Massacre in West Cork (25 page)

Appendix 1

LIST OF THOSE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN ATTACKED DURING THE MASSACRE PERIOD

1. Francis Fitzmaurice: he and his brother were giving information to the British according to his brother W. J. Fitzmaurice’s statement.

2. W. J. Fitzmaurice was allegedly sought but this does not appear to be the case from the inquest evidence.

3. David Gray: Eileen Lynch suggested he was gathering information.

4. James Buttimer: nephew called J. Buttimer identified as a spy in 1921.

5. John Buttimer: lived next door to Sunlodge Manch Bridge where a Buttimer had been identified as a spy in the Dunmanway diary. May be related to the J. Buttimer reference on the 1921 spy list.

6. John Greenfield: shot with John Buttimer.

7. Robert Howe: Robert lived within 2 km of William Howe, Rushfield House, Castletown-Kinneigh, who was identified as a likely informant in the Dunmanway diary.

8. John Chinnery: John was William Howe’s nephew. Risteard Ó Glaisne claimed after the fact that John was giving information to the British.

9. Alexander Gerald McKinley: there is a suggestion in Hart (1998) that Tom Nagle and Alexander’s uncle (Holtsbaum?) were hiding the valuables of the Masonic Lodge in Clonakilty on 28 April 1922. This is the only possible connection other than a suggestion, also in Hart, that he was ‘a friend of the police’, and Gerard Murphy’s tenuous suggestion about a connection to his theory about Freemasons being shot in Cork which he now suggests is more to do with internal church politics.

10. Robert Nagle: shot in place of his father, who appeared on a 1st Southern Command list of informers according to Hart (1998), p. 286.

11. Reverend Ralph Harbord: shot at Murragh Rectory on 27 April; he survived. His brother Alfred died at the Somme.

12. John Bradfield: shot in place of his brother William, who was an ex-military man and allegedly passed information to the military during the War of Independence.

13. James Wilson: from Dunmanway, he was sought and fled to England; his sister was told that he would be shot.

14. Hewart Wilson: sought and fled to England; his sister was told that he would be shot.

15. George ‘Appy’ Bryan: gun placed to his head on 26 April in Dunmanway, but the gun misfired.

16. William Jagoe: sought on 26 April, but was not at home; windows shot out.

17. John McCarthy: house was shot up on 26 April in Dunmanway.

18. Tom Sullivan: heard voices outside his house and fled, taking refuge in the graveyard.

19. Bank of Ireland was attacked on 26 April in Dunmanway.

20. William Morrison: house was attacked on 26 April in Dunmanway but he was not at home.

21. Gilbert Johnston: beaten up in Bandon by six IRA men because he was a Protestant and an ex-service man.

22. R. J. Helen: claimed he was attacked in Clonakilty and escaped.

23. William Daunt: attacked in Ballineen on 27 April; no reason given.

24. Henry Bradfield: also sought on the night John Bradfield was shot at Killowen.

25. W. J. Buttimer: sought on the night his father was shot in Cahir, Ballineen.

26. Thomas Hornibrook: arrested and shot after a firefight at Ballygroman House following the shooting of Michael O’Neill.

27. Samuel Hornibrook: arrested and shot after a firefight at Ballygroman House following the shooting of Michael O’Neill.

28. Herbert Woods: arrested and probably hanged following the shooting of Michael O’Neill at Ballygroman House.

29. James Bennett: sought on the night of the Ballineen killings; worked for the Cotters who had been boycotted and Alfred Cotter killed in 1921.

30. Robert Bennett: sought on the night of the Ballineen killings; worked for the Cotters who had been boycotted and Alfred Cotter killed in 1921.

31. Jasper Travers Wolfe: apparently sought on the night of 28 April and fled to England; he was at court in Cork the following week according to the Cork Examiner.

