Early Modern England 1485-1714: A Narrative History (4 page)

John of Gaunt’s dying speech from
The Tragedy of King Richard II
is justly famous, not least because it says a great deal about how the English view their land. The most obvious point to make about these words (apart from their overt patriotism) is that they portray the water surrounding the British Isles as a barrier. Specifically, England is separated from the mainland of Europe (and France, in particular) by the English Channel, a strait about 21 miles wide at its narrowest (see
map 1
). This is the “moat defensive” which “serves it [England] in the office of a wall.”

The Channel has, indeed, served England as a moat defensive against foreign invaders on a number of occasions in its history. As we shall see in chapter 5, in 1588 it prevented invasion by the armies of Philip II, who were to have been transported by the Spanish Armada. In 1805, after the period of time covered by this book, it would block a similar attempt by the armies of Napoleon Bonaparte. And in 1940, within the living memory of some readers, it would frustrate “Operation Sealion,” Hitler’s plan for invasion and occupation by the forces of Nazi Germany. Thus, the English Channel and Great Britain’s island status have been crucial to the preservation of England (and, later, Britain) as a sovereign country, with its own distinct traditions of government and social customs.

Less tangibly, the English have sometimes thought that the English Channel shielded them from continental ways and ideas. One of the most obvious facts about the English is that they are not the French or the Dutch. Their political, social, and cultural institutions developed along different lines from those of their continental neighbors. This has sometimes led the English to believe that they are set apart from those neighbors, a “little world,” protected by their watery moat from “infection and the hand of war.” To believe that one is set apart, that one’s situation is unlike others, is very close to believing that one is unique. This is, in turn, just a step away from believing that one is somehow superior to others, “the envy of less happier lands.” Perhaps as a result of this feeling, English governments have sometimes acted, first toward the other inhabitants of the British Isles, and later toward the subjects of a worldwide British Empire, as if “God was an Englishman” and that the remaining inhabitants of the planet had been given by Him to be conquered, exploited, even enslaved, by His chosen people. But, for the most part, the “island mentality” is not so much hostile or aggressive as it is indifferent, even mildly condescending, toward Europe. Hence a famous, if apocryphal, nineteenth-century headline: “Fog in Channel; Continent Cut Off.”

But in fact, most of the time, there is no fog in the Channel and England and the continent are not cut off from each other. This brings us to the other side of the watery coin: the “island mentality” is, to a great extent, a sham, for the English Channel has more often acted as much as a highway or a bridge to Europe than as a barrier. For most of human history, before the invention of the airplane or the automobile, the easiest and safest way to get from place to place was by water. It is true that the Channel, and England’s control of it, prevented the invasions of 1588, 1805, and 1940. But England faced many other invasions in its history, most of which the Channel
facilitated.
In fact, the people and polity of early modern England were products of successful migrations, indeed invasions, by the Celts from 800 to 200
BCE
(before the common era, see Conventions and Abbreviations), the Romans in the first century
CE
(during the common era, see Conventions and Abbreviations), the Angles, Saxons, and Jutes in the fifth and sixth centuries, the Danes in the ninth and tenth centuries, the Normans in 1066, and, within the time frame of this book, the Dutch in 1688.

Since all of these people decided to settle in England, the notion of English uniqueness must be qualified by the realization that they were and are, like contemporary Americans, a mixture of many different ethnic groups and cultures: those noted above; Welsh, Scots, and Huguenots during the period of this book; and, more recently, Irish, West Indians, Indians, Pakistanis, and others. The people, the culture, even the language of England were forged in a melting pot. Take, for example, the English language. Today, one will occasionally hear commentators complain of the infusion of new words and phrases, slang or sloppiness of speech emanating from the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or even parts of Britain itself which are distant in space and attitude from Oxford or London. In their view, these emanations corrupt the “purity” of the Queen’s English. The trouble with this view is that the Queen’s English was never pure. It is, rather, a mongrel born of and enriched by Celtic, Latin, Anglo-Saxon, Danish, French, and Dutch influences. Moreover, even within England itself (and certainly within the British Isles), it has always been spoken with a wide variety of regional accents, vocabulary, and syntax. In short, the English language was, and is, a living, evolving construct.

Migrations and invasions are not the only way in which new cultural influences have come to England. Because water surrounds the British Isles and water serves as a highway as well as a moat, it was probably inevitable that, in order to defend their country and buy and sell their goods, the English would become seafarers. (Obviously, many had to be seafarers to get there in the first place.) This implies a naval tradition in order to protect the islands: this book will return again and again to the admittedly unsteady rise of English naval power. But it also implies a tradition of peaceful overseas trade and the domestic industries that go with it (shipbuilding, carpentry, and cartography, for example). By 1714 the English would be the greatest shipbuilding and trading nation on earth, with London rivaling Amsterdam as its greatest money market. Though they have since relinquished those distinctions, trade and tourism, facilitated by the Channel Tunnel and membership in the European Union, continue to flow freely between England and the continent, and London remains one of the world’s leading financial capitals.

The wealth from trade and high finance would, in the eighteenth century, lead to military and naval dominance overseas and industrial growth at home. Another theme of this book is how England rose from being a puny and relatively poor little country in the fifteenth century to the dominant kingdom in a state, Great Britain, on the verge of superpower status, in the eighteenth. By the end of the era covered by this book, Great Britain (created when England and Scotland united in 1707) would be the most powerful state in Europe; it would rule an extensive overseas empire; and it would possess the economic base to launch the industrial revolution. In the nineteenth century, after the period covered by this book, that combination of military, naval, and industrial might would make Britain the center of an empire that would cover one-fifth of the globe and rule one-quarter of its people. The legacy of that empire is ever-present and controversial for the descendants of those who ruled it and those who were ruled by it. So a very great deal came of England’s being part of an island.

