Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (91 page)

General Dietl moved additional forces into the area and adjusted his front line late in the evening of May 29. The 83 men from the 1st Bn, 1st Parachute Regiment who arrived on May 29 were rushed to the Sildvik area and the Engineer Platoon assigned to Group Windisch on the northern front was withdrawn to Bjørnefjell as a division reserve. Dietl ordered Captain Walther to pull his forces back to a point about half a kilometer west of Straumnes and to occupy Hills 1436 and 970. There appears to have been confusion at all levels. Major Haussels’ forces were already on Hill 970 and Walther’s troops, believing they were on Hill 1436, were actually on the western slopes of Hill 818.

There were three reasons for Dietl’s redeployments. First, he wanted to make sure that Walther established contact with Haussels’ forces. Second, he wanted to move the forces along the railroad out of the reach of British warships and French/Norwegian artillery batteries at Øyjord. Finally, Walther was worried about an enemy landing in his rear, and a withdrawal to the narrows at Straumnes would alleviate this problem. The retreating Germans offered strong resistance and were able to destroy the railroad.

May 30 and 31 were days full of crises for the Germans and they did not know that the situation with respect to the French and Polish forces would stabilize at the end of that period. Captain Walther’s forces along the railroad were under steady and increasing pressure from the French. The most serious situation developed in Major Haussels’ area when it became apparent that the Poles were driving towards Sildvik. If they succeeded, Walther’s forces would be cut off. There were no reserves available and it was estimated that the Polish drive was in battalion strength. Haussels had only weak forces in their path and the 3rd Division expected the enemy to reach Sildvik shortly.

Dietl had a telephone conversation with Group XXI in Oslo and stressed the need for immediate assistance. He then traveled to Hundal to familiarize himself with the situation at the front. At 1200 hours, he decided to send a parachute company to block the expected arrival of the Poles in the valley above Sildvik. He also ordered Walther’s forces to fall back to positions at the narrow strait east of Straumnes. Naval detachment Kothe was withdrawn from Rundfjell on the northern front and moved towards Hundal while one company of mountain infantry was removed from Walther’s command and transferred to Haussels to shore up his left flank at Hill 884. The division reserve, the engineer platoon, was moved to the mountains south of Sildvik. At 2245 hours it was reported that the enemy was about to break through the German positions at Straumnes Strait and the parachute company that was earlier moved to the valley above Sildvik was brought back to Sildvik in case of a breakthrough to the west.

There was still no contact between Captain Walther’s left flank and Major Haussels’ right flank and it was not until the evening of May 31 that it was discovered that Walther’s left flank was two kilometers behind Haussels’ right flank. The division ordered Walther to establish contact with Haussels’ forces immediately and insure that there were no gaps between them.

The French forces reached the peninsula east of Straumnes on May 31 but did not press their attack. The Polish attack against Major Haussels’ forces was hampered by heavy fog and snow. Consequently, their advance was delayed and Company 2 was not able to capture Hill 884 before May 31, at the same time as Company 3 captured Hill 970. Company 1, which was supposed to make a more or less isolated move towards Sildvik encountered unexpected resistance. After being caught in a crossfire, it withdrew to the Beisfjord village area.

The bad weather that hampered the Polish attack on May 30 and 31 also affected the Germans. The troops were beginning to show signs of exhaustion. The weather had prevented aerial resupply for three days and ammunition was running short. An attempt to airdrop ammunition in the evening of May 31 was not successful. The parachutes were improperly fastened to the loads and tore loose. Most of the mortar ammunition detonated as it hit the ground. The situation was to become worse as continued bad weather prevented air operations.

The Last Fights

The first phase of the resumed Norwegian offensive called for a move to the Nygård watershed. Alta Bn was given the mission of clearing the Germans from the north side of this watershed, capturing Hill 346 on the south side of the watershed, and thereby securing the road from Trældal to Cirkelvann, the proposed new supply line that it was hoped would be opened by a French drive from the southwest.

The Germans had positions on the north side of the watershed, on Hill 361 and between Cirkelvann and Nedre Jernvann. They were driven back across the river in a series of company-size operations by the Alta Battalion between May 24 and May 31. The 6th Division ordered the Alta Bn to seize Hill 346 by 2400 hours on May 30. The Germans had strong forces on Hill 346 and the Norwegians were unable to cross the river because there was no bridging equipment available.

Lieutenant Colonel Dahl planned to cross Jernvannene using improvised rafts made from sleeping bags stuffed with hay or straw. It was envisioned that two sleeping bags tied together would suffice to carry five soldiers with equipment. It was now light around the clock and the battalion planned a quick crossing under air cover and concealed by an artillery smoke screen. Although the battalion was suffering from scurvy, Dahl felt that it was better to attack than continue the positional warfare and relative inactivity of the past week. Safely across, the battalion planned to bypass all enemy positions and secure the highest terrain in the area. The plan was not carried out since division’s operational order on June 1 directed that most of Alta Bn move east to operate in conjunction with the 6th Brigade.

New units were also arriving in the area. The 1/15th Inf assembled in Gratangen where it was reorganized since all its trains and transport were lost in the evacuation from Bodø. The battalion was eventually moved to the Lillebalak area with one company relieving part of Alta Bn and another company involved in supply operations. The reserve battalion of the 14th Inf also moved into the area from Nordland Province. This battalion, badly demoralized by its experience in that province, was given security missions in the rear, against enemy airborne operations. This mission was made more important by the frequent German parachute operations into the Bjørnefjell area.