32. William G. Wood: apparently sought on the night of 28 April and fled to England.

33. Edward Woods: warned to leave Cork after the shooting of Thomas and Samuel Hornibrook and Herbert Woods by the anti-Treaty IRA according to his witness statement to the Irish Grants Committee in 1927.

34. Matilda Woods: warned to leave Cork after the shooting of Thomas and Samuel Hornibrook and Herbert Woods by the anti-Treaty IRA, but she was still in residence in ‘Glenbrae’, Cross Douglas Road, in June 1922.

35. Family of Tom Nagle: nine brothers written to and warned to leave the country after the shooting of Robert, despite the fact that they lived in other parts of Ireland.

36. D. Cameron: a seventy-three-year-old Protestant from Crookstown, County Cork, he was warned to leave the country; no known reason.

Appendix 2

I
MMEDIATE AND
T
ERRIBLE
W
AR

‘Immediate and terrible war’ was the phrase apparently used by Lloyd George to force a conclusion to the negotiations about the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland on 3 and 5 December 1921. What this meant is rarely explained, but a rarely accessed set of documents in the British National Archives outlines exactly what was involved. This is the blueprint for the suppression of Ireland after the Truce and shows that the British did not regard the Truce as the end of the war by any means. It is reproduced here simply as an example of the documents now available free to access online.

From the National Archives, Kew

Current reference CAB 43/2, pp. 74–7
¹

Very Secret.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War.

1. In the event of the present Conference failing to reach an agreement and hostilities recommencing, we must be prepared to face the condition that these hostilities may open before the expiration of the 72 hours of grace.

It is essential that the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief should be given a free hand to take the initiative at once, and to assume the offensive wherever possible. It is also essential to increase the forces at his disposal at the earliest possible date.

2. Martial law should be proclaimed in the 26 counties, or in all Ireland if the Northern Government agrees. A draft has been agreed by the Irish Situation Committee, and is with the Secretariat.

3. Parliament should be called together (if it is not sitting) and speeches made by the Prime Minister calculated to stir the country. This should be followed by intensive propaganda, for, unless a wave of enthusiasm is created, it may not be possible to raise the necessary troops.

4. Recruiting should be commenced on one year’s engagement of ex-service men

a. for the Regular Army. About 35,000 men will be required to bring the 67 Infantry battalions in Ireland up to 1,000 strong, and a further 15,000 men can be absorbed in these battalions – say 50,000 Infantry. [total 83,000]

b. for permanent guards and a small mobile reserve will be required in Great Britain for internees and prisoners and for those vulnerable points for which the War Office is responsible – say 25,000 men.

c. for the other arms and the departmental corps which will also be required to be filled up R.E. and Signals, R.A.S[ervice].C., R.A.O[rdnance].C, and R.A.M[edical].C. – say 10,000 men.

When the above have been obtained, new units might be formed from the Yeomanry and Territorial Army and other special sources, but the first effort should be to secure the 85,000 men required for (a), (b) and (c) above.

5. A Proclamation should be issued (following a statement in the House of Commons) that the Irish rebels, whilst not recognised as belligerents, will, as an act of grace, be treated as belligerents if they conduct their operations in accordance with the rules of war as laid down in Article 1 of the Annex to the Hague Convention, subject to the reservation of the right to try and punish for high treason all leaders and organisers of rebellion. …

6. The women and children of the families of officers and other ranks in Ireland should be moved to this country, and provision made, where necessary, for their accommodation and maintenance. Preliminary arrangements for this have been made.

7. The present internees, about 4,000, should be moved … to Great Britain, and provision made … for, say, 20,000 more. The internees accommodated in English prisons and camps should be guarded and fed by the Army. The preliminary arrangements for this have been made and the guards for this are included in 4(b) above. The Navy should prepare and be responsible for, say 2,500 at Scapa and Osea Island.

8. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief has framed his plans to carry out an offensive policy … it is of the utmost importance that General Macready should know now whether he is permitted to carry on, so that he can complete his arrangements and be ready to act without any delay, if and when the occasion arises.