As this implies, if the “island people” have had a profound impact upon other peoples, so has contact with those peoples and cultures had a profound influence upon them. English people share with Americans the conviction that “imported” often means “better,” whether the item in question is French wine, German automobiles, or Italian art. Indeed, it could be argued that part of the friction that existed between England and France for so much of the period covered by this book was born, on the English side, not of blind hatred or haughty disdain, but of a sometimes sneaking admiration, even envy, for the achievements of French culture.

This Seat of Mars – and Less Happier Lands

Up to this point, we have generally referred to “England,” not Britain. Non- Britons sometimes use the terms “English” and “British” interchangeably, but, as indicated above, that is both inaccurate and insulting to the four distinct cultures which inhabit the British Isles. These cultures, though dominated from London during most of the last few hundred years, are geographically, ethnically, and culturally distinct.

England, to the south and east, is by far the most populous, the wealthiest and the most powerful country, politically and militarily, in the British Isles. We will explore England’s internal geography and topography later in this introduction. For now, the important thing to remember is that this is the part of the British Isles closest to Europe, and, therefore, most easily invaded and colonized. As indicated previously, the land that would come to be known as England was, like the rest of the British Isles, settled by Celtic peoples who came over in many waves prior to about 200
BCE
.
²
From this point England’s experience differs from that of Scotland to the north, Wales to the west, or Ireland further west across the Irish Sea (see
map 1
). Because of England’s proximity to Europe and relatively mild terrain, it continued to experience invasions and migrations – by the Romans, by the Angles, Saxons, and Jutes, by the Danes, and by the Norman French. As a result, England developed along a different track from the other lands of the British Isles, for each of these movements brought a new way of organizing society and government, a new language and culture, and, eventually, the assimilation of a new people and their ways.

In particular, precisely because it was repeatedly threatened with invasion, the people of southeastern Britain (i.e., England) experienced increasing centralization. During the Anglo-Saxon period (410–1066
CE
), a series of strong kings of the Wessex dynasty (most notably Alfred the Great, 848/9–99, reigned 871–99) established their control over the whole of “Angle-land.” In order to do this, and above all to repel a series of Viking invasions in the ninth and tenth centuries, they had to develop an efficient military and a reliable system of taxation to support it – or to buy off the invaders when they did not choose to fight. Readers of
Beowulf
know that Anglo-Saxon tribal kings had always relied upon small bands of noblemen (eventually called
thegns),
associated with their households, for their military force. Alfred, who came to rule not a tribe but a nation, needed a bigger, more national force. Thus, he established an efficient militia or
fyrd
, made up of the civilian male population serving in rotation, as well as a strong navy. To pay for their supply on campaign, Alfred’s successors developed an efficient land tax, called the
heregeld.

Anglo-Saxon kings also created institutions to enhance their control of England in times of peace. Thus, by 1066, they had established a capital at Winchester and divided the country into about 40 counties or shires (see
map 2
). Each shire had a “shire reeve” or sheriff, who acted on the king’s orders to collect the
heregeld
or raise the
fyrd.
He received those orders via royal messages called “writs,” which were sent out by the king’s chancellor and other secretaries, called clerks, working out of an office later called the Chancery. The yield from taxes was sent to the king’s Treasury, known as the Chamber because, at first, the king actually kept this money in his bedchamber. After the Norman Conquest of 1066, William the Conqueror (1066–87) and his successors moved the capital to London, but otherwise embraced this administrative system and improved it. These developments tended to make England a more centralized and unified country, and to make the king’s authority more efficient and secure. Admittedly, that process was still incomplete as this book opens in 1485, for the king’s authority was weak in many frontier areas in the north and west, where powerful nobles held sway.

Still, nothing like this process took place in Scotland, Ireland, Wales (or, for that matter, Cornwall in the remote West). Located farther away from continental Europe, more mountainous or boggy and difficult of access, these regions did not experience large-scale invasions or migrations until much later. Migratory groups might launch periodic attempts at individual settlement, but there was little mass displacement of population, settling down, or intermarriage before about 1150. These lands were therefore not subjected to the cultural clashes and transformations experienced by medieval England. They remained Celtic in culture and, to a great extent, language well into the Middle Ages.

Nor did strong centralized kingship emerge in these countries as in England. Once again, their harsher climates, poorer soils, and rougher topography (craggy, boggy, forested) made agriculture more difficult and worked against the growth of a central court city, large urban administrative centers, nucleated villages, or easy communication. Rather, people lived in isolated settlements, far from each other. This made it difficult for even a strong ruler to gain the cooperation or loyalty of his subjects. During the Middle Ages there arose a king of Scotland, a high-king of Ireland, and a prince of (North) Wales, but most people’s effective loyalty went to their individual tribe or, later, their clan or (in Ireland) their sept. A clan or sept was a political and social unit whose members claimed to be descended from a common ancestor; in practice, many had no blood relationship to each other. Rather, most clansmen were simply the tenants of their chief. Like an extended family, the clan provided sustenance, protection, and a sense of belonging, sometimes over very long distances, in return for loyalty and, especially, military service. This system left no room for a powerful sovereign or overarching “national” institutions. Rather, rival clans often fought long, bloody feuds, sometimes over broad issues such as the Crown of Scotland or the principality of Wales, but more often over local dominance, land, cattle, or women.