Lords of Finance: 1929, the Great Depression, and the Bankers Who Broke the World (55 page)

The following month Norman sailed for the United States, which he had not visited since the summer of 1929. It was obvious that in the intervening two years the American press had greatly missed him. From the very start, following the suddenly announced mission of what the
New York Times
called “England’s elusive master banker” and “man of mystery,” vaguely hinting that some great initiative to solve the world Depression was in the offing, they would not leave Norman alone. From his departure aboard the
Berengaria
⁶¹⁴
on March 21, he was followed everywhere on his “secret mission” and his movements—his meetings at the New York Fed, attended by even the secretary of state, Henry Stimson; his trip to Washington; his visit to the White House; lunch with Secretary of the Treasury Mellon—were all examined in minute detail. He put on a wonderful performance, hamming it up for the crowd of reporters that pursued him. Looking more like “an orchestra leader
⁶¹⁵
than a banker of such eminence,” he wished them “better luck next time” when they tried to extract the purpose of his visit. When they begged him
⁶¹⁶
for some tidbit of insight into the world financial situation, he teased them by gravely announcing that he thought the recent departure of King Alfonso of Spain into exile would have no effect on international finance. But for all the frenetic schedule of meetings, even his most devoted followers among the press had the suspicion that there was much less there than met the eye.

Even before Norman had arrived in the United States, J. P. Morgan & Co., usually his biggest supporter, had signaled that it had no intention of
backing an “artificial” agency
⁶¹⁷
or any “form of international organization of credit.” The New York Fed had cabled that it thought the whole scheme too “visionary and inflationary
⁶¹⁸
.”

Norman tried to convince his American hosts of the “very gloomy situation
⁶¹⁹
” of Europe. The only hope for Britain now was a savage reduction in wages. In Eastern and Central Europe the position was even more desperate. “Russia was the very greatest
⁶²⁰
of dangers,” he told Stimson. Germany and Eastern Europe were not receiving enough “help from the capitalist system to stand the expense of remaining capitalist . . . and all the time while they wobbled and wavered Russia was beckoning to them to come over to her system.” The specter of communism, which would persuade a later generation of Americans to pour vast amounts of money into Europe, did not have the same potency in 1931.

The United States was in a depression of its own, had over the previous seventeen years already committed some $15 billion to Europe, including war loans, and was eager to avoid any further entanglements across the Atlantic. Norman returned empty-handed. In May, when Thomas Lamont was passing through London, Norman complained to him that the “U.S. was blind
⁶²¹
and taking no steps to save the world and the gold standard.”

It was becoming apparent to most commentators that the continued flow of gold into France would eventually create a breakdown in the mechanism of international payments. As usual, Keynes put it the most graphically, “Almost throughout the world, gold has been withdrawn from circulation. It no longer passes from hand to hand, and the touch of the metal has been taken from men’s greedy palms. The little household gods, who dwelt in purses and stockings and tin boxes, have been swallowed by a single golden image in each country, which lives underground and is not seen. Gold is out of sight—gone back into the soil. But when the gods are no longer seen in a yellow panoply walking the earth, we begin to rationalize them; and it is not long before there is nothing left.” The bullion reserves that backed the credit systems of the world, buried as they were in underground vaults—or in the case of the Banque de France, underwater, because its vaults lay below a subterranean aquifer—were invisible to the
public eye. They had acquired an almost metaphysical existence. Keynes thought that perhaps gold, its usefulness now outlived, might become less important. He compared the situation to the transition in government from absolute to constitutional monarchy. He would eventually be proved right but not before a wrenching upheaval.

IN EARLY
1931, a similar insidious process of paralysis also began to affect the U.S. banking system. It originated in the most unlikely of places—the Bronx, one of the outer boroughs of New York City—with the strangely named Bank of United States (BUS), which despite its official-sounding title bore no relationship to the U.S. government but traced its very modest roots to the garment industry on the Lower East Side of Manhattan.

