Fighting on all Fronts (29 page)
Read Fighting on all Fronts Online
Authors: Donny Gluckstein
10
Cornelissen, Harmsen and De Jong (eds), pp59-63.
11
Boogman (et al, eds), p390.
12
Boogman (et al, eds), p421.
13
Kielich, p93; Harmsen and Reinalda 1975, p180.
14
Cornelissen, Harmsen and De Jong (eds), pp88-90.
15
Els Blok,
Uit de Schaduw van de mannen. Vrouwenverzet 1930-1940
(Sara, 1985), p169.
16
Robin te Slaa and Edwin Klijn,
De NSB—Ontstaan en opkomst van de Nationaal-Socialistische beweging 1931-1935
(Boom, 2009), p61.
17
Evelien De Gans, ‘They have forgotten to gas you: Post-1945 anti-Semitism in the Netherlands’, in Philomena Essed and Isabel Hoving (eds),
Dutch Racism
(Rodopi, 2014), p76.
18
The figure the NSB provided (32 percent workers among the last 5,000 members) is probably highly inflated for propaganda reasons. Te Slaa and Klein, p663.
19
Jan Rogier,
De geschiedschrijver des rijks en andere socialisten. Politieke portretten 1
(SUN, 1977), p24.
20
Te Slaa and Klijn, p21.
21
Josje Damsma and Erik Schumacher,
Hier woont een NSB’er—Nationaalsocialisten in bezet Amsterdam
(Boom, 2010), p15.
22
Lou De Jong,
Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog
, vol 3 (Nijhoff, 1969-1991), p499.
23
Hendrik Mattheüs Van Randwijk, In de schaduw van gisteren. Kroniek van het verzet in de Jaren 1940-1945 (Bert Bakker, 1970), pp150-151.
24
Bas von Benda Beckman,
De Velser Affaire: een omstreden oorlogsgeschiedenis
(Boom, 2013), pp42-43, mentions the arrest in Velsen of 300 Germans and 25 Nazis. In Eindhoven 266 “male strangers of the German nationality over 16 years” were arrested, and NSB members—Desiderius Marinus Dejaeger,
De houding van de Nederlandse politie tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog in de grote steden in Noord-Brabant
(Thesis Tilburg University, 1999), p19. Susan Galesloot and Hansje Legêne,
Partij in het verzet. De CPN in de Tweede Wereldoorlog
(Pegasus,
1986), p22, incompletely list arrested communists of 10 May: David Wijnkoop, Gerrit Roorda, Louis de Visser, Frans Olfers, Wiep van Apeldoorn, Gerrit Sterringa and others.
25
Dejaeger, p31.
26
Dejaeger p39.
27
“The Dutch responded to this problem by quickly converting from livestock to arable farming and although they were able to send large quantities of meat and fat to the Reich in the first two years of the war, by the end they were only able to supply potatoes, feed grain, sugar and large quantities of fruit and vegetables”—Lizzie Collingham,
The Taste of War. World War ii and the Battle for Food
(The Penguin Press, 2012), p175.
28
Van Randwijk, p166.
29
William I Hitchcock,
The Bitter Road to Freedom: The Human Cost of Allied Victory in World War II Europe
(Free Press, 2009), p100.
30
James Heartfield,
An Unpatriotic History of the Second World War
(Zero Books, 2012), p169.
31
Alan S Milward,
War Ecomomy and Society 1939-1945
(Pelican, 1987), p211.
32
Von Benda-Beckmann, p45.
33
Hitchcock, p100.
34
Nanda van der Zee,
Om erger te voorkomen. De voorbereiding en uitvoering van de vernietiging van het Nederlandse Jodendom tijdens de tweede wereldoorlog
(Meulenhoff, 1997), p172.
35
Rogier, 1979, p65.
36
Rogier, 1979, p103. It must be noted that post-war criticism of the Jewish Council was partly popular due to anti-Semitism, as this “You did it yourselves” could function as a lightning rod for the labour employment agencies (Arbeidsbureaus), city administrations and ministries.
37
Doeko Bosscher,
Om de erfenis van Colijn. De ARP op de grans vat twee werelden
(1939-1952) (Sijthoff, 1980), pp80-81.
38
Von Benda-Beckmann, p130.
39
Mr Abel J Herzberg, “De Joden”, in Bert Bakker, D H Couveé and Jan Kassies (eds),
Visioen en werkelijkheid. De illegale pers over de toekomst van de samenleving
(Semper Avanti, undated), pp253-258, p254.
40
Galesloot and Legêne, p65.
