Judy: The Unforgettable Story of the Dog Who Went to War and Became a True Hero (29 page)

Document Five

Author's note—a report on forced labor parties working in the Sumatran jungle as POWs of the Japanese that captures the stark horror of the camps and the unbreakable spirit of resistance of the Allied internees.

Report of a POW work party in the Gaje Country, S Atjeh, Sumatra

1. On March 3rd 1944 a POW work party of 300 Dutch, 200 British left Glegeer POW Camp, Medan, Sumatra. The Allied senior officer was Capt. Van der Lande. The British senior officer was Lieutenant L. R. T. Henman, the British Medical Officer was Captain P.M. Kirkwood. The whole party was commanded by Lieutenant S. Miura of the Japanese Army.

2. On arrival at Keta Tjane at the end of a day's truck ride Lieutenant Miura informed us that we must on the following day commence a march of 135 kilometers (approx. 85 miles) to Blangkedteren, S. Atjeh. After protest by the senior Allied officers, including medical officers, one more days grace was allowed before the march was commenced. All belongings that could not be carried had to be left at Keta Tjane.

3. This march was made in four stages with one whole days rest on the way. Food supplies consisted of rice, soya beans and meat. Owing to bad organization on the part of the Japanese the proper quantities were not always available at the stopping places. Many of the British particularly had no water bottles and in spite of warnings men drank from streams on the road and thus laid themselves open to attacks of dysentery. The men had not marched for two years or more and on the way suffered very severely from blisters. Nevertheless very few British fell out. The RN party of 45 (under Second Lieutenant H. Hedley, Mysore Regiment) completed the march in fours, with only one casualty in the last stage.

4. After about one month the British contingent (consisting of four parties—RN, Army, RAF and AIF) were finally billeted at a camp at 28 kilometer Blangkedteren Takengong Road. This road was being constructed by the Japanese with POW and native labor. The camp was at a height of approximately 3000 feet and consisted of bivouac attap huts built by POWs themselves immediately after arrival. Lieutenant Hedley, the RN party and some of the Army men had to spend two nights amongst native coolies in hovels made of bracken, in the midst of a sea of mud and excreta (human and otherwise) before being allowed to move into the camp at 28 kilometers. This they built as best they could with a small quantity of attap and wood cut in the jungle.

5. The men were driven out to work as soon as possible and no fit men were allowed to stay in camp other than a bare minimum for cooking and wood chopping. Work consisted of labor on a mountain road, tree felling, bridge building, stone carrying, earth removal with Java hoes and bucket, and metalling of the road surface. Average days work about nine hours in all weathers, and while carrying stones men sometimes had to walk 30 kilometers a day.

6. Sick men were continually persecuted and many men were forced to go out working when they were in no way fitted to do so. A certain percentage of men were required. If these were not forthcoming the sick were paraded (irrespective of what diseases they had) and the Japanese would choose those who in their opinion were fit for duty. Attached correspondence between Captain Kirkwood IMS and Lieutenant Miura gives an idea of the situation. Officers who protested were merely beaten up by the guards in front of the remaining POWs.

7. Food at this period consisted of 300 grams of rice and 200 grams of soya bean per day, salt fish was also provided, approximately 2 bullocks per week (amongst 500 men) and a small quantity of vegetables (see report by Second Lieutenant J. Hedley, Mysore Regiment). Many men could not eat the soya beans as they caused
diarrhea (see report by Captain Kirkwood, IMS). Naturally, the diet was totally inadequate for the work being done.

8. Particularly at first there were many cases of dysentery. Those were treated in a so-called hospital at Blangkedjeeren where a Dutch Army doctor named Duringa did splendid work with practically no equipment. As soon as these patients were pronounced temporarily fit they had to walk back to the camp from which they came (23–28 km.) and bring with them a bullock which was the meat ration for the camp concerned. Delay in sending men to Blangkedjeeren Hospital was in my opinion the cause of the death of Pte. Lahay, AIF, one of the three British casualties in Atjeh.

The two letters were attached to the original of this report submitted to MI5 War Office.

13. The worst part of the journey was a night march between the hours of 20:00 hours and 04:00 hours. During this period I was marching with the Navy party and the singing by them and the Army and R.A.F. of songs such as “The Eagle they fly high in Cell,” “Lily of Laguna,” and “The beer is on the table” helped a good deal.