On the morning of December 10, 1930, a small merchant from the Morrisania section of the Bronx went to his local branch of the Bank of United States on the corner of Freeman Street and Southern Boulevard and asked that the bank buy back his modest holdings of its stock. This was not as strange a request as it sounds. In the middle of 1929, the bank had set out to support the value of its shares by selling them to its own depositors. As an inducement, investors were given informal assurances that they could sell the stock back to the bank at the original purchase price—around $200 a share. If this sounds too good to be true, it was; but in the middle of 1929, people were willing to believe anything. By the fall of 1930, after the collapse on Wall Street and amid mounting concerns about the economic situation of New York, shares were trading at around $40.

Officials at the Bronx branch tried to convince the exigent depositor that he should hold on to his stock, that even at current prices it remained an excellent investment. No doubt irritated at this obvious attempt to renege on a clear promise, he stormed out and began reporting that the bank was in trouble. By the afternoon, a small horde of depositors had begun lining up outside the branch’s tiny neoclassical limestone building to withdraw their savings before closing time. Until now, despite the Depression, there had been no bank runs in New York, and soon a crowd of twenty
thousand curious bystanders had gathered to watch. As the anxious depositors became restless, a squad of mounted police had to be sent in to control them and several customers were arrested; and when the mob became frantic, the police charged the crowd with their horses.

The Bank of United States had fifty-seven branches across the four larger boroughs of New York, and over four hundred thousand individual depositors, more than any other bank in the country. Rumors of the trouble
⁶²²
quickly swept the city and similar scenes were enacted that afternoon at many other branches, with armored trucks being called in to deliver extra cash.

The bank had been founded
⁶²³
in 1913 by Joseph S. Marcus, a Russian Jewish immigrant who had come to the United States in 1879, and having begun as a garment worker on Canal Street, had made good as a manufacturer of clothing and then as a local banker. The first branch of his bank, located on the corner of Orchard and Delancey Street, catered to the neighborhood’s mostly Jewish garment workers and merchants. As a result of Marcus’s reputation among the Lower East Side traders for honesty and fair dealing, the bank had done well, although it was undoubtedly helped by the name, which gave many of its Yiddish-speaking clients the impression that it was somehow backed by the full faith and credit of the national government. By the time the older Marcus died in 1927, the bank had grown into an institution with $100 million in assets, a head office at 320 Fifth Avenue, and seven branches across the city. But its officers and its clientele remained predominantly Jewish, and it was snidely nicknamed “The Pants Pressers’ Bank.”

When Joseph Marcus died, the bank was taken over by his son Bernard Marcus, a brilliant but flamboyant businessman with a taste for conspicuous consumption far removed from his father’s modest ways. When, for instance, Bernard went to Europe
⁶²⁴
, he traveled with thirty pieces of luggage and always insisted on occupying the grandest suite on board ship. Over the next two years, he expanded his base through a series of mergers so that by 1929 it had grown to $250 million in assets.

Marcus resorted to a series of practices considered shady, even by the
lax standards of the time. The bank lent some $16 million
⁶²⁵
, a third of its capital, to officers of the company and their relatives to allow them to buy its stock. To finance its headlong growth—the bank more than doubled in size in two years—Marcus issued large slabs of equity, which he committed to buy back at the original price of $200. When the price began to fall in the spring and summer of 1929, many investors held Marcus to his guarantees. In order to take up all the stock coming on the market, he created a series of affiliate companies—in today’s parlance, off-balance-sheet special-purpose vehicles—that repurchased the equity with money borrowed from the bank itself. Marcus was in effect using depositors’ money to support the shares of his bank.

In its lending policy, the bank made a big bet on the value of New York City real estate. Half its loan portfolio, double that of comparable firms, went into real estate finance, though again the true exposure was hidden by channeling money through affiliate companies. When the crash hit, the bank was committed to two big projects on Central Park West
⁶²⁶
: $5 million for the Beresford, a twenty-story building at Eighty-second Street with over 170 apartments and another $4 million for the San Remo on Seventy-fourth with 120. Though it was rumored that Marcus himself owned these two developments, his interest in them was disguised through dummy corporations, and every single penny for their construction came from the bank.

