Making the Connection: Strategies to Build Effective Personal Relationships (Collection) (65 page)

The most obvious of these rewarding moral emotions
¹⁰
is gratitude, the feeling that wells up in us in response to kindness and inclines us to reciprocate. This warm feeling transcends any conscious ideas we have about paying someone back. Instead of reacting like robots that are programmed to give tit for tat, we appear to have evolved a tendency to feel good about returning a favor.

The same is true of compassion, which adds emotional energy to our tendency to help those in need. We don’t simply make the rational calculation that someone requires assistance and that we will uphold the social order by coming to their aid. We also empathize with their pain and feel an inner sense of moral goodness as we bring them relief.

Even more unequivocally selfless is the emotion called elevation, the feeling of warmth and expansion when we simply witness or hear about acts of great kindness and compassion. If you have any doubt about the deeply ingrained nature of moral emotions, think of the tears of happiness that may
come to your eyes when you observe something good happening to total strangers, tears that may flow freely not only in real life, but also while engaged in the make-believe world of the movies. Because of these properties, Jonathan Haidt has called elevation “the most prototypical moral emotion of all.”
¹¹

But Trivers also recognized that even though these positive moral emotions provide attractive internal rewards for moral behavior, they are not sufficiently powerful to override selfishness.
¹²
To defend against cheaters and maintain the benefits of cooperation, we have also evolved moral circuits that are linked to negative emotions—moralistic anger, contempt, and disgust. When triggered by unfairness or by actions that seem morally repugnant, these negative emotions are usually coupled with facial and body reactions that instantly communicate disapproval and warn the violator to expect retaliation. They also generate internal feelings of indignation that may short-circuit our positive moral emotions and cause us to ostracize people who don’t play by the rules.

These negative moral emotions are surprisingly easily to elicit. For example, just seeing someone cut into a line—whether we’re in the line or not—may trigger moralistic anger; seeing a referee unjustly penalize our favorite football team may make us fighting mad; learning that a public figure has engaged in an immoral sexual relationship may elicit profound feelings of disgust and contempt; and even reading words that describe character flaws, such as those in
Table 5.1
, may arouse flickers of negative moral emotions.

Such moral condemnation is so effective because it triggers the offender’s negative emotions and makes that person feel bad. Just a simple look of disdain or disgust may instantly elicit shame, embarrassment, or guilt. As we become socialized, the desire to avoid such mental anguish may keep us from even considering actions that would make others criticize us—from wearing the wrong clothes at a party to engaging in flagrant misconduct.

The ease with which we feel these positive and negative moral emotions underscores their power. However, as with other behavioral mechanisms, there are great individual differences. Some people are strongly inclined to feel gratitude, compassion, and elevation, while others find it easier to feel disgust, anger, and contempt. Some (antisocials) cheat all the time, while others (paranoids) specialize in detecting cheaters. Some (avoidants) are especially likely to feel embarrassed, while others (schizoids) are much less sensitive to disapproving glances. But even though considerable variations exist, most of us readily experience, recognize, and respond to each of the positive and negative moral emotions. All of this fits with Darwin’s idea that humans have evolved innate mental machinery that provides a biological basis for our moral behavior.

Different Cultures, Common Values

But instincts and emotions just provide the raw materials for our morality. Cultures provide the critical details. As Darwin pointed out:

[A]fter the power of language had been acquired, and the wishes of the community could be expressed, the common opinion how each member ought to act for the public good, would naturally become in a paramount degree the guide to action ... [F]or the social instinct ... is, like any other instinct, greatly strengthened by habit, and so consequently would be obedience to the wishes and judgment of the community.
¹³

Such wishes and judgments of the community vary greatly from culture to culture, and this was the reason Allport felt obliged to eliminate the concept of character from the scientific study of personality. But a group of psychologists led by Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman have challenged that decision.
¹⁴
In a study of the major Eastern and Western religious and philosophical traditions, they found universal admiration for a large number of character strengths. The strengths that are highly valued in all cultures were combined into six categories, which they call the six core virtues:

•
Temperance
—Strengths such as self-control and prudence that protect against excess

•
Courage
—Strengths such as bravery and persistence that help accomplish goals in the face of opposition, external or internal

•
Humanity
—Strengths such as kindness and love that involve tending to and befriending others

•
Justice
—Strengths such as fairness and citizenship that contribute to community life

•
Wisdom
—Strengths such as open-mindedness and love of learning that entail the acquisition and use of knowledge

•
Transcendence
—Strengths such as awe and spirituality that forge connections to the larger universe and provide meaning

Other researchers have also recognized universally admired character strengths, and Robert Cloninger, a psychiatrist, has developed his own way of categorizing them. In his view, character has three main components, which he calls self-directedness, cooperativeness, and self-transcendence.
¹⁵
Self-directedness refers to control of the self by being purposeful, responsible, and resourceful. It overlaps with temperance and courage. Cooperativeness refers to forming mutually beneficial relationships with other people by being empathic, compassionate, and principled. It overlaps with humanity and justice. Self-transcendence refers to awareness of our participation in the world as a whole by being spiritual, wise, and idealistic. It overlaps with wisdom and transcendence.

But recognizing the universal admiration of core virtues doesn’t preclude variations in cultural emphasis. In fact, obvious differences exist in the degree to which cultures prize particular virtues. In thinking about a person’s character, it is important to pay attention to the way someone expresses both universal and culture-based values.

