Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (61 page)

The British established a defense in depth with the equivalent of six companies near the village of Rindheim. The forward line consisted of two companies of Foresters with one company of Leicesters higher up the hillside. The Foresters occupied prepared positions. The three under-strength Norwegian dragoon companies were placed behind the British left flank on a plateau formed by the saddle between Hills 616 and 526. There were no prepared positions for the Leicester company and the dragoons, and their visibility was severely reduced in the heavily wooded terrain. A company of Foresters was in reserve along the road leading to Tretten and another company moved to the west side of Lågen. The rest of the Leicesters formed the second British line.

The British expected that the main German effort would be directed at their mountainous left flank so they placed a company of Leicesters and the Norwegian dragoons in this area. The Germans did not attack as the British expected. At about 1300 hours, their main attack, led by tanks, commenced along the road against the two Forester companies, with a secondary effort along the west side of the river. The British antitank rifles proved ineffective against the tanks. The reserve company was committed, but within one hour the British defenses disintegrated and the Germans continued towards Tretten.

The Norwegian dragoons, their route of withdrawal threatened by the German breach of the British line, started a retreat to Tretten. Fifteen to 20 British officers and NCOs offered to serve as a delaying force and most were killed or captured. The German advance was so rapid that the dragoons found their line of retreat cut. After a short engagement, the dragoons withdrew into the mountains and, after failing to reach friendly lines, were demobilized.

The fighting had now reached Tretten. The German force advancing on the west side of the river was able to get guns into position where they could fire on the bridge and the village. Tretten and the bridge were held until early evening. In the confused withdrawal of British forces west of Lågen, the lines connecting the prepared charges were disconnected and the Norwegian engineers, caught up in the panicky withdrawal, did not stay around to reconnect the charges. The Germans captured the bridge intact. A rear guard held a final position about two kilometers north of the village until 2130 hours. The remnants of the brigade dispersed and, using trucks and busses, they headed for Heidal. A Danish officer, a volunteer in the Winter War and now serving as a volunteer in the Norwegian forces, gives a rather uncomplimentary description of the British retreat to Heidal:

British authors describe Tretten as an unmitigated disaster. Derry writes that the brigade, after regrouping, was reduced to nine officers and 300 men. A few dozen survivors managed to reach Sweden or the coast in the days that followed. The Germans captured about 250 British soldiers, including Lieutenant Colonel Ford and a severely wounded Lieutenant Colonel King-Salter, the British Military Attaché.

Moulton blames the Norwegians for the defeat at Tretten. He claims that the confusion over the withdrawal of TF Dahl from Gausdal was the immediate cause for the defeat. This conclusion is highly questionable and shows reliance on British accounts, to the exclusion of Norwegian and German sources. It is not obvious that the withdrawal of TF Dahl from Gausdal would have altered the outcome. This was the fourth action by the 148th Brigade and it is extremely doubtful that the outcome would have been any different if it had engaged the Germans further north. The fault lies with the British authorities who rushed an untrained and poorly equipped militia force into the snow-clad mountains of eastern Norway without air support, artillery, or effective antitank weapons while their best troops sat on their hands in the Narvik area.

Norwegian Delaying Actions at Tromsa and Vinstra

Encouraged by their success against the British at Tretten, General von Falkenhorst altered the mission of the 196th Division. Group Fischer was put under von Falkenhorst’s direct command with the mission of linking up with German forces moving south from Trondheim. The rest of the division was ordered to conduct a relentless pursuit in Gudbrandsdal towards Åndalsnes, to destroy or capture the British forces in central Norway.

The Norwegian 11th Infantry Regiment carried out a near normal mobilization in the Møre and Romsdal Province and two line battalions were brought to the Dombås area to join the British in their southern drive to Trondheim. After the defeat at Tretten, the regiment was moved into Gudbrandsdal and the 1st Bn was placed under the command of Major Torkildsen near Tromsa, about ten kilometers north of Tretten. These troops witnessed the British retreat, and it certainly had a negative effect on their morale. If Ruge had known that operation
Hammer
was cancelled, he may have moved the 11th Regiment into Gudbrandsdal earlier.

