India After Independence: 1947-2000 (12 page)

At independence, India inherited as part of the colonial legacy, an administrative structure that had been the major instrument of colonial power and perhaps the chief instrument of co-option of natives, from the brilliant scions of princely and zamindari families who joined the Indian Civil Service ICS to the Matric Fail son of the poor Brahmin priest who was happy to become a peon. British rule was bureaucratic rule, and that was what was most wrong with it. The chief culprits were the members of the ICS, a small elite group of overpaid, insensitive, mostly British men—so the nationalist argument had run
ad nauseum
before independence. Then why were the ICS given constitutional guarantees and the administrative structure left largely untouched after independence? The
major reason lies in the circumstances that attended independence; Partition, transfers of population unprecedented in known history, integration of some 300 princely states, war in Kashmir, the assassination of Gandhiji. The one island of stability, of predictability, appeared to be the administrative structure. Most of the British members of the ICS had left, the few that remained were pro-India. The Indian members of the ICS, very few in number, made it clear that they were more than willing to hitch their wagons to the new regime, some out of nationalism, others as good bureaucrats whose dharma is to carry out the orders of their superiors. Perhaps national leaders had no reply to the entreaty of Sir Uma Shanker Bajpai, an outstanding ICS officer, who said with irrefutable logic: ‘If I could serve so well a foreign power, how much better will 1 serve my own countrymen?’ The ICS was therefore replaced by the IAS or Indian Administrative Service and the pre-independence structure of all-India services, provincial or state services and central or Union government services was retained.

The Constitution in ‘Part XIV: Services under the Union and the States’ while laying down that Union and State legislation would detail the rules for recruitment and conditions of service for Union and State services respectively, simultaneously provided constitutional guarantees against arbitrary dismissal. The Constitution (Article 315) also ensures fairness in recruitment by providing for independent public service commissions (for the Union and for each state). The members of the commissions are appointed for a term of six years by the President or the governor and at least half must be civil servants with at least ten years service. The commissions are entrusted with the task of conducting examinations for recruitment to the services and have to be consulted on all matters relating to the method of recruitment, appointment, promotion, and transfer of as well as disciplinary action against civil servants.

The Constitution mentions only two all-India services that were in existence at that time: the IAS and the Indian Police Service (IPS), but it provided for more by giving the power to the Rajya Sabha to resolve by a two-thirds majority to establish new all-India services. The Indian Forest Service and the Indian Engineering Service are two services set up under this constitutional provision. The all-India services have been a significant force for national integration, for typically half the cadre of each state must come from outside it. Further, each officer spends the first few years at the district or sub-district level, then some at the state level, followed by a stint at the Centre, then usually back to the state and so on, thus acquiring familiarity with all levels of administration and intimate knowledge of the work culture, strengths and weaknesses of each. The central services also perform a unifying role in that their recruitment base is the country as a whole. Officers of the Audit and Accounts Service, or Railway or Customs can be and are posted in different parts of the country even though they will work in central government offices and not in state government offices as in the case of IAS or IPS. Provincial or state service officers are posted within the state, unless they are on deputation
or get promoted via internal examinations.

The constitutional safeguards were intended to encourage independence and integrity in the bureaucracy. No doubt this has ensued, there are any number of upright civil servants who have been able to resist unwelcome political pressures because of the security provided by constitutional guarantees of security of tenure. But total security has to some extent also encouraged sloth, lack of initiative and even corruption. It is so difficult to dismiss a civil servant that even gross cases of corruption are ignored because the results are not likely to be commensurate with the effort.

