Empire of the Sikhs (18 page)

Nalwa, like Murat, was known as a general's general, and living up to his reputation he soon initiated a project to build a fort at Jamrud, which dominates the entrance to the Khyber Pass. Within a year of its construction in 1836, the resentful Kabul regime, furious at the audacity of the Sikhs even to think of building a fort in their territory, overlooking the traditional route they had taken into India for centuries, mounted an attack against it with a large force. They opened up with their guns on the walls of the fort and were about to begin an assault when Hari Singh, who had held back until the enemy advanced, suddenly fell upon them with his customary vigour, broke their ranks without much loss and put them to flight.
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Soon, however, with the arrival of Afghan reinforcements the ebb and flow of battle resumed with intensity. The outcome was in favour of the Sikhs but at a terrible cost – the death of Hari Singh Nalwa. Badly wounded, this great warrior died the same night. His contribution to upholding the valour of the Khalsa is reflected to this day in the inscription still to be seen on the inner gateway of the Bala Hisar or High Fort of Peshawar:

Victory to Purakh [the Supreme Being]. Through grace of Sri Akal. Under the liberal government of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh Bahadur over the region of Peshawar, in the year [Vikram Samvat] 1891 [AD 1834].
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The truly enlightened ones
Are those who neither incite fear in others
Nor fear anyone themselves.

GURU GRANTH SAHIB
, Slok, 16, p. 1427

Many writers have been at pains to give credit for some of Ranjit Singh's dazzling military victories to the European officers serving under him. But in fact, these officers were recruited only from 1822, and much before that many campaigns using forces made up of Sikhs and other citizens of Punjab had been fought, especially against the Afghans, battle-tested and bloodied fighters steeped for generations in a tradition of relentless armed conflict. Ranjit Singh was used to winning victories and calling the shots unaided well before the year 1822 in which Jean-François Allard and Jean-Baptiste Ventura arrived in Lahore.

He was in no doubt over the exceptional fighting qualities of the Sikhs and their courage and commitment on the battlefield, against the British or any other adversaries. But he was also aware of the need for other inputs and that his armies lacked modern weapons which the British and other Western powers had in plenty. He had been well aware since his secret nocturnal visit to General Lake's camp on the Beas during the British campaign against the Marathas in 1803 that his forces' effectiveness could be
considerably enhanced with newer and more advanced methods of training and a stronger sense of discipline and order. He hired foreign military instructors from early in his reign, mostly from within the subcontinent, including Anglo-Indians. The end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 released a ready supply of European professional soldiers, and a number of these entered the Maharaja's service from the 1820s as officers, those who had served under Napoleon being especially selected. He endlessly grilled those he knew could contribute towards the efficiency of his armies, since he had no problems with learning from others.

He was not to be taken in by smooth and facile statements and reviewed with the utmost care the pedigree of those who sought to enter his service, and even after they had effectively answered his barrage of questions he had them investigated still more thoroughly. When Allard and Ventura appeared before him, he had heard that they had both served in Napoleon's army, but to satisfy himself still further he had them checked out by his own men to eliminate the danger of moles. When he was convinced of their integrity, Allard was given a responsible position with the Sikh cavalry and Ventura with the infantry.

Jean-François Allard, a Frenchman with an impressive background, had fought in Naples, Spain and Portugal before joining Napoleon's Imperial Guard. Starting with the command of a company of a hundred men, Allard rose to be the senior general in Ranjit Singh's cavalry. Jean-Baptiste Ventura, an Italian, had an equally sound record and had served in Napoleon's army under Joachim Murat, Marshal of France. After Waterloo he had served in Turkey and Egypt, and when he met Allard in Tehran they both decided to go to India. A few years younger than Allard, Ventura was a colourful character; married to a Muslim woman, he kept a sizeable harem and had a roving eye. After serving with distinction for seventeen years he died in Peshawar of a heart attack in 1839. Ranjit Singh, who was himself seriously ill at the
time, was not told of his death as it was feared it might prove too much for him because of the extent of his affection and regard for Allard. Ventura served on after Ranjit Singh's death and retired in 1843. During his career with the Lahore Darbar he fought against the Afghans in 1823, in Kangra in 1828 and at Peshawar in 1832, also being appointed, successively, governor of Derajat and Lahore.

Two other generals who served Ranjit Singh with distinction were Paolo di Batolomeo Avitabile and Claude-Auguste Court. Both, like Allard and Ventura, had served in Napoleon's army. Avitabile joined the Sikh army in 1826 and Court in 1827. Avitabile, over six feet tall and inclined to stoutness, spoke fluent Persian, Hindustani, French and Italian. Further to his other appointments, he was made governor of Wazirabad in 1829 and of Peshawar in 1837. Court, a short, plump, well-dressed man with a pockmarked face, trained the Gurkhas serving in the Sikh army and provided major impetus to the development of the artillery. Figures vary regarding how many Europeans served in Ranjit Singh's army, although the number of forty-two is generally agreed upon. Of these twelve were Frenchmen, four Italians, four Germans, three Americans, two Spaniards, one Russian, one Scot, three Englishmen, seven Anglo-Indians, and there were five others.

After a period of induction during which they familiarized themselves with all aspects of the Sikh army, Ranjit Singh gave Allard and Ventura sweeping authority to organize new units, advise on the appointment of new officers and introduce French drill and training throughout the regular army. The change to the Fauj-i-ain, using French terminology and words of command, with beat of drum, in place of the existing system modelled on the British, took more than a decade to accomplish. The steady increase in the strength of the Sikh army's infantry and cavalry up to and beyond Ranjit Singh's death can be substantially attributed to the impetus provided by these two. Another change they
brought about was a restructuring of the Fauj-i-ain introducing the larger unit of the brigade.