The 6th Division’s directive for the operations against Bjørnefjell was issued on May 29. The 6th Brigade was directed to advance to the border and the railroad line. It was left up to the brigade whether this was accomplished by driving the Germans southward or over the border into Sweden. The 7th Brigade’s mission was to provide flank security for the 6th Brigade and serve as a link to the French forces that were expected to advance eastward at the same time. The 6th Brigade wished to locate its supply point at the east end of Hartvigvann but the division did not feel this solution was satisfactory. The decision was to establish a supply point for both brigades at the east end of Cirkelvann with the understanding that the brigades would fetch their supplies at this location. It was also decided that the 1/16th Inf, located on the far left, would continue to receive its supplies via Raudal.

The Germans held the northern front with the equivalent of three battalions. The exact composition of these battalions changed frequently as units were moved. Major Stautner’s battalion held the western sector from Rombakfjord to Hill 346 with Cos 2, 3, 4, and 5. Naval infantry Co Erdmenger was located behind the left wing. Major Hagemann’s battalion held the center from Hill 522 to the river junction 500 meters east of Øvre Jernvann with Cos 11, 12 (reserve), 13, 14, and 15 as well as some smaller units. Group Schleebrügge constituted the right wing of Windisch’s front from where it tied in with Hagemann’s troops to the Swedish border via Hill 620. He had a mixture of units under his command, including three companies of mountain troops (Co 1, 139th, and Cos 2 and 3 of the 138th), one parachute company (Co 1, 1st Regiment), ski platoons Adler and Rohr, naval infantry company Steinecker, and naval infantry platoon Braun.
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The British evacuation of Bodø and the collapse of the front in Nordland Province gave new urgency to Norwegian offensive preparations. A report by Colonel Finne, the Norwegian liaison officer at Allied headquarters, also caused unease. He reported that the French plan was to capture Sildvik but not advance any further and that the Norwegians would have to take care of the rest.

On May 30, the division amended its earlier directive and ordered the operations to begin no later than 2400 hours that same day. A phrase in the amendment summed up the sense of urgency, “It is, for the sake of the country, absolutely necessary that the brigades make a renewed effort to bring the Narvik Campaign to a conclusion.”
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The 7th Brigade was asked to report immediately any French failure to participate in or support the attack.

Problems in getting the French on the north side of Rombakfjord to participate in the planned offensive continued. We have seen that Béthouart viewed the troops in the 14th Bn, CA as unfit for offensive operations and that Valentini voiced the opinion that there was no need for haste since the Germans would either surrender or intern themselves in Sweden within two weeks. Both these officers were aware of the evacuation and the prohibition against offensive operations after the capture of Narvik.

The 6th Brigade issued its attack order to the battalions on May 29 at 2130 hours. The 1/16th Inf was ordered to attack the eastern anchor of the German line at Hill 620, while the 2/16th Inf was to advance from its rest area to pre-reconnoitered attack positions and capture, as its first objectives, Hills 456 and 615. The 3rd Mountain Artillery Battalion would support the attack from positions between Kuberget and Skitdalsvann.

The 2nd Bn began its move at 0200 hours on May 30 but the terrain east of Skitdalsvann was mountainous and difficult. The battalion came under intense enemy automatic weapons fire as the units reached the high ground to the north side of the watershed near its objectives. Major Munthe-Kaas viewed the chances of success in a frontal attack as very small and made the first in a series of recommendations that the battalion move into the mountains to the east where the terrain was more favorable. The brigade turned down these suggestions and repeated attempts, frustrated by heavy enemy fire, were made to ford the river or build a footbridge. After wasting almost four days in these attempts, the brigade agreed to move the battalion into the mountains to the east at 1330 hours on June 3.

It will be recalled that the 1/16th Inf was left on the high plateau after the Germans withdrew to new defensive positions on May 22. An eastward movement, to make room for the 2/16th Inf that was getting ready to move forward from its rest area was begun on May 27. The battalion plan of attack called for Co 1 to attack Hill 620 from the east while Co 2 approached the objective from the west, with the machinegun company supporting both attacks. Company 7 was left in its positions on Hill 931 as flank security. The attack was planned for 2300 hours on May 30 but was postponed until 0600 hours on May 31 because of heavy fog.

Company 1 ended up attacking the hill from the north, not east as planned. The first attempts were unsuccessful due to German air attacks and stubborn resistance.

Company 1 reassembled on the northeast slope of the hill and the battalion altered the attack plan by directing Co 2 to attack from the east. Company 1 was to remain in its positions and support Co 2’s attack with fire. Company 2 would move against the German right flank after reaching the plateau between Hills 620 and 698, and Co 1 would then attack Hill 620 on a prearranged signal. Company 2 cleared the plateau by 2300 hours on May 31 after some heavy fighting. The Norwegians were able to hold the gained terrain and Hill 620 was stormed and captured on June 1.

The Germans describe the fight for Hill 620:

Company 2 continued its attack against Hill 698 but was stopped by heavy enemy crossfire. The battalion commander also committed Co 7 against this objective. The two companies surprised the German defenders under the cover of a heavy fog on June 2 and gained a precarious foothold on the northern part of the hill. Three Norwegians were killed and nine wounded in the attack.

Heavy fighting continued throughout the following week for Hill 698 and Border Marker 267A (Hill 623). This key objective changed hands a couple of times. Both Norwegians and Germans accused each other of violating Swedish territory. It appears that both sides were guilty. The Norwegian violation was carried out by a unit commanded by a Swedish volunteer, Lieutenant Jan Danielsen. When confronted by a Swedish officer and accused of violating the border, Danielsen is reported to have replied, “To hell with that, we have to attack the Germans wherever they are.”
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This surprise attack from the east led to the capture of this key terrain.

Lieutenant Rohr’s platoon held the far right of the German line, up against the Swedish border. Rohr’s report to Schleebrügge indicates that he felt that what was appropriate for one side should also be appropriate for the other: