Foxbat (16 page)

Despite its official name, the Emergency Conference Room had not been designed for
conferences, only briefings, so as soon as Walter Hicks had finished delivering the Agency’s assessment of the current situation, the Joint Chiefs left the ECR and moved along the
corridor into the ‘Gold Room’ conference suite, also on the third floor of the Pentagon.

Thirty minutes after Hicks had departed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the situation in
North Korea was sufficiently serious to merit an upgrade in the alert status of US forces worldwide, and the most senior general present recommended this precaution to the President in a
lengthy telephone conference call that included the Secretary of Defense.

Fifteen minutes after that, the American alert state was upgraded to DEFCON Four, and alerting
signals were dispatched to all units and formations, worldwide. At the same time, most specific orders were flashed to the USS
Enterprise
in the North Pacific Ocean, but for the eyes of the captain only.

The President then instructed the Secretary of Defense and his National Security Adviser to
contact Pyongyang to obtain clarification of North Korea’s intentions, and to request an emergency session of the United
Nations Security Council to
discuss the ongoing situation. That, the President said, would probably turn out to be just another goddamned waste of everyone’s time, but after the Iraq fiasco he thought they should
at the very least go through the motions.

In a scene repeated in communications centres around the world, the warning bell, to indicate
receipt of a signal classified ‘Secret’ or above, sounded as the teleprinter began clattering. The Duty Communications Officer walked briskly over and scanned the lines of text as
they were printed out.

FLASH OVERRIDE
FROM:	JCS WASHINGTON DC/ /J3 NMCC/ /
TO:	AIG 931
SECRET (S)
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS DECLARED STEP UP IN DEFENSE READINESS CONDITIONS (DEFCON) FROM DEFCON 5 FOR US FORCES WORLDWIDE TO DEFCON 4. COMMANDERS WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS TO ASSURE INCREASED READINESS.

‘Oh, fuck,’ he muttered, tore the signal out of the machine, rapidly entered the
Date-Time Group and the originator in the log, then left the Center at a run.

Two hours later, highly detailed orders, classified Top Secret and prepared on the specific
instructions of the President, were sent with Military Flash precedence from the Pentagon to the United States Strategic Command (USStratCom) Center at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha,
Nebraska.

The briefing had been arranged with under thirty minutes’ notice for all participants,
and was classified Top Secret. The lowest-ranking officer inside the locked room was a Royal Navy commander, and he was there only to change the hastily prepared vu-graphs and slides, and
point at things on the screen.

A four-ring captain stood beside the podium. He’d already run through the substance of the
raft of signals they’d received from both the Americans and the Chief of the Defence Staff in London, and he’d just finished the operational appreciation and tactical
situation.

‘In your opinion, how much of this is pure speculation on the Americans’
part?’ CINCFLEET demanded.

‘Frankly, sir, I think most of it. All they know for sure is that there are troop
movements taking place north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone that could be interpreted as the prelude to an invasion, though they’re also consistent with the pre-planned exercise
designated “Silver Spring”. They also know that the North Koreans have obtained a minimum of ten MiG-25 interceptors. But in the overall scheme of things, I don’t believe a
dozen Foxbats will make any significant difference, bearing in mind that our intelligence suggests that the North Koreans can already field over eight hundred combat aircraft.’

‘What’s your analysis of the Americans’ suggestion that those MiG-25s are
intended to intercept incoming ballistic missiles?’

‘I believe it’s fanciful at best, sir. I understand the Russians have confirmed it
was specially designed for that tasking, but I personally doubt if any aircraft would be capable of achieving this. The speeds involved would be just too great, and the intercept calculations
too complex. I also don’t myself believe that the North Koreans are planning to invade the South, so I think the Americans are reading far more into this situation than the evidence
warrants.’

‘Noted,’ the admiral said. ‘Very well, we’ve been instructed to
assist, so what assets do we have in that area?’

The captain stepped across to the large-scale drop-down chart he’d been using to show
North Korean troop movements, and indicated an
area towards the south of the peninsula. ‘About here, sir, off the southern tip of Japan, is the
Illustrious
group, returning home after a deployment to Australia, and presently en route between Tokyo and Manila.
As well as the carrier, which has seven Harriers embarked, the group includes the Type 42 destroyer
Edinburgh
and
two frigates: HMS
Cornwall
, a Type 22, and the Type 23 HMS
Portland
.’

‘Support?’

‘They have four Royal Fleet Auxiliaries in company – the tankers
Oakleaf
and
Grey Rover
, and two of the Fort-class solid-stores vessels, namely
Fort George
and
Fort Austin
.’