Politicians are also much to blame, as they often encourage or even pressurize officials to perform favours for themselves and their associates in return for monetary or other rewards. The period during the Emergency 1975-77, followed by the Janata Government 1977-79, was probably the watershed in the history of the Indian bureaucracy. Mrs Gandhi had pushed the notion of a ‘committed’ bureaucracy, albeit with the proviso that the commitment expected was to the Directive Principles. In practice, especially with the ascendancy of Sanjay Gandhi, this tended to degenerate into commitment to a person. Those who showed ‘commitment’ were rewarded and those who did not were punished. With Janata coming to power in 1977, the pendulum swung all the way back. ‘Victims’ of the Emergency were rewarded with high posts and ‘committed’ officers sent into the wilderness to cool their heels. Subsequent regimes at the national level have mercifully not indulged in such visible, large scale, playing of favourites though the slow process of the increasing politician-official nexus continues apace with caste-based parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) or Laloo Prasad Yadav’s Janata Dal adding a new dimension by favouring officials belonging to the castes on which their electoral base rests. At the national level, the BJP’s action, after it had lost the vote of confidence in April 1999, of wholesale transfers of senior officials, obviously with an eye to the impending elections, is a disturbing trend.

India would do as she had done for centuries: take what she desired from other cultures and bend it to her needs.

—Granville Austin
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The framers of the Indian Constitution had borrowed freely and unabashedly from other Constitutions, confident that the soil had been prepared sufficiently for exotic plants and the more homegrown ones to take root. The wisdom of the US Constitution and its Supreme Court, the innovations of the Irish Constitution, the time-tested conventions of the British Parliament, the administrative minutae of the Government of India Act 1935, and much else, especially the essence of their own people’s struggle for freedom—all went into the design and content of the Indian Constitution. There were many sceptics who wondered whether India could actually
deliver on the freedoms she promised.

In retrospect, it may be said that the Indian Constitution has not disappointed its architects, though it may have let down the sceptics. First and foremost, the institutions created by it for fashioning a democratic structure have survived and evolved to meet the changing needs. Despite stresses and strains, perhaps inevitable in a situation of rapid transition, the basic framework of responsible government, with the necessary balance between elected legislatures, functional executives, and vigilant judiciary, has acquired a legitimacy that would be difficult to erode. Notwithstanding rarified academic debates about whether Indian democracy is formal or substantive, Indians have accepted the democracy enshrined in their Constitution as real enough. They are not wrong in doing so, for when they look around at their neighbours in Asia and Africa, and even at faraway Latin America, and at the troubled peoples of the erstwhile Socialist world in eastern Europe, they know the worth of what they have.

The Constitution has also been remarkably successful in providing a framework for protection of the Fundamental Rights of freedom of speech and expression, including the freedom of the press, freedom of association, including the right to join political parties of one’s choice and form trade unions, etc. Courts have acted as guardians of citizens’ interests against encroachment by the state as well as private organizations and individuals. Courts have also been creative in expanding the meaning and scope of rights. For example, the right to life in article 21 was expanded to include the right to livelihood in the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, popularly known as the ‘Pavement Dwellers’ Case’.
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The right to personal liberty guaranteed in article 21 has been interpreted to mean that a poor person cannot be imprisoned for not paying his debts. This is not to say that these rights are not violated, often with impunity, but that the institutional mechanism for their redressal exists and can be leveraged, and that the movement has been in the direction of expanding the scope of rights in the direction of a more just and caring society.

The Constitution has proved sufficiently flexible in the matter of amending itself. Article 368 which contains the provisions for amendment of the Constitution specifies that an amendment bill can be introduced in either house of parliament and must be passed by a clear majority with two-thirds of members present and voting. However, in case of amendments in Article 368 itself or in articles dealing with the election of the President, the extent of the executive powers of the Union and the state governments, the judiciary, the distribution of powers, and the representation of the states in the parliament, the amendment bill must also be passed by the legislatures of at least half the states. This has ensured that while amendments are not so difficult that the letter of the Constitution becomes a barrier to social change, yet it is not possible to make changes unless a real consensus has been built up. Again, while Article 368 does not exclude any part of the Constitution from the scope of amending provisions, the Supreme Court has in effect placed limits on the amending
powers by means of the doctrine of ‘basic structure’ or ‘basic features’ of the Constitution. While it is possible to argue that this is not envisaged in the Constitution itself, yet it cannot be denied that the doctrine may well act as a healthy check on the ambitions of amendment-happy governments with big majorities.

