"Non-Germans" Under the Third Reich (138 page)

85.
DJ
(1934): 64.

86.
E. R. Huber, “Anm. zur Entscheidung des Sondergerichts Darmstadt,”
JW
(1934): 1747.

87.
Cf. Hoche, “Grundsätze, Aufbau und Verwaltung des nationalsozialistischen Staates” (1934), 3: “Even though—as was unavoidable with a measure decreed on the basis of art. 48, par. 2 of the Reich constitution—this order only invalidated basic rights ‘until further notice,’ in actual fact it has invalidated these basic rights for good. For basic rights that automatically afford the individual firm areas of freedom from state influence are incompatible with the totalitarian principle of the National Socialist state”; see also OVG of October 10, 1940,
RVerwBl
. (1941): 56. For further details, see Stolleis,
Gemeinwohlformeln im nationalsozialstischen Recht
, 242 ff.: “Seen from the point of view of the weltanschauung of the Third Reich, the individual rights of the subject, with all that is inherent in this concept of liberal science, will not be recognized, since National Socialism takes the view that the individual is a member of the state organism, with no position other than within the state, and therefore has no right to make a legal claim against the state based on such a position.”

88.
For an account of the tacit abolition of basic rights, see Kluge and Krüger,
Verfassung und Verwaltung
, 165; for further details, see Echterhölter,
Das öffentliche Recht im Nationalsozialismus
, 26 ff.

89.
Cf. Poetzsch-Heffter, Ule, and Dernedde,
Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts
, 1 ff., 265.

90.
Special Court (SG), Hamburg,
DRiZ
(1935), no. 553, regarding the religious liberty of Jehovah’s Witnesses.

91.
Schmitt, “Ein Jahr nationalsozialistischer Verfassungsstaat” (1934), 27; Poetzsch-Heffter, Ule, and Dernedde,
Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts
, 1 ff., 265; initially, judicial proceedings were quite correctly based on the assumption of the continuing validity of the Weimar Constitution, insofar as this was not formally invalidated (Supreme Court for Civil Cases, 1939, 396; 143, 107, 145, 373 f.; 147, 253; Supreme Court for Criminal Cases, 67, 130, 221; Reich Supreme Court,
JW
[1934]: 767;
DR
[1939]: 1785; OVG 91, 136; Württemberg State [Superior] Administrative Court, May 16, 1933,
RVerwBl.
[1934]: 979; Thüringen Administrative Supreme Court, January 16, 1935,
DVerw
[1935]: 148); increasingly, however, the courts represented the view that even those articles not expressly abrogated were to be considered as “effectively” invalid (Supreme Court for Civil Cases [Reichsgericht], 142, 393; Special Court, Hamburg, of March 15, 1935,
RVerwBl.
[1935]: 700; and Special Court, Schwerin, verdict of March 15, 1935,
JW
[1935]: 2082; Special Court, Breslau, of April 27, 1935,
DRiZ
[1935]: 440). To a certain extent, the question of the continuing validity of the Weimar Constitution was left open (Supreme Court for Civil Cases, 69, 345; Prussian Administrative Supreme Court, Hamburg,
RVerwBl
. [1938]: 253) or it was interpreted from the “standpoint of the … political goals of the National Socialist state” (Württemberg VGH [State Superior Administrative Court],
DVerw
[1938]: 126; State Superior Court, Jena,
ZAKfDtRecht
[1938]: 712; OVG,
DVerw
[1936]: 128; OVG, 100, 325; Sächsen Administrative Supreme Court,
Jahrbuch
[1939], 7); thereby the courts tacitly nullified its continued validity on both grounds (cf. Reich Administrative Court, September 3, 1942,
DR
[1943]: 660). For more details on the position of the administration of justice, see Echterhölter,
Das öffentliche Recht im Nationalsozialismus
, 164 f.

92.
State Court of Appeals, Dresden,
JW
(1935): 1949.

93.
Special Court, Hamburg,
RVerwBl
(1935): 700; BadVGH,
DVerw
(1938): 503.

94.
Schmitt, “Ein Jahr nationalsozialistischer Verfassungsstaat,” 27: “It therefore goes without saying that any exploration of the question of the creation of the [new] constitution must begin with the simple phrase: the Weimar Constitution is no longer valid.”

95.
In any case, the basic rights of the Weimar Constitution not specified in the order of February 28, 1933, were later rendered de facto null and void by a series of regulations. For more on the nullification of a guaranteed legal authority (art. 105) see the Law on the Establishment of the People’s Court of April 24, 1934 (
RGBl.
I 340), the July 3, 1934 (
RGBl.
I 529), Law on the Suppression of Treasonable Attacks of June 30 and July 1–2, 1934 (Röhm putsch), and the so-called Decree on the Competence of the Courts (
Zuständigkeitsverordnung
) of February 21, 1940 (
RGBl
, I 405). For more on the nullification of the principle
nulla poena sine lege
(art. 116), cf. sec. 2 of the Penal Code following the Penal Code Amendment Law of 1935, see, further, Gürtner and Freisler,
Das Neue Strafrecht
(1936), 77; for more on the nullification of professional and commercial freedom (art. 151), see Echterhölter,
Das öffentliche Recht im Nationalsozialismus
, 37 ff., with details of all the individual regulations. Employee participation was de facto annulled by secs. 2 and 5, par. 1, of the Law for the Regulation of National Labor of January 20, 1934 (
RGBl.
I 45) since it stipulated that “the works leader … was responsible for all decisions concerning the running of the enterprise” and only a shop steward acting in an advisory capacity would be allowed in the place of the works commission. For an account of the abrogation of the freedom of religious association (art. 137), see Special Court, Darmstadt, of March 26, 1934 (
JW
[1934]: 1747), which had still affirmed the validity of art. 137 WRV for the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Contrast with the State Court of Appeals, Dresden,
JW
(1935): 1949. The Reich Supreme Court declared art. 137 WRV still valid but justified a ban on religious communities “where these were irreconcilable with the order of the state” (
JW
[1935]: 3378).

