Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (54 page)

The 1/16th Inf began its move at 1900 hours on April 25. The companies, in relays, had to clear the road as they moved since it was impossible for horses and sleds to move in the deep snow. The snow clearing was hard work but the battalion arrived at its destination around 0800 hours on April 26. It remained in Levangen for four days after which it was ordered back to Fossbakken. The 1/16th reached its destination at midnight on the 29th and went into bivouac between Fossbakken and Lapphaugen, alongside the 2nd Battalion of the same regiment, which had also been directed to that location.

The German Counterattack

The German 2nd Battalion, 139th Regiment commanded by Major Ludwig Stautner was deployed in depth from Lapphaugen to Elvenes in Gratangen. The reinforced Co 2 was at Lapphaugen. The battalion’s heavy weapons were located near Elvenes with the primary mission of supporting Co 2 and covering its possible withdrawal. Company 13 was in battalion reserve. This unit and the battalion CP were located near Storvann. One platoon from Co 13 provided flank security at Foldvik.

German patrols sent towards Fjordbotneidet and Fossbakken prior to April 24 were unable to carry out proper reconnaissance because they encountered Norwegian troops. The Norwegian attack, while expected, came as a surprise as far as timing was concerned. The daily heavy snowfall also caused severe problems for the Germans. It was difficult to bring supplies and provisions forward from Bjerkvik and impossible to conduct air reconnaissance. Except for patrols and a small number of other units, the German troops were not equipped with skis. They bought all the skis they could lay their hands on and improvised by using white bed sheets, drapes, and later white parachutes as winter camouflage cover.

Major Stautner received a radio message around 0900 hours on April 24 from Lieutenant Bauer, the commander of Co 2 at Lapphaugen, reporting that the unit had been under heavy artillery fire since 0830 hours and that the enemy was attacking. There were no further contacts with Co 2. Reports from two reconnaissance patrols reported enemy forces numbering 100-200 men advancing from the north and northeast. Stautner believed these to be part of the force that had attacked Co 2 and he concluded that the unit at Lapphaugen was cut off by the Norwegian advance. He sent a message to Colonel Windisch at Elvegårdsmoen around 1600 hours reporting his situation and asking for reinforcements. The request for reinforcements was denied.

Windisch had good reasons for denying the major’s request. The Norwegian offensive was launched on the same day the British carried out the heavy bombardment of Narvik with a battleship and several cruisers. The Germans did not know that this was just a coincidence and they had every reason to assume that the two operations were coordinated. They knew that there were two British battalions in Bogen, to the west of Bjerkvik, and it was reasonable to expect that they might advance on Bjerkvik and Elvegårdsmoen as part of a joint operation with the Norwegians. Major Lindbäck-Larsen had suggested this kind of cooperation to General Mackesy when they met on April 15.

Major Stautner decided to concentrate his forces and ordered those near Elvenes to withdraw to Storvann where Co 13 and the battalion CP were located. Reconnaissance reported that a strong enemy force had occupied the built-up area east of Elvenes in the evening but that it was not moving towards Elvenes.

Radio contact was reestablished with Co 2 around 2200 hours. Under the cover of the snowstorm, it had managed to withdraw from Lapphaugen, leaving behind the wounded and both mortars. With great effort in deep snow, the company had moved slowly southward for seven kilometers and Lieutenant Bauer reported that his men were still withdrawing and located east of the former tourist station. Another message from the company was received about 30 minutes later. It reported that the enemy had not pursued them through Oalgge Pass. The report also stated that, while they had no contact with the enemy, the Norwegians in the Gratang Valley were resting in buildings at the Moen, Nylund, and Dalsletten areas with hardly any sentries posted.

Stautner saw an opportunity and grabbed it. He did not waste time in discussing the situation with Colonel Windisch, or even ask permission to undertake his planned operation. His actions provide an excellent example of the advantages of decentralized control.

