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Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach

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The targeted flights for Op Overt plotters were:
1. 1415 UA931 LONDON-SAN FRANCISCO (United Airlines)
2. 1500 AC849 LONDON-TORONTO (Air Canada)
3. 1515 AC865 LONDON-MONTREAL (Air Canada)
4. 1540 UA959 LONDON-CHICAGO (United Airlines)
5. 1620 UA925 LONDON-WASHINGTON (United Airlines)
6. 1635 AA131 LONDON-NEW YORK (American Airlines)
7. 1650 AA91 LONDON-CHICAGO (American)
1
British authorities found this information on a USB drive.
APPENDIX IV: POSSIBLE TARGETS
 
Other Possible Targets for Op Overt plotters:
1. Canary Wharf
2. The national grid
3. A gas pipeline between Britain and Belgium
4. UK airports, including Heathrow’s new control tower
5. Oil and gas refineries at Bacton, Fawley, Correton, and Kingsbury
6. Several UK power plants, including nuclear stations
7. Companies that store and process hydrogen peroxide
2
NOTES
 
CHAPTER 1: FIRE FROM THE SKY
 
1
Declan Walsh, “Air Strike Kills Taliban Leader Baitullah Mehsud,”
Guardian
, August 7, 2009; Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann,
Revenge of the Drones: An Analysis of Drone Strikes in Pakistan
, New America Foundation, October 19, 2009.
2
Jane Mayer, “The Predator War,”
New Yorker
, October 26, 2009; Joby Warrick, “CIA Places Blame for Bhutto Assassination,”
Washington Post
, January 18, 2008.
3
Mayer, “Predator War.”
4
“Obama: ‘We Took Out’ Pakistani Taliban Chief,” Reuters, August 21, 2009.
5
Joby Warrick, Josh Partlow, and Haq Nawaz Khan, “A Psychological Blow to Pakistani Taliban,”
Washington Post
, August 8, 2009.
6
Ibid.
7
US Department of State, “Rewards for Justice: Baitullah Mehsud,” March 25, 2009.
8
Matthew B. Ridgeway,
The Korean War
(Garden City, NY: Da Capo Press, 1967), 89.
9
Michael Hayden, “Intelligence in the 21st Century,”
Air Force Speeches,
June 19, 2007.
10
James R. Clapper Jr., “Intelligence Transformation: Meeting New Challenges in the Middle East and Beyond” (address presented to the Washington Institute, Washington DC, May 19, 2009).
11
Dana Priest, “Foreign Network at Front of CIA’s Terror Fight,”
Washington Post
, November 18, 2005.
12
“CIA Pays for Support in Pakistan,”
Los Angeles Times
, November 15, 2009.
13
Dana Priest and Ann Scott Tyson, “Bin Laden Trail ‘Stone Cold,’”
Washington Post,
September 10, 2006.
14
George Tenet,
At the Center of the Storm
(New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 254.
15
Elizabeth Bumiller, “Later Terror Link Cited for 1 in 7 Freed Detainees,”
New York Times
, May 20, 2009.
16
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen,
Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, January 2010.
17
Ibid., 1.
18
Alexander Mooney, “Obama Says Time to Rid World of Nuclear Weapons,” CNN, July 16, 2008.
CHAPTER 2: ATROPHY
 
