Exceptional (18 page)

As the meeting concluded, the Iraqi vice president asked once again what would fill the vacuum when American troops left. Undersecretary Bill Burns, according to the embassy's report of the meeting,
“reiterated that the U.S. is determined to keep its commitments to Iraq, build strong political and security institutions, and will not exchange Iraq's security as part of
discussions with Iran.” Sadly, President Obama would walk away from just those commitments over the next few years.

On August 12, 2010, the Iraqi Army chief of staff was even more direct about what the security of his country required. Lieutenant General Babakir Zebari told a London newspaper that the Iraqi Army would not be ready to protect the nation
until 2020 and that they would need support from U.S. troops until then.

In a speech from the Oval Office on August 31, 2010, President Obama announced the end of American combat operations in Iraq. It was time, he said, for us to turn our attention to problems at home and to the war in Afghanistan, where, he said, “al Qaeda continues to plot against us, and its leadership remains anchored in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. We will disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda, while preventing Afghanistan from serving as a base for terrorists.” But, as important as the war in Afghanistan was, we were going to fight it only for the next year. “Next August,” he explained, “we will begin a transition to Afghan responsibility.”

In case America's withdrawal from the field of battle looked to the world like a defeat, President Obama offered this: “In an age without surrender ceremonies, we must earn victory through the success of our partners and the
strength of our own nation.” He could hardly have been more wrong. In an age of terror, America must earn victory by defeating the terrorists, not by ceding them large swaths of territory and resources.

As 2011 opened, President Obama had to determine what size residual force the United States would leave in Iraq after the current Status of Forces Agreement expired in December. America's new commander in Iraq, General Lloyd Austin, recommended a force of between
20,000 and 24,000. The White House said that was too large. General Austin then recommended 19,000, with two other options for 16,000 troops with different glide paths for withdrawal. Again, the White House said no. The president decided, based on no military rationale, that he was prepared to leave behind no more than
3,500 troops. In addition, the United States would insist that any new Status of Forces Agreement would have to be approved by the Iraqi parliament. In light of the political atmosphere in Baghdad at the time, this was essentially a poison pill.

Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki suggested a
memorandum of understanding or an executive agreement that would not require the politically impossible step on which Obama was insisting. The White House said no. In the end, the number of troops President Obama was willing to consider in a stay-behind force was too small to protect America's interests or Iraq's security. Maliki was being asked to take a big political risk—seeking parliamentary approval—for minimal security gain. The deal fell apart.

America's commitment to Iraq's security was now being replaced by something else. In a joint press conference with Maliki on December 12, 2011, Obama said America and Iraq would be “partnering for
our shared security.” This did not mean “stationing American troops there or with U.S. bases in Iraq,” President Obama was quick to add. “Those days are over.” What America would be doing, among other things, would be establishing “a new formal channel of communication between our national security advisors.” In addition, America and Iraq would be “partnering for regional security.” The president didn't offer any details, but he did issue an edict. “Just as Iraq has pledged not to interfere in other nations,” he said, “other nations must not interfere in Iraq. Iraq's sovereignty must be respected.”

President Obama still seemed not to understand that words divorced from action cannot defeat a determined enemy.

On December 14, 2011, the president visited Fort Bragg to commemorate the end of the war in Iraq. America's withdrawal was “a moment of success,” he said.

Now, Iraq is not a perfect place. It has many challenges ahead. But we're leaving behind a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people. We're building a new partnership between our nations. And we are ending a war not with a final battle but with a final
march toward home.

When President Obama arrived in office, Iraq was stable, largely because of the surge of forces and the adoption of a counterinsurgency strategy ordered by George W. Bush, but that stability would not last long. On December 17, 2011, at 0230 hours, the last American ground convoy left Iraq.

A senior Obama administration official interviewed by Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor for their book
The Endgame
explained:

[
W
]
e came to the conclusion that achieving the goal of a security partnership with Iraq was not dependent on the size of our footprint in country, and that stability in Iraq did not depend on the presence
of the U.S. forces.

It was a convenient conclusion, and it was wrong. Though the Iraqis themselves certainly bear a portion of the responsibility for the failure to secure a new Status of Forces Agreement, it is clear President Obama did not want to leave any American forces in Iraq.

He has since tried to deny this—as terror and destruction spread across Iraq in the wake of America's complete withdrawal. President
Obama has tried to assert that the troop withdrawal wasn't his plan after all. Most memorably, in an appearance on the South Lawn of the White House in August 2014, the president was asked whether, in light of the rise of ISIS and the violence spreading across Iraq and Syria, it might not have been better to have left some U.S. troops in Iraq. “You know,” he said, “the thing I find interesting about this, is that people are acting as though it
were my decision.”

The president seemed to have forgotten his repeated claims of credit for the removal of all U.S. forces from Iraq, beginning with his announcement of the end of combat operations in a speech from the Oval Office in October 2011. “After taking office,” he explained, “I announced a new strategy that would end our combat mission in Iraq and remove all of our troops by the end of 2011. . . . So, today, I can report that, as promised, the rest of our troops in Iraq will come home by the
end of the year.”

