Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (29 page)

The 3rd Naval District’s chief of staff notified General Fleischer around 0345 hours that foreign warships had entered Ofotfjord. This message was followed 15 minutes later by a similar report from the District Command. At the same time, District Command reported that all was ready in Narvik. This statement was apparently in answer to Lindbäck-Larsen’s request 45 minutes earlier for confirmation that the battalion from Elvegårdsmoen had reached Narvik and that the bunkers were occupied. What the District Command used as a basis for the claim that all was ready in Narvik is not known. Colonel Sundlo tried unsuccessfully to contact District Command from 0300 until at least 0330 hours. It is true that the machinegun crews had occupied the bunkers the previous evening but the movement of the battalion was not completed. Fleischer decided to return to his headquarters and two naval aircraft were placed at his disposal for transport from Vadsø to Tromsø.

The patrol vessel
Senja
left Narvik at 0135 hours to escort merchant ships past the British minefield in Vestfjord. At 0340 hours, the patrol boat sighted a warship, believed to be a British destroyer, near Ramnes. This report reached Captain Askim but it was interpreted as a British cruiser. His reaction, according to Steen, was, “Thank God, there are also British ships in the Fjord.” As
Senja
approached to challenge the warship, it turned out to be German. A second German destroyer was also sighted. This information was transmitted to Captain Askim by radio but, for unknown reasons, he did not receive the report. The Germans sent an armed boarding party aboard the Norwegian ship, put its radio out of commission, removed critical parts from the 76mm gun, and ordered the skipper to proceed to Narvik. Captain Askim had ordered the patrol vessels at the Ofotfjord entrance not to engage foreign warships. This was a sensible order in view of the disparity in size and armaments between these small vessels and destroyers.
Senja
arrived in Narvik at 0630 hours.

Search for Shore Batteries

The German forces approaching Narvik were divided into three groups: Group West, Group Narvik, and Group Elvegårdsmoen. These groups were to carry out nearly simultaneous attacks on the three main objectives.

Group West consisted of the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla (
Hans Lüdemann
,
Anton Schmitt
, and
Diether von Roeder
) and the troops aboard these destroyers. Captain Bonte detached the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla at 0340 hours. Group West’s mission was to land two infantry companies to capture the non-existent Norwegian shore batteries at Ramnes and Hamnnes.
Anton Schmitt
was to land the reinforced Co 1 on the south side of Ofotfjord, in a small side fjord called Vargfjord. The plan called for the company to advance across the narrow peninsula and attack the imaginary Hamnnes battery from the rear. Thereafter, the company would continue along the north shore of Vargfjord and attack a battery the Germans believed was located at Jevik. Company 1 belonged to the 1st Battalion, which landed at Bjerkvik.

Hans Lüdemann
was to land the reinforced Co 6 at Skarvik, just east of Ramnes. The company would advance westward and attack the Ramnes battery from the rear. Company 6 belonged to the 2nd Battalion, which landed in Narvik. The two destroyers remained in the fjord, prepared to support the operation with naval gunfire. These were the two destroyers encountered by
Senja
. The reserve for these two landings was aboard
Diether von Roeder
. This destroyer positioned itself near Barøy where it would be near enough to the landing sites quickly to land the reserve and at the same time be in position to assist
Erich Giese
when she arrived, should that be necessary.

The German troops exhausted themselves in a fruitless search in six feet of snow for the non-existent guns. They reembarked on destroyers around 0700 hours and landed in Narvik.

Capture of Elvegårdsmoen

Elvegårdsmoen was a major mobilization center as well as the training area for the 15th Infantry Regiment, the Hålogaland Engineer Battalion, and several smaller units. It was a major weapons, ammunition, and supply depot. Among the items at the depot were 4,000 rifles, 2,000 carbines, 600 handguns, 222 machineguns, 14 mortars, 1.5 million rounds of ammunition, and huge stores of uniforms, supplies, and food.

