Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (25 page)

The plan did have some weaknesses. The Sildvik position was difficult to reinforce from Elvegårdsmoen. With enemy control of the fjord, reinforcements had to come through the mountainous wilderness to the east of Elvegårdsmoen, a difficult and time-consuming operation. Moreover, it was prudent to anticipate that an attack on Narvik would also involve an attack on Elvegårdsmoen. It was therefore important to make the Sildvik blocking force as large and self-sustaining as resources would allow. The capture of Elvegårdsmoen would make it possible for the enemy to send a force through the mountains and reach the Ofot Railway behind the Norwegian blocking force, between Bjørnefjell and Nordal Bridge. A similar operation could also be launched from the village of Beisfjord, south of Narvik, but it was possible to block such a move without abandoning the Sildvik positions. The Norwegians in Sildvik, to avoid being isolated by forces moving east from Elvegårdsmoen, would have to retreat if other units were unable to block the enemy.

The failure to complete the coastal artillery batteries, and to establish a naval base with adequate forces meant that the army became the most important force in the defense plans for Narvik and the Ofot Railway. The political decision to rely on army forces rather than on coastal defense installations and the navy in the Narvik area went against all military recommendations since well before World War I.
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The German attack in 1940 was exactly the type of attack that had served as a basis for the military recommendations. The political leadership’s reordering of military priorities, and the national military leadership’s reluctant acceptance, had severe consequences. The government’s failure to provide adequate resources forced local military leaders to improvise a defense in which they did not have much faith. In a recommendation on February 2, 1940 for completion and occupation of the coastal artillery batteries as soon as possible, General Fleischer notes that the failure to complete the coastal artillery batteries at the Ofotfjord entrance had forced the division to try to organize a harbor defense as means to thwart a surprise attack.
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Attempts to obtain heavy guns for use in Narvik failed. The intention was to use these guns in flanking positions against an attack from the sea. Those that were available, such as the 65mm mountain artillery pieces or 105mm guns, were unsuitable. In the end, only a single 75mm gun on an armored railroad car was made available.

The 6th Division’s operational directive to the commander in Narvik dated February 19, 1937 instructed him to use two-thirds of his main force (the infantry battalion at Elvegårdsmoen) on the south side of the fjord, for the defense of Narvik and the Ofot Railway. The regiment’s mission with respect to Narvik was to defend against air attacks and troop landings. The remaining third of the force was to stay on the north side of the fjord for use as security for Elevgårdsmoen. Differences in views between the division and the regiment on how to defend Narvik and the Ofot Railway surfaced because of this operational directive although they had probably been present for some time.

Colonel Sundlo conveyed the regimental views about the defense of Narvik to the Major General Carl Johan Erichsen, who was the divisional commander at the time, on several occasions following the issuance of the operational directive. The regiment believed that the most likely threats against Narvik were either a naval attack to destroy facilities to prevent the export of iron ore or a landing of troops from naval vessels to secure those facilities. The regiment felt it was imperative that some kind of defense measures be taken in the Ramsund area, such as a well-guarded minefield.

When the division threw cold water on this possibility, the regiment suggested that, as an interim measure, one reinforced company equipped with 65mm mountain artillery should be deployed to the fjord entrance. A reinforced infantry company, the train-mounted 75mm gun, some 65mm mountain artillery pieces, and one or two air defense batteries was considered the minimum force that should be stationed in Narvik. The regiment suggested that the force left at Elvegårdsmoen be reduced to one infantry platoon while the rest of the reinforced company be given the mission of defending the Ofot Railway (at the end of the fjord) and also used as a reserve for the force in Narvik.

The plan for the neutrality watch issued by the division at the end of 1937 dropped the idea of a forward deployed company at the fjord entrance, since the responsibility for guarding the coastline belonged to the navy based on an agreement between the commanders of the two services. The limit on the size of the force to be used on the south side of the fjord was retained.

