Authors: Alan Maki
Master Chief (7 page)
On the morning of June twenty-eighth I drove with Doc Holmes, Barron, and our Kit Carson scouts Hoan and Kiem to Vinh Kim village and left our jeep there. It was a beautiful day for a two-mile walk to Ba To’s hamlet. We were heavily loaded with all of the extra 5.56mm ball
ammo, M-26 frag grenades, M-72 LAAWs (Light Anti-Armor Weapon), an M-79 40mm grenade launcher that I had traded for with a PBR sailor, 40mm HE rounds and pop parachute flares that we carried in addition to our regular field gear.
While Doc Holmes was holding unofficial sick call for the families of the hamlet—officially called MEDCAP, for Medical Civic Action Program—Hoan and I were able to get away from the crowd and alone with Ba To. I presented the M-79 and the rest of the ordnance to Ba To as bona fides for November Platoon’s commitment to help his hamlet, and I assured him that there would be more. After the stage had been set, I asked Ba To to be my agent handler and offered to pay him 8,000 piasters a month and his agents 5,000 piasters a month in cash—at that time the exchange rate was 275 piasters for one dollar—plus cash rewards according to results. Ba To was very pleased and immediately gave me information on two potential targets. I then gave him history statements to be filled out so that OSA Al and naval intelligence could prepare BIs for each agent’s dossier. I warned Ba To that his agent net was not to know about our agreement and that his agents were to report only to him. We further agreed that I would visit Ba To’s village weekly, using Doc Holmes’s medical care of the villagers as a cover. During each visit, Ba To would inform me of enemy locations and activities, plus any logistical support that he might need for the protection of his hamlet. After Doc’s sickcall was completed, the five of us returned to Dong Tam in the midst of a heavy rainstorm.
Shortly after our return to Dong Tam, Lieutenant Fletcher handed me an immediate priority Air Force message that reported two special forces and one ARVN personnel’s death and burial by VC forces in Tay Ninh province, South Vietnam, in 1969. It read as follows:
26/0100Z June 71
CONFIDENTIAL/[illegible]
The following is raw and unevaluated information and has received no substantial [1 word illegible] or evaluation by intelligence production analysts.
Message in four parts
Part 1
25 June 1971
1. Country: South Vietnam
2. U.S. ??? in Tay Ninh Province RVN
| SIGNED: | [illegible] Gerald [illegible] Chief, AFX? Team? |
CONFIDENTIAL
3. ISC Number:
4. Date of Info: Late April 1969
5. Date of Acquisition: 24 June 1971
6. Evaluation: F-6
7. Source: Returnee LUU HOANG TIEN (LUWU HOANGS TIEENS) aka LE HOANG PHONG (LEE HOANGS PHONG) aka LUU MINH PHUC (LUWU MINH PHUCS)
8. Report Number: D-0513-118-71
9. Date of Report: 25 June 1971
10. Number of Pages:
11. References:
12. Originator: Hq. 1021 USAF FLDACTYSQ
13. Prepared By: Gerald J. Kreiger, AFE Team D Det 6 1021 USAF FLDACTYSQ
14. Approving Authority: RUDOLPH C. KOLLER, Col USAF
15. Summary: This report contains information concerning the location of the graves of two U.S. personnel KIA in late April 1969 in an operation against COSVN headquarters. The graves are in the vic of 113842N/1061856E, XT434875 (Sheet 6232II), TAN HOI Village, Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province, RVN.
PART II SOURCE DESCRIPTION
1. This report is the result of a HOI CHANH interview by a USAF interrogator. Source was born in 1940 in CAY DIEU Hamlet, TAN LOC Village, Thoi Binh District, An Xuyen Province, RVN. He received no formal education and no special military training. Source joined the VC on 19 September 1959 and was assigned as a guerrilla to TAN LOC Village, Thoi Binh District, An Xuyen Province, RVN. The following are his assignments until he rallied on 5 February 1971 at the Ha Tiem Chieu Hoi Center:
21 July 61—soldier, 2nd sq, 3rd plt, 1st co, 330th bn, the protection bn for MR-3 Current Affairs Org.
28 June 62—promoted to assistant sq ldr same unit.
June 63—bodyguard for doctor in civilian hospital in MR-3.
Sept 65—assist sq ldr, 1st sq, 27th plt, 3rd co, 3173rd bn (formerly 330th bn).
Sept 67—assigned to ATK Grp to protect South Liberation Front.
Oct 67—soldier, 1st sq, 1st plt, 1st co, 1st bn, 180th grp (protection of Current Affairs Org of COSVN). April 69—remains in same unit at old site of COSVN as COSVN moves.