Thus by the middle of 1930, while the official books gave the impression of a bank that had $250 million in deposits, $300 million in good quality assets and $50 million in equity, the operational reality behind these numbers was quite different. The true value of assets was worth no more than $220 million, all its equity had been wiped out, and the bank was $30 million in the hole.

In the fall of 1930, as rumors that the BUS might be in trouble circulated through the higher financial circles of New York, the Fed tried to engineer a merger with some of the other Jewish majority-owned banks in the city: the Manufacturers Trust, the Public National Bank, and the International Trust Company. The deal would have required the
resignations of Marcus and his cronies who had presided over its mismanagement. But suspicion of Marcus within the financial community was so great that no one could bring themselves to trust the accounts, and the deal fell through at the last minute.

On the evening after the run began on December 10, all of the familiar Wall Street barons—George Harrison of the New York Fed, Thomas Lamont of J. P. Morgan, Albert Wiggin of Chase, Charles Mitchell of National City, and another half dozen of the city’s top bankers—gathered on the twelfth floor of the New York Fed to try to put together a rescue package. By 8:30 that evening they were close to striking a deal and Harrison had even begun preparing his press statement. To save the bank, they would collectively have to be willing to pump in $30 million. At the last moment, however, several key bankers balked.

These men had all been reared on Walter Bagehot’s nineteenth-century classic
Lombard Street,
which described how the Bank of England, then the financial center of the world, handled financial crises and panics. Bagehot argued that during normal times a central bank should follow the gold standard rule book, allowing credit to expand and contract in line with bullion reserves. But in a financial crisis, it should throw away the rule book and “lend freely, boldly
⁶²⁷
, and so that the public may feel you mean to go on.” As he put it, “A panic . . . is a species
⁶²⁸
of neuralgia, and according to the rules of science you must not starve it.” In other words, a central bank had to be willing to inject as much money as was necessary to satisfy the public demand for cash and safe assets.

But Bagehot did inject one caveat. Though he argued that in a panic the central bank should lend without hesitation or question, it should do so only to banks facing a temporary squeeze on liquidity and never to those actually insolvent. The problem this time was that the BUS was not just temporarily short of funds, it was insolvent and could not hope to cover its obligations.

There was another element involved in the decision not to bail out the Bank of United States, though it was unspoken. Marcus was a Jew and, moreover, a Jew of the wrong sort. There had always been a divide between
the WASP houses and the Jewish houses on Wall Street. But firms such as Kuhn Loeb, Lehman Brothers, and J. W. Seligman represented “Our Crowd,” the German Jewish elite, and for all the anti-Semitic bigotries of old dinosaurs like Jack Morgan, these firms were held in very high regard and viewed as reputable and very prestigious institutions. But the Wall Street patricians gathering on the evening of December 10 would have found it hard to hide their distaste for bailing out a Jew like Marcus, an ex-garment manufacturer from the Lower East Side who was running a bank that, according to Thomas Lamont’s son, Tommy, was patronized largely by “foreigners and Jews
⁶²⁹
.” Russell Leffingwell, the Morgan partner, described it as a bank “with a large clientele
⁶³⁰
among our Jewish population of small merchants, and persons of small means and small education, from whom all the management were drawn.”

When Joseph Broderick, the New York State superintendent of banks, learned of the decision, he insisted on coming to address the meeting. After being pointedly kept waiting until 1:00 a.m., he was finally admitted. He would testify later that “I told them
⁶³¹
that the Bank of United States occupied a rather unique position in New York City, that in point of people served it was probably the largest bank in the city and that its closing might affect a large number of smaller banks and that I was afraid that it would be the spark that would ignite the whole city.” Broderick reminded the grandees that only two or three weeks before “they had rescued two of the largest private bankers in the city.” One of them was Kidder Peabody, an investment bank run by Boston Brahmins, founded in 1865, which as result of the crash and of subsequent withdrawals of deposits by, among others, the government of Italy, had had to be bailed out in 1930 with $15 million from J. P. Morgan and Chase.