41
The NIOD estimated resistance “industries” as: illegal press, pilot aid and forgery 25,000; finance 4,000; espionage 5,000; armed resistance 2,000 and aid for hiders 40,000. This included “September Knights” and “May Beetles” (Evert Werkman (ed),
Ik néém het niet! Hoogtepunten uit het verzet 1940-1945
(Sijthoff, 1965), p348).
42
Galesloot and Legêne, p43.
43
Galesloot and Legêne, p59.
44
Von Benda-Beckmann, p132.
45
Van Randwijk, p218.
46
Von Benda-Beckmann, pp180-183.
47
Werkman (ed.), p71.
48
Rogier, 1979, p75.
49
Galesloot and Legêne, pp54-56.
50
Galesloot and Legêne, p67.
51
Galesloot and Legêne, pp73-74.
52
De Jaeger p42.
53
Galesloot and Legêne, p80.
54
Galesloot and Legêne, pp87-88.
55
De Jaeger, pp34-35.
56
Von Benda-Beckmann, pp80-81.
57
I Schöffer,
Het national-socialistische beeld van de geschiednis der Nederlanden. Een historiografische en bibliografische studie
(HES, 1978), p73.
58
Heartfield, pp168-169.
59
Bosscher, p58.
60
Heartfield, p169.
61
Madelon de Keizer,
De gijzelaars van Sint Michielsgestel. Een elite-beraad in oorlogstijd
(Sijthoff, 1979), p113.
62
Schöffer, p76.
63
Rogier, 1979, pp103-104.
64
Amounting to 130 mayors, “ruling” circa 40 percent of the population in 1943 (Von Benda-Beckmann, p77).
65
Damsma and Schumacher, p30.
66
Frans Dekkers,
Eindhoven 1933-45. Kroniek van Nederlands lichtstad in de schaduw van het Derde Rijk
(Onze Tijd/In de Knipscheer, 1982), p182.
67
Dekkers, pp214-216.
68
Galesloot and Legêne, p99.
69
Lou De Jong,
Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog
, vol 5 (Nijhoff, 1969-1991), p100.
70
Galesloot and Legêne, p93-95. The RSAP (ao) criticised the CPN for this move.
71
Galesloot and Legêne, p124.
72
Galesloot and Legêne, pp131-133.
73
Van Randwijk, p165.
74
Rogier, 1979, p280.
75
Erica Moens and Piet Eken,
Vervolging van wagenbewoners in Nederland, 1900-1945
(Doctoral thesis Cultural Anthropology Utrecht University, 1988), p104
76
Pieter Koenders, “Isolement. Homoseksualiteit in de jaren dertig en veertig”, in
Fascisme en Homoseksualiteit
(SUA/De Woelrat, 1985), p150.
77
Galesloot and Legêne, p101.
78
This was the notorious “Flag incident” (Werkman [ed], p146).
79
Ruud Koole,
Politiek partijen in Nederland. Ontstaan en ontwikkeling van partijen en partijstelsel
(Spectrum, 1995), p329.
80
Galesloot and Legêne, p114.
81
Galesloot and Legêne, p119.
82
Van Randwijk, p165.
83
Heartfield, p241.
84
Van Randwijk, p166.
85
Joost Divendal,
Arnold Koper, Max van Wezel
(eds),
De moeizame destalinisatie van de CPN
(Van Gennep, 1982), p51.
86
Von Benda-Beckmann, p144.
87
Galesloot and Legêne, p169.
88
Moens and Eken, p61.
89
Von Benda-Beckmann, p90.
90
Von Benda-Beckmann, pp127-129.
91
Van Randwijk, p224.
92
Hitchcock, p101.
93
Galesloot and Legêne, p194.
94
Werkman (ed), pp314-322.
95
Collingham, pp176-177.
96
Hitchcock, p103.
97
Hitchcock, p98.
98
Hitchcock, p101.
99
Galesloot and Legêne, p216.
100
Damsma and Schumacher, pp136-141.
101
Elaborately documented by Madelon De Keizer.
102
De Keizer, pp41-42.
103
De Keizer, p72.
104
De Keizer, p87.
105
De Keizer, p163-165.
106
Arnold Koper,
Onder de banier van het stalinisme. Een onderzoek naar de geblokkeerde destalinisatie van de CPN
(Van Gennep, 1984), pp41-43.
107
Divendal, Koper and Van Weezel (eds.), p47.
108
Galesloot and Legêne, p171.
109
Rogier, p29
110
Galesloot and Legêne, p184.
111
Galesloot and Legêne, p201.