Together with Avitabile, Allard and Ventura created the ‘Royal Army', the Fauj-i-khas, which became known as ‘the French Legion', containing units of all three main branches of the army. In two years its infantry strength was four battalions and two cavalry regiments, with a smaller artillery corps under a Muslim officer; it eventually attained a total strength approaching 6,000 men.
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Whereas the effectiveness of Allard's cavalry is a matter of some debate, especially after Allard's death in 1839, the infantry component of the Royal Army went from strength to strength, seasoned by the actions at Naushehra (1823), Peshawar (1837-9), Kulu and Mandi (1841) and reaching a pinnacle of performance in the First Sikh War (1845-6).

Although Court was given the task of developing the regular artillery soon after his entry into the Maharaja's service in 1827, it took four years and Governor-General Bentinck's artillery demonstration at the Ropar meeting of 1831 to bring home the full scale of reform that was needed. Court followed his French compatriots in introducing French gun drill and words of command, at the same time training the artillerymen with a French manual he translated into Persian. He greatly increased the scale of production of guns at the Sikh foundries and taught the ordnance workmen how to cast shells and make fuses. At Ranjit Singh's death in 1839 the regular artillery possessed some 192 field pieces (compared with roughly a hundred in 1826), not counting guns in fortresses and in the hands of the
jagirdars.
By the outbreak of the First Sikh War six years later this figure was to double, although a number of these guns were old pieces taken from fortresses and refurbished.

One authoritative answer to those who insist that Ranjit Singh's military victories were only made possible by European officers is given by J.D. Cunningham, himself a British army officer and
assistant to the British political agent at the Sikh frontier in 1837: ‘It has been usual to attribute the superiority of the Sikh army to the labours of these two officers [Generals Allard and Ventura] and of their subsequent coadjutors, the Generals Court and Avitabile; but, in truth, the Sikh owes his excellence as a soldier to his own hardihood of character, to that spirit of adaptation which has distinguished every new people and to that feeling of a common interest and destiny implanted in him by his great teachers.'
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No one better understood the need for adaptation, commitment and practical wisdom for achieving military goals than Ranjit Singh. He not only displayed these qualities personally, motivating soldiers to battle determined to win or die in the attempt, but he chose generals who themselves became legends in their lifetime. His generals took pride in proving to the enemy that they were no ordinary men, that they belonged to the army of the Khalsa. And to set the example he would very often lead them into battle himself. He proved in more ways than one that a good leader of men must also be a good judge of men. While we have seen him as soldier, statesman, humanist and liberal, it is time to look at another side of him – as a leader who knew how to pick men who would help him achieve his aims in the many armed struggles he knew he would be involved in all his life and also men who would help him administer his expanding empire.

It should be noted at this point that while most of the men Ranjit Singh chose served him well during his lifetime, some betrayed his successors and the Sikh empire after his death, notoriously the two Dogras and two Brahmins Gulab Singh, Dhian Singh, Tej Singh and Lal Singh. For the British historian Lepel Griffin ‘there are, perhaps, no characters in Punjab history more repulsive than Rajas Dhian Singh and Gulab Singh', and he writes of their ‘atrocious cruelty, their treachery, their avarice, and their unscrupulous ambition'.
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But, vile as they were, these men served Ranjit Singh well while he lived and showed their true colours only after his
death. Their actions are described in the last chapter of this book; they are mentioned here in order to illustrate that while Ranjit Singh had no difficulty in getting the most perfidious men to do his bidding he did not provide for the possibility that some might ill-serve his legacy after his death, and in this lapse he has to share some of the responsibility for the fall of the Sikh empire.

Hari Singh Nalwa, Ranjit's stalwart in Kashmir, is only one of some forty-seven generals acclaimed for ‘sealing his victories with their blood'. In stark contrast to the prevalent tendency in India to favour men of one's own faith, caste or class, Ranjit Singh showed no such bias in the choice of these men. He looked for merit and rewarded it with high rank and respect. So it is no surprise that the Hindu, Sikh, Muslim and Christian generals who earned the empire distinction through their military victories also helped strengthen the secular traditions of the Sikh state. Many biographers have been unable or unwilling to acknowledge this quality of Ranjit Singh's.

Ranjit Singh proceeded in exactly the same way in selecting his cabinet of ministers. There was no discrimination whatsoever, and in fact it was the Sikhs who held the least number of posts in his cabinet.

What stands out in the different stages of Ranjit Singh's life is how he was able to interact with people of different religions and races. He used diplomacy and treaties to deal with the British but bargained and warred with the Afghans. He was at ease with both, just as he was at home either in the saddle riding fifty miles a day or at a grand Durbar held in honour of some dignitary. Military genius, empire-builder, ladies' man – all this would have been of no account had he lacked the ability to consolidate his empire and keep it stable. This he managed to do for forty years through just administration – no mean feat for an uneducated school drop-
out. ‘Governing', writes Sir Lepel Griffin, ‘is an art which may no doubt be brilliantly practised without special training by some men of exceptional genius.'
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The young Ranjit Singh as a
misldar
had a small body of people to help him administer his
misl.
Its affairs were looked after by Diwan Lakpat Rai, who was in charge of a treasury-keeper or
toshania,
an accountant or
munim
and a few clerks or
munshis.
Ranjit Singh allocated the portfolios of civil and military affairs, revenue collection and expenditure to himself. After he became Maharaja he built up his administrative department, which at one time consisted of fifteen different offices of state.