France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (20 page)

We must also point out that the two rascals were discussing the matter and delaying their official responses. By the beginning of September, however, their refusal was a matter of course, which did not displease Barthou.

The participants in the Eastern pact were not alone. France had its interests and traditional ties to Great Britain. Since the end of the Ruhr matter, France didn’t even consider a security policy that was not based, first of all, on an understanding with London. As we have seen, this had already led to many concessions. The Eastern pact couldn’t be launched without the prior approval or the support of the British, even if they didn’t take part in the system. After all, it did introduce the USSR into the Locarno pact and the British would have to be in on it.

From the start, British reaction was expected to be cool. Anthony Eden, the minister responsible for the League of Nations had been informed in Geneva. However, there was the April 17 Note and the vengeful answer by Barthou to Sir John Simon on May 30. Following the meeting between Barthou and Litvinov, British newspapers were thundering against the Eastern pact. It was one thing to allow the USSR into the League of Nations, but to open the door to her entry into the halls of European diplomacy or even become her ally “was not popular among some of my colleagues, especially the older ones who were less realistic than Mr. Barthou.”
⁹⁴
When, on June 14, Ambassador Corbin went over to see Sir John Simon and the then permanent secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart, he found them extremely reticent.
⁹⁵

Barthou therefore decided to explain his position directly to the British, even if it meant being rather blunt about it. He traveled to London on July 9 and 10.
⁹⁶
On the British side Sir John Simon, Eden, Vansittart, Lord Stanhope, and Sargent were present. Barthou, Léger, Massigli, Ambassador Corbin and councilor Roland de Margerie represented the French side. Sir John Simon was very cold at first. He wanted no part of a Soviet guarantee to Locarno. Barthou and Léger explained that this was a limited guarantee by the USSR to France alone. But Simon was mostly
concerned about the fate of poor Germany. “To protect yourselves from Germany?” He must have thought the idea absurd.

For the Locarno treaty he insisted on its very essence—“reciprocity.” Great Britain would guarantee Germany from a French aggression and France from a German one. Would the Eastern pact work the same way? Furthermore, wouldn’t this pact be a good way to reopen disarmament negotiations? On the first point Barthou felt that Germany should request such a guarantee. On the second point Barthou clearly answered that the two issues should not be linked. But, answered Sir John Simon, seconded by Eden and Vansittart, this will place us in a delicate position in the House of Commons! The point didn’t trouble Barthou, who brought up French public opinion. It sounded like the famous debates between Clemenceau and Lloyd George in 1919.

Barthou, in other words, did not give an inch to the British policy of “arbitrage.” What he was after was
an alliance
. Alexis Léger was not as clear-cut as his chief. He reminded them that France had rejected Soviet proposals for military accords. Barthou used the phrase, “until now the French government has rejected every Soviet proposal that tended to become a military alliance.” The words “until now” need to be underscored. He insisted on “the fundamental importance France attached to its friendship with England.” “She does not
want
to do anything
against
Great Britain. Better still the French government does not
wish
to get into anything
without
Great Britain.” Once again we note the use of the word
want
and of the word
wish
.
⁹⁷
[Emphasis added.] In short, France for once had decided to do what it wanted. During a trip to London in July, navy captain Decoux found that, “The British no longer treat us like little boys ever since we have a strong government.”
⁹⁸

Sir John Simon was resigned to supporting the Eastern pact, and a press statement drafted by Vansittart and Léger pointed out the conditions of British acceptance.

