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Authors: Mark M. Lowenthal
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GEOINT INTELLIGENCE
•
www.fas.org/irp/wwwimint.html
(Federation of American Scientists)
•
www.fas.org/irp/imint/kh-l2.htm
(Federation of American Scientists)
MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE
•
www.fas.org/irp/program/masint—evaluation—rep.htm
(Federation of American Scientists)
•
www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996—rpt/ic21/ic21007.htm
(Federation of American Scientists)
OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
•
www.fas.org/irp/eprint/oss980501.htm
(Federation of American Scientists)
•
www.fas.org/irp/wwwecon.html
(Federation of American Scientists)
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
•
www.fas.org/irp/wwvsigin.html
(Federation of American Scientists)
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
•
www.ncix.gov
(National Counterintelligence Executive)
•
www.www.fbi.gov/hq/ci/cointell.htm
(Federal Bureau of Investigation)
•
www.dss.mil
(Defense Security Service)
•
www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/hula/hitzrept.html
(“Abstract of Report of Investigation, The Aldrich H. Ames Case: An Assessment of CIA’s Role in Identifying Ames as an Intelligence Penetration of the Agency,” October 21, 1994)
COVERT ACTION
•
www.nytimes.com/library/national/cia-invismain.html
(New
York Times)
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
CURRENT NEWS ARTICLES
INTELLIGENCE REFORM OF 1996
•
www.access.gpo.gov/int/report.html
(Report of the Aspin-Brown Commission: “Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community”)
BUSINESS (COMPETITIVE) INTELLIGENCE
•
www.lookoutpoint.com/index.html
(Real-World Intelligence Inc.)
•
www.scip.org
(Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals)
•
www.stratfor.com
(Stratfor)
•
www.opsec.org
(Operations Security Professionals Society)
•
www.pcic.net
(Professional Connections in the Intelligence Community)
•
www.fas.org/irp/wwwecon.html
(Federation of American Scientists)
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
•
www.csis-scrs.gc.ca
(Canadian Security Intelligence Service)
•
www.cse-cst.gc.ca/cse/english/home-1.html
(Communications Security Establishment, Canada)
•
www.asio.gov.au
(Australian Security Intelligence Office)
•
www.asis.gov.au
(Australian Secret Intelligence Service)
•
www.ona.gov.au
(Office of National Assessments, Australia)
•
www.defence.gov.au/dio
(Defence Intelligence Organisation. Australia)
SPECIAL REPORTS
•
www.carnegie.org/deadly/0697warning.htm
(“The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy,” New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997)
•
www.fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/s980731-rumsfeld.htm
(U.S. Senate, “The Rumsfeld Commission Report,”
Congressional Record,
daily ed., 105th Cong., 2d sess., July 31, 1998)
•
www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/news/19980222.htm
(“Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation and Associated Documents,” CIA report on the Bay of Pigs)
•
www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/jeremiah.html
(Comments of Adm. David Jeremiah on his investigation into actions taken by the intelligence community leading up to the Indian nuclear test of 1998)
•
www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/cocaine2/index.html
(CIA inspector general report: “Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States”)
•
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/drugs/front.htm
(“Special Report: CIA, Contras, and Drugs: Questions Linger,”
Washington Post)
PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS
•
www.iafie.org
(International Association for Intelligence Education)
•
www.afio.com
(Association of Former Intelligence Officers)
•
www.nmia.org
(National Military Intelligence Association)
•
www.aochq.org
(Association of Old Crows)
•
www.opsec.org
(Operations Security Professionals Society)
•
www.afcea.com
(Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association)
•
www.cloakanddagger.com/dagger
(Cloak and Dagger Books)
•
intelligence-history.wiso.uni-erlangen.de
(International Intelligence History Association)
APPENDIX 2
MAJOR INTELLIGENCE REVIEWS OR PROPOSALS
This appendix, which lists some of the most important reviews or proposals for change in the intelligence community, is based on a 1996 Congressional Research Service report,
Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-1996,
by Richard A. Best Jr. The synopses offer insight into the major concepts that have been put forth over the years. However, they do not capture the many proposals made by individuals.
Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-1996,
by Richard A. Best Jr. The synopses offer insight into the major concepts that have been put forth over the years. However, they do not capture the many proposals made by individuals.
Eberstadt Report, 1945.