1
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), 131.
2
Ibid.
3
From August 1998 until July 1999, President Clinton signed a series of memorandums of notification (MON) authorizing the CIA, the CIA’s tribal assets, and later the Northern Alliance to run capture and kill operations against bin Laden.
4
See the 9/11 Commission report for further explanation. In 1998, director of central intelligence George Tenet canceled a capture plan that was opposed by Richard Clarke, chair of the NSC’s Counterterrorism Security Group, and national security adviser Sandy Berger. In August 1998, members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense opposed follow-on strikes. In 1999, all principals struck down a cruise missile proposal. Clarke stood in the way of U2 flights over Afghanistan in 1999. CENTCOM commander general Anthony Zinni halted a proposal to deploy AC-130 gunships in 1999. That same year, both Clarke and Tenet opposed a plan to target bin Laden in fear that it could also strike representatives of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It is unclear whether the “best chance” strike on bin Laden in 1999 was canceled by Tenet or the Pentagon. CIA leadership would halt all of the Agency’s own plans until 2001.
5
9/11 Commission Report,
115.
6
9/11 Commission Report,
112–113.
7
“Military Bases That U.S. Could Use,” Associated Press, September 26, 2001.
8
Christopher O’Sullivan,
Colin Powell: American Power and Intervention from Vietnam to Iraq
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 60.
9
Barbara Slavin, “Threats Blurred for U.S. After Cold War,”
Washington Times,
November 9, 2009.
10
Richard Clarke,
Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror
(New York: Free Press, 2004), 74.
11
9/11 Commission Report,
105–107.
12
John Goldman, “Yousef, Driver Guilty in Trade Center Bombing,”
Los Angeles Times,
November 13, 1997.
13
Clarke,
Against All Enemies,
78.
14
“Missed Signals: Many Say U.S. Planned for Terror but Failed to Take Action,”
New York Times,
December 30, 2001.
15
The CIA: History and Performance,
interview with R. James Woolsey, June 20, 2006,
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/themes/cia.html
.
16
Terrorism Project, In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo,
Center for Defense Studies, July 23, 2002; William Broad, “Sowing Death: How Japan Germ Terror Alerted World,”
New York Times,
May 26, 1998.
17
William Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 39, June 21, 1995.
18
Ibid.
19
John Deutch, “Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by the Director of Central Intelligence,” February 22, 1996,
www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1996/dci_speech_022296.html
.
20
Richard Clarke,
Your Government Failed You
:
Breaking the Cycle of National Security Disasters
(New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 158.
21
William Clinton, Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, April 24, 1996,
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=52713#axzz1cVMxVsde
.
22
William Clinton, PDD 62, May 22, 1998.
23
Ibid.
24
Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo,
Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda by the CIA’s Key Field Commander
(New York: Three Rivers, 2006).
25
Farhan Haq, “Politics-U.N.: Sudan, Afghanistan Struggle for Response to Attacks,” Inter Press Service.
26
James Risen, “To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: A Year Later, Debates Rankle,”
New York Times,
October 27, 1999.
27
“A Question of Credibility,”
Economist,
September 8, 1998.
28
Byron York, “The Facts About Clinton and Terrorism,”
National Review Online
, September 11, 2006.
29
9/11 Commission Report,
213.
30
Richard Miniter,
Losing Bin Laden: How Bill Clinton’s Failures Unleashed Global Terror
(Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003), 222–227.
31
Ted Bridis, “Before 9–11, Terror Was a Low Priority,” Associated Press, June 29, 2002.
32
Condoleezza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest,”
Foreign Affairs,
January–February 2010.
33
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon,
The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America
(New York: Random House, 2003), 336.
34
Jim Mann, “Post–Cold War CIA Fighting for Its Future,”
Los Angeles Times,
January 3, 1993.
35
George Tenet, “Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” March 24, 2004.
36
Tenet,
At the Center of the Storm,
15.
37
Robert Dreyfuss, “Orbit of Influence: Spy Finance and the Black Budget,”
American Prospect,
March 1, 1996.
38
Douglas Jehl, “Campaign Is Begun to Protect Money for Spy Agencies,”
New York Times,
March 14, 1993; Walter Pincus, “Spy Agency Hoards Secret $1 Billion; Satellite Managers Did Not Tell Supervisors Of Classified ‘Pot of Gold,’ Hill Sources Say,”
Washington Post,
September 24, 1995.
39
Elaine Sciolino, “Clinton Offering Few Hints of His Plans for Spy Agency,
New York Times,
November 29, 1992.
40
Phase III Report: Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,
United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, February 15, 2001.
41
Walter Pincus, “CIA Plans to Close 15 Stations in African Pullback,”
Washington Post,
June 23, 1994.
42
9/11 Commission Report,
357.
43
Tenet,
At the Center of the Storm
.
44
David Kaplan, “Playing Offense in the War on Terror,”
USNews.com
, June 2, 2003.
45
Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars
(New York: Penguin, 2004), 456.
46
Robert Baer, “A Dagger to the CIA,”
Gentlemen’s Quarterly,
April 2010.
47
Clarke,
Your Government Failed You
, 107.
48
Tenet,
At the Center of the Storm
, 15.
49
9/11 Commission Report,
133.
50
Ibid.
51
Coll,
Ghost Wars
,
52
9/11 Commission Report,
211.
53
Coll,
Ghost Wars,
550.
54
Tenet,
At the Center of the Storm
;
9/11 Commission Report.
55
Coll,
Ghost Wars
, 550.
56
9/11 Commission Report,
Staff Statement 9.
57
Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi were two of the nineteen terrorist hijackers in the 9/11 attacks. Zacarias Moussaoui, though he had trained to be a pilot, did not participate in the attacks and is now serving a life sentence in Florence, Colorado’s federal ADX supermax prison, for conspiring to kill US citizens.
58
Attorney General John Ashcroft, testimony to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, April 13, 2004.
59
9/11 Commission Report,
Staff Statement, 9.
60
Kelly Moore, “The Role of Federal Criminal Prosecutions in the War on Terrorism,”
Lewis and Clark Law Review
11, no. 4 (2007).
61
9/11 Commission Report,
76.
62
9/11 Commission Report,
Staff Statement, 9.
63
Ibid.
64
Eric Lichtblau, “Threats and Responses: The Former FBI Director; Tough Security Questions Are Likely for Ex-Chief of FBI,”
New York Times
, April 13, 2004.

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