What struck the French the most was that British reticence and search for balance appeared exactly ten days following the “Night of the Long Knives” of June 30, 1934. We need not recount an event that took place inside Nazi Germany, namely the bloody elimination of the SA, their leader Ernst Röhm and a few other enemies of Hitler, which he proceeded to do with the army’s discreet support. François-Poncet and his councilor Arnal described those events in minute detail.
⁹⁹
The only time it affected French foreign policy was “the accusation of conspiracy with
foreign powers” leveled by those who carried out the coup.
¹⁰⁰
François-Poncet quickly found out that France was the target of those insinuations, of having delivered weapons to Röhm.
¹⁰¹
He lodged a strong protest with von Neurath
¹⁰²
because “some British publications” were repeating that false story. “The purpose,” he said, “was to warn British public opinion, at the time of the French foreign minister’s visit to London, about the scandalous intrigues by the French government that endangered the peace.”
¹⁰³
The accusation was vague, unofficial, insinuating and patently absurd—as the French documents clearly show—and was forgotten by Germany as early as July 9.
¹⁰⁴

The Nazi system had nevertheless shown more brutally than ever before one of its characteristics. The “Night of the Long Knives” was like a settling of scores among gangsters in more ways than one. Impervious to all this, Sir John Simon tried to maintain
equilibrium
between France and Germany and be the
referee
between a democratic and fearful ally and the racist dictator, a treaty-breaking gang leader who was also a terrorist killer.
¹⁰⁵
According to Charles Corbin, the French ambassador to London, Sir Eric Phipps, the British ambassador to Berlin came to the following conclusion regarding the “Night of the Long Knives”: “Those events, as awful as they may be, can perhaps create more opportunities toward an understanding on armaments reduction.”
¹⁰⁶

More Nazi violence followed that coup. Austrian Nazis favoring an Anschluss murdered Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss on July 25, 1934. We shall not recount those happenings that affected our subject by promoting a Franco-Italian rapprochement, which we shall examine in the next chapter. It will suffice to mention that Italy alone reacted in any meaningful way by sending a few divisions to the Brenner Pass. Barthou felt he should excuse France’s lack of action, because he was also thinking, as we already mentioned, about an alliance with Italy. “The apparent coolness that the French government has felt the need to display when faced with events in Austria…should not encourage any doubts regarding the complete solidarity of the French government with the Italian government in the present situation.” He then announced the rapprochement: “The idea of an international agreement to bring about a concrete and precise commitment toward Austria could be examined.”
¹⁰⁷
This and the death of the elderly President von Hindenburg (August 2, 1934), making Hitler the German head of state, no doubt eased the way for the USSR’s entrance into the League of Nations.

Despite his cautious speeches, Barthou felt that the League of Nations was not effective. The entry of the USSR was not a prelude to an Eastern Locarno, which would probably fail, but of a Franco-Soviet alliance. The British felt that the League, weakened as it was by the absence of the United States and the exit of Japan, followed by that of Germany, would thus be reinforced. Czechoslovakia and Romania, two countries of the Little Entente both favorable to the Eastern pact and the League of Nations covenant, recognized the Soviet Union
de jure
on June 9, 1934. Yugoslavia refused to do so but the three members of the Little Entente enthusiastically supported the concept of regional mutual assistance agreements at a meeting in Bucharest (June 18–20).
¹⁰⁸

The events in Germany and Austria converted Italy to the idea that the USSR should be admitted to the League of Nations. The USSR did not want to declare its candidacy and France didn’t want to be alone in supporting it. The Vatican was very much opposed to granting such international recognition to an atheist regime, and Portugal’s Catholic regime supported the views of the Holy See. The Poles were also very much against it. There was opposition to Litvinov’s policies within the USSR coming from his own deputy, Krestinski, and from Defense Commissar Marshal Voroshilov. That at least was the opinion of Alexis Léger.
¹⁰⁹
Belgium wasn’t that much in favor and Switzerland was completely opposed. A two-thirds vote was required. On September 12 the delegates of thirty countries issued an invitation to Moscow. The Council then unanimously decided—minus three abstentions—to give permanent membership to the USSR. After a short debate the USSR was admitted by a vote of 38 in favor, 3 against and 7 abstentions. The Soviet delegation was immediately introduced and Litvinov took the rostrum. “The goal of the USSR,” he said, “is to avoid war.” “My main task is now accomplished,” Barthou declared to Geneviève Tabouis at the time.
¹¹⁰

