Harry Truman (60 page)

Only the day before, my father had ordered our ambassador to the UN, Warren Austin, to assure Secretary General Trygve Lie that we had no desire to incorporate Formosa within the American defense perimeter and were prepared to have the United Nations investigate our actions on that island. MacArthur’s statement created consternation in the UN and in the capitals of our allies around the world.

My father immediately met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense. Grimly, in a manner that was totally foreign to his usual style of conducting these meetings, he asked each man if he knew anything about MacArthur’s message before it was released to the press. All of them said they were as surprised as the President. Dad ordered Louis Johnson to order MacArthur to withdraw the message. To my father’s amazement, the Secretary of Defense hesitated to obey this direct order. Instead, he suggested issuing a statement that would have been little more than a light tap on General MacArthur’s wrist - an explanation that his message to the VFW was “only one man’s opinion.”

When my father heard about this timidity - a shocking example of the awe with which General MacArthur was regarded by the Department of Defense - he called Johnson and dictated the following message: “The President of the United States directs that you withdraw your message to the National Encampment of Veterans of Foreign Wars, because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations.” Dad followed this up with a long letter once more carefully explaining our policy and enclosing Ambassador Austin’s letter to Trygve Lie.

This episode was close to the last straw in my father’s efforts to be patient with Louis Johnson. The Secretary of Defense had become an obstructionist force in the government. He had used the outbreak of the Korean War to sharpen and widen his feud with Secretary of State Acheson. He went around Washington making sneering remarks about disloyalty in the State Department and intimating the Department of Defense was the only reliable force for a constructive foreign policy in the government. He had even discussed with opposition senators the possibility of his supporting a move to oust the Secretary of State. On September 11, at 4:00 p.m., Johnson came to the White House for an off-the-record meeting. “Lou came in full of pep and energy,” Dad says. “He didn’t know anything was wrong. I told him to sit down and I said, ‘Lou, I’ve got to ask you to quit.’

“He just folded up and wilted. He leaned over in his chair and I thought he was going to faint. He said, ‘Mr. President, I can’t talk.’”

In Congress, the right-wing Republicans were attacking Johnson, as the man responsible for the poor showing of our army in the first months of fighting in Korea. Dad told Johnson that Democratic members of Congress had come to him and sworn that Johnson’s continuance in the Cabinet would beat them in the November elections. This was a polite lie which, Dad knew, made him look timid. He did this to make it as easy as possible for Johnson to leave.

Frantically, for a few moments, Johnson tried to argue with Dad. He cut him short. “I have made up my mind, Lou, and it has to be this way.”

Minutes after Johnson left, my father walked into Charlie’s office and said, “This is the toughest job I have ever had to do.”

A few days later, Dad told George Elsey: “I had one hell of a time with Lou Johnson. I’ve never had anyone let me down as badly as he did. I’ve known for months - ever since May - that I would have to fire him, but I just couldn’t bring myself to do it. You know that I would rather cut my own throat than hurt anyone. I’ve known Lou for thirty years and I hated to have to do this to him, but the worst part about this job I have is that I can’t consider my personal feelings. I have to do what is right and I just couldn’t leave Johnson there any longer. The terrible thing about all this is that Johnson doesn’t realize he has done anything wrong. He just doesn’t seem to realize what he’s been doing to the whole government. I couldn’t let it go on any longer.”

Johnson proceeded to prolong the agony by handing Dad his letter of resignation the following day, unsigned and expressing the hope he would not be asked to sign it. Dad’s jaw tightened, and he said, “I’m afraid it has to be signed, Lou.”

The Secretary of Defense signed and left the White House. My father immediately telephoned General George Marshall at Leesburg, Virginia, and asked him to become Secretary of Defense. Once more, this great man and soldier instantly obeyed his commander in chief.

My father also considered relieving General MacArthur, when he issued his flagrantly insubordinate statement about Formosa. But he decided against this move because he had already approved the daring plan General MacArthur had conceived to break out of our Pusan beachhead and seize the offensive in Korea. It called for an end run by sea around the North Korean army and a lightning amphibious landing at Inchon, on the west coast of Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were deeply worried by the dangers involved in the plan. MacArthur’s landing force at Inchon was small - only two divisions - and the harbor was extremely tricky, with huge tides that rose and fell as much as twenty feet leaving miles of mud flats to be negotiated by our amphibious troops, if our timing went awry. But my father called it “a bold plan worthy of a master strategist,” and backed MacArthur to the hilt. To make the plan possible, he had withdrawn troops from Puerto Rico, Hawaii, the Mediterranean, and handed them over to General MacArthur. Dad knew from his long study of military history that relieving a commander on the eve of battle inevitably damaged an army’s morale. He believed in General MacArthur’s ability to win the tremendous gamble at Inchon.

Win he did. On September 15, while everyone in the White House and the Pentagon sweated and prayed, the 1st Marine Division and the army’s 7th Infantry Division stormed ashore, achieving complete tactical surprise. Simultaneously, our troops inside the Pusan bridgehead took the offensive. By September 29, Seoul had been recaptured. Dad sent General MacArthur a telegram that communicated not only his congratulations but the close and knowledgeable attention he had paid to his tactics and strategy.