Many suggestions have emanated from diverse sources over the years about changes required to, be made in the Constitution. Some want introduction of the Presidential system, others want proportional representation in place of or in addition to the first past the post system, still others want that winning candidates should have to secure at least fifty per cent of votes, as in many other countries. A relatively recent addition is the proposal that a vote of no-confidence which brings down a government should include a vote of confidence in an alternative government-a proposal clearly inspired by recent rapid changes in governments and resultant fears of instability. Despite considerable opposition, the BJP-led NDA government has appointed a Constitution Review Commission in 2000. The overall feeling is that most parties and most people, even when they seek important changes, are quite content to seek these within the given structure of the Constitution. We cannot lay our failures at the door of the Constitution; where there are failures, as indeed there are many, it is not the Constitution that has failed us, it is we who have failed the Constitution. As Rajendra Prasad said at the time of the framing of the Constitution, a Constitution can only be as good as the people who work it.

It is also significant that even those commentators, who are very sharply critical of the Indian political system, and pessimistic about its future prospects, have little criticism to offer of the Constitution. It is necessary to emphasize that at a time when most other institutions of governance have suffered greater or lesser erosion of legitimacy, the Constitution has continued to command respect. This is not a small gain for a country with such diversity and complexity. In the turbulent times that perhaps await us in the new millennium, the Constitution may well be a much-needed anchor of support. Its unambiguous commitment to a democratic, secular, egalitarian and civil libertarian society should help greatly in keeping the ship of state tied firmly to its moorings.

Fifteenth August, 1947, the first day of free India, was celebrated with much exhuberance and elation. The sacrifices of generations of patriots and the blood of countless martyrs had borne fruit. But this joy was tainted by despair, for the country had been divided. Large parts of the two new nations were engulfed by communal riots. There was a mass exodus of people from both states across the new borders. There was scarcity of food and other consumer goods, and a fear of administrative breakdown.

In a memorable address to the Constituent Assembly on the night of 14 August, Jawaharlal Nehru, speaking as the first prime minister of a free India and giving expression to the feelings of the people, said:

Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge . . . At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance. It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take the pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and to the still larger cause of humanity . . . We end today a period of ill fortune and India discovers herself again.
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But independence had been accompanied by a multitude of problems, and, of course, centuries of backwardness, prejudice, inequality, and ignorance still weighed on the land. The debris of two centuries of colonialism had to be cleared and the promises of the freedom struggle to be fulfilled. The long haul had just begun. As Nehru declared in his 14 August speech, ‘The achievement we celebrate today is but a step, an opening of opportunity, to the greater triumphs and achievements . . . That future is not one of ease and resting but of incessant striving so that we may fulfil the pledges we have so often taken.’
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There were the immediate problems of the territorial and administrative integration of the princely states, the communal riots that accompanied Partition, the rehabilitation of nearly six million refugees who had
migrated from Pakistan, the protection of Muslims threatened by communal gangs, the need to avoid war with Pakistan, and the Communist insurgency. Restoration of law and order and political stability and putting in place an administrative system, threatened with breakdown because of Partition and the illogical division of the army and higher bureaucracy virtually on religious lines, were other immediate tasks. As Nehru declared in 1947, ‘First things must come first and the first thing is the security and stability of India.’
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Or in the words of the political scientist W.H. Morris-Jones, the task was ‘to hold things together, to ensure survival, to get accustomed to the feel of being on the water, to see to it that the vessels keep afloat.’
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In addition there were the medium-term problems of framing a constitution and building a representative democratic and civil libertarian political order, organizing elections to put in place the system of representative and responsible governments at the Centre and in the states, and abolishing the semi-feudal agrarian order through thorough-going land reforms.

The newly-formed independent government also had the long-term tasks of promoting national integration, pushing forward the process of nation-in-the-making, facilitating rapid economic development, removing endemic poverty, and initiation of the planning process. It also sought to bridge as quickly as possible the gap between mass expectations aroused by the freedom struggle and their fulfilment, to get rid of centuries-long social injustice, inequality, and oppression, and to evolve a foreign policy which would defend Indian independence and promote peace in a world increasingly engulfed by the Cold War and getting divided into hostile power blocs.