Laid the basic groundwork for what became the National Security Act of 1947, creating the National Security Council (NSC), a de jure director of central intelligence (DCI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Also created a unified defense structure, as opposed to separate War and Navy Departments.
Laid the basic groundwork for what became the National Security Act of 1947, creating the National Security Council (NSC), a de jure director of central intelligence (DCI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Also created a unified defense structure, as opposed to separate War and Navy Departments.
First Hoover Commission, 1949.
Raised concerns about the lack of coordination among the CIA, the military, and the State Department, resulting in duplication and some biased estimates. Urged a more central role for the CIA in national intelligence.
Raised concerns about the lack of coordination among the CIA, the military, and the State Department, resulting in duplication and some biased estimates. Urged a more central role for the CIA in national intelligence.
Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, 1949.
Recommended that the DCI concentrate on community-wide issues, with a subordinate running day-to-day CIA operations.
Recommended that the DCI concentrate on community-wide issues, with a subordinate running day-to-day CIA operations.
Doolittle Report. 1954.
Urged more effective espionage, counterespionage, and covert action to deal with the Soviet threat and noted the need for technical intelligence to overcome impediments to human intelligence (HUMINT) in the Soviet bloc.
Urged more effective espionage, counterespionage, and covert action to deal with the Soviet threat and noted the need for technical intelligence to overcome impediments to human intelligence (HUMINT) in the Soviet bloc.
Taylor Commission, 1961.
Offered an assessment of the Bay of Pigs invasion that criticized all agencies involved, the planning and concept of the operation, and the plausibility of deniability. Made recommendations regarding future planning and coordination for covert action.
Offered an assessment of the Bay of Pigs invasion that criticized all agencies involved, the planning and concept of the operation, and the plausibility of deniability. Made recommendations regarding future planning and coordination for covert action.
Kirkpatrick Report, 1961.
Was an internal CIA review of the Bay of Pigs, which also criticized the operation’s planners.
Was an internal CIA review of the Bay of Pigs, which also criticized the operation’s planners.
Schlesinger Report, 1971.
Questioned the increased size and cost of the intelligence community in contrast with little apparent improvement in analysis; the cost of duplicative collection systems; and insufficient planning for future resource allocations. Recommended strengthening the role of the DCI in these areas.
Questioned the increased size and cost of the intelligence community in contrast with little apparent improvement in analysis; the cost of duplicative collection systems; and insufficient planning for future resource allocations. Recommended strengthening the role of the DCI in these areas.
Murphy Commission (Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy), 1975.
Raised the issue of the DCI’s responsibility versus authority but did not recommend increasing the DCI’s line authority to agencies beyond the CIA. Argued for the DCI to spend more time on community-wide issues, delegating CIA’s management to a deputy.
Raised the issue of the DCI’s responsibility versus authority but did not recommend increasing the DCI’s line authority to agencies beyond the CIA. Argued for the DCI to spend more time on community-wide issues, delegating CIA’s management to a deputy.
Rockefeller Commission (Commission on CIA Activities within the United States), 1975.
Formed in the wake of revelations about improper or illegal CIA activities (the “family jewels” report); focused largely on proposals to prevent a recurrence and to direct
CIA
attention solely on foreign intelligence activities.
Formed in the wake of revelations about improper or illegal CIA activities (the “family jewels” report); focused largely on proposals to prevent a recurrence and to direct
CIA
attention solely on foreign intelligence activities.
Church Committee (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), 1976.
Prompted by the “family jewels” revelations. Recommended legislative charters for all intelligence agencies, spelling out roles and prohibited activities. Also recommended statutory recognition of the DCI’s role as principal foreign intelligence adviser, with authority to establish national intelligence requirements, the intelligence budget, and guidance for intelligence operations. Recommended that national intelligence budget be appropriated to the DCI, not to agency directors. Recommended banning assassinations.
Prompted by the “family jewels” revelations. Recommended legislative charters for all intelligence agencies, spelling out roles and prohibited activities. Also recommended statutory recognition of the DCI’s role as principal foreign intelligence adviser, with authority to establish national intelligence requirements, the intelligence budget, and guidance for intelligence operations. Recommended that national intelligence budget be appropriated to the DCI, not to agency directors. Recommended banning assassinations.
Pike Committee (House Select Committee on Intelligence), 1976.