The Germans attacked the 1/11th Inf with tanks and infantry in the morning of April 24. With the arrival of additional armor and seeing how helpless the Norwegians and British were against this weapon, the Germans changed their tactics. Rather than immediately initiating flanking maneuvers, they made frontal attacks led by armor. This tactic was successful at Tretten and at Tromsa. While their armor broke into the positions at Tromsa, the Norwegians succeeded in making an orderly withdrawal to another delaying position. The Germans followed and broke through the Norwegian lines with tanks that same afternoon. A number of Norwegians were driven into the mountains. The battalion, reduced to 550 troops, withdrew to an assembly area north of Otta, about 40 kilometers to the north. The Torkildsen Battalion was not attacked and managed to withdraw to Ringebu (15 kilometers to the north) in the evening but only after losing 50 men, who were cut off by the Germans.

Meanwhile, the 2/11th Inf had occupied a hasty delaying position north of Vinstra, about 12 kilometers from Ringebu. The roadblocks were held open for retreating units but the Germans were in such hot pursuit that it was not possible to close them after the last retreating units came through late on April 24. The German armor drove through the Norwegian frontlines, driving some of the defenders into the mountains. The Norwegian reserves managed, with great difficulty, to stop the Germans, who withdrew to Vinstra for the night. That same night the Norwegians were ordered withdrawn to Otta. The 2/11th was badly mauled. It had lost one infantry company, most of the machinegun company, and another infantry company had lost 30 men. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment was reduced to two squadrons. German armor and air power were major factors in the inability of the Norwegians and British to halt the relentless German pursuit, a pursuit that repeatedly scattered and isolated the defenders.

British Reinforcements

Lieutenant General H. R. C. Massy was appointed commander of all British forces in Norway, except those in the Narvik area, on April 20, but he never left London. Major General P. G. T. Paget was appointed commander of forces operating in southern Norway on April 20, now that this was about to become a multi-brigade operation with the diversion of the 15th Brigade to Åndalsnes from its original mission against Trondheim. Brigadier General H. E. F. Smyth commanded the 15th Brigade and this unit began landing in Åndalsnes and Molde from cruisers and destroyers on April 23. The 15th Brigade, unlike the 148th, consisted of regular soldiers, withdrawn from the western front with great secrecy. The original plan called for this brigade to enter Østerdal and assist TF Hiorth. However, the disaster at Tretten made it necessary to move the brigade into Gudbrandsdal to shore up the crumbling defense there.

The British tried to remedy their mistake in not providing air support. They were reluctant to bring aircraft carriers sufficiently close to the coast to be effective and decided to counter the German air threat by bringing in fighter aircraft and more antiaircraft guns. However, half the antiaircraft guns were lost when a German submarine sank the transport
Cedarbank
.

The British could not find a suitable airfield in this mountainous terrain and decided to base their operations from the frozen Lake Lesjaskog, between Dombås and Åndalsnes. Despite objections by their own officers sent to reconnoiter, the British Air Staff decided to use Lake Lesjaskog since it was closer to the operational area than the larger lake near Vang in the Valdres Mountains, which was used by the Norwegians.

Ground personnel arrived in Lesjaskog on April 23 where Norwegians had cleared enough snow to make one landing strip. The British set up operations the following day when 18 Gladiators from the 263rd Squadron flew in from the aircraft carrier
Glorious
. The problems started the next day when some of the carburetors and controls had frozen, making it difficult to get the motors started.

The Germans reacted quickly to this threat to their air dominance. Only one Gladiator managed to take off before the Luftwaffe appeared. The first visit caused little damage and the Germans lost one aircraft. The Germans reappeared in greater force around 0830 hours. In the interim, a further two Gladiators had become airborne and were flying air cover in Gudbrandsdal. The other 15 Gladiators were still on the ice. Although a couple managed to become airborne, ten were destroyed in the course of the morning.

