Anarchy, State and Utopia
(New York: Basic Books, 1974); Ronald Dworkin,
Taking Rights Seriously
(London: Duckworth, 1978); Joseph Raz,
Ethics in the Public Domain
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994; revised edition, 1995); among other contributions.