Massacre in West Cork (26 page)

23
Easter 1916:
http://www.easter1916.net/
(accessed 18 December 2012).

24
History Empire, ‘Easter Rising’: 
http://historyempire.com/ireland/easter-rising/
 (accessed 13 May 2013). This is unfair to Maxwell, who was asked to resign in October more for changing his view about conscription than anything else, according to George Dangerfield: see Dangerfield, G., 1966,
The Damnable Question: a study in Anglo-Irish relations
(London, Constable), p. 247.

25
Mac Giolla Choille, B. (ed.), 1966, Intelligence Notes, 1913–1916, preserved in the
State Paper Office
(Dublin, Stationery Office).

26
House of Commons debate, ‘Continuance of Martial Law’, 11 May 1916, vol. 82, col. 945:
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1916/may/11/continuance-of-martial-law
(accessed 26 July 2013).

27
Morrissey, J., 2006, ‘A Lost Heritage: the Connaught Rangers and Multivocal Irishness’, in McCarthy, M. (ed.),
Ireland’s Heritages: critical perspectives
on memory and identity
(Ashgate, Aldershot), pp. 71–87. Available at
http://www.nuigalway.ie/geography/documents/Heritage-Chapter.pdf
 (accessed 18 December 2012).

28
Mansergh, N., 1991,
The Unresolved Question: the Anglo-Irish settlement and its undoing,
1912–72
(New Haven, Yale University Press), p. 119.

29
Lloyd George, D., 1933,
War Memoirs of David Lloyd George
(Boston, Little, Brown, and Co.), p. 323.

30
Cassar, G. H., 2009,
Lloyd George at War, 1916–1918
(London, Anthem Press).

31
Jeffery, K., 2008,
Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: a political soldier
(Oxford, Oxford University Press).

32
Woodward, D. R., 1983,
Lloyd George and the Generals
(Newark, University of Delaware Press); Hankey, M., 1961,
The Supreme Command, 1914–1918,
2 vols (London, Allen and Unwin); Liddell Hart (1972), pp. 327–36; Lloyd George, D., 1938,
War Memoirs
(London, Odhams Press), p. 323.

2
T
HE
P
OLITICS OF
W
AR

1
Of course there had been incidents before this but this is the accepted start date.

2
See Kautt, W. H., 1999, The Anglo-Irish War, 1916–1921: a people’s war (Westport, Conn., Praeger), for a more detailed analysis of the war than presented here. See Hittle, J. B. E., 2011, Michael Collins and the Anglo-Irish War: Britain’s counterinsurgency failure (Washington, D.C., Potomac Books), for an up-to-date treatment of this subject. See also Fitzpatrick, D., 1977, Politics and Irish Life 1913–1921: provincial experience of war and revolution (Dublin, Gill & Macmillan) and Fitzpatrick, D., 2012a, Terror in Ireland: 1916–1923 (Dublin, Lilliput Press).

3
Simson, H. J., 1937, British Rule, and Rebellion (Edinburgh, Blackwood and Sons), analysed the Irish and Palestinian conflicts as failures to win hearts and minds.

4
See Ramakrishna, K., n.d., ‘The Role of Propaganda in the Malayan Emergency: lessons for countering terrorism today’, p. 8. Available at:
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/cens/publications/others/ProfKumarPresentation.pdf
(accessed 22 August 2013). See also Hack, K., 2009, ‘The Malayan Emergency as counter-insurgency paradigm’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3, pp. 383–414.

5
Charters, D., 2009, ‘The development of British counter-insurgency intelligence’, Journal of Conflict Studies 29, pp. 55–74. Available at:
http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/15233/19650
(accessed 18 December 2012). See also Walton, C., 2013, Empire of Secrets: British intelligence, the Cold War and the twilight of empire (London, Harper Press).

6
Gray, C. S., 2012, ‘Concept failure? COIN, counterinsurgency, and strategic theory’, Prism: a Journal of the Centre for Complex Operations 3, no. 3, June, pp. 17–32. Gray argues that the recent debate among military strategists about its value is a misunderstanding of the concept.

7
Callwell, C. E., 1906, Small Wars. Their Principles and Practice (London, printed for HMSO by Harrison and Sons); Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library:
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll11/id/394
(accessed 8 December 2012). See Davies, C. C., 1975,
The Problem of the North-west Frontier, 1890–1908, with a Survey of Policy since 1849
(London, Curzon Press), for the punitive system in India from 1849. Available at:
http://oudl.osmania.ac.in/bitstream/handle/OUDL/1934/218382_The_Problem_Of_The_North-West_Frontier_1890–1908.pdf?sequence=2
(accessed 15 February 2013). See also Ion, A. H. and Errington, E. J., 1993,
Great Powers and Little Wars: the limits of power
(Westport, Conn., Praeger).