9. Such forces as are available in this country can be despatched to Ireland at short notice …

10. With reference to the policy to be adopted regarding Ulster … re-form the 36th (Ulster) Division on an Imperial basis.

11. … Provision has been made in co-operation with the Home Secretary to provide police and military guards for the principal places where arms and explosives are stored in bulk, but there are docks, railways and bridges which are open to attack, and stores of explosives are kept near coal mines unguarded. Military protection for these latter will not be available, and the police should therefore be prepared to supply protection.

12. Censorship of the Press will be carried out in Ireland. Schemes have been worked out and staffs (200) are being selected for enforcing censorship of cables at London, Liverpool, and Glasgow; and of postal communications at London, Chester, and Glasgow. These schemes can be put into force at 48 hours and 5 days notice respectively.

13. The main points on which decisions are required briefly [edited by the author]

(a) Martial Law in all Ireland or in the 26 Counties.

(b) Parliamentary Campaign and intensive Press propaganda.

(c) Raising of special forces.

(d) Treatment of enemy.

(e) Dáil etc. to be declared treasonable organisations.

(f) Possession of arms, ammunition or explosives without a permit punishable by death after Drumhead Court.

(g) Control of the Press, censorship.

(h) Passports to enter Martial Law Area from Great Britain or abroad.

(i) Introduction of a system of identity cards.

(j) Restrictions on export of Irish produce, and if necessary the closing of manufacturing establishments.

(k) Destruction of Government property, animals, etc., to be met by requisition without payment [legal theft] on the area concerned.

(l) Stoppage of all Fairs, Markets, Race Meetings etc., as required.

(m) Closing of all ports except Cork and Dublin.

(n) Closing of all Civil Courts throughout the Martial Law area.

(o) Placing 2 Battalions of Marines on 48 hours notice.

(p) Raising of Ulster Division.

The War Office,

22nd October, 1921.

See also the next two documents in CAB 43/2/Admiralty, ‘Naval Defence’, pp. 82–7, 22 October 1921, and ‘Memorandum by His Majesty’s Government’, pp. 88–93, 24 October 1921, for the reasoning behind the key British demands in the Treaty negotiations. All of these documents are available to download free online from the National Archives, Kew.

Endnotes

A
BBREVIATIONS

Bureau of Military History (BMH)

Cork City and County Archives (CCCA)

General Post Office (G.P.O.)

Irish Republican Army (IRA)

Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB)

Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC)

Witness Statement (WS)

I
NTRODUCTION

1
For example, RIC Auxiliary Cadet Vernon Hart, who was convicted of killing the parish priest of Dunmanway, is often referred to as ‘Harte’, but in his census returns for 1901 and 1911 and his marriage certificate his second name is spelled ‘Hart’. Therefore, I have used the spelling ‘Hart’.

2
The following quotation from the BMH’s website –
http://www.bureauofmilitaryhistory.ie/about.html
 (accessed 22 August 2013) – sets out the details of the project: ‘The Bureau of Military History Collection, 1913–1921 (BMH) is a collection of 1,773 witness statements; 334 sets of contemporary documents; 42 sets of photographs and 13 voice recordings that were collected by the [Irish] State between 1947 and 1957, in order to gather primary source material for the revolutionary period in Ireland from 1913 to 1921.’ Tom Barry observed in his refusal to take part in the project: ‘Any individual is entitled to make any claim he likes and defame any officers he likes and it must be recorded by your Bureau. In my opinion no history is a real history unless all statements are subjected to the light of publicity during the lifetime of those who took part in the events being recorded’, BMH WS 1734, p. 2.