Stautner ordered Co 2 to take up blocking positions along Route 50, southwest of the former tourist station from where it could use all its weapons against the area occupied by the Norwegians. One platoon was located where it could defend against a possible enemy approach from the east. The company was ordered to hold its positions at all costs in order to prevent an enemy breakout to the south. Two platoons from Co 13 and one ski platoon were to quietly approach the Norwegian positions in three columns from the west, overrun the Moen and Nylund farms and continue to the end of the valley. The heavy weapons company occupied positions at the road junction near Storfossen to provide fire support for Co 13. The attack force assembled at Elvenes School at 0440 hours and the attack was launched at 0550 hours. The two infantry platoons advanced along Route 50 while the ski platoon paralleled the road along the hillside to the east.

While the German attack came as a surprise to the 1/12th Infantry, there were indications in the early morning hours that something was afoot. There were reports during the night of enemy patrol activity and between 0400 and 0600 hours reports of enemy forces along Route 50. The final report, shortly after 0600 hours, indicated that the Germans had occupied the empty Norwegian defensive positions. It was obvious that the security measures taken by the Norwegians had been inadequate.

The Norwegians apparently had no plans to meet an attack other than to reoccupy the defensive positions they had abandoned the night before. They made the initial move in this direction when they came under intense fire, direct and indirect, from the high ground on the south side of the valley. At the same time, the Germans launched their ground attack from the west. Company 2, located on the Moen farms, was the first Norwegian unit to feel the brunt of the German attack. The troops exited their quarters and fought from various positions around the farmhouses. It was still blowing a gale with heavy snow squalls and the visibility varied from good to almost zero. The German center column engaged Co 2 frontally while the other two slipped around its flanks. The Norwegians were under fire from several directions and the company commander, Captain Nils Øvreaas, was among the first to be killed.

After the fight had lasted for a while, the Norwegian company fragmented into small groups. Some continued the fight while others surrendered. Still others tried to withdraw up the hill towards Fjordbotneidet but heavy enemy machinegun fire made this difficult. A number of troops escaped by following creek beds that gave them some cover. Forward elements of the Alta Bn on Fjordbotneidet tried to help by opening fire but it is possible, in the limited visibility where it was difficult to discern friend from foe, that the fire caused more harm to their comrades than to the enemy. Companies 1 and 3 believed they received fire from the Alta Bn on Fjordbotneidet during the fighting and Captain Mitlid sent a messenger to Lieutenant Colonel Dahl in the morning of April 26 asking that all firing into the valley stop.

Company 1, located at the eastern farms and to the north of the tourist station, tried to retake its defensive positions, now in German hands. The troops were under heavy fire as they tried to work their way up the steep hillside and the commander, Captain Thormod Casper Mitlid, was wounded and evacuated. The Norwegian attack faltered. Some of the troops dug in while others withdrew back into the valley.

Major Bøckman had not noticed any efforts by the Alta Bn, which was supposed to protect his right flank, to come to his assistance. He sent his adjutant to the telephone station to try to establish contact. He did not locate his CP where he could communicate with both the Alta Bn and General Fleischer. The adjutant reached the house where the telephone was located but the telephone connection was severed by German fire.

The hillside leading to Fjordbotneidet was swept by German machinegun fire and the lieutenant had to give up trying to contact the Alta Bn. He gave Co 3’s commander, Captain Hilmar Mjøen, an order from Bøckman to attack and drive the Germans from Route 50. The adjutant was wounded on his way back to the battalion CP.

Major Bøckman had meanwhile ordered Captain Otto Ludvig Nyquist, the commander of Co 4 to support Co 3 in its attack and to place fire on the Germans attacking from the west. Captain Nyquist was wounded on his way back to his unit but continued to coordinate the fire support with Captain Mjøen. He had just sat down to dress his wound when a mortar shell killed him. Norwegian machinegun fire succeeded in temporarily stopping the Germans near the eastern Moen farms.

Company 3, minus one platoon, advanced towards its old positions along Route 50, now occupied by Germans from Co 2, 139th Regiment. The going was slow as the attackers were under continued direct and indirect fire. A flank attack by one platoon made good progress until it reached open terrain and was stopped by enemy fire from three directions.