112
De Keizer, p165.
113
Dirk Schilp,
Dromen van de revolutie
(Wereldbibliotheek, 1967), 156.
114
Galesloot and Legêne, p226.
115
Divendal, Koper and Van Weezel (eds), p51-52.
116
Hitchcock, p106.
117
Hitchcock, p110.
118
Hitchcock, p119.
119
Galesloot and Legêne, p205.
120
Hitchcock, p110.
121
Gabriel Kolko,
The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1943-1945
(Pantheon, 1990), p97.
122
John Newsinger,
British Intervention and the Greek Revolution
(Socialist History Society Occasional Papers Series no 16, 2002), p21.
123
Divendal, Koper and Van Weezel (eds), p53.
124
Damsma and Schumacher, p143.
125
Collingham, p63.
126
Bosscher, p211.
127
Kees Bals and Martin Gerritsen,
De Indonesië-weigeraars
(Materiaalfonds Vereniging Dienstweigeraars, 1989), p11. There were also Dutch soldiers in Indonesia, so the total forces were about 200,000.
128
Bals and Gerritsen, p27.
129
Bals and Gerritsen, p16.
130
Bals and Gerritsen, p17.
131
Bals and Gerritsen (p42) explain: “The usual pretext was that a mother could not do without her son. If you stood up for your political motivation, then you would be singled out and got the heaviest punishment…everybody understood it was very stupid to stand up openly for your political motivation.”
132
De Gans, p77.
133
De Gans, p80.
134
Dienke Hondius, ‘Thans dienen de Joden hun dankbaarheid te tonen’, in Hansje Galesloot and Margreet Schrevel, In Fatsoen hersteld. Zedelijkheid en wederopbouw na de oorlog (SUA, undated), p138.
135
Rogier, p92.
136
Bosscher, p246.
137
Annet Mooij,
De strijd om de Februaristaking
(Balans, 2006), p20.
138
Prof M. W H Nagel, ‘Berechting en zuivering’, in Bakker, Couveé and Kassies (eds), pp112-146, p119.
139
Van der Zee, p139.
140
Van der Zee, p180.
141
Rogier, p65.
142
Von Benda-Beckmann, p95.
143
Rogier, p88.
Russia: Stalin and the People’s War
Donny Gluckstein
The battle between Germany and the Soviet Union formed the largest and most important theatre of operations during the Second World War. Hitler’s Wehrmacht deployed 674 divisions there compared to the 56 to 75 opposing the D-Day landings in Western Europe.
1
Yet the Soviet Union sits uneasily within the history of a war that officially began when Germany attacked Poland in September 1939.
Just a week before, Stalin and Hitler had jointly signed up to a pact partitioning Poland. Indeed, the Soviet Union only fought Germany in 1941 after it was itself attacked. Due to this belated entry Russians refer to the “Great Fatherland War” rather than the Second World War.
2
The Soviet Union seems so very different, politically and socially, to all other protagonists that it is legitimate to ask whether it fits into the pattern of war from above and below seen elsewhere.
The Tsarist Empire was 5,000 miles across and 2,500 miles from top to bottom. It employed a powerful, centralised state to intensively exploit the people to both staff and pay for a large army. This was imperialism on a grand scale but of the traditional kind rather than the modern version described by Lenin as “the highest stage of capitalism”. Indeed, the heavy burden of the state depressed economic development, perpetuating a backward semi-feudal society composed of a vast amalgam of Russian and non-Russian groups.
The “Russian steamroller” could prevail as long as the sheer number of soldiers deployed brought success. But advances abroad in military technology threatened this strategy. Fear of falling behind motivated Tsar Peter the Great to open a window on the west by moving his capital from Moscow to St Petersburg in 1712. Thus industrial development was consciously championed by the state in order to provide the military basis for its survival.
In 1914 the Russian economy was still largely dominated by agriculture and the challenge of war proved too much for it. Mass strikes, army mutinies and peasant seizures of the land swept Tsarism aside in February 1917 and carried the Bolsheviks to power in October. The peasantry gained the land while the working class established a new form of democracy through soviets. The Bolshevik rejection of imperialism was expressed by Lenin’s Decree on Peace: “The government considers it the greatest of crimes against humanity to continue this war over the issue of how to divide among the strong and rich nations the weak nationalities they have conquered, and solemnly announces its determination immediately to sign terms of peace to stop this war”.
3
The principle of opposing the dominance of “the strong and rich nations” over “weak nationalities” was also applied at home when oppressed non-Russian nationalities were offered the chance to secede.