The bombing caused panic among the ground personnel and they fled into the woods along the lake. This caused a severe slowdown in operations since it took the pilots over one hour to replenish their ammunition and fuel. Those aircraft able to take off shot down two German aircraft. By evening, there were only four operational Gladiators left. These flew to Åndalsnes next morning, where the parade ground of a Norwegian training camp was used as a landing strip. Since these aircraft ran out of fuel the following day, all were destroyed.

British Actions at Kvam, Kjørem, and Otta

General Smyth reported to General Ruge in the morning of April 24 and was directed to occupy positions at Kvam, about eight kilometers north of Vinstra. Smyth occupied the Kvam positions with the battalion of the King’s Own York and Lancaster Infantry, an antitank company, and some engineers. Norwegian engineers delayed the German advance sufficiently to give Smyth five to six hours to organize his defense. These professional soldiers proved more difficult for the Germans to defeat. They also had effective antitank weapons.

General Pellengahr’s forces in the area had grown to six infantry battalions, a mountain battalion, a motorized machinegun battalion, several batteries of artillery, and a number of tanks. The narrowness of the valley allowed for only a part of this force in the forward area. Most German units were deployed in depth all the way to Ringebu. The first German attack at 1130 hours on April 25 was repelled despite considerable British losses to an intense enemy artillery bombardment. The forward British company was forced to withdraw by 1600 hours after having lost 89 men. The Germans tried to envelop the defending force but the British managed to extend their left flank and frustrate the flanking movement. General Smyth was wounded early in the engagement and Lieutenant Colonel Kent-Lemon assumed command of the brigade. The York and Lancaster Battalion occupied a position behind the village through which the forward units could withdraw.

The Germans resumed their attack at 0630 on April 26. This time they sent a whole battalion around the British left flank and the companies there became heavily engaged. The Germans also attacked in the center with heavy air and artillery support. While the French-made British antitank guns proved effective, some were neutralized by enemy artillery fire. Despite supporting attacks by Norwegian ski troops sent by General Hvinden-Haug, the British were in danger of having the road behind their positions cut by the German envelopment. The situation was becoming precarious for the British, not only because of the envelopment, but also from groups of Germans who infiltrated gaps between the companies.

General Paget ordered withdrawal from Kvam at 2300 hours. The York and Lancasters, and one company from the Green Howards, were to set up a position at Kjørem, five kilometers to the north, and the British were to withdraw through these positions. Two companies on the far left of the British line were not informed about the withdrawal and had to make a perilous escape through the hills.

Generals Paget and Ruge met on April 26, and a new command arrangement was worked out. The British now had the preponderance of forces in Gudbrandsdal and it was therefore natural that all forces in that area should be under British command since British forces had operated under Norwegian command when the situation was reversed. Paget, who was worried about a German breakthrough in Østerdal presenting a threat to his rear, had suggested a withdrawal to the rugged terrain south of Dombås but this was not acceptable to Ruge. To do so would mean sacrificing TF Dahl, now on the offensive against the German left flank at Fåberg.

Both Paget and Ruge reported back to their respective governments around this time. Paget’s report on April 26 refers to the 148th having “had a dusting,” and it fed the flames of ill feeling among the Norwegians by calling some of their units “unreliable.” He also gave a greatly exaggerated estimate of German strength when he reported that the 15th Brigade faced two or three German divisions.
¹³

General Massy’s reply on April 27 emphasized the importance of holding a bridgehead that included Dombås and a 70-kilometer stretch to the north as far as Opdal in order that a second base could be developed in Sunndalsfjord. It is difficult to understand Massy’s message in view of what was going on in London and Paris. Chamberlain had ordered plans finalized for an evacuation of Åndalsnes and Namsos on April 26 and Massy received permission from the Prime Minister and the War Office to evacuate Åndalsnes the following day, the very day on which he sent the message to Paget.