The Power of Culture-Based Values

To study differences in culture-based values, Richard Shweder, an anthropologist, divided the moral order of each culture into three categories that resemble those Cloninger used to describe individuals. Shweder calls his categories ethics of autonomy, which resembles self-directedness; ethics of community, which resembles cooperativeness; and ethics of divinity, which resembles self-transcendence.
¹⁶

The first of Shweder’s categories, the ethics of autonomy, views each person as a free agent. Its main focus is maximizing the rights of the individual and achieving personal excellence. But the ethics of autonomy also balances the individual’s right to self-fulfillment with a commitment to equal autonomy for all. It is the predominant moral view in many contemporary secular cultures.

The ethics of community turns this around by sacrificing some autonomy for the benefits of having a defined place in an organized group. It views the family and the community as the most important entities, whose moral integrity and reputation must be protected by each of its members. It also views each person primarily in terms of social roles and obligations rather than individual rights. Its main moral themes—duty, hierarchy, and interdependence—have a central place in traditional cultures.

The third category, the ethics of divinity, permeates the traditional cultures in which religion plays a major role. It views each person as a manifestation of a grand universal design that transcends individuals and provides a spiritual basis for moral behavior. In some versions, each person is
seen as a responsible bearer and representative of a holy legacy rather than as a mundane practitioner of reciprocal altruism.

Breaking down a moral system into these three categories is not just an abstract exercise. It can also help us recognize how our own culture shapes our personal moral judgments. Consider, for example, something as seemingly trivial as the proper way to address your father. To most contemporary Americans, who are largely governed by the ethics of autonomy, it is acceptable to use his first name. But in the traditional Hindu society that Shweder studied in India, it is considered extremely disrespectful, a violation of both family hierarchy (community) and the sacred natural order (divinity).

The same approach can also help us understand the basis for the passionate disagreement about the morality of abortion by two groups of Americans who are each convinced that they are right. In this case, the pro-choice group belongs to a subculture that emphasizes a version of the ethics of autonomy that gives priority to the individual woman’s right to protect herself from what she considers a very harmful outcome and downplays the right to life of the unborn fetus. In contrast, the pro-life group belongs to a subculture that emphasizes a version of the ethics of divinity that gives priority to the sanctity of all human souls.
¹⁷

When considered in terms of the values of their cultures, it becomes easy to see how two people who are equally endowed with moral instincts and emotions can fervently defend such different positions. In judging the character of an individual, it is thus important to separate the person’s culture-specific values from his or her rankings on those values that are
universally admired. Little relationship may exist between the religious, political, and philosophical worldviews mandated by their culture and their personal rankings on temperance, courage, justice, humanity, wisdom, and transcendence.

The Character of Benjamin Franklin

To see why it’s important to separate culture-specific values and universal values in judging a person’s character, let’s go back to Benjamin Franklin. One reason he makes a good subject is that there has been surprisingly intense disagreement about this aspect of his personality. Even though everyone recognizes Franklin’s great contributions as a founding father, many critics have challenged the depth of his morality.

Much of this controversy centers on what Franklin included in his list of 13 virtues, as well as on what he left out. If you look over the list, you will see that almost all of the virtues are simply tactics for self-regulation and self-organization—the ethics of autonomy. To his fans, Franklin’s practical tactics for success are worth emulating. A recent example is Stephen Covey’s
Seven Habits of Highly Effective People,
which describes a stepwise plan for getting ahead that was inspired by Franklin.
¹⁸
But critics are disappointed in Franklin’s focus on the practical and condemn him for neglecting the higher and more inspiring aspects of morality. He has even been accused of representing “the least praiseworthy qualities of the inhabitants of the new world: miserliness, fanatical practicality, and lack of interest in what are usually known as spiritual things .... He had a cheap and shabby soul.”
¹⁹

Walter Isaacson, who has summarized several hundred years of such polarized assessments, believes that these divergent opinions are largely culture-based, a reflection of a split in the American view of good character that was already developing in Franklin’s lifetime. As Isaacson put it, “Franklin represents ... the side of pragmatism versus romanticism, of practical benevolences versus moral crusading ... of religious tolerance rather than evangelical faith ... of social mobility rather than an established elite ... of middle-class virtues rather than more ethereal noble aspirations.”
²⁰

Franklin would probably agree about this cultural split. But he would then try to convince you that he had picked the right side. He might begin by pointing out that, instead of being purely selfish, his emphasis on self-development was also designed to help others. And instead of having a “cheap and shabby soul,” he would argue that he was devoted to many high ideals, such as human rights, and had done a lot to implement them. As for spirituality, he would tell you that he valued that, too, but that he had replaced the puritanical God of his childhood with a benevolent one who “delights in the happiness of those He has created ... and delights to see me virtuous.”
²¹
To express his belief in this benevolent God, Franklin added the following daily prayer to his table of 13 virtues:

O powerful Goodness! bountiful Father! merciful Guide! Increase in me that wisdom which discovers my truest interest. Strengthen my resolutions to perform what wisdom dictates. Accept my kind offices to thy other children as the only return in my power for thy continual favors to me.

So was Franklin right to conclude that he was virtuous? Was he right to consider writing
The Art of Virtue
as a guidebook for us all? One way to assess his character is to consider how he ranked on the six universally admired categories of virtues. Focusing on them helps minimize the influence of our culture-based values.