Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (10 page)

The German fleet was divided geographically into the Eastern Group Command in the Baltic under Admiral Rolf Carls and the Western Group Command in the North Sea under Admiral Alfred Saalwächter. Saalwächter sent a report to the Naval High Command (Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, or OKM) on March 2, 1939 in which he openly discussed the acquisition of bases in Norway. He cautioned that the British Navy would close the northern approach with a mine barrier, including mining Norwegian territorial waters. The Norwegian government’s ability to prevent such an action was judged as being limited. Saalwächter’s report stressed both the dangers to Germany of British dominance in Norwegian waters and the favorable change in the geo-strategic position that a German occupation of Norway would bring about.
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The OKM was also concerned about the effects of a mine barrier. As a result of the increased range of air power, they considered it likely that the new barrier would be located further north than the one in World War I, and that the only option available to change this strategic fundamental would be through the acquisition of bases in central or northern Norway. The OKM, however, continued to believe that the best solution to the strategic problems of the German Navy was through the acquisition of bases on the French coast.

Admiral Carls had been a longtime follower of Wegener’s ideas.
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He was the third highest-ranking officer in the navy and a dominant personality, known among his colleagues as the “Blue Czar.” According to Carls, the only way the navy could achieve decisive results in a war was to adopt a two-pronged strategy that concentrated on holding open German sea-routes while attacking British overseas trade. While favoring Wegener’s views, he also considered the acquisition of bases in France the best solution, since the German Navy could not eliminate the effects of a British blockade and pose a threat to that country’s supply routes from Norway. These ends could only be accomplished by capturing the Faeroes or the Shetland Islands, objectives beyond Germany’s capabilities.

In an appraisal of the political-military situation on September 4, 1939, Admiral Carls pointed out the strategic importance of Scandinavia and the danger to Germany if the British Navy was to obtain bases in that area. At every opportunity in September 1939, he emphasized the dangers posed to Germany by British naval and air bases in southern and western Norway. He continually stressed the importance of making plans to counter the possibility of the British establishing themselves on the Norwegian coast.

Raeder claims in his autobiography that “our armament industries would have died overnight” had it not been for the 10 million tons of Swedish iron ore used in German steel production. He goes on to say that the trade through Norwegian waters was going so well that it was taken for granted. He claims:

In addition, he continued, “Nobody in the Navy, and probably almost nobody else in Germany gave the Norwegian problem a second thought during the first month of the war.”
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These statements are not supported by facts and they misrepresent the navy’s role in planting the seeds and establishing the intellectual framework for the necessity of the Norwegian operation.
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Raeder’s assessment that the war economy would have died overnight if Swedish ore were unavailable is no doubt influenced by his realization that the navy would be the first to suffer if further prioritizing became necessary. By stressing this point in his testimony before the International Military Tribunal, he was undoubtedly trying to depict his activities in the months leading up to the invasion of Norway as responsible pre-emptive planning.

In his testimony at the Nuremberg Trial, Admiral Raeder states that he had not concerned himself with the Norwegian question until he received several intelligence reports during the last week of September 1939.
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He is less than candid. The question of bases in Norway surfaced numerous times in the period after 1935. In a post wargame statement on April 12, 1938, Raeder dealt with the subject of base acquisition for improving the navy’s operational possibilities. The planning committee in 1938 considered a partial occupation of Norway, but its final report concluded that while such a move would improve Germany’s strategic position, it would require substantial forces that could be used better elsewhere. However, the idea was kept alive as an acceptable alternative to the acquisition of bases on the continent’s open Atlantic coasts.

Admiral Carls kept a journal that was read regularly by Raeder, and entries in that journal in September 1939 pointed out the risk of British footholds in southern and western Norway and the necessity for planning German counter-measures.
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The intelligence reports that Raeder refers to in his testimony at the Nuremberg Trial included reports from the German Naval Attaché in Oslo, Lieutenant Commander Richard Schreiber, and a rare personal visit by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of the Abwehr (Department for Foreign Intelligence and Security within OKW) who informed him that there were signs “that the British intended to occupy bases in Norway.”
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The next impetus came from Admiral Carls, who was privy to the same intelligence reports as Raeder. He made a telephone call to Raeder during one of the last days of September to explain that he had prepared a private letter for him. The letter dealt with the dangers to Germany of a British occupation of bases in Norway, and raised the issue of whether Germany should forestall such an attempt by the British. Raeder states that he received the letter at the end of September or beginning of October. He testified at his trial that the letter impelled him to pose a series of questions to the Chief of Staff of the Naval Staff (Seekriegsleitung, or SKL) examining the danger of English occupation of Norwegian bases as well as the pros and cons of a German expansion to the north.
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The questions Raeder posed to the SKL were also given to Rear Admiral Karl Dönitz, the commander of German submarine forces, for comments. Dönitz proposed the establishment of a major submarine base in Trondheim and a fuel/supply depot at Narvik.

The SKL reached mixed conclusions on Admiral Carls’ letter and on the questions posed to them by Raeder. In a document prepared by the Operations Divisions of the Naval Staff on October 9, their opinion was one of caution.
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The naval staff saw no pressing reasons why Germany should establish itself forcefully on the Norwegian coast. First, the occupation of bases on the Norwegian coast would not bring any decisive advantages to Germany’s strategic position, particularly if it were necessary to secure such bases with force. Second, SKL viewed continued Norwegian neutrality as a definite advantage to Germany. They concluded that the German ore traffic would be safer with a neutral Norway than it would be after an eventual German occupation, provided the British forces respected Norwegian territorial waters. The naval staff saw the obvious advantages of Norwegian bases in a naval war against Britain, but they also saw clearly the hazards involved in an effort to expand the operational theater in face of superior British naval power.