‘What assets have the Americans got, apart from their troops in South Korea?’

The captain pulled down a larger-scale map and pointed to a spot in the northern Pacific
Ocean. ‘The USS
Enterprise
Carrier Battle Group is currently about here. According to Washington, it’s en route towards
North Korea but realistically they don’t expect it to reach the area for at least two or three days. Their best forecast is fifty hours, but there’s a tropical storm brewing to
the north-east of the Korean Peninsula, and the CBG’s arrival time will depend on how the weather system develops, and whether or not the ships have to detour around it.’

The admiral made the only decision possible, his instructions from Downing Street and the CDS
having been most specific. ‘Very well,’ he said. ‘Signal
Illustrious
and tell her and her escorts to take on fuel
to their maximum capacity. Then the group is to split.
Illustrious
and
Cornwall
are to proceed north into the Yellow Sea, while
Oakleaf
and
Fort George
are to follow and catch up as quickly as they can.

‘
Edinburgh
and
Portland
are to move into the Sea of Japan and the two remaining RFAs are to follow. Once there, this group is to hold position off the east
coast of the Korean Peninsula, keeping well clear of territorial waters, and then monitor shore and air activity north of the DMZ.

‘
Illustrious
is to report
passing abeam the southern tip of the peninsula, and is then to hold position south-west of Inchon, outside Korean territorial waters, pending diplomatic clearance from Seoul to move
closer.

‘The Air Group is to prepare for both offensive and defensive operations, including
Combat Air Patrol and ground attack, and all ships are
to ensure that they carry sufficient warshots to conduct autonomous real-world operations for a
minimum period of three days, pending the arrival of the auxiliaries. Detailed tasking instructions will follow. Any questions?’

The captain shook his head. ‘No, sir.’

‘Finally,’ CINCFLEET added, addressing the assembled officers, ‘I’ve
received further instructions regarding our independent nuclear deterrent. Downing Street has instructed the CDS to retask our patrolling submarine until this crisis is resolved. I will be
issuing separate orders to HMS
Victorious
in due course.’

Paul Richter closed his laptop, disconnected the power cable and tucked everything away in
the leather carrying case. His small suitcase was already packed and sitting beside the door of his hotel room. Three minutes later he walked out of the building and climbed into the taxi
he’d ordered. He had nearly three hours before his flight to Seoul was due to leave Moscow, which even by Russian standards should be time enough.

Commander-In-Chief Fleet exercises operational control of Britain’s Trident boats,
which provide the independent nuclear deterrent. Unlike surface ships, which can both send and receive detailed messages via satellite wherever they are in the world, communicating with
submarines is difficult. The deeper the boat submerges, the more difficult communications become. The standard operating procedure is for submarines to deploy a short aerial designed to
receive Extremely Low Frequency signals. ELF is very slow, so it’s only possible to send a very small number of characters in a given time period – normally between two and four
characters a minute. Passing a complete operational
message by this means would clearly be impossible, so ELF is only used to transmit a coded warning to a
submarine.

This type of message is a repeated sequence of a few characters. The acronym, when decoded, will
advise the submarine that an operational message is going to be transmitted, the time it will be sent and the transmission method. At the specified time, the submarine will reduce its depth
and either trail a long aerial reaching up to just below the surface, or else extend a vertical aerial above the water from the sail. The former is slow but relatively secure, while the
above-surface aerial allows reception of high-speed transmissions but naturally carries a greater risk of detection.

Just over an hour after the briefing finished at Northwood, a Group Warning Signal was
transmitted to HMS
Victorious
, the single ‘boomer’ on patrol, from the ELF radio relay station situated near Rugby in
Warwickshire. Twenty-five minutes afterwards, a Military Flash Operational Tasking Signal was relayed by communications satellite to the submarine. Five minutes after this signal had been
received, the boat was again submerged at its normal operating depth.

In some ways, the programmed troop movements were overkill, but Pak Je-San knew that
they’d only have this one chance and he was determined to get it right.

Even before any reservists were called up, or a single vehicle or aircraft started its engine,
the regular forces of North Korea were already able to unleash a devastating attack on their southern neighbour. Because of Seoul’s proximity to the DMZ, the South Korean capital was
within range of some five hundred North Korean artillery pieces, including the 170-millimetre Koksan gun, and over two hundred 240-millimetre multiple-rocket launchers. It has been assessed
by Western intelligence agencies that the North Korean forces could, without any significant troop or artillery movements, unleash a barrage of up to half a million rounds per hour against
Seoul and other strategic targets in the north of the country, and could sustain that level of assault for several hours.