It was Group Elvegårdsmoen’s mission to capture this depot. The group consisted of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla (
Wolfgang Zenker
,
Hermann Künne
,
Erich Koellner
, and
Erich Giese
) carrying 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 139th Mountain Regiment, commanded by Colonel Windisch. The 1st Battalion was short one company, which was part of Group West. The landing force was also short about 200 men who had embarked on
Erich Giese,
which had still not arrived. Bonte released the 4th Destroyer Flotilla at 0410 hours and the three destroyers proceeded on a northeasterly course. The troops were landed at a wooden pier in Bjerkvik from the destroyers’ boats. The landing was unopposed and the troops advanced towards Elvegårdsmoen as soon as they came ashore.

When Major Spjeldnæs took his battalion to Narvik, he left a guard detail of 17 men from Co 3 at Elvegårdsmoen. In addition, there were about 150 non-combat personnel at the depot. It appears that Spjeldnæs failed to appoint a camp commander when he departed and the senior officer failed to assume command. Steen and Sandvik write that Spjeldnæs viewed the repositioning of the battalion as an administrative move and neglected to brief those left behind. The two authors claim that this behavior evidently stemmed from Colonel Sundlo not giving Spjeldnæs a reason for moving the battalion to Narvik.

However, it seems unlikely that Sundlo failed to give a reason for the move or that Spjeldnæs failed to ask why the colonel deployed his battalion with live ammunition and a battle train, on short notice, at night, and in a snowstorm. Spjeldnæs’ own testimony fails to support the claim. Sundlo talked to Spjeldnæs at 2000 hours when he ordered the machinegun company and mortar platoon into Narvik and again around 2100 hours when he ordered the major to bring the rest of the battalion. While Spjeldnæs could not recall the details of the conversations, he was sure that the colonel gave the reason for the move during the second call.
¹⁴
Thus, he had no reasons to view the deployment as an administrative move.

The Norwegians at Elvegårdsmoen were warned about the approaching Germans 15 minutes before they arrived. The officers left behind at the depot spent those 15 minutes discussing whether they should issue live ammunition to the 17 troops. They could not reach a decision and the arrival of the German troops interrupted their discussion. Elvegårdsmoen was captured without a shot being fired. General Hovland writes that the depot commander surrendered the place after a telephone conference with Colonel Sundlo. This telephone call, which must have been made in the 15 minutes between the time Elvegårdsmoen learned about the approach of German troops and their arrival, a period when Sundlo was apparently away from his headquarters, is not mentioned in the official histories. In the end, it does not matter since there was little 17 soldiers could do against two battalions of elite troops.

Hurriedly moving the entire 1/13th Inf into Narvik only exacerbated the defense problems in the Narvik area. All the disadvantages of mounting a defense on the Narvik Peninsula were still valid and in the process, the depot was lost intact. Military planners must have realized that the seizure of military depots was an important supporting objective in securing Narvik and the railroad to Sweden. Their capture would prevent or disrupt any mobilization that might threaten the attackers hold on Narvik.

If it were General Fleischer’s plan all along to bring the entire 1/13th Inf into Narvik in a crisis, it would have been prudent to plan for the defense or destruction of the depot at Elvegårdsmoen. To rely on the 2/15th Inf unit, which had to travel more than 40 miles over bad roads in wintertime was not a good solution. This is undoubtedly the reason the defense plan called for no less than one third of the battalion, at least a reinforced infantry company, to remain on the north side of Ofotfjord.

A reinforced infantry company could not hold Elvegårdsmoen, but it might have delayed the Germans long enough to permit the destruction of some of the valuable stores that fell into their hands. The captured food stores alone were sufficient to feed the German forces in the Narvik area for two to three weeks.
¹⁵

It is questionable whether they could have survived without them. There should have been standing operating procedures for moving or destroying the stores in the event of an emergency and the authority to execute these procedures should have been specified.

The Germans were surprised by the lack of resistance. Group Elvegårdsmoen consisted of almost two thirds of the German forces in the Narvik area. This attests to the fact that its capture was high on the list of German priorities and that they expected more resistance at Elvegårdsmoen than they did at Narvik.