The construction of bunkers and other defensive works in the Narvik area was, as Fleischer noted on February 2, 1940, a result of the government’s failure to complete the long-promised fortifications at the fjord entrance. In the fall of 1939, divisional engineers constructed two reinforced concrete bunkers in Narvik and one for the defense of the largest of the railroad’s bridges, known as the Nordal Bridge. The construction of bunkers in and around Narvik and Fleischer’s order on February 17, 1940 for an absolute defense of the city signaled a major departure from the World War 1 plans.

The partial mobilization in late January 1940 included an engineer company that the division stationed in Narvik except for one platoon that was sent to East Finnmark. However, during the winter, the division pressed the regiment to use infantry units to construct the defensive works planned for the Narvik area, Elvegårdsmoen, and Øyjord. The construction in Narvik was delayed for several reasons. First, the regiment felt that the work was so technical in nature that it should be delayed until an experienced engineer officer became available. Second, the 1/15th Inf battalion that was stationed in the Narvik area at the time had been sent to East Finnmark. Finally, in addition to the difference of views between General Fleischer and Colonel Sundlo about the wisdom of defending Narvik relying primarily on infantry forces, they also differed on where the defense positions in Narvik should be located.

Sundlo considered it foolish to confront an attacker on the flat terrain in the harbor area where the defenders would be subject to the full fury of naval firepower. He wanted to establish the main defense line along the high ground in the eastern part of the town, with a covering force in the harbor area. This covering force was not expected to become involved in decisive combat but to delay and channel an enemy advance towards the main defensive line. It appears that Sundlo intended to use his forces in an offensive role and did not think elaborate defense works were called for. The division did not agree and Sundlo later clarified that when he had expressed the opinion that elaborate prepared defense positions were not needed, he referred to the covering force. Whatever the case, the difference in views between Fleischer and Sundlo apparently extended to precisely how that defense should be carried out.

It is difficult to determine the thinking behind the location of the first two bunkers. There was 3,000 meters between them and they were therefore not mutually supporting. The distances from the Fagernes and Framnes bunkers to the central harbor area were 1,800 and 1,000 meters, respectively. The central parts of the harbor were therefore outside the effective range of machineguns and small arms.

Major Sigurd Omdal, the regimental executive officer, recommended that a number of machinegun nests be built in the harbor area. The division plan for construction of defensive positions in Narvik, however, involved only the expansion and strengthening of the bunker system. It called for the construction of four additional reinforced concrete bunkers: one on the west side of the Framnes Peninsula, one near Vassvik, one at Ornes, and one at Ankenes on the west side of the harbor. The plan also called for supporting machinegun positions near at least two of these bunkers. The engineer company was tasked with building the bunkers. The regiment requested that the engineers also build the machinegun positions, but the division directed that infantry be used for that purpose. It appears that Colonel Sundlo also wanted to build machinegun positions along Rombakfjord. During his trial, Sundlo stated that he believed an enemy attack would come from the north side of town and he did not think a landing would take place directly in the harbor.
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Major Omdal’s recommendation for the construction of machinegun positions in the harbor area was not acted on. Instead, infantry troops were to patrol or occupy posts along the 3-kilometer harbor area separating the two bunkers. There was only one prepared position between the two bunkers. This was a covered infantry position at the south end of the Iron Ore Pier. Infantry positions were also dug or blasted out of rocks along the north side of Framnes Peninsula, between Kvitvik and Lillevik.

There are differing reports on the general plan for defensive preparations. Colonel Sundlo still wanted to place the main defensive effort along the high ground on the city’s northeastern side with a forward covering force, including machineguns, in the harbor area. General Fleischer did not agree. According to Sundlo, Fleischer wanted the defense to be concentrated on the western side of the city and as part of that decision, Sundlo was ordered to prepare positions for an infantry company along the northwestern slope of the Framnes Peninsula. According to Sundlo, Fleischer confirmed this decision when he visited Narvik in early 1940. The division chief of staff, Major Odd Lindbäck-Larsen, stated later that the division did not tell the regimental commander how he should conduct the defense of the town and he found it unlikely that Fleischer would have ordered Sundlo to prepare infantry positions on Framnes Peninsula against the colonel’s wishes and without telling the chief of staff. Lindbäck-Larsen stated that he was surprised to find defense works on that peninsula.

