 | FRUS, 1950,
4: 92829. Acheson reitierated U.S. support for the French position in a press conference of January 18, 1950, ibid., 92930. Even so, Acheson asked that McCloy and Ambassador David Bruce urge upon Schuman ''a policy of moderation and caution" in handling the Saar (Acheson to McCloy, January 20, 1950, and Acheson to Bruce, January 20, 1950, ibid., 93031).
|
| 65. Transcript of Adenauer press conference, March 4, 1950, MAE, Europe 194460, Sarre, vol. 244
*
.
|
| 66. On American thinking about strengthening the NAC, see Acheson to Certain Diplomatic Offices, April 13, 1950,
FRUS, 1950,
3: 4950; Acheson to Douglas, April 15, 1950, ibid., 53; Acheson to Bruce, April 21, ibid., 5960; background paper on NAC prepared by the Bureau of European Affairs, April 25, 1950, ibid., 6569; and "U.S. Objectives and Course of Action in the May Meetings," April 28, 1950, ibid., 10011006. On British thinking, see "Brief for the U.K. Delegation," April 24, 1950,
DBPO,
Series II, 2: 95105. Britain's plan to pose as the link between the United States and Europe, and thus enhance British status in both regions, is stated forcefully in this memorandum.
|
| 67. In a speech at the Foire de Lyon on April 16, 1950, Premier Bidault rather vaguely proposed the creation of a High Atlantic Council for Peace which would coordinate all the important military, economic, and political functions of the Western Alliance and which would not include Germany (text in
Le Monde,
April 18, 1950). This was an idea originally proposed on April 5, 1950, in
Le Monde
by journalist Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. Hervé Alphand, the French delegate to the NAC, had also been influential in calling for greater powers within the NAC to direct economic as well as military affairs. For his ideas, see the important article by Guillen, "La France et la question de la défense de l'Europe occidentale." For Ambassador David Bruce's reading of Bidault's plan, see Bruce's four telegrams to Acheson: April 15, 1950,
FRUS, 1950,
3: 5455; April 20, 1950, ibid., 5758; April 22, 1950, ibid., 6062; and April 25, 1950, ibid., 6365. Bidault's idea was poorly received, especially in European capitals, where it was seen, rightly, as a scheme to limit small-power interference in alliance affairs. See the documentation in MAE, EU 194955, Généralités, vol. 18,
|
| 68. For Adenauer's interviews on this subject of March 7 and March 21, 1950, see his
Memoirs,
24448.
|
| 69.
Problèmes de politique internationale,
address to the National Committee, March 26, 1950, MRP Papers, AN, AP 350, box 59.
|
| 70. François Seydoux,
Note,
April 7, 1950, MAE, EU 194955, Généralités, vol. 87.
|
| 71. This memorandum, dated April 21, 1950, constituted a cover letter to a
Dossier sur l'Allemagne
put together by the Direction d'Europe, in which were included a number of long position papers on the May conference (MAE, EU 194955, Généralités, vol. 87).
|
| 72. U.S. Delegation to State, May 4, 1950,
FRUS, 1950,
3: 92326.
|
| 73. Bullock,
Bevin,
76467.
|
| 74. Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Henry Byroade, to State, May 6, 1950,
FRUS, 1950,
3: 93335.
|
|
