Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (95 page)

This is a serious charge that is not supported by statements, documents, and reports. It would certainly be strange for the German military to agree to and sign a document that recognized and acknowledged continued Norwegian resistance from overseas and one should therefore not be surprised that this subject is not mentioned. Ruge was empowered by the government to make all arrangements dealing with the German assumption of authority in North Norway. Both representatives initiated their contact by stating that the king, government, navy, and air force had left the country and that Norway, as a state, continued now and in the future to be at war with Germany. In this regard, it may be of interest to quote from Roscher-Nielsen’s description of events when he reported to the German headquarters in Trondheim:
¹⁷
: “The negotiations began with Colonel Buschenhagen [von Falkenhorst’s chief of staff] asking what kind of negotiating authority I had, whether I came to negotiate a peace or a cease-fire. I answered that I was exclusively authorized to negotiate a cease-fire for the 6th Division in North Norway, which for various reasons no longer could continue the fight.”

Buschenhagen then asked Roscher-Nielsen if he was empowered to act on behalf of the Norwegian Navy and Air Force to which the Norwegian answered that he did not have such powers. As to the location of the navy and air force, Roscher-Nielsen answered that he did not know but believed they were outside the country. Roscher-Nielsen’s report continues:

The OKW situation report from June 10 confirms Roscher-Nielsen’s account, “… the negotiator emphasizes strongly that despite the end of fighting in Norway, the war continues. It is stressed that the Norwegian naval and air forces have left Norway with the Allies.”
¹⁸
Furthermore, the nine-paragraph document signed by Roscher-Nielsen starts with the following statement of purpose, which clearly limits its scope: “In view of the Norwegian 6th Divisions courageous conduct, it is accorded the honorable conditions set forth below in laying down its weapons.”
¹⁹
The other paragraphs in the document deal with the release of prisoners, weapons, ammunition, equipment, fuel, vehicles, airfields, and the disposition of Norwegian forces along the Soviet border. These forces were permitted to continue their functions under the authority of the provincial governor until German forces could take over those functions. Non-career officers, NCOs, and troops were allowed to proceed to their homes. Career officers and soldiers could chose between giving their word of honor not to participate in hostilities against Germany or its allies in the current war or entering an honorable prisoner-of-war status. Officers were permitted to retain their personal weapons.

General Ruge became a prisoner of war, but he was treated with courtesy and generosity by Dietl, and no efforts were made to interfere with the Norwegian demobilization. Dietl visited Ruge’s headquarters on June 12 and Ruge made a reciprocal visit to Dietl’s headquarters the following day. Walter Hubatsch takes note of what General Ruge said in his proclamation to the Norwegian people on June 9. The statement “But the war continues on other fronts–Norwegians are participating in that war …” towards the end of the proclamation are hardly words describing a “total Norwegian capitulation.”
²⁰

Operation
Juno

The evacuation from Norway was not completed without serious losses. The Germans, without any knowledge about the Allied evacuation, had launched a naval operation in northern waters. In mid-May, OKW held a bleak view of the situation in Narvik. It appeared that Dietl would not be able to hold out much longer, that the weather in the Narvik area was too unpredictable for effective reinforcements by air, and that General Feurstein’s troops would not reach Narvik in time to save the 3rd Mountain Division. It was decided to employ German naval forces against the Allied bases and ships in the Harstad-Narvik area in order to reduce the pressure on Dietl’s forces. The mission was expanded on May 16 to include protection of sea supply routes for General Feurstein’s troops. The operation was given the codename
Juno
.

Admiral Saalwächter issued the directive for the operation to Admiral Wilhelm Marschall, the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, on May 29. The main objective was to enter Andfjord and Vågsfjord to destroy enemy warships, transports, and base facilities. If the fleet commander found a penetration of Ofotfjord to Narvik possible, that would become the main mission. The protection of the sea routes for supplies to the 2nd Mountain Division was a secondary objective. The forces placed at Admiral Marschall’s disposal included the battleships
Gneisenau
(his flagship) and
Scharnhorst
, the heavy cruiser
Admiral Hipper
, and the destroyers
Karl Galster
,
Hans Lody
,
Erich Steinbrinck
, and
Hermann Schoemann
.

The German fleet departed Kiel at 0800 hours on June 4 and proceeded northward through Storebelt. It had a rotating escort of He-115s and 111s for portions of the voyage and aggressive air reconnaissance was carried out from bases in Norway. The fleet passed the latitude of Bergen during the night of June 6 and reached a position at the latitude of Harstad, 200 nautical miles southeast of Jan Mayen in the morning of June 7.

Marschall was informed by Group Command West that an analysis of British radio traffic indicated that the British were unaware of the presence of the German fleet. Group Command West kept Marschall informed about the location and movement of British surface units. A report in the evening on June 6 informed Marschall that the battleship
Valiant
, the aircraft carriers
Glorious
and
Ark Royal
, the cruisers
Devonshire
,
Southampton
,
Vindictive
,
Coventry
and about 15 destroyers were in North Norway. A message the following morning reported seven ships about 360 nautical miles northwest of Trondheim on a southwesterly course. These were the ships of the first convoy, carrying about 15,000 Allied troops. Marschall was about 110 nautical miles north of the reported sighting when he received the message. These fast liners were already out of reach of the German fleet. Marschall may have assumed that they were empty ships returning to England and the report did not cause him to change his plan to attack the Harstad area.

