Find, Fix, Finish (38 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has a broad job description but little actual power. He is held hostage by twin roles: top intelligence officer and theoretical manager of sixteen disparate, often warring intelligence agencies, many of which take their marching orders from other leaders, including the DNI’s boss, the president of the United States. Being CEO of the intelligence community is an all-consuming task; having one individual absorb and synthesize all the intelligence issues facing the country on top of that is well-nigh impossible.
The ODNI’s inability to hire and fire heads of organizations and the problems that result has been well documented. But the difficulty runs deeper than the bureaucratic imperatives of the day. Twenty-three-year CIA veteran and former director of intelligence and counterintelligence at the US Department of Energy Rolf Mowatt-Larssen argues that the IC needs “genius, great ideas, great concepts . . . that’s the edge to cut through all the red tape.... The world is changing so rapidly. We need to transform to keep up with the world.”
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But as of now, Mowatt-Larssen sadly remarked, there seems to be “no sense of urgency—the urgency that fuels successful transformation. Whenever there’s a change of culture, the bureaucracy protects itself.”
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But as of now, Mowatt-Larssen sadly remarked, there seems to be “no sense of urgency—the urgency that fuels successful transformation. Whenever there’s a change of culture, the bureaucracy protects itself.”
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Still, beyond its role as the political fall guy in the event of another catastrophic terror attack, the ODNI can be an interagency umpire. In the event that two agencies are at odds with each other over policy, the ODNI can serve as a neutral arbiter. For example, in 2008 CIA and Saudi security services covertly ran a jihadist website intended to lure extremists in order to gather intelligence, thwart terror plots, and make arrests before anything became operational.
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However, the US military became concerned that the website was being used to facilitate fighters entering Iraq and shut it down—despite the intelligence lost. In this case, the ODNI could have refereed this high-stakes interagency conflict to some sort of conclusion instead of one bureaucracy forcibly getting its way over another.
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However, the US military became concerned that the website was being used to facilitate fighters entering Iraq and shut it down—despite the intelligence lost. In this case, the ODNI could have refereed this high-stakes interagency conflict to some sort of conclusion instead of one bureaucracy forcibly getting its way over another.
Another way the ODNI could provide value is through real strategic intelligence. It doesn’t need to redraft the tactical and pseudo-strategic memos drawn from the same information streams exploited by every open source analysis shop in the intelligence community. As of now, the slurry porridge that is “finished intelligence”—especially counterterrorism analysis—is crafted by multiple government agencies with varying degrees of competence, accuracy, and creativity. But it remains unclear whether the redundant analysis provided by the ODNI, the “house that al-Qaeda built,” is superior, or even on par, with what their colleagues in long-established organizations produce. Of course, a certain amount of redundant analysis can be an important check, but multiple redundancies can often lead to bureaucratic constipation and paralysis.
In this light, ODNI could remove itself from the day-to-day tactical analysis churned out by other mission-focused organizations, and develop a prestigious cadre of “superanalysts”—the US government’s foremost experts in a given national security field—who can focus on the big picture and remain above the fray of the timid, lowest-common-denominator analysis common in communally created products. As the WMD Commission (among other commissions and studies) noted a few years ago, “Analysts cannot maintain their expertise if they cannot conduct long-term and strategic analysis,” but the demand for “current intelligence” consumes the majority of government analysts’ time and energy.
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By creating a cadre of first-among-equals analysts, the ODNI could capitalize on the creative energies of its working population. This effort would be separate from the occasional strategic-level papers produced by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) because these particular thinkers would be encouraged to challenge conventional wisdom.
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By creating a cadre of first-among-equals analysts, the ODNI could capitalize on the creative energies of its working population. This effort would be separate from the occasional strategic-level papers produced by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) because these particular thinkers would be encouraged to challenge conventional wisdom.
Nothing remains secret forever; intelligence activities must be defensible in the court of public opinion.
Denying actions that are legally or morally questionable does not make them go away. America’s robust drone-based strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban-linked individuals in countries with whom we are not at war has been a firm policy since 9/11, yet the US government will not officially confirm that these actions are taking place.
Denying actions that are legally or morally questionable does not make them go away. America’s robust drone-based strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban-linked individuals in countries with whom we are not at war has been a firm policy since 9/11, yet the US government will not officially confirm that these actions are taking place.
The US exploits numerous new counterterrorism tactics, including some extremely controversial ones. The White House–sanctioned, Department of Justice–certified use of so-called black sites, enhanced interrogation techniques, warrantless electronic surveillance, and targeted killings were once closely guarded secrets. Not only was the public kept in the dark but most people in the intelligence community knew nothing of these efforts. But most secrets eventually become public; it was only a matter of time before the information inevitably leaked.
For reasons as varied as disgruntlement, fame-seeking, political mischief, or a troubled conscience, US policymakers and intelligence officials have brought these controversial practices to light. Furthermore, detainees treated to stepped-up methods of information extraction have and will likely continue to talk about their treatment in detention. And the media and public are always hungry for a good story.
These morally gray areas would benefit from debate and consensus, as a number of counterterrorism techniques raise troubling moral, ethical, and legal questions. The targeted killings of terrorists as a function of state policy has been one of the clearest reversals of American foreign policy behavior stemming from the 9/11 attacks. As late as July 2001, US ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk specifically condemned Israel for its policy of targeting specific terrorist leaders for death, stating “the United States government is very clearly on the record as against targeted assassinations. They are extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that.”
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Clearly the US has set upon a difficult path. The list of individuals slated for elimination seems to be growing. At first al-Qaeda top leaders were the only ones on the list, then Taliban leaders, and now other individuals such as drug lords in Afghanistan—not direct combatants—are marked.
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This “target creep” is dangerous and its implications are dizzying.
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There must be a sober discussion in America to determine whether this road is worth traveling down in the future, long after al-Qaeda is dead and gone.
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This “target creep” is dangerous and its implications are dizzying.
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There must be a sober discussion in America to determine whether this road is worth traveling down in the future, long after al-Qaeda is dead and gone.
Pakistan is a critical but deeply unreliable ally in the fight against al-Qaeda.
As the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan—Islamabad being one of three capitals that recognized the Taliban as the rightful rulers of Afghanistan prior to 9/11—once remarked, “[The Pakistanis] have two tongues in one mouth, and two faces on one head, so that they can speak everybody’s language. They use everybody, deceive everybody.”
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As the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan—Islamabad being one of three capitals that recognized the Taliban as the rightful rulers of Afghanistan prior to 9/11—once remarked, “[The Pakistanis] have two tongues in one mouth, and two faces on one head, so that they can speak everybody’s language. They use everybody, deceive everybody.”
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On one hand, Pakistani assistance is essential to destroying al-Qaeda. Bin Laden lived and died there, as have most of the major personalities in the organization. Pakistan’s government and security services are on the forefront of the conflict with al-Qaeda; they also supply and support US efforts in Afghanistan. Hundreds of al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders are now dead or imprisoned because of Pakistani efforts. Most top al-Qaeda leaders in American custody today are sitting in Guantanamo Bay today because of the ISI’s partnership.
On the other hand, almost all major terrorist attacks against the West in the modern era—9/11, the 2003 Madrid train bombings, the 2005 London transit attacks, as well as several botched attacks, including Operation Overt and the Zazi plot—are intimately connected to Pakistan. In fact, the case can be made that Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in September 2011 called the Haqqani network, the terrorist family-cum-criminal syndicate operating in northwestern Pakistan, a “veritable arm” of the ISI. The Haqqanis, responsible for many operations against US and allied forces in Afghanistan, including an attack against the US embassy in Kabul in late 2011, are part and parcel of Pakistan’s strategy “to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy,” as Mullen noted in congressional testimony, in order to take advantage of Afghanistan after the US pulls out of the country.
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Pakistan allows a permissive environment and some security assistance to the Afghan Taliban and other vicious terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed as well as al-Qaeda. There are persistent rumors that members of the security and military establishment have no small degree of personal sympathy for the extremists in their borderlands fighting US forces in Afghanistan. The tension in the bilateral military relationship can be seen in a number of tragic events that have occurred between American and Pakistani forces—many of which are charitably characterized as “friendly fire” but are more accurately expressions of the frustration that each side feels with the other. For instance, in June 2008, a US air strike killed eleven Pakistani Frontier Corps soldiers in what American officials later described as a “tragic mistake.” However, according to local observers, it was anything but: US forces called in the strikes because Pakistani border guards were shooting at them. “When the Americans started bombing the Taliban, the Frontier Corps started shooting at the Americans,” said one observer. “They [the Frontier Corps] were trying to help the Taliban. And then the American planes bombed the Pakistani post.’“
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After the May 2010 car bombing attempt in New York City’s Times Square—carried out by an individual who colluded with TTP operatives and trained in a camp in Pakistan—the White House considered options for unilateral strikes in the event that a successful attack on American soil was traced back to Pakistan’s tribal areas.