The Norwegian attack on Co 2’s position caused a critical situation for the Germans. They were exhausted from fighting at Lapphaugen and a night withdrawal in a snowstorm. Every man was committed to bring the Norwegian attack to a halt. The fighting was vicious and at close quarters. The attack faltered under heavy crossfire, and the Norwegians withdrew.

Under cover of a heavy snow squall, the Germans in the Moen area managed to close in on some of the farm buildings still occupied by Norwegian troops. Some were captured and the Norwegians claimed that the Germans used these captives and civilians as shields in their advance against Co 4. There were other reports of prisoners and civilians used as shields. The Germans denied the charge but admitted that prisoners were brought forward behind the attacking forces since moving them to the rear was impossible.

The fighting began to subside around noon. German medics, under white flags, moved onto the battlefield to remove the dead and wounded. Through a returned prisoner, the Germans requested Norwegian medical assistance. Later, Norwegian medical personnel received permission to evacuate wounded soldiers through Gratangen. Four fishing vessels with medical personnel were dispatched from Sjøvegan to Gratangen. From there, medics and litter bearers moved east through the German lines, picked up the wounded, brought them back through German lines to Gratangen, and evacuated them to Harstad.

There were two reasons the fighting died out around noon. The determined attack by Co 3, 1/12th Inf came close to overwhelming the Germans in Co 2, 139th. The unit needed rest. The second, and probably more important reason, was that Major Stautner learned from prisoner interrogation and from what the Germans had observed in the direction of Fjordbotneidet, that a fresh Norwegian battalion was located on those heights, threatening their flank and rear. In fact, if the Alta Bn had moved forward into the valley during the morning, most of the German forces would have had to break contact quickly or be isolated.

An operational plan seldom survives long past the first shot and Fleischer made a serious mistake when he did not alter the plan and order the Alta Bn forward. While the centralized philosophy of the Norwegian military frowned on the kind of individual initiative displayed by Major Stautner, it is nevertheless difficult to understand why Dahl did not question the wisdom of remaining inactive on the forward slope of Fjordbotneidet where all he could do was be a witness to what happened in the valley. His primary mission was to protect the right flank of the 1/12th. After the 1/12th moved into the valley, the Alta Bn could no longer provide effective flank cover from the location specified in the orders. Dahl should also have made a concerted effort to reestablish communications with the 1/12th when that communication was lost around midnight.

Having confirmed that there was a fresh Norwegian battalion in the area and knowing that an additional battalion or two were located about 8 kilometers to the north, Stautner made the prudent decision to terminate the attack and withdraw from the valley. In order to maintain strict control of the troops as they withdrew, Stautner directed the units to assemble in their attack positions. The ski platoon covered the withdrawal, accomplished without losses despite artillery shelling from Fjordbotneidet. Company 13 and the heavy weapons company took up defensive positions at the entrance to the pass across the Gratangen Isthmus. Company 2, worn out after several days of fighting and moving in snowstorms, moved further east.

Major Bøckman was able to assemble the various subordinate units during the afternoon and decided to withdraw and reorganize the battalion after nightfall. The medics were left behind to care for the wounded. All heavy equipment was hidden, to be retrieved later. The Germans took note of low Norwegian morale. A message from the 139th Regiment to General Dietl’s at 1240 hours on April 26 states that prisoners expressed great bitterness against the British. The message suggested that the time was right for leaflet drops.

While the offensive resulted in a German withdrawal from their forward positions at Lapphaugen and within a few days, a withdrawal from Gratangen to new defensive positions in the defile on the Gratangen Isthmus, the price paid by the Norwegians was high. Their attack was in fact a costly failure. They had nearly 2,500 troops to throw into the attack against 300–400 Germans, and only about 150 of these were in forward positions at Lapphaugen. According to the Germans, only 230 Germans participated in the attack on the 1/12th. The two platoons from Co 13, for example, had a strength of only 74 men.
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The 1/12th was combat ineffective because of the losses it sustained and General Fleischer decided to pull the battalion back to Levangen to reorganize. The losses were so great that when it again took part in operations at the beginning of May, the 1/12th had only two rifle companies, a machinegun platoon, and a mortar platoon.