Was I louse counterpart to the Church Committee. Presented recommendations not in a final approved release but as leaked to the
Village Voice
newspaper. Recommended separating the DCI from the CIA to focus on community-wide issues; a ban on assassinations in peacetime: greater congressional oversight of covert action; charter legislation for the National Security Agency; publication of the overall intelligence budget figure; and abolition of the Defense Intelligence Agency, with its functions divided between the Defense Department and CIA.
Was I louse counterpart to the Church Committee. Presented recommendations not in a final approved release but as leaked to the
Village Voice
newspaper. Recommended separating the DCI from the CIA to focus on community-wide issues; a ban on assassinations in peacetime: greater congressional oversight of covert action; charter legislation for the National Security Agency; publication of the overall intelligence budget figure; and abolition of the Defense Intelligence Agency, with its functions divided between the Defense Department and CIA.
Tower Commission
(Report of the President’s Special Review Board),
1987.
Formed after initial revelations about the Iran-contra affair. Recommended improvements in the structure and functioning of the NSC staff, more precise procedures for the restricted consideration of covert action, and a Joint Intelligence Committee in Congress. Raised concerns about the influence of policy makers on the intelligence process.
(Report of the President’s Special Review Board),
1987.
Formed after initial revelations about the Iran-contra affair. Recommended improvements in the structure and functioning of the NSC staff, more precise procedures for the restricted consideration of covert action, and a Joint Intelligence Committee in Congress. Raised concerns about the influence of policy makers on the intelligence process.
Boren-McCurdy, 1993.
Presented recommendations of the chairs of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees (David L. Boren, D-Okla., and Dave McCurdy, D-Okla., respectively), including creation of a director of national intelligence (DNI), with budgetary programming authority across the intelligence community; two deputy DNIS, one for analysis and estimates and one for intelligence community issues; a separate director of the CIA, subordinate to the DNI; and consolidation of analytical elements under a deputy DNI.
Presented recommendations of the chairs of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees (David L. Boren, D-Okla., and Dave McCurdy, D-Okla., respectively), including creation of a director of national intelligence (DNI), with budgetary programming authority across the intelligence community; two deputy DNIS, one for analysis and estimates and one for intelligence community issues; a separate director of the CIA, subordinate to the DNI; and consolidation of analytical elements under a deputy DNI.
Aspin-Brown Commission (Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community),1996.
Studied the future of the intelligence community after the cold war. Said the intelligence community needed to function more as a true community, overcoming agency barriers. Recommended a closer tie between intelligence and policy to improve direction of roles, collection, and analysis; a second deputy DCI for the intelligence community; a fixed six-year term for the deputy DCI responsible for the CIA; realignment of the intelligence budget under discipline managers reporting to the DCI; and transfer of Defense Humint Service’s clandestine recruitment role to the CIA Directorate of Operations.
Studied the future of the intelligence community after the cold war. Said the intelligence community needed to function more as a true community, overcoming agency barriers. Recommended a closer tie between intelligence and policy to improve direction of roles, collection, and analysis; a second deputy DCI for the intelligence community; a fixed six-year term for the deputy DCI responsible for the CIA; realignment of the intelligence budget under discipline managers reporting to the DCI; and transfer of Defense Humint Service’s clandestine recruitment role to the CIA Directorate of Operations.
IC21: The Intelligence Community in the Twenty-first Century,
1996.
Study by the staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, contemporaneous with Aspin-Brown. Sought to create a more corporate intelligence community, with the DCI acting as a chief executive officer. Recommendations included DCI concurrence in the secretary of defense’s appointments of National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) defense agencies; increased DCI programmatic control over NFIP agency budgets and personnel; creation of a second deputy DCI for community management; consolidation and rationalization of certain management and infrastructure functions across the intelligence community; creation of a Technical Collection Agency to manage signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and measurement and signatures intelligence; and creation of an intelligence community reserve.
1996.
Study by the staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, contemporaneous with Aspin-Brown. Sought to create a more corporate intelligence community, with the DCI acting as a chief executive officer. Recommendations included DCI concurrence in the secretary of defense’s appointments of National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) defense agencies; increased DCI programmatic control over NFIP agency budgets and personnel; creation of a second deputy DCI for community management; consolidation and rationalization of certain management and infrastructure functions across the intelligence community; creation of a Technical Collection Agency to manage signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and measurement and signatures intelligence; and creation of an intelligence community reserve.
BOOK: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
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