France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (19 page)

Poland was therefore the first country to play the well-known game of signing a treaty with a potential opponent whose blatant bad faith was obvious, using the pretense of holding thunder at bay. Between the German-Polish declaration of January 26, 1934, and the German-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939, many countries would follow an ineffectual policy of frightened egoism! And France is not to be excluded.

Barthou wanted to put an end to this incipient dislocation, first by increasing contacts. He tirelessly began a whole series of pilgrimages to the small allied states.

The first visit was to Belgium, which had signed a secret military agreement with France on September 7, 1920, and later the Locarno treaties of 1925. Since that date the interpretations by the two countries regarding the 1920 agreement were growing progressively farther apart. The French objective was to avoid another 1914 and be able to enter into
Belgium fast enough in the event of war with Germany. The Belgians were suspicious of such a broad interpretation, which ended up giving France the right to occupy their country. Some people, such as the socialist Vandervelde and many other Flemish leaders, advocated simply canceling the agreement since they viewed the Locarno treaties as being more than adequate. Belgium had to avoid above all being drawn into a conflict because of France’s other allies. The most controversial article concerned Belgium’s obligation to mobilize immediately “in case Germany issued a general call to arms.” With an exchange of letters in February 1931 between Belgian minister Hymans and French ambassador Peretti della Rocca, it was agreed to mention the 1920 agreement but to reduce it to “military cooperation between Belgium and France in case of an unprovoked aggression by Germany.”
⁶⁶

That toning down didn’t go far enough for the Belgians. Would they allow French troops to enter their territory in the event—something that was forbidden by Locarno—of a violation of the Rhineland demilitarized zone? Paul Claudel, the new ambassador, was asked to inquire with Hymans on November 27, 1933. On February 8, 1934, the Belgians replied that they didn’t feel obligated to call on France immediately.
⁶⁷

Marshal Pétain had very awkwardly mentioned to Baron Gaiffier, the Belgian ambassador to Paris, that in case of war with Germany, France would send its armies through Belgium. The ambassador replied, “If we allow you to do so.” To which Pétain replied, “with or without your permission.” “In that case,” said Gaiffier, “we shall welcome you with cannon fire.”
⁶⁸

One week after the Belgian note King Albert I died in a mountain climbing accident and his son Leopold III became king. Barthou’s March 27 visit was mostly intended to satisfy protocol. Barthou met with the king, Prime Minister de Broqueville and, more importantly, accompanied by Paul Claudel, his Belgian counterpart Paul Hymans. The conversation focused mostly on disarmament—the note of April 17 was at hand. The Belgians favored a Franco-German understanding and the military agreement was barely mentioned. Barthou just made a point of underlining the need for general staff agreements.
⁶⁹

Since the pilgrimage to Belgium yielded few results, Barthou traveled to Poland, Warsaw, and Cracow (April 22–24), right after the April 17 note, then to Czechoslovakia (April 26–27). He had specifically prepared those trips and handed a memo
⁷⁰
to Ambassador Chlapowski with the questions he wanted to ask the Polish leaders. The crowds gave him a
very warm welcome and Barthou’s visit to Warsaw and Cracow confirmed the deep feelings of affection that the Polish people felt toward France. Barthou was direct and spontaneous. The welcome by the political leaders was less warm. Pilsudski was friendly and reiterated Poland’s commitment to the alliance with France.

Beck was “tense and uptight at first.” The only tangible result was that the Poles succeeded in convincing Barthou that the Polish-German agreement contained no secret clauses and that Poland had “a free hand” towards its two larger neighbors. Barthou was therefore unable to change the new line Poland had taken nor to improve the traditionally poor relationship between the Poles and the Czechoslovaks.
⁷¹

In Prague there were more reliable friends and a foreign policy management that was less mysterious and more democratic. “A cheering crowd that wasn’t normally inclined to being demonstrative” welcomed Barthou.
⁷²
He had broad discussions with Beneš. What were Austria’s chances to remain independent? What relations did Czechoslovakia have with Austria and Hungary? The proposal often raised in France of a Habsburg restoration to give Austria an identity was something Beneš rejected out of hand.
⁷³

In May Barthou spent part of his time in Geneva and we have mentioned his sparring with Sir John Simon. We shall discuss him [at the League] again with Litvinov later in this chapter. His last two friendship visits were postponed until June.

