No Mission Is Impossible (13 page)

The boats, two limping behind because of glitches and three leading the flotilla, sailed toward Israel, where the entire country awaited their arrival. In the end, they docked in Haifa, where they were received by the defense minister, the chief of staff, and the navy's commander in chief.

Operation Noa had worked out according to plan. Several French generals paid the price by losing their jobs, Siem was exiled to a secondary post in the United States and Limon was forced to leave France.

Despite sharp condemnations in France, the operation generated a wave of admiration for Israel, although Paris's official policy remained chilly and distant for many more years.

   
HADAR KIMCHI, DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE NAVY

          
“The most difficult moment, for me, was making the decision to get under way. Initially, I had determined that the departure would be at eight
P.M
., but the terrible storm was raging, and I delayed setting sail. The boats were new, the crews were young and inexperienced with these boats, and there was a lack of standard communications equipment and radar on most of the vessels. I couldn't take the risk. I delayed until ten o'clock, then to midnight, and later to two
A.M
.

              
“At one
A.M
., reports came in by radio that the storm was turning northward. I informed everyone: We're leaving at two-thirty. This was a difficult decision. We struggled with the waves for more than twelve hours. The boats were shuddering; everyone got seasick. At a certain moment, planes appeared above us, taking pictures. I announced on the radio, ‘Everyone, comb your hair! They're snapping photos!' Several engines were inoperative during the trip, and when we reached the Aegean Sea I requested over the radio that Israeli ships in the area be ready to tow us. The first captain who answered told me, ‘I'm willing—this is for our country, and I'll do it for free.'
I was elated. I asked him, ‘Where are you?' He replied, ‘Near Copenhagen . . .'

              
“After him, similar offers came in from six more boats.

              
“In the end, we arrived safely at the Kishon port. Five years later, I visited Cherbourg again, and I received a warm welcome. The French said, ‘You fled, but you got us amazing publicity. Because of you, the Greeks and the Iranians bought missile boats from us, and the engine company got lots of orders too.'”

The war of attrition along the Suez Canal claims many casualties on both sides. The Soviet Union, determined to regain her lost prestige in the Arab world, supplies Egypt with state-of-the-art military equipment—tanks, aircraft, missiles and electronic installations.

O
n the night of December 26, 1969, three IAF Super Frelon helicopters crossed the Gulf of Suez into Egypt and landed on the sands of Ras Gharib. After setting down behind enemy lines, a company of paratroopers set out, in total silence, for its destination, launching one of the most imaginative operations ever conceived by the IDF.

These were the days of the war of attrition, which had broken out following the Six Day War. Israel controlled Sinai, and the core of the conflict was an endless duel between the IDF and the Egyptian Army along the length of the Suez Canal: artillery bombardments, commando raids, operations deep in Egypt, aerial battles, ambushes and planting of mines. The number of Israeli losses constantly grew. The Egyptians had replaced the military equipment destroyed in the war with a massive supply of sophisticated Soviet weaponry. New tanks and troop carriers, MiG aircraft, ground-to-air missiles and sophisticated radar stations had all arrived from the USSR. Over and over again, the Israeli Air Force attacked the radar stations, which disrupted its planes' freedom of action in the skies over Egypt.

In particular, the air force was troubled by a P-12 radar station that was among the most sophisticated ever built by the Soviet Union, capable of detecting aircraft flying at very low altitudes. The station was spotted in Ras Gharib, at a secure, protected site, and was attacked by the IAF in mid-October. The attack was successful, and the station was completely destroyed. But a few days later, to the Israelis' surprise, it turned out that the station continued to operate; air force experts realized that they had blown up a dummy station built to deceive them, and that the real station was in fact operating at another site hidden in the desert.

On December 22, the IAF conducted a photo-reconnaissance mission in the area. Two sergeants from the Technical Services Unit of the intelligence department were charged with deciphering the images. Sergeant Rami Shalev, who reviewed the photo sequences, recounted, “Suddenly, as I was going through them, I found it! I locked in on the real Ras Gharib radar station. I said to myself, You have a radar station here.” The facility was very well camouflaged, resembling two Bedouin tents in the heart of the desert. They were, in fact, two huge containers installed on Russian ZiL trucks. The station was neither defended nor secured; an Egyptian military installation containing a mortar battery was located just a few kilometers to the north. Antiaircraft guns had not been placed in the area around the station, apparently in order not to draw attention. By contrast, a force of roughly fifty Egyptian soldiers was positioned around the decoy station that had been bombed, equipped with machine guns and antiaircraft artillery.