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The context of this message suggests that what officials were discussing was a larger retaliatory strike—versus a surgical capture/kill operation—sending the message that the US was prepared to take stronger actions if Pakistan’s actions (or inaction) resulted in US civilian casualties in the homeland.
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The context of this message suggests that what officials were discussing was a larger retaliatory strike—versus a surgical capture/kill operation—sending the message that the US was prepared to take stronger actions if Pakistan’s actions (or inaction) resulted in US civilian casualties in the homeland.
The crux of the problem is that Pakistan—a country chronically just three days from total collapse—has fundamentally different geopolitical priorities than the US. A segment of Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders see the cultivation of extremist organizations as part of a larger strategic game that ensures the stability of the Pakistani state. By assuring the US that attacking Islamic extremists is a priority, while at the same time tolerating and occasionally assisting the same militants, the Pakistani government has successfully secured a continuous flow of billions of dollars in aid to boost the economy, military, and the leaders’ personal coffers.
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In a country where less than 5 percent of the population pays income tax and where the ruling elite has created a system that protects them from paying anything at all, the jihadist threat is essential to keeping the economy afloat.
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“Pakistan is dependent on the American money that these games with the Taliban generate,” a Pakistani official once told journalist Dexter Filkins. “The Pakistani economy would collapse without it.”
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In a country where less than 5 percent of the population pays income tax and where the ruling elite has created a system that protects them from paying anything at all, the jihadist threat is essential to keeping the economy afloat.
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“Pakistan is dependent on the American money that these games with the Taliban generate,” a Pakistani official once told journalist Dexter Filkins. “The Pakistani economy would collapse without it.”
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Pakistan is a deeply corrupt country and the American largesse flowing in does little to ameliorate this endemic problem. Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index rated Pakistan the 143rd most corrupt country (out of 178), making it more corrupt than such legendary kleptocracies such as Zimbabwe and Nigeria.
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The ravaging floods in mid-2010, affecting tens of millions of people and destroying hundreds of miles of land, only worsened the teetering financial state of the country.
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The ravaging floods in mid-2010, affecting tens of millions of people and destroying hundreds of miles of land, only worsened the teetering financial state of the country.
Since Pakistan’s civilian government and the semi-autonomous ISI have little interest in bringing down their dangerous extremist groups, the US may have to act unilaterally. Pakistan has repeatedly pushed back against proposals for the US to conduct boots on the ground operations inside Pakistan, warning that failing to respect the country’s sovereignty could result in armed resistance by Pakistani troops. Still, to fulfill US national security requirements, at least one major foreign policy player with long-term experience in South Asia suggested that the US should conduct operations with or without Islamabad’s acquiescence. George W. Bush’s ambassador to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, wrote in late October 2010 that “the United States should demand that Pakistan shut down all sanctuaries and military support programs for insurgents or else we will carry out operations against those insurgent havens, with or without Pakistani consent. Arguments that such pressure would cause Pakistan to disintegrate are overstated. Pakistan’s institutions, particularly the country’s security organs, are sufficiently strong to preclude such an outcome.”
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The bin Laden raid was the clearest example of successful American intervention. Using the tools at hand, including intense overhead reconnaissance, forward bases along the Afghanistan border, and tactical ground maneuvers, is extremely risky and probably cannot be sustained over a long period of time. The strategy is hamstrung by the fact that US combat troops in Pakistan would incite a strong response within the country, marginalizing any supporters still left in the country and the military. Despite their decade-long involvement, American forces are still alien to the region, while the adversary has walked these ancient pathways for generations. The possibility of American blood being shed in Pakistan remains high. Khalilzad’s comments notwithstanding, a hard political shove by America could result in Pakistan’s complete disintegration of the tenuous grip on stability that Islamabad maintains, leading to a revolt most likely ending with one of two terror-inducing possibilities: a hard-line, half-cocked, nuclear-armed Islamic state or total anarchy.
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