Barthou left on June 19 and decided to stop in Vienna to meet with Chancellor Dollfuss, who was optimistic about Austria’s independence. There was Nazi terrorism in Austria “but Mr. Dollfuss noted a reduction in the attacks.” The poor man obviously couldn’t foresee that on July 25 he would be one of their victims himself. There was something tragic in that meeting of the two men fated to die.
⁷⁴

On June 21 Barthou arrived in Bucharest, the Romanian capital. He met with Prime Minister Tatarescu, who was also minister of war and who urgently requested the delivery of French military supplies that Romania would pay for, even with oil.
⁷⁵
France could rely on the solid friendship of Foreign Minister Titulescu and had a false friend in King Carol II. The King told Barthou that he was the strongest supporter of an alliance with France. “I can only laugh,” said Titulescu to French representative André Lefèvre d’Ormesson, who found the minister’s words to be those of “an impulsive, egocentric, nervous, vindictive man, despite possessing
a keen intelligence.” D’Ormesson thought the King was “unreliable and totally underhanded.”
⁷⁶
“Read with interest and approved,” was Barthou’s notation on the margin of the document.

Yugoslavia was the final and, in a sense, the fateful stop because at that meeting Barthou invited King Alexander to visit France where they were both to die together, shot by the same criminals. There again the purpose of the trip was to maintain a strong existing friendship. The King was pleased to see that the French minister’s visit brought together the various peoples—Serbs, Slovenes and Croats. Croatian Utashis were the murderers of October 9.
⁷⁷

4.

T
OWARD THE
G
RAND
A
LLIANCE

At what point and why did Barthou become interested in a Franco-Russian rapprochement? As we mentioned earlier, on January 4, 1934, in the course of a conversation with Alexis Léger, Soviet Ambassador Dovgalevsky had brought up the possibility of his country participating in the League of Nations and “of a mutual defense agreement” limited to Europe. Until the April 17 Note, Barthou didn’t appear to be in a hurry to consider the issue. On March 3 he cabled Ambassador Alphand that a visit to Paris by People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov would be premature.
⁷⁸
On March 30 the political affairs section addressed a memo to Barthou entitled, “Mutual assistance in Eastern Europe.” France had always wanted to add an Eastern Locarno to the Western Locarno. What was being proposed was simply a regional mutual assistance pact that would include Poland, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, and Germany, without making any commitments regarding the Asian portion of Russia. It clearly stated that “only with the participation or inclusion of Germany could this system take on characteristics similar to the Locarno treaties.” There was no mention of France or the kind of relationship she could have to the pact.
⁷⁹

Precisely one month later, on April 28, the same political affairs section drafted a new memorandum that was to be at the origin of the Eastern Pact. France was now to play a major part. The idea of an Eastern Locarno was kept, “whereby each signatory, after committing himself to not attack any of the other parties, would also agree to provide
assistance to any
neighboring
party against an aggression coming from
any signatory
.”

Thanks to this extremely clever formula that must have greatly appealed to the Briandists and the Quai d’Orsay treaty makers—Alexis Léger first and foremost—Germany and the USSR, not being neighbors, would not be obligated to provide assistance to one another. Contrary to Dovgalevsky’s proposal of January 4, France would not be directly included because its only neighbor within this combination was Germany. Therefore, France would be placed in the incredible position of providing assistance only to Germany. The “Eastern Locarno” agreement would be completed by a special agreement between France and the USSR. The two countries would promise to provide each other with help and assistance in case they became victims of an aggression due to Germany’s failure to abide by one or the other of those agreements. A Franco-Soviet pact clearly aimed at Germany would thus be added to the existing Western Locarno and to the Eastern Locarno still to be agreed to.
⁸⁰
Léger, after approving the document, presented it orally to Rosenberg, councilor at the Soviet embassy in Paris. Barthou had therefore approved it, and had personally met with Rosenberg.