On the other hand, the SKL considered it absolutely necessary to prevent a British occupation of Norway or the seizure of bases in that country. They argued that a British presence in Norway would bring Sweden into the British sphere of influence and possibly end Swedish iron ore exports to Germany. Their temporary conclusions were that bases in Norway would not significantly enhance Germany’s strategic position.
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The fact that Germany was negotiating with the Soviet Union for the lease of a base near Polarnoje (in Kola Bay) may have influenced the SKL conclusion. The lease of the base took effect in November, and German submarines used it frequently.

Raeder Briefs Hitler

Raeder had a routine meeting with Hitler on October 10, 1939 and used the opportunity to bring up the subject of Norway.
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He took a more aggressive approach than that contained in the SKL answers to his questions on October 3. Raeder pointed out that the establishment of British naval and air bases in Norway would be a very dangerous development for Germany. The importance of Norway for aerial warfare was a factor that was not present in World War I, but which had since considerably increased the importance of that country to the belligerents. Raeder stated that Britain would not only be able to control the entrance to the Baltic, but would be in a position to outflank German naval operations in the North Sea and German air attacks on Great Britain. The flow of iron ore from Narvik would end, and the Allies would be able to exert strong pressures on Sweden.

Having alerted Hitler to the obvious dangers, Raeder proceeded to mention possible solutions. He pointed out the advantages that would follow from German occupation of certain strategic points along the Norwegian coast, the major one being virtually unhampered naval access to the Atlantic. By dwelling on the dangers to Germany of a British presence in Norway and the advantages of a German presence there, rather than on the advantages of the status quo, Raeder showed that he was more in tune with the ideas of Wegener and Carls than those of his own staff. He was also exploiting Hitler’s paranoia. Hitler, who was preoccupied with the planned attack in the west, was noncommittal. He asked Raeder to leave his notes, promising further consideration.

There were, of course, officers within the SKL who favored the idea of acquiring bases in Norway. Two of these, mentioned by both Salewski and Gemzell, had close personal relationships with Raeder. One was Lieutenant Commander Heinz Assmann, the second Admiralty Staff Officer, an influential position within the Operations Department. He was involved in operational planning, kept the war diary, and prepared Raeder’s reports to Hitler. These confidential duties indicate that he was held in high regard and caused him to have frequent contacts with Raeder. The second officer was Captain (later Admiral) Erich Schulte Mönting. He had been Raeder’s aide-de-camp and then became chief of his personal staff. As such, he had important coordinating duties, including the supervision of German naval attachés in foreign countries and contacts with foreign naval attachés in Germany.

Admiral Raeder continued his interest in the establishment of German bases in Norway after his conversation with Hitler on October 10. He received valuable support from Lieutenant Commander Schreiber and from Alfred Rosenberg, the semi-official philosopher of Nazism and chief of a special office concerned with propaganda in foreign countries.

Schreiber was assigned as naval attaché to Norway on the recommendation of Admiral Carls. He had served on Carls’ staff and he was well acquainted with that admiral’s views on the Norwegian question. Soon after his arrival in Oslo, Schreiber established contact with Vidkun Quisling, the leader of the Norwegian fascist party.

The strategic importance of Scandinavia took on greater importance in both Berlin and London when the Soviet Union attacked Finland on November 30, 1939. Schreiber kindled Raeder’s interest by his reports of rumors of Allied plans to occupy strategic points along the Norwegian coast. These reports reinforced similar information in the Western press and from German diplomats in neutral countries.

The possibility that the war would be longer than previously thought began to arise in November 1939. This possibility brought the economic warfare issue to the forefront, and Hitler issued a directive on this subject on November 29. Raeder quickly exploited this new emphasis by pointing out that Great Britain received substantial supplies from the three Scandinavian countries. He indicated that much of the export from these countries passed through Norway and then via convoys to Great Britain. The resources going to the Allies would go to Germany if that country came under German control. Denial of British access to these valuable raw materials and foodstuffs would serve to shorten the war.
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Hitler Meets Vidkun Quisling

Alfred Rosenberg sponsored a visit to Berlin by Quisling in December 1939. Rosenberg and Quisling had met for the first time in 1933. Quisling had been a reserve officer in the Norwegian Army and the Norwegian Minister of War from 1931 to 1933. It was after his stint as cabinet minister that he founded
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(National Unity), a party with an ideology similar to Nazism. Its platform was pan-German, anti-Soviet, anti-British, and anti-Semitic. Rosenberg and Quisling’s organizations maintained regular contact. Quisling and Rosenberg met again in June 1939 when the former spoke to a convention of the Nordic Society, a Nazi organization for cultural and trade relations with Scandinavia.

Quisling arrived in Berlin on December 10, 1939, and the next day Raeder was informed that Quisling had requested an interview, based on a recommendation by Rosenberg. The interview was arranged quickly. The traditional view, as reported by historian Telford Taylor, is that Rosenberg was behind this meeting as well as the later ones with Hitler. Ralph Hewins, Quisling’s biographer, has called this into question. He claims that Raeder knew all about Quisling and his party, and that he may have used the Rosenberg organization to establish formal contact.
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There is evidence to support Hewins’ claim. Admiral Schniewind, Chief of Staff of SKL (a position comparable to that of Fritz Halder on the General Staff), has written that many important issues were classified “political,” kept from the SKL, and handled by Schulte Mönting. Schniewind claims Schulte Mönting arranged the contact with Quisling.
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Raeder’s adjutant, Freiwald, worked for Schulte Mönting and he reports that Schulte Mönting and Viljam Hagelin, a Norwegian business executive who was Quisling’s representative in Germany, were old friends.
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Hans-Dietrich Loock claims that there were close contacts between Schulte Mönting, Rosenberg’s people, Quisling, and Hagelin.
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