All these problems had to be dealt with within the framework of the basic values to which the national movement had been committed and within the parameters of a broad national consensus.

The people and the political leadership set out to handle these short-term and long-term problems fuelled by an optimism, a certain faith in the country’s future and with a
joie de vivre.
This mood was to persist for most of the Nehru years. Though many, especially on the left, were dissatisfied with and basically critical of Nehru and his policies, they too shared this feeling of hope. Those who have lived through the Nehru era often now feel that they were lucky to have done so. Nehru himself once again expressed this feeling after nearly a decade as prime minister: ‘There is no lack of drama in this changing world of ours and, even in India, we live in an exciting age. I have always considered it a great privilege for people of this generation to live during this period of India’s long history . . . I have believed that there is nothing more exciting in the wide world today than to work in India.’
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Some of this euphoria disappeared with the India-China war of 1962. The war brought in a degree of realism but even so neither Nehru nor the country experienced any sense of defeatism. Nehru had always believed that ‘India’s greatest need is for a sense of certainty concerning her own success.’
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And it was this sense of excitement and of the coming success
which he succeeded in imparting to the millions.

We shall discuss the short-term problems in the following sections. The long-term tasks, the maturing of the country under Nehru’s stewardship, and the development of the political parties are discussed in subsequent chapters.

Independent India embarked on its tasks with the benefit of an outstanding leadership, having tremendous dedication and idealism besides the presence of a strong nation-wide party, the Congress. Beside the great Nehru stood a group of leaders who had played a notable role in the freedom movement. There was his deputy prime minister, Sardar Patel, a leader who possessed a strong will and was decisive in action and strong in administration. Then there were the learned Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the erudite Rajendra Prasad, and C. Rajagopalachari, endowed with a razor-sharp intellect. At the state level, were several leaders like Govind Ballabh Pant in U.P., B.C. Roy in West Bengal, and B.G. Kher and Morarji Desai in Bombay, who enjoyed unchallenged authority in their states. All these leaders had skills and experience to run a modern and democratic administrative and political system which they had acquired through organizing a mass movement, building up a political party, and participating in colonial legislatures for decades. They also possessed a great deal of talent in consensus-building. The national movement had brought together different regions, sections of society and ideological currents around a common political agenda. Outside the Congress were the Socialists, Acharya Narendra Dev and Jayaprakash Narayan, the Communists, P.C. Joshi and Ajoy Ghosh, the liberal communalist, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, and the Dalit leader, Dr B.R. Ambedkar. On the periphery were Dr S. Radhakrishnan, the distinguished philosopher, Dr Zakir Hussain, the educationist, V.K. Krishna Menon, who had struggled for India’s freedom in Britain, and a host of dedicated Gandhian leaders.

The leaders of independent India were persons of total personal integrity and had an austere lifestyle. No finger was ever pointed at Sardar Patel, for example, even as he performed the unenviable but necessary task of gathering funds for the Congress from the rich.

The Congress leaders also shared a common vision of independent India. They were committed to the goals of rapid social and economic change and democratization of the society and polity, and the values imparted by the national movement. Nehru’s commitment to these values is well known. But, in fact, Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad and C. Rajagopalachari were equally committed to the values of democracy, civil liberties, secularism, and independent economic development, anti-imperialism, social reforms and had a pro-poor orientation. These leaders differed with Nehru primarily on the question of socialism and class analysis of society. We may point out, parenthetically, in this context that Patel has been much misunderstood and misrepresented both by admirers
and critics. The right-wingers have used him to attack the Nehruvian vision and policies, while his leftist critics have portrayed him as the archetypal rightist. Both, however, have been wrong. In any case, it is important that Nehru and the other leaders shared the belief that for the country’s development building-up of a national consensus was necessary. The leadership’s position was strengthened by the fact they enjoyed tremendous popularity and prestige among almost every section of the people. On top of that, this team was headed by Jawaharlal Nehru who exercised, after December 1950, unchallenged authority in the party and the government.