9 Sept 70—assist sq ldr, 1st sq, 4th escort team, Security Section, COSVN.
11 Nov 70—caught malaria, released from duties, started home, rallied 5 Feb 71.
PART III U.S. BURIAL SITE IN TAY NINH PROVINCE, RVN
2. Circumstances of Knowledgeability: In April 1969 Source was a member of the 1st sq, 1plt, 1st co, 1st bn, 180th Armed Public Security Grp, responsible for the protection of the political half of COSVN hq. In late April 1969 he witnessed an attack on COSVN hq. He saw the bodies of the two U.S. personnel and watched their burial. The information in this report is the result of personal observation and hearsay.
3. Attack on COSVN: Approx 0600 hours on an unrecalled date in late April 1969 two helicopters landed on unknown amount of ARVN troops in the vic of 113852N/1061725E, XT406877 (Sheet 6232II). The ARVN proceeded Eastward approx 3000 meters to a clearing where they made contact with the VC. The VC were patients of a COSVN military hospital located on the Eastern side of the clearing. The ARVN point man and two U.S. personnel were killed in the action, which took place approx 0900 hours. The remaining ARVN troops placed a cloth, half yellow, half red, approx 80×60 centimeters, on the ground and threw an unknown number of yellow and black smoke grenades. Two helicopters strafed the area for approx ten minutes and withdrew. The ARVN troops withdrew Westward across the clearing. The VC had no more contact with the ARVN that day. The following day the VC lost two men in a skirmish with the ARVN in the vic of 113820N/1061740E, XT412868. (The proceeding information was told to the Source by the VC personnel who engaged the ARVN. Source saw the two-colored cloth after the contact as it lay on the ground. Source observed the yellow and black smoke from his position
near COSVN political hq in the vic of 113915N/1062005E, XT455885.)
4. Burial Site: Source first observed the one ARVN and two U.S. dead approx 1500 hours the day of the attack. His unit came to the VC hospital to reinforce the defenders about that time. The bodies were left where they fell in the hope that an attempt would be made to retrieve them and an ambush could be made. No such attempt was made and the bodies were buried at approx 1800 hours. Source saw the VC carry the bodies from the clearing and bury them in a bunker in the vic of 113842N/1061856E, XT434875, on the Eastern edge of the clearing, approx 1500 meters South of MONG stream, approx 4500 meters Northeast of BO TUC Hamlet, TAN HOI Village, Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province, RVN. The bodies were stripped of their uniforms and footgear and were buried in their under-shorts. Source did not see any rank, unit insignia or name tags on the green fatigues worn by the one ARVN and two U.S. He did not see any dogtags on any of the bodies. Source was told by other VC that the attacking force was Special Forces because that was the type of operation that they usually performed.
5. Bunker: The three bodies were buried in a bunker shaped like the letter “Z”. The middle part of the “Z” was 3 meters long; each end of the “Z” was 1.5 meters long. The bunker was 80 centimeters wide throughout and 1.2 meters deep. The bunker had a roof 1.2 meters thick made of logs covered with earth. The bunker had an opening at each end of the “Z.” The three bodies were buried by removing the earth covering the bunker, caving in one side of the log roof, placing the bodies inside and covering them with earth. The two entranceways were filled with earth.
6. Buried Personnel: The dead ARVN troop was approx
1.6 meters tall and weighed approx 52 kg. He had been killed by a single round passing through his throat and out the back of his neck. One of the Americans was Negro and the other was Caucasian. The Negro was approx 1.67 meters tall and weighed about 65 kg. He had been killed by one round through his stomach and out his back and he also had one round in his right thigh. The Caucasian was approx 1.7 meters tall and weighed about 68 kg. He had been killed by three rounds in the chest.
7. Miscellaneous: Source stated that a few days after the attack the area was hit by B-52 strikes until September 1969. Source claims the area has bomb craters too numerous to count. (Craters measure 9 to 15 meters in diameter and 3 meters deep.) Source is willing to lead an operation to the area to recover the bodies, but fears the site may have been obliterated by the bombing. PART IV COMMENTS OF THE COLLECTOR
8. Source Credibility: Source is above average intelligence despite his lack of formal education. Source was cooperative about furnishing information and control questions indicated no apparent attempts to deceive the interrogator. Source has been offered and accepted the promise of remuneration if he leads an operation to the burial site and the bodies are found and identified as U.S.
9. Map References: AMS Series L7014, Sheet 6232II, First Edition, dated 1965.
10. Source Disposition: Source has furnished information concerning COSVN hq in Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia and two commo-liaison stations in Kandal Province, Cambodia. Source has no further information of air intelligence interest. Exploitation has been terminated. Source is presently in the MR IV Regional Chieu Hoi Center, CAN THO City, RVN.Gp3
On July 30th, four Australian SAS lads named Ray, Jim, Terry, and Bill arrived from Nui Dat. At 1730 hours we dutifully did our daily PT (physical training) and a three-mile run. Afterward, it was time to wet our whistles and to party with our newfound SAS mates.
