Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (7 page)

A British destroyer flotilla of six ships commanded by Captain Philip Vian (later Admiral of the Fleet) in the destroyer
Cossack
, intercepted
Altmark
, now escorted by the Norwegian torpedo boat
Skarv
, outside the entrance to Jøssingfjord, halfway between Egersund and Flekkefjord. Three destroyers made the initial intercept:
Cossack
,
Intrepid
, and
Ivanhoe
. At first, they stopped short of Norwegian territory and signaled
Altmark
to proceed on a westerly course, out of Norwegian waters.
Altmark
ignored the signal and proceeded on its previous course. At that point,
Intrepid
and
Ivanhoe
entered Norwegian waters despite protests from the Norwegian torpedo boat.
Ivanhoe
tried to position itself to block
Altmark
but the Norwegian torpedo boat took up a position between the two ships and moved to within hailing distance of the British destroyer, which fired a warning shot toward
Altmark
.

The
Altmark
slowed down and a boat was launched from
Ivanhoe
with the intention of boarding the German ship. Lieutenant Hansen, the commander of
Skarv
, protested the British breach of Norwegian neutrality. Captain Gordon answered the protest by telling the Norwegian officer that he had orders to capture the German ship. Captain Dau used the delay to move
Altmark
at full speed towards the Jøssingfjord entrance. Three additional British destroyers arrived on the scene, and a second Norwegian torpedo boat,
Kjell
, took up a position between the British force and the entrance to Jøssingfjord.

A very dangerous situation had developed. The six modern British destroyers were vastly superior to the two Norwegian torpedo boats.
²²
However, the sinking of Norwegian naval vessels, with loss of life, in their territorial waters would probably lead to war between Britain and Norway.

Lieutenant Halvorsen,
Kjell’s
commander, was the senior Norwegian officer on the scene and took command of the Norwegian force in the area. He protested verbally to Captain Hadow, the
Ivanhoe’s
skipper. For unknown reasons, Captain Hadow initially addressed Halvorsen in German. Hadow switched to English after the Norwegian lieutenant told him, to the great amusement of the destroyer crew, “Please, speak English, Sir.”
²³
With these pleasantries out of the way, Lieutenant Halvorsen demanded that the British force leave Norwegian territorial waters immediately. Captain Hadow informed the Norwegian that
Altmark
carried 400 British prisoners, and that he had orders to free them and bring them to England. Nevertheless, the British withdrew. On the advice of Norwegian pilots,
Altmark
used the time to enter Jøssingfjord. Captain Dau again used his radio to send a message to the German Embassy in Oslo via a coastal radio station. Norwegian authorities stopped the message.

Skarv
remained with the British destroyers while
Kjell
followed and hailed
Altmark
. Captain Dau informed Halvorsen that Norwegian warships from the 2nd Naval District had visited the ship repeatedly and he had received permission to use Norwegian territorial waters. No mention was made of prisoners.
Kjell
returned to the British destroyer force, tied up alongside
Cossack
, and Halvorsen boarded the British ship for a conference with Captain Vian. To Vian’s statement that
Altmark
carried British prisoners, Halvorsen replied that he had no knowledge of any prisoners. However, even if this was the case, he maintained the British had no rights to violate Norwegian neutrality, and demanded that the British force depart as quickly as possible in order to avoid serious consequences.

The Norwegian torpedo boats had received orders from Rear Admiral J. Smith-Johannsen, commander of the 1st Naval District (which included the Jøssingfjord area), that force should be used to oppose any British attempt to seize
Altmark
. Vian suggested that Norwegian and British officers should inspect the ship, but the Norwegian turned down this suggestion, since allowing foreign officials to inspect ships in Norwegian waters was a serious infringement of the nation’s sovereignty. Halvorsen pointed out that the German ship was in Norwegian waters, had been inspected by Norwegian warships, and had been permitted to proceed. Vian agreed to leave territorial waters, but stated that his force would remain outside to wait for
Altmark
.

Reports of what was transpiring on the Norwegian coast reached Churchill, and with the concurrence of the Foreign Office he sent Captain Vian the following order:

By this stage, the German Ambassador and his naval attaché had become involved, lodging protests. Admiral Boyes visited the Norwegian Naval Staff that evening. In addition to protesting the British action, Norwegian officers pointed out that it was not necessary for the British to attack
Altmark
in its present position. The Norwegians showed Admiral Boyes maps illustrating that
Altmark
would be forced to leave Norwegian territorial waters to avoid the ice in the Skagerrak, and that British forces could easily intercept the ship at that time. It would be logical for Admiral Boyes to forward this information to the British Admiralty. The official Norwegian naval history states that there is no evidence he forwarded the information, but if he did, it had no influence on the events that were unfolding.

The urgency of the British action raises questions about their motives, aside from the obvious one of freeing their fellow citizens.
Altmark
was trapped in Jøssingfjord and going nowhere, with a force of six British destroyers outside the entrance. If Churchill’s suggestion of a joint escort of
Altmark
to Bergen or another suitable harbor had been made to the Norwegian government, rather than through Captain Vian to a low-ranking Norwegian naval officer, it is quite possible that a solution agreeable to both parties would have been found. Similarly, the information given to Admiral Boyes by the Norwegian Naval Staff was certainly available to the British Admiralty, even if Boyes did not make a report. There are good reasons to believe that the British (probably Churchill and the Admiralty), knowing there were acceptable alternatives to confrontation, chose the latter. A confrontation would certainly focus public attention on German misuses of Norwegian waters, plus Norway’s failures to enforce its neutrality, and could lead to the kind of German countermeasures Churchill desired.