Another positive feature of the Indian situation was the existence of Congress, a strong, democratically functioning, India-wide national party, with an established leadership and deep roots and strong support among the people. Except for the Communist party, its authority or legitimacy was questioned by nobody.

Even as Congress was being transformed from a movement into a party and was struggling to retain its politically all-embracing and ideologically diverse character, its leadership was aware of the fact that in the troublesome post-Partiton period the country needed a government which would represent the widest possible consensus and carry with it different shades of opinion and sections of society for implementing a common programme. So, even though the Socialists and the Communists moved into the Opposition, and the Congress was in an overwhelming majority in the Constituent Assembly and enjoyed unchallenged power, the Congress leadership widened the base of the Constituent Assembly and the government by the inclusion of distinguished and representative non-Congressmen. The government virtually became a national government. For example, the first Nehru cabinet of fourteen included five non-Congressmen: Dr B.R. Ambedkar and Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, both of whom had opposed the Congress before 1947, John Mathai, C.H. Bhabha and Shanmukham Chetty. Dr B.R. Ambedkar was also made the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution. Dr S. Radhakrishnan, the first Vice-President and the second President of India, had never been a Congressman.

Unifying under one administration, post-Partition India and the princely states was perhaps the most important task facing the political leadership.

In colonial India, nearly 40 per cent of the territory was occupied by fifty-six small and large states ruled by the princes who enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy under the system of British paramountcy. British power protected them from their own people as also external aggression so long as they did British bidding.

In 1947 the future of the princely states once the British left became a matter of concern. Many of the larger princes began to dream of independence and to scheme for it. They claimed that the paramountcy
could not be transferred to the new states of India and Pakistan. Their ambitions were fuelled by the British prime minister, Clement Attlee’s announcement on 20 February, 1947 that ‘His Majesty’s Government do not intend to hand over their powers and obligations under paramountcy to any government of British India.’
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Consequently, rulers of several states claimed that they would become independent from 15 August 1947 when British rule ended.

In this they got encouragement from M.A. Jinnah who publicly declared on 18 June 1947 that ‘the States would be independent sovereign States on the termination of paramountcy’ and were ‘free to remain independent if they so desired.’
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The British stand was, however, altered to some extent when, in his speech on the Independence of India Bill, Attlee said, ‘It is the hope of His Majesty’s Government that all the States will in due course find their appropriate place with one or the other Dominion within the British Commonwealth.’
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The Indian nationalists could hardly accept a situation where the unity of free India would be endangered by hundreds of large or small independent or autonomous states interspersed within it which were sovereign. Besides, the people of the states had participated in the process of nation-in-the-making from the end of nineteenth century and developed strong feelings of Indian nationalism. Naturally, the nationalist leaders in British India and in the states rejected the claim of any state to independence and repeatedly declared that independence for a princely state was not an option—the only option open being whether the state would accede to India or Pakistan on the basis of contiguity of its territory and the wishes of its people. In fact, the national movement had for long held that political power belonged to the people of a state and not to its ruler and that the people of the states were an integral part of the Indian nation. Simultaneously, the people of the states were astir under the leadership of the States’ Peoples Conference as never before, demanding introduction of a democratic political order and integration with the rest of the country.

With great skill and masterful diplomacy and using both persuasion and pressure, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel succeeded in integrating the hundreds of princely states with the Indian union in two stages. Some states had shown wisdom and realism and perhaps a degree of patriotism by joining the Constituent Assembly in April 1947. But the majority of princes had stayed away and a few, such as those of Travancore, Bhopal and Hyderabad, publicly announced their desire to claim an independent status.

On 27 June 1947, Sardar Patel assumed additional charge of the newly created States’ Department with V. P. Menon as its Secretary. Patel was fully aware of the danger posed to Indian unity by the possible intransigence of the rulers of the states. He told Menon at the time that ‘the situation held dangerous potentialities and that if we did not handle it promptly and effectively, our hard-earned freedom might disappear through the States’ door.’
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He, therefore, set out to tackle the recalcitrant states expeditiously.