3
David Fitzpatrick, in his review of Gerard Murphy’s
The Year of Disappearances
, flags ‘the ubiquity of serious factual errors and self-justifying distortion in much republican testimony such as that collected by the Bureau of Military History’, Fitzpatrick, D., 2011, ‘History in a hurry’, Dublin Review of Books 17, Spring,
http://www.drb.ie/more_details/11-03–17/History_In_A_Hurry.aspx
(accessed 13 May 2013). While admitting its limitations, Eve Morrison gives a far less dismissive view of the witness statements in an interview on Near FM, ‘The History Show’, episode three: ‘Dr Eve Morrisson on the Bureau of Military History: interview with Cathal Brennan’,  
http://nearfm.ie/podcast/the-history-show-episode-3/
 (accessed 21 January 2013).

4
National Library of Ireland, Ms. 33,913 (5) Piaras Béaslaí papers, Dublin. Reports include 3rd Cork Brigade, 1st Southern Command, 2nd Cork Brigade, Belfast Brigade, Antrim Brigade, North Roscommon Brigade and others for May and June 1921.

5
There are difficulties in achieving this. I attempted to access the Manchester Regiment’s record of civilian arrests, but was informed that this was closed until 2021. Following discussions with the archivist, this closure period was reduced to eighty-four years and the archive is now open.

6
McDonnell, K. K., 1972, There is a Bridge at Bandon: a personal account of the Irish War of Independence (Cork, Mercier Press), pp. 159–61.

7
‘The colonisation of Castletown-Kinneigh’,
Southern Star
, 10 August 1963, p. 6, col. 3, and 31 August 1963, p. 6, col. 3.

8
House of Lords debate, 27 November 1837, vol. 39, col. 241, Earl of Mulgrave:
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1837/nov/27/state-of-ireland
(accessed 26 July 2013).

9
In early November 1920 the cabinet had noted that ‘we were liable at any time to be confronted with a demand for interest now due for the past year and a half, and for the accruing interest’: National Archives, Kew, CAB 23/23/1, ‘Cabinet conclusion’, 3 November 1920.

10
Referring to Gladstone’s attempts to answer the ‘Irish Question’, the famous historical parody 1066 and All That commented that ‘whenever he was getting warm, the Irish secretly changed the Question’: Sellar, W. C. and Yeatman, R. J., 1931, 1066 and All That: a memorable history of England, comprising all the parts you can remember including one hundred and three good things, five bad kings and two genuine dates (New York, E. P. Dutton and Co.), p. 116.

1
P
RELUDE TO
W
AR: 1914–1919

1
In the House of Lords, speaking about the Easter Rising, House of Lords debate, 10 May 1916, vol. 21, col. 970:
http://hansard.millbank systems.com/lords/1916/may/10/the-sinn-fein-rebellion
 (accessed 7 June 2013).

2
In the House of Commons, speaking in response to Lord Midleton, House of Commons debate, 11 May 1916, vol. 82, col. 941:
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1916/may/11/continuance-of-martial-law
(accessed 7 June 2013).

3
It would be wrong to think that everyone involved in this issue had an intellectual understanding of this: it was an emotional war and all the more dangerous because of that.

4
Curtis, L., 1916,
The Commonwealth of Nations: an inquiry into the nature of citizenship in the British Empire, and into the mutual relations of the several communities thereof
(London, Macmillan and Co.).

5
Karsten, P., 1983, ‘Irish soldiers in the British Army, 1792–1922: suborned or subordinate?’,
Journal of Social History
17, pp. 31–64.

6
The support for Home Rule consisted of 274 Liberals, 71 Irish Parliamentary Party and 42 Labour against 272 Conservative and Liberal unionists.

7
The Curragh website, ‘The Curragh “Mutiny” 1914’:
http://www.curragh.info/articles/mutiny.htm
(accessed 20 December 2012). See also: Florida Irish Heritage Center, 2011, ‘My summer in Maine, a great book and an incident in Ireland that changed world history’,
http://floridairishheritagecenter.wordpress.com/tag/curragh-mutiny/
(accessed 16 July 2013) for a detailed study of the incident; Beckett, I. F. W., 1986,
The Army and the Curragh Incident
, 1914 (London, Bodley Head for Army Records Society); Beckett, I. F. W., 1986, ‘A note on government intelligence and surveillance during the Curragh incident, March 1914’,
Intelligence and National Security
1, pp. 435–40.