Obama similarly took credit for removing all U.S. forces nearly every day of the 2012 presidential election campaign. During a debate with his Republican opponent, former governor Mitt Romney, on October 22, 2012, President Obama criticized him for asserting that America should have left a stay-behind force. “Now you just gave a speech in which you said we should still have troops in Iraq. That's not a recipe for making sure we are taking advantage of the opportunity and meeting the challenges
of the Middle East.”

In his State of the Union address on January 24, 2012, President Obama heralded all he had done to end war, and explained what this new era would mean for America:

Ending the war in Iraq has allowed us to strike decisive blows against our enemies. From Pakistan to Yemen, the al Qaeda operatives who remain are scrambling, knowing they can't escape the reach of the United States of America.

He wrapped our exit from Iraq in a glossy metaphor:

As the tide of war recedes, a wave of change has washed across the Middle East and North Africa, from Tunis to Cairo; from Sana'a to Tripoli.

There was indeed a wave of change washing across the Arab world. Tragically, it would be led by thousands of militant Islamist terrorists marching under the black banners of al Qaeda and ISIS.

In 2008, candidate Barack Obama left no uncertainty as to his position on the war in Afghanistan. In a speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars that August, he said:

This is the central front in the war on terrorism. This is where the Taliban is gaining strength and launching new attacks. . . . This is a war we have to win. And as commander in chief, I will have no greater priority than taking out these terrorists who threaten America, and finishing the
job against the Taliban.

At about that time, work was under way in the Bush White House from which President Obama and his team would benefit. In the fall of 2008, President Bush ordered “a quiet surge” of additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan. At the same time, he instructed the National Security Council to conduct a review of Afghan policy and provide recommendations for the road ahead. Simultaneous reviews were under way at the State Department, Defense Department, and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

President-elect Obama and his national security team were briefed
on the findings and recommendations of these reviews early in the transition process. The incoming national security advisor, General Jim Jones, asked that the Bush administration not announce the findings of their policy review publicly and President Bush agreed. He wanted to give the incoming team every opportunity to succeed.

In March 2009, when President Obama launched his new Afghanistan strategy, which included additional troops and a focus on counterinsurgency, it bore a striking resemblance to the review and findings the Bush team had provided. In a speech from the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, the president told the American people what was at stake:

We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the United States, our friends and our allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of violent extremists. So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That's the goal that
must be achieved.

To complete this mission, President Obama had ordered the deployment of an additional 17,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. In May 2009, he appointed General Stanley McChrystal to take over command of U.S. forces and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates instructed McChrystal to undertake a sixty-day assessment of the situation on the ground before making any requests or
recommendations for resources.

General McChrystal submitted his findings on August 30. He urged immediate action. “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near term (next 12 months)—while Afghan
security capacity matures,” he wrote, “risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.” It was also crucial that the president dedicate the necessary resources to the fight. “Failure to provide adequate resources,” McChrystal's report concluded, “also risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs, and ultimately, a critical loss of political support. Any of these risks, in turn, are likely to result in
mission failure.” General McChrystal assessed he would need an additional 40,000 troops to accomplish the mission President Obama had given the military. McChrystal wrote later that he viewed the troop calculation not as a “request” but as providing his “
best military advice to the commander in chief.”

Having told the American people for the last two years that he was dedicated to doing everything it took to win in Afghanistan, and having already established the mission in March 2009, the Obama administration nonetheless took months debating McChrystal's assessment and troop request. As Secretary of Defense Gates described it, “Over and over again we would rehash the issues and get further into the weeds—details beyond what was
needed or appropriate.”

Ultimately, the president decided to send 30,000 additional troops. At least one of the reasons he did not grant the full troop request was political. During one of the meetings to discuss the troop levels, according to former secretary of defense Gates, the president had said, “On Afghanistan, my
poll numbers will be stronger if I take issue with the military over Afghanistan policy.”

President Obama announced his decision in a speech on December 1, 2009, at West Point. He explained all that was at stake. America's security, “the security of our allies, and the common security of the world,” he said, depended upon denying al Qaeda a safe haven and reversing the Taliban's momentum. And then, in what may be the most ambivalent presidential call to arms in history, he said, “As commander in chief, I have determined that it is in our national interest
to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home.” In case the Taliban or al Qaeda or our allies didn't catch this first reference to a timetable, a few paragraphs later the president said we would “begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in
July of 2011.” After telling the world that this was a war of necessity, not a war of choice, Barack Obama was now announcing he would be fighting it only for the next eighteen months.

Much of what the president said about Afghanistan in 2009 was true. American security did depend upon defeating al Qaeda and denying them a safe haven. Those things were still true two years later when the president chose to withdraw the majority of American forces from the field of battle.

By the spring of 2011, the president had lost the will to fight and win the war in Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense Gates has written about the deep concern he felt sitting in an NSC meeting in March 2011, listening to the president describe his determination to draw down American troops:

As I sat there, I thought: The president doesn't trust his commander, can't stand Karzai, doesn't believe in his own strategy, and doesn't consider the war to be his. For him, it's all
about getting out.

On June 22, 2011, President Obama announced that U.S. forces in Afghanistan would begin coming home in July, and that all of the surge forces he had announced in the December 2009 West Point address would be home by the summer of 2012.