 | and fall of 1950, does not discuss the political origins of the Pleven Plan (
The United States and the Making of Postwar France,
195204).
|
| 23. Douglas to Acheson, October 27, 1950,
fFus, 1950,
3: 41215.
|
| 24. For the American plan to bring Germans into the integrated force, see paper of October 26, 1950,
Frus, 1950,
3: 4069.
|
| 25. Acheson to Bruce, November 3, 1950,
FRUS, 1950,
3: 42631. For a summary of NAC discussions, see ibid., 41526.
|
| 26. Sir F. Hoyer Millar to Bevin, November 6, 1950,
DBPO,
Series II, 3: 24851; and Memorandum by Mr. Bevin, November 24, 1950, ibid., 29394.
|
| 27.
Note sur le projet de Conférence de Quatre,
November 20, 1950, MAE, EU 194955, Généralités, vol. 90. Bevin also wanted to be certain that the Allies had come to some firm conclusions before any four-way meeting, and Massigli informed him that this was Schuman's view as well (Bevin to Harvey, November 22, 1950,
DBPO,
Series II, 3: 27779). The Soviet note is in Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Documents on Germany,
535. Robert Schuman, discussing the prospect of a four-power conference on Germany with his MRP colleagues, reminded them that a neutral and unified Germany was hardly in French interests, particularly if it withdrew from European institutions on which regional stability was based. Far better an outcome: "maintain the status quo in a divided Germany" (Comité National session of January 1314, 1951, MRP Papers, AN, 350 AP, box 59).
|
| 28. For the Spofford compromise, see Marshall to Bums, December 5, 1950,
FRUS, 1950,
3: 51721; and report by NAC Military Committee, December 12, 1950, ibid., 53847.
|
| 29. Or so Bidault recounted in the MRP Executive Commission, Minutes, December 7, 1950, MRP Papers, AN, 350 AP, box 49.
|
| 30. De Margerie to Parodi, November 9, 1950, MAE, EU 194955, Allemagne. vol. 71.
|
| 31. See the summaries of the Brussels Conference in Parodi to major embassies, December 21, 1950 and January 8, 1951, MAE, EU 194955, Allemagne, vol. 73.
|
| 32. On the fragile recovery evident by mid-1950, see Baum,
The French Economy and the State,
6667, and tables 9 and 12. The trade deficit had shrunk to a postwar low; prices had stabilized; production too had leveled off, but unemployment was low and the Monnet Plan investments still represented about onethird of government expenditures. Substantial budget deficits were largely covered by counterpart aid; with rearmament, however, the budget deficits ballooned beyond anything yet experienced since the war. More detail is provided by Lynch, "The Economic Effects of the Korean War in France, 19501952."
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