First Lieutenant Yechiel Haleor, from the Technical Services Unit, brought the images to Colonel Yeshayahu Barkat, the head of the aerial-intelligence department. The head of IAF operations, Colonel David Ivry, was also present at the meeting. Barkat instructed Haleor to prepare an “objectives sheet,” including the geographical coordinates for bombing the station.

Haleor asked, “Why bomb if we can take?”

Haleor's remark fired up his commanders' imaginations. “To take”—to swipe an entire radar station from under the nose of the Egyptians
and bring it to Israel! But would it be possible to transport an entire station over the Gulf of Suez—two heavy containers and a tall antenna? The station was a fifteen-minute helicopter ride from Sinai, then under Israeli control. Ivry called for an assessment of whether helicopters could carry out the task. On December 24, Major Nehemiah Dagan, the commander of the Sikorsky (“Yassour”) wing in the helicopter squadron, informed him that it was feasible. At the time, there were only three Yassours that could carry out the operation—new Sikorsky helicopters that had just arrived in Israel. Dagan estimated that if the radar station's two containers were separated, it would be possible to lift them with the helicopters and bring them to Israeli territory. According to early estimates, the weight of the main container, the “heart” of the station, was approximately four tons. Going by the book, the Yassour was capable of lifting roughly three. The weight of the second container was lower, about two and a half tons.

Air Force Commander Motti Hod transmitted the proposal to Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev, who assigned the ground operation to the paratroopers. A computer spit out its name: Operation Rooster 53. The head of the 50th Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Arieh (“Tzidon”) Tzimmel, was appointed the operation's commander.

Tzimmel assembled the raid force using two types of fighters: those with battle experience, the majority of them officers, and soldiers with technical skills who would be able to detach the radar station's two containers from the truck platforms on which they were placed, break the connections between them and take down the antenna.

Eliezer (“Cheetah”) Cohen, one of the air force's most senior helicopter pilots, turned to First Sergeant Ezra, a radar expert, and told him that he was looking for a model that the helicopter pilots could use for training.

“Why do you need a model when you have a Russian radar at the ready?” Ezra asked. Located at the Tzrifin base among Israel's captured enemy equipment was a Russian radar container taken during the Six Day War; although its parts were out of date, its size and shape were identical to those of a P-12. Cohen, Ezra and the paratroopers' deputy
commander, Levi Hofesh, hurried to Tzrifin. Instead of turning to the quartermaster general of the IDF and getting tangled up in bureaucracy, as well as the potential leak of the secret, the three called a tow truck and “stole” the container. It was transported to an air force base, and two Yassour pilots, Nehemiah Dagan and Ze'ev Matas, along with their crews, trained at tethering it to the helicopters and lifting it up.

At the same time, the paratroopers were practicing the capture and dismantling of the radar station. They received wrenches that fit the Russian standards, technical scissors for cutting the cables and connections, oxygen tanks and welding devices in the event that the scissors didn't work. Martin Leibovich, a company sergeant major for the 50th Battalion, was called by his company commander, who blindfolded him and drove him by jeep to one of the airfield's most distant runways. When the blindfold was removed, Leibovich saw before him a soldier from the Ordnance Corps standing next to large oxygen tanks. The soldier kept loudly declaring that he wouldn't be going on the mission because he was a
jobnik
, or pencil pusher. Leibovich took on the role. “I became the locksmith of the operation,” he said later. In addition to Ezra and Leibovich, several technical experts were also attached to the mission, as well as a young man who knew how to drive a Russian ZiL truck, in case it was decided to move the trucks with the containers to the canal shore. All these preparations were completed in twenty-four hours.

The following night, three Super Frelons crossed the Gulf of Suez and unloaded their cargo—sixty-six commandos—close to the radar station. There was a full moon out, and so the paratroopers wore light-colored clothes and wrapped their weapons in light-colored fabric, in order to blend into the sand. They spotted the station site close to an oil rig nearby and reached it at a brisk walk, and later by crawling. They split into a blocking force and an attacking force, and charged at the station. An Egyptian guard opened automatic gunfire on them, and a second joined in. After a brief battle, the paratroopers took control of the installation, killing two soldiers and capturing four; three other Egyptians got away. In the bunker and tent next to the station, the paratroopers found detailed files and guidebooks about how to operate the electronic equipment.