Fleischer inspected the Narvik defenses on March 7 and 8, 1940 and expressed his satisfaction with the progress. It seems strange that he would have approved the defense works on Framnes Peninsula if it were not his intention that they should be located there. According to his own testimony about the inspection, the chief of staff protested sharply the fact that there were no defensive positions in the harbor area. Fleischer did not support his arguments, stating that it was Sundlo’s decision as to how he conducted the defense. According to Lindbäck-Larsen, this discussion led to a decision to place machineguns in the harbor area and to prepare a position at the southern end of the Iron Ore Pier.

The division directed the engineers to build bunkers at Vassvik and Ornes on March 18, and to construct an artillery bunker on Fagernes. The bunkers’ exact locations were to be determined by Colonel Sundlo and the commander of 3rd Mountain Artillery Bn. Only the machinegun bunkers at Fagernes and Framnes were placed under the control of the regiment and occupied by infantry prior to April 8. The construction of the bunkers at Vassvik and Ornes had started. Those at Kvitvik and Ankenes were nearly complete but control had not been transferred to the regiment. Construction of the artillery bunker at Fagernes had not begun. The infantry positions in the Kvitvik-Lillevik area were to be completed by mid-April.

The defensive plans required that a reinforced infantry company maintain a state of readiness that would allow it to occupy all defensive positions in Narvik within three hours. The need for a higher readiness level was recognized after the navy announced that it could not provide three hours of early warning. The reinforced company earmarked for Narvik was located at Elvegårdsmoen in the inter-war period, not at Narvik. The tense situation after the
Altmark
incident and the need for a higher readiness level caused General Fleischer to move the reinforced company from Elvegårdsmoen to Narvik on February 17, 1940. He ordered Colonel Sundlo to prevent landings by foreign troops, regardless of nationality.

In hindsight it is easy to see where mistakes were made. The plan to mount the defense of the Ofot Railway in Narvik, particularly before all defensive works were completed, ignored a number of basic defensive principles.

An attacker would have dominance of the fjords and every part of the defense would be exposed to the devastating effects of close-range naval gunfire. The forces in Narvik were separated from the areas north of Ofotfjord and therefore from any reinforcements. There were no lines of communications through the mountain wilderness to the south. The positions in Narvik could easily be enveloped by enemy landings on the south side of Rombakfjord. These landing forces would isolate Narvik from the outside world. From the landing sites, an attacker could advance to the Swedish border virtually unopposed. He could also occupy the high ground east of Narvik, eliminating any realistic possibility of holding the town. If these military objections were not sufficient, there was the humanitarian factor. Why turn Narvik, with its 10,000 civilians, into a bloody battlefield when that was not necessary for defending the Ofot Railway?

The considerations enumerated above, along with the knowledge that the capture of Narvik was only important militarily to an enemy if it also included control of the railroad to the Swedish border, should have dictated a defense that did not involve trying to hold the town. It was not a prudent decision to meet an attack by an enemy with naval dominance at the water’s edge. The attacker would have the advantage of selecting the point of attack, forcing the defender to spread his forces to meet threats from all directions. A fixed forward defense is usually unwise unless the defender has strong fortifications and sufficient reserves that can be moved quickly in response to a dangerous development. The inability of the Germans to move their reserves quickly to counter the landings in Normandy, because of Allied air dominance, virtually eliminated the value of their defensive works. In Narvik, there were neither strong defensive works nor any reserves.

A defense in the interior, along the railroad, would have had several obvious advantages. It would have spared the civilian population in Narvik, removed Norwegian forces from the reach of naval gunfire, made envelopment difficult, and forced an enemy to operate in a severe climate and unfamiliar terrain. From an interior position, contact could be established and maintained with Norwegian forces to the north.