North Korea’s one million or so soldiers are organized into 170 brigades and divisions
that include special operations groups, artillery, tank and infantry units, and about sixty of these are permanently located south of a line running between Pyongyang and Wonsan. The country
has deployed well over half of its forces close to the DMZ, and about seventy per cent of its front-line troops – some 700,000 men, 2,000 tanks and 8,000 artillery pieces – are
permanently based within a hundred miles of the Demilitarized Zone. Many of these units are located in underground or hardened facilities, almost a North Korean trademark, of which there are
more than four thousand close to the DMZ.

And it’s not just troops on the ground. The North Korean Navy, a
significant force in its own right, has positioned the majority of its surface vessels and submarines in forward bases on both coastlines of the peninsula, near to the DMZ.
Forty per cent of the country’s 800 fighter aircraft are also based very close to the border. Without repositioning a single soldier, vehicle or aircraft, the DPRK is capable of
launching a major attack on South Korea within a matter of hours.

But Pak Je-San had no intention of doing any such thing: his plan was a good deal more subtle,
and should, he hoped, take the Americans and the South Koreans completely by surprise and negate their carefully constructed defensive strategy. Details of the constantly evolving Oplan 5027
have been known within Pyongyang and the country at large for well over a decade. In fact, news statements in the North Korean media frequently refer to it by name.

The mountainous terrain of the Korean Peninsula would largely dictate the way any invasion must
be conducted, as was equally obvious to the planners in Washington and Seoul. The advance towards Seoul by ground forces would have to proceed down the Chorwon, Kaesong-Munsan and Kumwa
corridors, crossing the Imjin or Han rivers, and the troops would then be facing well-prepared defences, including the South Barrier Fence, manned by South Korean and American troops of the
Combined Forces Command.

Standard battle tactics decree that any attack across the DMZ would be preceded by a major
artillery barrage, possibly by special forces’ raids against highly specific strategic targets, and even by missile- or artillery projectile-delivered chemical and biological weapons
designed to kill or incapacitate the defenders.

The Combined Forces Command perception is that any invasion of South Korea would be conducted in
three phases. In the first, the ground forces would smash through the CFC defences and destroy their ability to counter-attack. In the second phase, Seoul itself would be isolated and
captured. This would be the prime objective, because nearly half of the population of South Korea lives within forty miles of the nation’s capital. The third phase would be essentially
mopping-up exercises, before the occupation of the entire peninsula.

To counter this, Oplan 5027 postulates that substantial numbers of American troops –
nearly 700,000 men – and armour would be landed
in the south of the peninsula and that these assets, supported by aerial bombardment, should be able
to push the DPRK forces back north of the DMZ. Amphibious assaults into North Korea would isolate and surround the enemy, and air power would help destroy their land forces in the narrow
passes through which they’d have to travel. The ultimate intention of the Oplan, since its 1998 revision, is to continue the advance north to capture Pyongyang, eliminate the DPRK
leadership there, and thus place the whole of the peninsula under South Korean control.

And all that, of course, was also known to Pak Je-San, which was exactly why he’d devised
‘Golden Dawn’.

The flight to Seoul was nothing like as bad as Richter had expected, Aeroflot having come a
long way since the last time he’d flown with the airline, but it was still a hell of a long haul from Moscow to Korea.

He had never been comfortable sleeping on an aircraft unless he was absolutely exhausted, and he
was far from tired as he boarded the flight. Despite reading distractedly for a couple of hours, and then lying with the seat reclined as far as it would go, sleep still eluded him.

The first thing he did on departing Kimpo International Airport was to switch on his Enigma
mobile. Less than thirty seconds after it reported good signal strength, he stepped away from the group of Asian businessmen standing waiting for taxis in front of him to answer it.

‘Richter,’ he announced.

‘You’ve taken your time. I’ve been trying to get hold of you for
ages.’

‘I’ve been on an aircraft for the last twelve hours, Simpson. In case you
didn’t know, you’re supposed to switch off your mobile while you’re in the air.’

That wasn’t strictly true, but Richter had left his phone turned off deliberately, on the
off-chance that he might get some sleep.

‘Things have been developing since you left Moscow,’ Simpson continued regardless,
and he then explained Washington’s concern about the DPRK troop movements their satellites had detected north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone.

‘So what are they doing about it?’ Richter asked.

‘Pretty much as you’d expect,’ Simpson sighed. ‘They’ve asked for
an emergency session of the United Nations so that Pyongyang can have a chance to explain exactly what they’re doing.’