Clearly, the French minister had changed his mind. Herriot confirmed that Barthou did not favor the Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact of December 1932, and had at first, like Doumergue, slowed down the negotiations.
⁸¹
“At some point at the end of April, Barthou decided to take on the Russian alliance,” as American historian William Evans Scott writes correctly. But he no doubt was wrong in attributing part of this change to the influence of Léger.
⁸²
Obviously, like all Briandistes, he favored the Eastern Locarno, but it seems doubtful that he would back a real bilateral alliance.

The key event was the meeting between Barthou and Litvinov in Geneva on May 18, 1934.
⁸³
Litvinov immediately agreed to the French plan but asked for some explanations on a few points: Why was Belgium being excluded? Why wouldn’t France agree to join in an Eastern Pact like the one suggested by Dovgalevsky on January 4? Could Finland also be part of it? He appeared satisfied by Bartou’s explanations. As the French minister explained, it was as though a river separated France and the USSR and each side was building a bridge to connect with the other. Litvinov then asked the truly critical question: Would Germany and Poland agree to take part? He doubted this very much and when Barthou told him that, according to Beck, there was no secret Polish-German agreement
he expressed deep skepticism. But the question led to a critically important answer by Barthou: “
Should Germany refuse we would then be free to enter into a pact without her
.” [Emphasis added.] The fact that Barthou was thinking about a pact with the USSR exclusively is also borne out by other documents, for example, what Ambassador Laroche told Colonel Beck on July 5.
⁸⁴
“I reminded him that should our combination fail, we wouldn’t want to bear the responsibility in rejecting Russia’s offer of collaboration and that we would undoubtedly restructure it on a strictly Franco-Soviet basis.” And also what Barthou told Sir John Simon on July 9, in recalling France’s old alliance with tsarist Russia saying that “should the Eastern Locarno pact fail perhaps France would feel the need, faced with the dangers of the European situation, to consider such a solution once again.”
⁸⁵
Beneš
⁸⁶
and King Alexander
⁸⁷
of Yugoslavia were also encouraging Barthou to go in that direction.

The discussion between Barthou and Litvinov then focused on the possibility of the USSR entering the League of Nations. Paul Bargeton, the political affairs director, left for Paris in order to prepare some concrete proposals for the Eastern Pact with Léger. These were handed to Litvinov on June 2
⁸⁸
and revised following his comments. He was given a more complete draft on June 8.
⁸⁹

Ambassadors François-Poncet and Laroche were instructed to invite Germany and Poland, respectively, to join the future pact. They immediately encountered a wall of skepticism and resistance, as could be anticipated. How could Germany be expected, after having consistently refused to guarantee her eastern borders, to join a pact that could legitimately be seen as directed against her? “Both from a geographic and military point of view the draft of the pact is unacceptable to us,” was what von Neurath told Litvinov when he went to Berlin.
⁹⁰
Von Neurath also belittled the “packtomania,” tending more to complicate the situation further than to ensure security.
⁹¹

As for Colonel Beck’s Poland, it was totally taken by its diplomatic flirt with Germany. Poland wanted to preserve the “equilibrium” between Germany and the USSR but with a stronger sentimental tilt toward the former. Pilsudski believed in an imminent collapse of the USSR.
⁹²
But Poland faced the eternal problem that would reappear more acutely than ever in 1939: What would happen if the Red Army entered into Polish territory? “What may happen,” wrote Payart, the French chargé d’affaires in Moscow, “once the Russian army crosses into Poland to take part in operations is that it might forget the common objective and settle into
the country of transit. The danger is magnified now by the fact that the troops engaged in a potential collective action are not simply Russian but actually Soviet. They are…not only heirs to the old Russian territorial imperialism, but also see themselves as the messengers of a new social order and as the missionaries of a universal ideology that is itself imperialist.”
⁹³