Living Silence in Burma (14 page)

When the results came out, both the military and the people were astonished by the NLD’s overwhelming victory. Most significantly, the NLD won seats in military-dominated districts in Rangoon and elsewhere, indicating that a number of the NLD candidates’ votes came from army personnel. Although Aung San Suu Kyi was still under house arrest at the time of the election, the votes that the NLD received were largely because people strongly desired a return to democracy and had faith in her ability to lead. In some districts the NLD candidates were not inspiring leaders, and some did almost no campaigning, but they were voted into office on the strength of the people’s conviction that the NLD needed a decisive victory.

Out of the 234 registered parties, ninety-three ended up fielding candidates and there were eighty-eight independent candidates. The NLD won 392 of the 485 parliamentary seats, including all fifty-nine seats in Rangoon Division. The military-backed National Unity Party won only ten seats. Twenty-five other parties, nineteen of which were ethnic minority parties, and six independents captured the remaining eighty-three seats.
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Out of those, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy won twenty-three seats, and the Arakan League for Democracy took eleven seats.

Post-election struggles

Before the election, the military had not mentioned when power would be handed over to the winning party, and General Saw Maung had said only that the winners would be able to form a provisional government and write a constitution. Once the regime realized it had lost, and badly, the generals began announcing delaying tactics. By early September, General Saw Maung was saying that first a National Convention would have to be convened to draw up the ground rules for the new constitution. Then, the elected representatives could meet to write the constitution, which would have to be approved by the people in a referendum. In the meantime, military rule would continue.
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After the 1988 coup, the SLORC had tried to distance itself from the BSPP regime. This was symbolically represented by the Burmanization of place names, which was intended to instil pride in being Burmese. The long-used colonial transliterations were discarded and Rangoon became ‘Yangon’ and Burma, ‘Myanmar’. The most significant change,
however, was the decision to open up the country to foreign investment. Many people had participated in the 1988 demonstrations as much for economic reasons as for political rights. Although the regime was stalling, Burmese citizens were at least left with the hope that the new economic policies might bring some measure of prosperity to the country.

Meanwhile, the NLD began planning how to transform their election victory into an actual transfer of power. NLD officials organized a party meeting at Gandhi Hall from 27 to 29 July to come to a consensus about how to proceed. Some members advocated negotiating with the regime, not wanting to do anything that might result in the disqualification of the party. Other members and many in the crowds outside the hall believed that the NLD should simply announce the formation of a new government then and there. The meeting ended up calling for the convening of the parliament by 30 September, a move that was seen as too assertive by some and not assertive enough by others.

In the following weeks, some MPs-elect held a number of secret meetings to discuss the formation of a parallel government if the regime did not transfer power. After the SLORC generals found out about the plans, they tried to arrest all involved, including Dr Sein Win, Aung San Suu Kyi’s cousin. He and some of his colleagues, however, escaped to the KNU’s headquarters on the Thai–Burma border. There he and eleven other elected members of parliament in exile formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), an organization that could take the democracy movement’s case to the international community.

Inside the country, monks and students, particularly in Mandalay, engaged in various forms of civil disobedience to put pressure on the regime. The monks in Mandalay had been active throughout the election campaign, often openly supporting the NLD and using religious rituals to express their discontent with the junta. On 8 August 1990, student activists organized a commemoration of the second anniversary of the 1988 uprising. Monks gathered on 84th Street, and Mandalay residents brought alms in remembrance of those who had died. The student unions also came with their flags coloured black as a sign of mourning. The situation turned ugly after the military insisted that the students lower the flag, and a high-school student leader talked back to them. When soldiers started beating him in front of the crowd, a monk came forward to plead for a peaceful resolution of the problem. Then the soldiers started beating monks, and people began throwing rocks at the soldiers. The soldiers shot into the crowd, reportedly killing two monks and injuring many others. Several people were arrested.

In the meantime, the monks in Mandalay were so upset about the killings and arrests that they decided to start a religious boycott (
patta ni kozana kan
) against the regime. The organizers contacted monks in the towns of Sagaing, Monywa, Pegu and elsewhere, encouraging them to join the boycott. Thus, starting on 27 August 1990, participating monks rejected alms from soldiers and their families. Monks also refused to attend merit-making ceremonies at the houses of army families. Many army members and their families were visibly upset. Merit-making was an essential part of their lives. If monks were not present at funerals, for instance, it was believed that merit could not be made for the dead, and they would become ghosts rather than moving on to a higher form of existence.

Tensions also increased between the inhabitants of the monasteries and the soldiers camped out near or beside many of the larger monasteries in Mandalay. Many student activists were still based in the monasteries and traded insults with the soldiers. Finally, anger on both sides erupted into, of all things, slingshot battles. Apparently, the soldiers had been ordered not to fire their guns, but slingshots were permitted. In general, the soldiers fared much better in the battles at various monasteries than the untrained students and young monks. The soldiers knew how to coordinate their attacks and their ammunition was better. On one occasion the students beat a hasty retreat after it began raining. Their clay balls dissolved, while the military continued shooting steel balls.

Although it might seem strange that monks were participating in such violent activities, many people supported them, feeling that only the monks could continue the struggle for democracy. Older monks stayed away from the slingshot fights but did not punish the teenaged monks for breaking the monastic code of conduct.

After the religious boycott had continued for almost two months, spreading to other cities, without showing any signs of abating, the regime ordered it stopped. On 20 October 1990, military authorities in Mandalay were told to arrest and disrobe recalcitrant monks and to disband Buddhist organizations participating in anti-government activities. A few days later, the military raided over one hundred monasteries in Mandalay.
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The boycott ended, and the remaining monks began accepting alms again. By forcing the monks into submission and chasing down and arresting elected members of parliament, the regime made it clear that protecting its own interests was its primary concern. A transfer of power appeared increasingly unlikely.