They then began dismantling the installation, but the work stretched on. The wrenches didn't fit; the scissors proved completely useless. Eventually, the welding devices were used, but the cables connecting the two caravans needed to be taken apart one at a time. The antenna, held in place on a sturdy steel base, reached a height of almost seventy feet, and it refused to move from its place until several paratroopers climbed on top and used the weight of their bodies to bring it down. The dismantling process, which was supposed to take thirty minutes, lasted more than an hour. At the same time, IAF Skyhawks were attacking Egyptian targets in the Gulf of Suez as a diversionary tactic. The work finally ended, and, at 2:45
A.M
., the first Yassour appeared, flown by Dagan. The main container was then tied on with a “hammock,” a special sling, and Dagan slowly rose up above the site. At that moment, he realized that the precise weight of the container was beyond expectations: 4.1 tons. The Yassour was built to carry a weight of up to just three tons. But the helicopter lifted off anyway, and the soldiers on the ground cheered with excitement.

The battle is over; the radar is in the paratroopers' hands.

(Zvi Malik, IDF Archive)

The enthusiasm spread to the senior commanders waiting on the other side of the gulf, but that feeling faded away quickly and was replaced by deep anxiety. Inside the helicopter's cockpit, red lights started blinking and sirens wailing. Dagan reported that one of the two hydraulic systems installed on the helicopter had become completely inoperable. It appeared that the cables harnessing the load had become too tightly strung because of the excess weight and had crushed the oil tube, which had spilled oil that damaged the helicopter's hydraulic drive system. According to the operating manual, Dagan had to dump the cargo immediately; otherwise he was risking a fatal accident. But Dagan decided to carry on. From the command post on the Israeli beach in Sinai, the commanders followed him with bated breath. They understood the risk he was taking on, continuing to fly with a load much heavier than the Yassour was capable of carrying, and with just one functioning hydraulic system. “The aircraft was shaking,” Dagan recounted. “But we crossed the Gulf of Suez, and we immediately landed on the sand.”

Simultaneously, Matas was reaching his destination, loading the second container which was lighter—and the antenna, and starting on his way. Over the Gulf, the Yassour bounced around violently, but Matas kept control and he, too, arrived safely. The three Super Frelons landed next to the defunct radar station and returned the commandos to Israeli territory.

Upon their return, the paratroopers were received by Raful Eitan, who told them about a similar mission carried out by British commandos during the Second World War. The soldiers had landed on a German base in France but brought back only a few components of a radar station, and many were killed. Israel's air force and paratroopers had obtained an intact radar station, without losses—the only operation of its kind in the world. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan sent two bottles of champagne to the commander of the helicopter squadron, a gift to the team.

The secret surrounding the mission was kept for a few days, until it was published by London's
Daily Express
. In the Israeli newspapers,
which were submitted to strict military censorship, cartoons appeared showing Israeli helicopters transporting the pyramids and the Sphinx.

IAF experts analyzed the radar systems and learned the principles of the Soviet methods. On the basis of their findings, they then developed new methods of electronic combat. The radar secrets were also revealed to the Americans.

Dagan was honored with a Medal of Distinguished Service, and Chief of Staff Bar-Lev told the paratroopers who had participated in the missions, “You performed one of the most complicated, daring, impressive actions the IDF has ever carried out.”

   
NEHEMIAH DAGAN, COMBAT PILOT

          
“The first two Yassours arrived from America in September, and within a month we were deeply immersed in the war of attrition. We trained there—four pilots and fifty mechanics. I was appointed commander of the Yassour wing within the Frelon squadron.

              
“They called me from headquarters and talked to me about lifting a radar container. Officially, I could have lifted two-point-nine tons with a Yassour. We trained only for one day, Ze'evik Matas and me, at lifting a radar container. They told me, ‘A radar container weighs three-point-two tons.' I said, ‘Look, guys, this is heavier.' They replied, ‘Nehemiah, don't wear us out with your problems.'

              
“We didn't have night-vision devices, so we needed moonlight, and we came in flying low. I feared that there would be problems with tying up the container, that it would be installed too high on the truck bed. But we discovered that the truck had been dug into the ground, and I could hover practically at surface level.