‘They’ll insist it’s just an exercise,’ Richter interrupted.

‘They already have. So then Washington broke protocol and contacted the North Koreans
direct. They claimed it’s a routine exercise called “Silver Spring”, but nobody believes them. The Americans will continue with the usual diplomacy, but I don’t think
they seriously expect anything useful to come of it, so they’re now also looking at military options. Their nearest surface group, the
Enterprise
CBG, is currently in the north Pacific and still a couple of days away from Korea. So they’ve now hiked the alert state to
DEFCON Four.’

‘That’s not good news.’

‘No.’ Simpson’s tone was uncharacteristically subdued. ‘We’re not
fully in the loop here, but the Intelligence Director thinks the Yanks will probably target North Korean airfields and military bases with their ICBMs, silo- and sub-launched, and inform
Pyongyang that they’ve done so, just to try to make them back down. Or, in case they really
are
conducting this “Silver
Spring” thing, to make sure that it stays just an exercise.’

‘What do you want me to do?’

‘First, make your number with the NIS, then request them to fly you down to Kunsan as soon
as possible.’

‘Which is where, exactly? And what do I do when I get there?’

‘It’s an air base on the west coast of South Korea. Let me know your likely arrival
time as soon as you’ve worked it out, so I can coordinate things from here.’

‘What things, exactly?’

‘You’re going back to sea, Richter. The
Illustrious
has been retasked by their Lordships at the Admiralty, and she’s lurking around somewhere off the Korean Peninsula right now,
ready to help repel boarders. I’ll ask them to send a chopper for you. I want you to get on board and brief the captain on what you found out in Russia, and what you think the North
Koreans are likely to do next.’

‘Terrific,’ Richter replied, with a marked lack of enthusiasm.

‘I
thought
you’d like
that,’ Simpson rang off abruptly.

As Richter slipped the mobile phone back into his jacket pocket, a smartly dressed Korean
approached him somewhat diffidently.

‘Mr Richter?’ he asked, and received a nod.

Looking relieved, the man pulled out a wallet to show an identification badge comprising an
eight-pointed gold star inside a blue circle, with the words ‘National Intelligence Service’ inscribed around the lower half of the circle, and what was presumably the same legend
in Korean around the top half. On the opposite side of the wallet was a plastic card with the man’s name, photograph and personal details.

The badge meant nothing at all to Richter, who’d never before seen a National Intelligence
Service ID. Since nobody, apart from Simpson and presumably now the NIS hierarchy, knew he was due to arrive in Seoul, he guessed the guy was probably genuine. But Richter would never take
anything at face value, so before he went anywhere he intended to run a check.

‘The car is over here, sir,’ the man said, leading the way towards a Mercedes
saloon.

‘How did you recognize me?’ Richter asked, as he put his two cases in the
boot.

‘Your Mr Simpson’ – the name came out more like ‘Thimthon’
– ‘sent us a description and a photograph.’

‘Most considerate of him,’ Richter murmured dryly. ‘Two questions first. Where
are we going? And what’s the name of the head of your organization?’

The man smiled as he opened the rear door of the car. ‘To our new headquarters building at
Naegok-dong, and that’s where Bae Chang-Su, the Director-General of the NIS, is waiting to meet you.’

‘Good enough,’ Richter said, and climbed into the back seat.

The foundation of America’s national strategy of deterrence is called the Triad.
Nothing to do with Hong Kong street gangs, the Triad comprises
the three strategic elements of the American military machine: long-range bombers, land-based
ICBMs and ballistic missile-carrying submarines.

Each component of the Triad provides America with a different strength and capability, and
presents an enemy with three entirely different threats to counter. Of the three, the submarines, the SSBNs, are arguably the most lethal, offering a unique combination of mobility, colossal
firepower, invisibility and hence survivability, while at the same time providing American leaders with a global strike capacity with the highly successful Trident missile.

There are usually between five and fifteen SSBNs constantly at sea, manoeuvring within
designated patrol areas that each extend to around one million square miles, ready at all times to react to coded instructions to launch one or all of their twenty-four Trident missiles.

All US nuclear-powered submarines are assigned to either the Pacific or the Atlantic Fleets, but
control over their strategic assets, meaning the missiles, is vested in the United States Strategic Command. The USStratCom Command Center is the locus of this organization and its primary
function is to transmit National Command Authority directives to the strategic arsenal of all three legs of the Triad, under the ultimate authority of the President of the United States of
America himself.