Barthou could now turn to the issue of the alliance, since the idea of an Eastern pact was practically defunct by the end of September, following Germany’s reticence and “Poland’s exaggerated diplomatic procrastination.”
¹¹¹
But at the same time he wanted to work on the rapprochement with Italy and with this in mind he thought of a Mediterranean pact that would play the same role as the Eastern pact. He had to foster improved relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, traditionally hostile to one another. That was the reason behind the invitation to King Alexander of
Yugoslavia, who arrived in Marseille on the cruiser
Dubrovnik
on October 9, and was murdered by Croat Ustachi gunmen a few minutes later. Barthou was also fatally shot. In the commotion everyone worried only about the King. Barthou walked to the hospital but had lost too much blood and died as he arrived. It clearly appears that the widespread panic at the scene was the cause of his death. It was an additional tragedy during that dreadful day. Barthou’s death signaled the end of an ambitious foreign policy for France, the only one that could possibly still protect her from war and aggression.

5.

F
RENCH
P
UBLIC
O
PINION

It remains to be seen whether Barthou’s initiatives were those of a determined but isolated realist with a long-term vision or if he was responding to pressure from a variety of groups. In order to provide a short answer to that question, we must carefully separate two issues: the Franco-Soviet
rapprochement
and the
alliance
between the two countries.

A broad segment of French public opinion was clearly in favor of a rapprochement. Not just the communists obviously, but also many socialists, part of the radicals like Pierre Cot and Herriot and even some elements of the right-wing nationalists. The USSR’s admission to the League of Nations was generally viewed favorably in France.

The issue becomes much more sensitive with respect to an alliance. The very nature of the Soviet regime and the existence of a French Communist Party representing 10 percent of the voters at that time meant that the foreign affairs issue of mutual assistance would automatically have internal political repercussions. For one, it would increase the prestige of the Communist Party in France, something the majority of the voters would not like at all. On the other hand, it would also reduce the party’s relentless anti-militarist propaganda and therefore strengthen the French army. This explains the complex and hesitant reactions, especially once the news of the ongoing negotiations reached the newspapers, since they had widely commented upon the Barthou-Litvinov meetings in May and June. It was in July that the press was informed about the broad strokes of the Eastern pact.

Four main tendencies may be identified within French public opinion:

       
1.
    
The Communist Party
(including the CGTU labor union under its control)

This group was naturally in favor of an unconditional rapprochement with the USSR. Prior to October 1934 the thought of an alliance doesn’t appear to have crossed the minds of the French communist leadership at all. The initial rumors even placed the communists in a difficult position. They hadn’t stopped criticizing Barthou’s foreign policy, “We have every right to show the kind of aggressive propaganda that is being spread by the Tardieu-Pétain-Marquet-Barthou government to incite the chauvinist spirit and accelerate preparations for war…It’s no coincidence that Barthou, the man behind the
Three Year Law
, is now leading Foreign Affairs.”
¹¹²
Furthermore, the security method via alliances against the German threat was thought to be inherently bad by
L’Humanité
. An April 16 editorial was entitled “Security, a formula for war and anti-Soviet intrigues.”
¹¹³
It was, “The well known doctrine of security.”
¹¹⁴
Persistent rumors of a mutual assistance between France and the Soviet Union led
L’Humanité
to issue a cautious denial: “Let’s not believe the far-fetched news issued last night about so-called sensational projects by the people’s commissar.”
¹¹⁵
Then once the rumor appeared to be true, Gabriel Péri commented that such an alliance would encourage disarmament, the world proletarians would approve of the Soviets joining the League of Nations, “and they approve even more warmly if by helping reach a Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact, the approval helps reduce the disastrous consequences of the French Note of April 17 by depriving the French leaders of one of their reasons to overarm themselves.”
¹¹⁶
Suspicion toward Barthou didn’t abate during the months that followed. “Mr. Barthou has reached the climax of chauvinistic agitation,” wrote Gabriel Péri on June 2.
¹¹⁷
In Geneva, “Mr. Barthou has requested that Soviet proposals be taken into consideration and underscored their importance. We find those polite statements disturbing.”
¹¹⁸