Admiral Smith-Johannsen rescinded his order to use force to prevent the seizure of
Altmark
after he discussed the matter with his superior, Admiral Diesen. Captain Vian had meanwhile received Churchill’s order and decided to carry it out using his own destroyer. Halvorsen hailed him at the mouth of the fjord and Vian stated what his orders were. Halvorsen, who was personally convinced the German ship carried no prisoners, asked for ten minutes to examine the German ship. Reports from the 2nd Naval District indicating that prisoners might well be aboard the ship were apparently not relayed to the 1st Naval District. Captain Vian rejected the Norwegian suggestion and proposed instead that Halvorsen accompany the British boarding party as a representative of the Norwegian authorities. He also suggested that the boarding take place from the Norwegian torpedo boat. Halvorsen rejected the suggestion. However, since he was convinced there were no prisoners aboard
Altmark
, he consented to be present on HMS
Cossack
as an observer.

After he realized what was happening, Dau managed to ram
Cossack
with the aft end of
Altmark
, without causing any significant damage. The British boarding party entered the German ship and, according to German and Norwegian sources, opened fire on its crew resulting in five (seven according to some sources) dead and a number of wounded. The British reported that they had fired in self-defense after coming under fire from the Germans. Captain Dau denied that the Germans had fired a single shot. Lieutenant Halvorsen left the British destroyer in protest when the firing started, and reported later that he observed the British firing at German crewmembers fleeing on the ice. Two hundred and ninety-nine prisoners were freed and transported to England. Norwegian destroyers escorted
Altmark
to repair facilities and the ship eventually returned to Germany.

Norway protested the British action. On the legal side, Norway based its position on the claim that
Altmark
was a warship. “Warships have the rights to passage through neutral waters and the fact that it is carrying prisoners does not change this fact.”
²⁵
The British rejected the Norwegian protest. Chamberlain deplored the views of the Norwegians since “it would in their [British] view legalize the abuse by German warships of neutral waters and create a position which His Majesty’s Government could in no circumstances accept.”
²⁶

The
Altmark
affair had no direct effect on Allied planning except for the conclusion that the Norwegians were either in no position or were not inclined to prevent German misuse of their territorial waters. The passive reaction by the Norwegian Navy may also have emboldened the British dramatically to increase their violations, both in number and scope, over the next few weeks. A passage from the Norwegian naval history is illustrative.
²⁷

In the opinion of the Allies, the
Altmark
incident strengthened their moral justification for their planned action in Scandinavia. Such an underpinning was badly needed since it appeared that the Finnish-Soviet conflict was reaching a climax and could cease to be a motivation for action in Scandinavia.

End of the Winter War and its Effect on Allied plans

The great Soviet offensive against the Finnish Army on the Karelian Isthmus opened on February 1, 1940. It lasted for 42 days. Ten days of heavy bombardment by over 500 aircraft and Soviet guns, massed wheel to wheel, preceded the attack by two armies consisting of 54 divisions. After 12 days of ferocious fighting, resulting in enormous Russian casualties, the Mannerheim Line was breached on February 13, and by March 1 the Finnish right flank was pushed slowly back to the city of Viipuri. The situation for the Finns had become desperate. They were short of ammunition and their troops were exhausted. The hoped-for assistance from the West had not materialized. The total number of foreign volunteers in Finland numbered only 11,500, and 8,275 of these were from Sweden and Norway, mostly from Sweden. The volunteers also included 300 men in the Finnish-American Legion who received their baptism of fire in the last days of the war.

A Finnish delegation proceeded to Moscow to discuss armistice terms on March 7. The Soviet terms were surprisingly lenient, almost the same as those contained in their demands in November 1939 that led to the war. The Russian losses in the war have never been published but most observers believe they suffered more than 200,000 killed and another 400,000 wounded. The Soviets were also alarmed by the cool attitude displayed by Germany in early 1940, and by the prospect of a war with England and France unless they came to quick terms with the Finns. The Finns accepted the Soviet terms on March 12.

The conclusion of peace between the Soviet Union and Finland rendered the underpinnings of Allied plans obsolete. With unenthusiastic agreement by the French leader, Daladier, the British government decided on March 14 to set aside plans for operations in Scandinavia. Since there was no longer the slightest chance that Sweden and Norway would acquiesce to an Allied presence in their countries, active resistance had to be anticipated. This would throw the Scandinavian countries into the arms of Germany.

It is easy to recognize that Allied policy and plans were shortsighted and inadequate. While execution of the policy may have achieved some success against Germany’s peripheral interests, it carried with it huge long-term risks that seriously damaged the Allies’ claim to the high moral ground. The slow-moving Allied planning and preparation machinery was undoubtedly very fortunate for their war effort. Operations in Scandinavia and assistance to Finland would probably have resulted in war with the Soviet Union, while Sweden and Norway might have become Germany’s reluctant allies. This could have had enormous consequences for the outcome of WWII.

The conclusion of peace between the Soviet Union and Finland also saved Chamberlain and Halifax from the precarious position of having to carry out an operation that they believed would remove all possibilities of peace. They no doubt welcomed the news that the Soviet-Finnish conflict had ended, and to remove any possibility that an operation on the scale anticipated could be carried out, they quickly dispatched the two regular divisions (held back for operations in Scandinavia) to France. By reducing the force available for use in Scandinavia to 11 battalions, they hoped to discourage their use. This became a major factor in the debacle following the decision to dispatch troops to Norway.