14. A Korean guard named Matsuoka was especially vicious during the march. On one occasion when P/O. Sparks, W. No D/JX 125134 with blistered and festered feet as being helped along by Capt. Kirkwood and P/O. Northcott, C.J. No. D/JX 137479 his guard used his rifle butt on all three of them, because they were not walking fast enough.

15. We finally arrived at Kota Tjane with 6% of our strength having fallen out against 25% of the Jap and Korean guards. The streets were festooned with bananas—but Lieut. Miura had given orders to his Sergeant that on no account were the P.O.W.'s to be given or allowed to purchase any fruit at all.

16. This man Miura provides a most interesting study. He spoke English (and Malay) extremely well and had apparently been in some large business firm in Japan, where he said he had many foreign friends. He was always anxious to try to convince me that he was trying to do everything in his power for the P.O.W.'s. Had his actual behavior, particularly toward the sick, borne out his fine words I should have been more impressed with his good intentions. “Sick men,” he said to me on more than one occasion, “are of no use to the Japanese Army. It is better for them to die.” The hospital too he
said, should be made to resemble a prison as near as possible. “You yourself,” he added, “complain far too much. It is not gentlemanly.”

17. He had no control over his Korean guards who did more or less as they pleased. He did indeed at my request forbid them to take action into their own hands by inflicting physical punishment themselves, but when, as soon happened, they began to disobey this order, he seemed quite unable or unwilling to see that it was enforced. “Do not punish your men,” he told me when I asked for some powers of punishment (with regard to sanitary matters), “Always be kind. I never punish my guards.” Quite true.

18. Under the circumstances the discipline of the men was very good and for this credit must go to the officers under me (especially Lieut. Hedley and Lieut. D.S. Matthews, G.S.) and equally to the N.C.O.'s of the various parties (R.N., Army, R.A.F. and A.I.F.) These N.C.O.'s had not only to work and live with the other men, but, on return to the camp each evening, had to distribute food, collect money for canteen purchases (when allowed), detail working parties and settle all minor disputes without having any disciplinary powers at all.

I would also especially like to recommend Lieut. Hedley for the excellent work he did as ration officer on the march down from Blangkedjeren to Kota Tjane and at other times.

19. Capt. Kirkwood, I.M.S. succeeded under the circumstances in preserving the men's health, or what was left of it, to an astonishing degree (though for most of the time he was sick himself with amoebic dysentery). In all during the eight months period only three men died.

Although the hard times which the men underwent was probably the original cause of the many casualties which we suffered afterward in the Pakan Baree area. (See report by Capt. Kirkwood, I.M.S. and Capt. J.G. Gordon, R.A.)

20. The whole Atjeh party (Dutch and British) were drafted to Pakan Baree after approximately three weeks rest in a camp (Sungei Songkel) near Medan. On the way we (500 men) were kept at Fort de Kock (Nr. Padang) for four days in two rooms which in normal times formed the police courts of the town in question. During these four days we were given very little to eat, the only sanitary arrangements consisted of a trench dug in the yard, and it was only possible to have a bath by standing in the bin. There was just sufficient room for each man to lie down on the floor. The sick lay in the middle of one room in a space which we cleared for them.

21. At Petai Camp (Pakan Baree area) Lieut. Miura put cost and difficulties in the way with regard to the digging of latrines. He would not allow sufficient time for the work and forbade me to use the timber (for our big latrine) from the jungle nearby. However by disobeying orders we managed to get the latrine completed, upon which he sent for me and congratulated me on its efficiency. A few days previously he had complained that the British, though they always obeyed him, did so “with a sulky face.” The next day (Nov. 23rd) he went to Pakan Baree and bought back Capt. Gordon, R.A. as Senior British Officer.

22. This officer, who had worked untiringly on the troops behalf in Medan, took over the duties of Senior British Officer from me. He was faced with the last (and most difficult) period which we went through as P.O.W.'s, and in my opinion carried out his duty until I left him in Legas in August 1945, in a most admirable manner. He has details, which I handed over to him, of the personnel of the Atjah Party and all casualties which we suffered then and in the Pakan Baree area.

23. Finally I would like to say how much the British Contingent in Atjah appreciated the great organizing ability and general efficiency of Capt. J.J.A. Van der Lande and his S.M.O. Capt. Linggen (Royal N.E.I. Army) in particulary in connection with medical matters the work done by Sergt. Major Bougels (R.N.E.I. Army) is worthy of the highest praise.

(SGD) L.R.T. HERMAN

Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.

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