8
Kautt (1999) suggests that the misbehaviour by British soldiers, the Auxiliaries and new recruits to the RIC occurred because they were inexperienced at counter-insurgency, but Callwell (1906) shows that expeditions to punish local communities for attacks against their forces were part of normal British imperial policy; see also Davies (1975).

9
The current version of the
British Army Field Manual
(2009) says that Callwell also omits many factors which would be considered important, such as intelligence, but he states that in guerrilla wars intelligence is essential. Available at:
news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_army_manual.pdf
.

10
MacDonagh, O. and Mandle, W. F., 1986,
Ireland and Irish-Australia: studies in cultural and political history
(London, Croom Helm), p. 89.

11
National Archives, Kew, CAB 24/139, ‘Situation in Ireland: report by Major Whittaker’, 19 September 1922.

12
British Houses of Parliament Archives, Lloyd George papers, LG/F/48/6/8 and LG/F/48/6/10, Lord French to Lloyd George; Holmes, R., 1981,
The Little Field-Marshal, Sir John French
(London, J. Cape), pp. 351–3. French in 1920 suggested that the civilian population would need to be removed from areas to concentration camps before aircraft could be used.

13
Walsh, M., 2008,
The News from Ireland: foreign correspondents and the Irish Revolution
(London, I. B. Tauris), p. 124.

14
Daily Sketch
, 3 December 1920. See the Royal Irish Constabulary Forum, The Auxiliary Division, C Company:
http://irishgenealogyqueries.yuku.com/topic/762/t/C-Company.html.UR1UVB13a_g
(accessed 13 February 2013).

15
At the time of this burning it was illegal but was tolerated to avoid having to investigate the Auxiliaries. In 1901 the British legal position had been explained in the House of Commons: ‘Article XXIII. (g) of the Hague Convention lays down that the destruction of an enemy’s property is permissible when imperatively demanded by the necessities of war’, House of Commons debate, ‘Farm burnings’, 20 May 1901, vol. 94, cols 579–80, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1901/may/20/farm-burning
(accessed 26 July 2013) in reply to J. Flynn, Cork North; the Hague Convention 1899 Article 23,  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague02.asp
(accessed 18 December 2012). As the British did not declare war during the Irish fight, neither the protections nor the rules applied until martial law was declared in late 1920, though arguments can also be made against this.

16
House of Commons adjournment debate, 13 December 1920, as reported in ‘Rebels burned Cork’,
The New York Times
, 14 December 1920. (Greenwood had been created a baronet in 1915, and from then on was thus referred to as Sir Hamar Greenwood.)

17
White, G. and O’Shea, B., 2006,
The Burning of Cork
(Cork, Mercier Press), pp. 146–61. There is plenty of evidence in that book that the burning was a planned reprisal that got out of hand. See also ‘The burning of Cork’,
Southern Star
, 18 June 1921, p. 2, and the discussion of K Company of the Auxiliaries in Chapter 3 of this book.

18
Secretary for India M. Montagu: ‘I have not received final figures, but I understand that the total number of deaths in the Punjab, Delhi, Ahmedabad, and Calcutta, is estimated at about 400, and the number of injured at about the same number. Eight or nine Europeans were murdered. The damage done by rioters in the Punjab may amount to something not far short of £1,000,000’, House of Commons debate, 28 May 1919, vol. 116, col. 1184:
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1919/may/28/recent-riots-total-civilian-casualties
.

19
‘Black Hand in Ireland’,
Auckland Star
, 13 March 1920, p. 17. Available at National Library of New Zealand past papers:
http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/paperspast
(accessed 18 December 2012).

20
BMH WS 400, Richard Walsh, pp. 64–6.

21
Office of Public Works, Dublin Castle, ‘The end of British Rule’:
http://www.dublincastle.ie/HistoryEducation/History/Chapter16TheEndofBritishRule/
(accessed 8 February 2013). For Alan Bell, see BMH WS 1099, George C. Duggan, assistant to Under Secretary for Ireland, Dublin Castle, 1919–1922, p. 31.

22
James Craig had been made a baronet in 1918 and became Sir James Craig after this. Wylie and Craig had different motives for looking for Dominion Status with partition, but their analysis of the likely eventual outcome is striking in its similarity.

23
National Archives, Kew, CAB 24/109, ‘Notes of a conference with the officers of the Irish Government held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. on Friday, 23rd. July 1920, at 11.30 a.m. and 3.30 p.m.’; Mansergh (1991), pp. 151–3.