The disintegration of the North Korean army was swift, as a result of General MacArthur’s smashing blow. All opposition below the 38th parallel evaporated. Unfortunately, many of their men succeeded in fleeing across the border into North Korea, although they had to abandon most of their weapons while doing so.

A major decision now had to be made. Should we cross the 38th parallel in hot pursuit of the enemy’s disorganized but by no means destroyed army? Was it possible that, by destroying this army, we could unite North and South Korea and create a free independent nation? The United Nations declared this was their goal, and on October 7, they voted resoundingly for a resolution calling for “a unified, independent and democratic government” of Korea.

This goal was in harmony with traditional military doctrine, that the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces was the only way to end a war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommended MacArthur be authorized to operate in North Korea. But he was warned that this permission depended upon one enormously vital fact - that “there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in Korea.” At the same time, General MacArthur was requested to submit a plan of operations - a request which, he made it clear, he resented. He was also explicitly told by the Pentagon: “No non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.”

General MacArthur finally presented a plan of operations that was in entire harmony with these directives. He proposed to attack north until he had established a line about fifty miles above the enemy capital of Pyongyang. From there, if the situation warranted it, he would commit South Korean troops to occupy the remaining sixty miles of Korea between that point and the Yalu River.

Meanwhile, in Washington, ominous warnings filtered into the State Department from nations who were in contact with China. They all reported that the Communist government in Peking had declared they would send troops into Korea if American troops crossed the 38th parallel. My father immediately sent this warning to General MacArthur. The Chinese repeated the warning over their official government radio a few days later. General MacArthur, and his intelligence chief, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, dismissed it as political blackmail, designed to frighten the United Nations and prevent them from voting overwhelmingly in support of the resolution for a free unified Korea.

The more my father thought about the complex situation, and General MacArthur’s difficult personality and strong political opinions, the more he became convinced the President should have a personal talk with his Far East commander. He wanted to find out exactly what MacArthur planned to do in Korea. Above all, he wanted to give the General a realistic appraisal of what he and his administration were thinking about the whole world. He worried about the tendency of the General and his staff to think too exclusively of the Far East. They had been away from home too long.

At first, Dad thought of flying to Korea to visit the troops. But he decided this would take him away from Washington for a dangerously long period of time. He did not want to bring General MacArthur to Washington because that would separate him from his troops for an equally dangerous period. So the decision was made to meet at Wake Island, in the Pacific. It was a decision that gave General MacArthur only 1,900 miles to travel, and Dad 4,700.

Before he left, my father discussed with his aides the possibility of bringing along something General MacArthur might not be able to buy in Japan - some small present that would please him. Charlie Murphy found a young man in the Pentagon who had been MacArthur’s personal aide. He advised Charlie to take some Blum’s candy for Mrs. MacArthur. She was very fond of it and could not get it out there. Charlie bought five one-pound boxes and took them along on the plane. In Honolulu, Averell Harriman decided a five-pound box was better and bought one. So Dad’s party arrived bearing ten pounds of Blum’s goodwill candy.

Coming in to land at deserted, dusty Wake Island, they wondered for a moment if they had wasted their time. Dad, knowing General MacArthur’s imperial tendencies, thought the President should be the greeted, not the greeter. He had flown twice as far, and according to every standard of rank and protocol, General MacArthur, as the Far Eastern commander, should be on hand to welcome his commander in chief. Dad told the pilot of the
Independence
to check with ground control and find out if General MacArthur had already arrived. When this was affirmed, my father issued orders to land.

The plane taxied to the operations building, and everyone waited to see what would happen next. For a moment, their suspicions seemed to be realized. There was no sign of General MacArthur. Then he strolled out, wearing his famous battered hat and fatigues, the shirt open at the collar. He and Dad shook hands and drove to the office of the airline manager where they talked for an hour, alone.

My father summed up their conference in this memorandum which he dictated to his secretary, Rose Conway:

My father now brought the General over to meet his advisers, who included Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, General Omar Bradley, Philip Jessup and Dean Rusk from the State Department, and Averell Harriman. There General MacArthur repeated much of what he had told Dad in private about Korea. By happy coincidence, we know exactly what he said in this much-debated meeting. Miss Vernice Anderson, Ambassador Jessup’s secretary, had been brought along to help in the drafting and final typing of a communiqué Dad planned to issue at the end of the meeting. Miss Anderson was waiting in the next room for this assignment, and the door was partially open. She could hear everything being said and took shorthand notes. Not because anyone ordered her to, but because she thought it would not hurt to have a record of the meeting.

“What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?” my father asked.

“Very little,” General MacArthur said. “Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100 - 125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50 - 60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no air force. Now that we have bases for our air force in Korea, if the Chinese try to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter. . . . The Russians have no ground troops available for North Korea. The only possible combination would be Russian air support of Chinese ground troops. . . . I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese as often as they would bomb us. . . . I believe it just wouldn’t work.”