The following day, Doc, Ray, and I went via sector slick to Vinh Kim subsector, picked up Captain Campbell, then proceeded to Ba To’s hamlet. I had managed to bum a case of 40mm HE and pop flares from the PBR sailors in My Tho for Ba To and his men. As expected, they were very thankful for the ordnance. It was only a matter of time until units of the 309F MF HW Battalion attacked Ba To’s tiny hamlet again.
Ba To gave me information on the activities of the VC village security subsection and a twenty-bed VC hospital that was located in the midst of a large bunker complex. Doc and I spent the afternoon back in Dong Tam making a 1:4,000 scale mosaic from split vertical photos for future enemy targets. We also replaced the malfunctioning KY-8 crypto unit in our FM, AN/VRC-46 radio.
Later that afternoon, Dai Uy and NILO John went on a VR near one of the cache sites that Ba To had told us about. After they returned to Subsector, Dai Uy gathered all information about the cache site from Captain Campbell. Fletcher had learned that approximately one month earlier a VC/NVA sapper school with nineteen instructors had educated fifty students in the arts of assaulting and destroying government outposts and hamlets such as Ba To’s. The school had been located in the immediate vicinity of two tombs and the cache. There was also a possibility that a seventy-man VC unit was located near the cache. Regardless, Dai Uy gave the warning order at 2130. There was no party with our SAS buddies that night.
On the morning of July second SAS Ray and I drove to Vinh Kim subsector to pick up two guides from Ba To’s
hamlet. Unfortunately, the guides didn’t show and we were forced to return to Dong Tam empty-handed, but Lieutenant Fletcher and I decided that the guides weren’t really that important.
Dai Uy gave his patrol leader’s order at 1000. By 1200 we had inserted in a rice paddy and were covered by Seawolf gunships. The line of march was the three Kit Carson scouts, me, Dai Uy, Doc Holmes with the radio, Barron, Waneous, Chief Bassett, Chamberlain, Eberle, Mr. Kleehammer, and others.
I was carrying my favorite weapon, my M-16 with an XM-148 40mm grenade launcher that was attached to the rifle’s barrel. I had an added gadget secured to the carrying handle of my M-16’s upper receiver. The “Singlepoint” gun sight produced a red dot that was radioactively illuminated day or night. Both of the shooter’s eyes were kept open while pointing and firing the weapon. The trick was to learn to point, not aim, in a manner similar to trap or skeet shooting. I especially liked it for night operations. While my right eye focused on the red dot, my left eye focused on the target. If I could make out a human silhouette or see muzzle flashes, I would simply place the dot on the enemy and fire with deadly accuracy. I wouldn’t have been able to do that at night very well, if at all, with peep sights. My weapon was great for applying the principles of “quick kill” out to two hundred yards.
I started the day’s op with sixty-three 40mm HE rounds, four 40mm para flares, four hand-initiated pop flares, two MK-13 day/night flares, two minifrag grenades, two mini-CS grenades, two M-26 frag grenades, six thirty-round M-16 magazines, three thirty-round M-16 magazines taped together and carried with one magazine inserted into the rifle, first-aid kit, two LRP meals, two to four quarts of water, strobe light with extra infrared, blue and red lenses, survival gear, and one
M-18A1 claymore antipersonnel mine. It was a heavy but ideal load for our short-duration operations, during which we inserted by helo and captured, killed, or liberated our targets and extracted within a couple of hours.
After we patrolled to the edge of the jungle near the reported location of the two tombs and cache, Dai Uy had me set up and command detonate one claymore mine at a time until I had blown a safe path through the booby traps and entangled jungle to the tombs. It was a trick that I had learned from the PRU in ’69.
The day was very hot and humid, the marshy terrain had deep bog holes of mud and slime, and worst of all, there wasn’t even a slight breeze to dry the sweat beads that kept flowing into my eyes and smearing my cammi paint. After several miserable hours of crawling through the muck and bramble, some of the guys were beginning to suffer from heat exhaustion.
Seaman Barron was our M-60 machine gunner and stood six feet two inches and weighed about 225 pounds. This was Barron’s first tour in Vietnam. He was a strong man and very fast with his hands and feet. Despite good motives, Barron had decided to carry twelve hundred rounds of 7.62mm bandoleers crossed around his chest plus all of the rest of his basic field gear. By 1400 hours one of his bandoleers had been dropped into the deep mud. In between the sucking noises of bodies being pulled out of the muddy pitfalls, I heard sniggering to the rear of our file. Later, I found out that poor Barron’s ammo dumping hadn’t gone unnoticed by the men behind him.