Although the elected MPs were unable to assume power, the NLD’s election victory greatly enhanced the legitimacy of the pro-democracy movement both domestically and abroad. Clearly, the majority of the people in Burma favoured a democratic government under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi and her party. The pro-democracy movement had also benefited from being able to set up a nationwide organizational structure which reached into nearly every district and township. In the following years, members of the pro-democracy movement tried to keep the political focus on honouring the election results while the military regime sought to delegitimize the results and dismantle the NLD and other political organizations outside its control.

4 | Military rule continues, 1990–2000

    People might have had strong determination about ’88, but in reality, the stomach also plays an important part. So, many people retreated. (NLD member from Upper Burma)

In the years following the 1990 election, Burma’s leading generals focused on four objectives. First, they sought to expand the size of the armed forces in order to be in a stronger position against their armed and unarmed opponents. As a result, the number of soldiers was increased from 180,000 in 1988 to approximately 300,000 by the late 1990s, and new military compounds and bases were constructed throughout the country.
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If mass protests were to break out again, there would be troops near by ready to take action. The number of military intelligence agents was also increased in order to infiltrate opposition organizations and monitor soldiers as well.

Second, the ruling generals worked to break up the organizational structure of the pro-democracy movement, and particularly the NLD. By keeping Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest and the top party strategists in prison, they ensured that the party leadership was in disarray. Meanwhile local authorities used a variety of methods to put pressure on NLD members to resign.

Third, the regime attempted to neutralize the ethnic armed resistance movements by making ceasefire agreements with many of the armed groups. While some of the regime’s early ceasefire deals gave de facto autonomy to the ceasefire groups, in other cases the ceasefires resulted in a weakening of the strength of the armed ethnic organizations and greater
tatmadaw
access into ethnic nationality areas. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s the
tatmadaw
was facing numerous armed opponents along most of its northern and eastern borders, by 2000 only pockets of resistance remained.

Fourth, the SLORC tried to improve the economy by opening up the country to trade and foreign investment. The regime had no expertise in economic planning, however, and the generals were unwilling to delegate responsibility to trained economists. After an initial growth spurt in the early 1990s, the country suffered from declining investment, a severe depletion of foreign reserves and rampant inflation.

Military ascendancy

The period following the May 1990 elections until Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest in July 1995 was one of ascendancy for the military regime. The high energy of the 1988 demonstrations and 1989/90 campaign period had dissipated. Non-violent means of bringing about change seemed to have proved unsuccessful. The international community had not intervened. People felt demoralized.

With Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest and other prominent politicians and student activists in prison, in hiding or in the jungle, the democratic movement’s momentum collapsed. Those who were still free had no clear plan of action for how to continue the struggle, and the military regime was taking steps systematically to eliminate its opposition.

Over the next two years, the military weeded out civil servants and military personnel who had been active in the 1988 demonstrations or showed clear anti-military attitudes. One way they determined who posed a threat was by administering a questionnaire to all civil servants in 1991. This questionnaire had two functions: first, to identify those openly disloyal to the regime and, second, to intimidate others into submission. Those who answered ‘yes’ to the question ‘Is it appropriate to elect as the Head of State somebody who is married to a foreigner?’ were likely to find themselves out of a job or transferred to a remote or inactive post. The question clearly referred to Aung San Suu Kyi. Other questions included: ‘How should the military, which is shouldering the country’s welfare, regard those who view it as their enemy?’ and ‘As the government has already instructed civil servants to be free from party politics, do you know that disciplinary actions will be taken in case of violating these instructions?’

In the meantime, there was no constitution in effect, and the SLORC ruled by decree, citing whichever laws from previous political eras proved useful. The SLORC initially appeared to follow through on its pledge to open the economy, however. Many people consoled themselves with the hope that at least their standard of living might improve and perhaps gradual political changes would result.

The SLORC legalized private enterprise and welcomed foreign investment, particularly in joint ventures with military-owned companies. A number of foreign businesses came into the country to invest in oil, gas, lumber and mining, to set up labour-intensive manufacturing industries and to import consumer goods. New jobs became available to Burmese working with these foreign companies and in the service sectors that supported them. With the regime’s promotion of tourism, several new
hotels were constructed in Rangoon, Mandalay and Pagan, also providing employment. Opportunities for trade grew, and some Burmese were able to travel out of the country for business or pleasure.

To facilitate economic development, the SLORC initiated infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges and irrigation canals throughout Burma. Although such projects are part of the normal work of any modern government, the generals in power since 1988 have taken great pride in their achievements in this area. As a headline in the
New Light of Myanmar
put it: ‘Progress Made in Nation-building Projects at Present Many Times Greater than in Periods when the Country Received Foreign Assistance’.
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In fact, many of the projects were carried out by forced labourers working under duress.

At the same time, the military regime was scoring victories in its long-standing battles with armed groups. In 1989, the Communist Party of Burma collapsed. The ethnic minority factions within the CPB broke off and agreed to ceasefires with the regime in return for minimal
tatmadaw
interference in their internal affairs. In practice, this meant that the newly formed United Wa State Army and the Kokang-led Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army could produce and traffic drugs with impunity. Between 1989 and 1991, twenty-three new heroin refineries opened in Kokang territory in the hills of northern Burma.
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At the local level, Burmese military officers profited from the drug business through taxing the farmers, the owners of heroin refineries and the traffickers.
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Moreover, a number of the country’s major investments in infrastructure projects and hotels were made by drug kingpins permitted to launder their money and establish legal businesses, often in the form of joint ventures with military-owned holding companies.
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