Heavy units of the Home Fleet were engaged in a chase after two mysterious warships reported by a British armed merchant ship. These mysterious naval vessels were 200 nautical miles northeast of the Faeroe Islands with a course towards the Faeroe-Iceland gap. Admiral Forbes, fearing a German breakout into the Atlantic, sent a strong naval force consisting of the battle cruisers
Renown
and
Repulse
, the cruisers
Newcastle
and
Sussex
, and five destroyers to chase this sighting. This left the battleships
Rodney
and
Valiant
at Scapa Flow.
Valiant
was sent to meet the first troop convoy, escort it around the Faeroe Islands, and repeat the operation for the second troop convoy two days later.

Marschall assembled his ship captains aboard his flagship in the evening of June 7 to discuss the attack on Harstad, which he intended to carry out during the night of June 8-9. While this conference was taking place, Marschall received a radio report from Group Command West (2155 hours) which read:

This intelligence was several hours old when received, but it caused Marschall to revise his estimate of the situation. He became convinced that the numerous reports of British ship movements on different courses away from the Norwegian coast indicated that a major movement of warships and transports were underway and that the most important targets would not be found in the fjords around Harstad. An entry in his war journal reads, “It strikes me that that the noteworthy westerly movement [of British ships], may indicate a British evacuation of Norway, and that the convoys on a westerly course present valuable targets.”
²²

Marschall decided to operate against the British ships that had been sighted and to await further intelligence before moving against Harstad. He informed Saalwächter of his decision at 0400 hours on June 8. Saalwächter disagreed with Marschall’s decision and sent a message stating that the main mission remained as before, the destruction of enemy naval forces in the Harstad-Narvik area. There appears to have been some differences between Saalwächter and the German Naval Staff on this issue, resulting in a compromise which permitted the
Hipper
and the destroyers to search for the merchant convoy.

The Germans encountered the British tanker
Oil Pioneer
and its escort, the armed trawler
Juniper
at 0600 hours on June 8.
Hipper
sank the trawler with gunfire and 29 survivors were taken aboard the German ships. The Germans removed the crew from
Oil Pioneer
and sent the ship to the bottom with torpedoes. The two British ships were unable to send out messages warning other ships.

Aircraft were launched by
Hipper
and
Scharnhorst
to look for the convoy. This led to the sighting of the passenger vessel
Orama
and the hospital ship
Atlantis
. The liner
Orama
was one of the troop transports not used in the evacuation. It was short of fuel and water and she was sent on her way along with the hospital ship without an escort.
Hipper
sank the 20,000-ton
Orama
, carrying 100 German prisoners, and successfully jammed her last radio message. Two hundred seventy-five survivors were taken aboard the cruiser and two destroyers. In accordance with the rules of war, the Germans did not attack
Atlantis
, carrying over 600 wounded, and in accordance with the same rules,
Atlantis
did not report the presence of the German ships until she made a visual signal to the battleship
Valiant
about 24 hours later.

Hipper’s
reconnaissance aircraft also reported seeing an enemy cruiser and a merchant ship to the south and the two German battleships and the destroyers searched unsuccessfully for these ships while
Hipper
took care of
Orama
. The reported sighting must have been a mistake since there was no British cruiser near that location. It is possible that the aircraft had spotted the
Devonshire
but if this is the case it was serious mistake in position and direction since that cruiser was located to the northwest of the German fleet.

Soon after this encounter, Marschall sent
Hipper
and the destroyers to Trondheim to refuel and to participate in that part of his mission that called for securing the sea route along the coast of Nordland Province. He discontinued his search for additional British transports and headed north with the two battleships, intending to operate between Harstad and Tromsø. He was particularly interested in the two aircraft carriers, which had been reported repeatedly.

Several groups of British ships were meanwhile well within range of the German battleships. Two divisions of the slow convoy were approaching from the northeast. The second troop convoy, carrying about 10,000 troops and escorted by the cruisers
Southampton
and
Coventry
, the aircraft carrier
Ark Royal
, and five destroyers, was also approaching from the northeast. This convoy was heavily outgunned by the two German battleships. The cruiser
Devonshire
, carrying the Norwegian royal family, Government, and Allied diplomats and their families (400 passengers), was located only 80 nautical miles northwest of the German battleships. Then there was the aircraft carrier
Glorious
with its two destroyers,
Acasta
and
Ardent
, about 100 nautical miles behind
Devonshire
.

The land-based British fighter aircraft had maintained their patrols over the evacuation area until the very last moments around midnight on June 7. The original plan was to destroy the aircraft but it was decided to try to land them on the aircraft carriers despite expert opinions that the flight decks were too short for Hurricanes.
Ark Royal
had a slightly longer flight deck, but since the aircraft could not be brought under deck because their wings could not be folded, it was decided that they should land on
Glorious
. The ten Gladiators and eight Hurricanes landed successfully on this aircraft carrier in the early hours of June 8. The landings on an aircraft carrier by pilots who had never before done so and in aircraft not intended for carrier operations was a courageous accomplishment. However, problems for air operations were thereby created. The Gladiators and Hurricanes, whose wings could not be folded, made for a disorderly storage situation.