The Sinking of the
Eidsvold

Captain Bonte continued towards Narvik with the 1st Destroyer Flotilla,
Wilhelm Heidkamp
,
Bernd von Arnim
, and
Georg Thiele
, after detaching the 4th Destroyer Flotilla at 0410 hours. When they neared the harbor entrance at 0415 hours, the Norwegian coastal defense ship
Eidsvold
suddenly appeared through a snow squall.
Eidsvold
challenged the lead German destroyer,
Wilhelm Heidkamp
, with a signal light. A warning shot was fired when the German destroyer failed to respond and simultaneously the flags for the international signal, “Bring your ship to a stop” were hoisted.
Wilhelm Heidkamp
stopped about 200 meters off
Eidsvold’s
port side and Captain Bonte signaled, “Sending boat with an officer.” The other two destroyers continued towards Narvik.

Captain Willoch was perfectly within his right not to go through the formalities required by the neutrality regulations. The instructions from Admiral Diesen at 2345 hours stated that force be used against any attacker. The foreign warships that appeared at the harbor entrance were German and the ships attacking Bergen had been identified as German. These were more than sufficient reasons for Willoch to conclude that neutrality procedures no longer applied with respect to German ships. Instead of opening fire immediately, Willoch allowed a German destroyer to take up a position very close to his own ship, permitted Lieutenant Commander Gerlach to board
Eidsvold
and come to the quarterdeck, and allowed two German warships to proceed to Narvik.

It was well within
Eidsvold’s
capability to destroy or severely damage the German destroyer. The destruction of
Wilhelm Heidkamp
might not have altered the eventual result in Narvik, but the possible elimination of General Dietl, Captain Bonte, 200 troops and over 300 naval personnel would most certainly have affected subsequent operations. Colonel Windisch would have succeeded to command of the German forces. He was a very capable officer but he did not enjoy Hitler’s confidence in the same way as Dietl.

Commander Gerlach saluted the Norwegian captain when he stepped onto the bridge. With the military courtesies out of the way, Gerlach told Captain Willoch that the Germans had come as friends to defend Norwegian neutrality against the British. While appealing for cooperation, he demanded that Willoch surrender his ship. He stated that resistance was useless and that several Norwegian cities were already in German hands. Willoch asked for ten minutes in which to contact his superior for instructions. Askim’s short answer was, “Open fire.”

Captain Willoch’s next action is even more difficult to understand. Gerlach had left the Norwegian warship and Willoch reportedly recalled the German officer and told him that he had orders to fire on the German destroyer. Gerlach saluted and left the Norwegian ship for a second time.
Wilhelm Heidkamp
had meanwhile changed its position and was now located 30° off
Eidsvold’s
port bow at a distance of approximately 700 meters. Commander Gerlach fired a prearranged signal flare after leaving the Norwegian warship, which told his shipmates that the Norwegians had turned down the German demands. There was some quick soul searching among the officers on
Wilhelm Heidkamp’s
bridge. Although old and outdated, the
Eidsvold
had a formidable armament. The two 8.3-inch, six 6-inch, and eight 3-inch guns could bring devastation to the German destroyer at this close range.

Eidsvold
headed towards the German destroyer and the distance was quickly reduced to 300 meters before the destroyer skipper, Lieutenant Commander Hans Otto Erdmenger, ordered full speed ahead to take up another torpedo position. The Norwegian guns were aimed at the destroyer and Erdmenger was very concerned for the safety of his ship. He requested permission to open fire but Bonte was reluctant. The navy’s operational order stated explicitly that German ships were not to fire the first shot. He was also concerned that an attack on the Norwegian warship would eliminate all chances for a peaceful occupation of Narvik. It was only after General Dietl, who was also on the bridge, demanded that he open fire that Bonte authorized Erdmenger to torpedo the coastal defense ship.

It is sometimes necessary in combat for a commander to deviate from plans and regulations when common sense dictates it in order to accomplish the mission. Such decisions are always risky and often heart wrenching. Captain Bonte faced such a dilemma when it became obvious that
Eidsvold
would use her big guns against his destroyer at close range. The directives from Admiral Raeder and General von Falkenhorst made it clear that German ships were to fire only after the Norwegians had opened fire. If Bonte waited for the Norwegians to open fire, he risked the destruction of his ship and put the accomplishment of the task force mission in jeopardy. He had to choose quickly between two parts of his order—“let nothing stop you from accomplishing your objective” and “the Norwegians must fire the first shot.”