The USStratCom Command Center is a purpose-built, two-level, fourteen-thousand-square-foot
concrete and steel section of the Underground Command Complex, which also houses the Force Status Readiness Center, the Intelligence Operations Center and various other strategically vital
offices. Like Cheyenne Mountain, the complex can be sealed in times of tension or war, and is able to operate independently for prolonged periods of time. Critical command and control
communications equipment is specially shielded against the effects of the electromagnetic pulse which follows a nuclear explosion, and allows the Commander In Chief of USStratCom to control
forces worldwide both before and during a nuclear war.

As soon as the Joint Chiefs of Staff increased the readiness state for US forces globally to
DEFCON Four, CINCSTRAT ordered the complex to be sealed, then summoned his senior staff for a high-level restricted-access command briefing.

‘Gentlemen,’ General Mark Winchester began, ‘the CIA has obtained technical
intelligence that shows North Korean forces assembling north of the Demilitarized Zone. Pyongyang is claiming that these manoeuvres are part of an exercise called “Silver Spring”,
but the fear in Washington is that they’re actually the prelude to an invasion of South Korea.

‘The White House, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs, has taken this threat
sufficiently seriously to go to DEFCON Four, and our forces will remain in this state, or in a higher state of readiness, until either the threat is dismissed as a false alarm or an invasion
attempt is actually made by the DPRK.’

Winchester paused and glanced around the long oblong table. Nobody spoke, or reacted in any way,
which is precisely what he had expected. All of his senior staff had been fully aware of the situation for at least one day, and most of them had moved into the complex even before CINCSTRAT.
The briefing he was giving would, essentially, tell them nothing they didn’t already know, but it would summarize the latest intelligence and, more importantly, lay out the options
available and the actions then to be taken.

‘The first task is to ensure the integrity of our C
³
I assets,’ General Winchester said. He pronounced it ‘cee cubed eye’ and the acronym stood for command,
control, communication and intelligence. ‘I want continuous checking routines to be run on all our landline, radio, microwave and satellite systems with immediate effect, starting with
the Red Phone system and JANET.’

The ‘Red Phone’ is the slang term applied to the Primary Alerting System, a network
of dedicated telephone circuits that allows USStratCom controllers to communicate directly with over two hundred operational centres worldwide, including individual intercontinental ballistic
missile silos and missile-launch control centres.

‘JANET’ is the Joint Chiefs of Staff Alerting Network, which comprises direct
lines to the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon and to all other principal command headquarters. The system permits CINCSTRAT to communicate immediately with the two National
Command Authorities – the President of the United States and
the Secretary of Defense – and with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
other military commanders.

The Command Center also has access to a vast range of radio networks, operating in every
available frequency band. These networks, in conjunction with relay and communications satellites, allow direct contact with aircraft in flight in any part of the world, and allow the
transmission of National Command Authority orders to American military assets worldwide.

‘The North Korean threat, assuming this is not just an exercise, isn’t directed
ostensibly against the United States, but I want to ensure that we’re ready in all respects should the situation deteriorate and involve a direct threat to the homeland. The
longest-range missile the North Koreans are known to be working on currently is the Taep’o-dong 2, and the latest intelligence assessments suggest it probably can’t reach any part
of the continental US except Alaska, which doesn’t really count.’ Winchester got the smiles he expected. ‘But intelligence has been wrong before, so within the next four
hours I want to see two additional E-6B Cover All aircraft holding at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma at Alert Thirty and Sixty, and another National Airborne Operations Center E-4B at
Alert Thirty here at Offutt.’

Originally, the Strategic Air Command’s airborne command post was an EC-135, code-named
Looking Glass. When this platform was retired from service, the upgraded E-6B TACAMO aircraft assumed the mission, and the revised code-name Cover All.

‘Finally, I want the Ground Mobile Headquarters deployed immediately, and to be fully
operational no later than twelve noon tomorrow. Send it somewhere central – Colorado or Kansas, say – and ensure that communications with it are kept to an absolute minimum to
avoid compromising its location.’

In the circumstances, what Winchester was ordering was overkill, but he’d never seen any
point in having assets if they weren’t being used, and the Ground Mobile Headquarters was USStratCom’s last-ditch asset. An entirely self-sufficient mobile unit, it can set up
operations anywhere inside the United States and there duplicate all the control functions of the Command Center itself. By virtue of its mobility, its location cannot be known far enough in
advance to get programmed
into enemy missile-guidance systems, so it is effectively invulnerable to an enemy strike.

‘Any questions?’ Winchester asked, but nobody spoke. ‘OK, command briefing
complete. Let’s get to it.’