8
The two offending paragraphs were repudiated in the House of Commons by Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons debate, ‘Colonel Seely and the Cabinet’, 25 March 1914, vol. 60, col. 454:
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1914/mar/25/colonel-seely-and-the-cabinet S5CV0060P0_19140325_HOC_410
(accessed 10 February 2013).

9
House of Commons debate, 23 March 1914, vol. 60, col. 122:
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1914/mar/23/motion-for-adjournment
(accessed 13 June 2013).

10
Ibid., col. 135 (accessed 10 February 2013); McLean, I., 2010,
What’s Wrong with the British Constitution?
(Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 100–27 argues convincingly that the incident could be considered as a
coup d’état.

11
Taylor, A., 2006,
Bonar Law
(London, Haus), pp. 53–75, provides an in-depth study of the manoeuvring by the leader of the ‘Conservative and Unionist Party’ to use the situation to force a general election. See also Smith, J., 1996, ‘Paralysing the Arm: The Unionists and the Army Annual Act, 1911–1914’,
Parliamentary History
15, pp. 191–207. Lord Willoughby de Broke said during a House of Lords debate on 10 February 1914, vol. 15, cols 5–48: ‘I say that we ought to deal with the Army Annual Act in such a way as to make it impossible for the Army to be used in such a way as noble Lords think. If nobody else will deal with it in this way, I shall in the meantime consider whether it is not possible to amend the Army Act in such a manner as to frustrate the sending over of the Army to Ulster to coerce these Ulstermen’:
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1914/feb/10/address-in-reply-to-his-majestys-most
(accessed 1 August 2013).

12
The Ulster Volunteers were formed in 1912 by Edward Carson and James Craig (later first prime minister of Northern Ireland) to pressure the British government into withdrawing the 1912 Irish Home Rule Bill which would give nationalist-dominated but limited self-government to Ireland. History Journal.ie, 2012, ‘The Ulster Volunteers’:
http://www.historyjournal.ie/archives/war-in-ulster/143-the-ulster-volunteers.html
(accessed 7 June 2013).

13
History Journal.ie, 2012, ‘The Ulster Covenant’:
http://www.historyjournal.ie/archives/war-in-ulster/142-the-ulster-covenant.html
 (accessed 7 June 2013).

14
Connolly, S. J., 2007,
The Oxford Companion to Irish History
(Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 303.

15
The Irish Volunteers were formed in November 1913 in response to the Ulster Volunteers and to promote the implementation of Home Rule.

16
Eyewitness to History, 1998, ‘The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand 1914’:
http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/duke.htm
(accessed 13 May 2013).

17
‘England declares war on Germany’,
Manchester Guardian
, 5 August 1914.

18
Liddell Hart, B. H., 1972,
History of the First World War
(London, Pan Books), p. 217.

19
There was much bitterness in the House of Lords that the Ulster opt-out was not included as an amendment.

20
University College Cork, ‘Multitext project in Irish History: Movements for Political & Social Reform, 1870–1914’:
http://multitext.ucc.ie/d/John_Redmond
(accessed 17 December 2012). See also MacDonagh, M., 1917,
The Irish on the Somme: being the second series of ‘The Irish at the Front
’ (London, Hodder and Stoughton).

21
At Verdun the French casualties were estimated at around 377,000 with 162,000 killed. The battle failed because the Germans were also bled white with around 337,000 casualties, including 100,000 killed. The British casualties at the Somme were 419,000 with 95,000 killed.

22
Lyons, J. B., 1983,
The Enigma of Tom Kettle: Irish patriot, essayist, poet, British soldier, 1880–1916
(Dublin, Glendale Press), p. 293. His wife was the sister of Francis Sheehy Skeffington, Irish journalist, pacifist and anti-war protestor.