96.
For further details, see Fraenkel,
Der Doppelstaat
, 40 ff., with numerous examples from judicial proceedings.

97.
For an account of the concept of equality in the Weimar period, see Anschütz,
Die Verfassung des deutschen Reiches
, 14th ed., 521 ff.; Triepel,
Goldbilanzenverordnung und Vorzugsaktien
(1924); Leibholz,
Die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz
(1925); Aldag,
Die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz in der Reichsverfassung
(1924); Kaufmann, “Die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz” (1926); Rümelin,
Die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz
(1928); Bindewald,
Der Gleichheitsgedanke im Rechtsstaat der Gegenwart
(1931), with numerous examples; Huber, “Bedeutungswandel der Grundrechte” (1932), 1 ff. (30 ff.); Nef,
Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit
(1941).

98.
Reuß, “Partei und Staat im Dritten Reich” (1935); H. O. Ziegler, “Autoritärer und totaler Staat,”
AöR
, NF, 24, 122 ff.; W. Frick,
Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts
, vol. 22, 25 (“authority of the total state”); Lammers, “Die Staatsführung im Dritten Reich” (1934); Gerber,
Staatsrechtliche Grundlinien des neuen Reiches
, 26 f.; Schmitt,
Staat, Bewegung, Volk
, 33 f., 46; E. R. Huber,
AöR
, NF, 24, 250 (discussed in Leibholz,
Die Auflösung der liberalen Demokratie in Deutschland
[1933]). For an account of the total incorporation of the individual in the Nazi, see Kirchheimer, “Die Rechtsordnung des Nationalsozialismus” (1971), 356 ff.; Fraenkel,
Der Doppelstaat
, 82 ff., with examples.

99.
Reuß, “Partei und Staat im Dritten Reich,” with a discussion of the book by Meißner and Kaisenberg,
Staats- und Verfassungsrecht im Dritten Reich
, in which he explains: “The total state also contains …
in nuce
the demand for a total domination of the mind” and “affects the entire content of social existence” (Scheuner, “Die nationale Revolution,” 203–4); in this respect see also Ziegler, “Autoritärer und totaler Staat,”
AöR
, NF, 24, 122 ff.

100.
AG, Berlin-Lichterfelde,
Das Recht
(1935), no. 8015; AG, Hamburg,
Das Recht
(1935), no. 8016; AG, Wilster,
JW
(1938): 1264;
Sondergericht
Breslau,
DRiz
(1935), no. 554; AG, Frankfurt/M.-Höchst,
DR
(1937): 466.

101.
Krüger, “Volksgemeinschaft statt subjektiver Rechte” (1935), 57 ff.; Kirchheimer, “Die Rechtsordnung des Nationalsozialismus,” 356 ff. (370).

102.
O. Dietrich: “The individual, according to today’s teaching, has neither the right nor the duty to exist, for all rights and duties derive initially from the community” (
Völkischer Beobachter
, December 11, 1937).

103.
Hitler,
Mein Kampf
(1939), 436 ff.

104.
Siebert, “Gemeinschaft und bürgerliches Recht” (1934) (“Rather than killing off the individual, the community raises him to a higher level”); in this respect see also von Scheurl, “Grundsätze deutscher Verwaltung” (1934).

105.
Huber, “Bedeutungswandel der Grundrechte” (1932); Dennewitz,
Das nationale Deutschland, ein Rechtsstaat
(1933), 28 f.; Kluge and Krüger,
Verfassung und Verwaltung
, 159 ff.; no. 1.4: “National Socialism safeguards property, equality, religious freedom, but always in relation to the community…. Justice ends with the protection of the national community; injustice begins with the infringement of its interests.”

106.
Kluge and Krüger,
Verfassung und Verwaltung
, 356.

107.
Vogel,
Vom Wesen des ständischen Rechts
(1937), 3 ff.

108.
Lammers, “Staatsführung im Dritten Reich,” 9 ff., 13.

109.
Scheuner, “Der Gleichheitsgedanke,” 253, 255; Huber, “Bedeutungswandel der Grundrechte,” 1 ff., 30 ff., 34 ff.; Dennewitz,
Das nationale Deutschland, ein Rechtsstaat
, 26 ff.; Krüger, “Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungswirklichkeit” (1943).

110.
Scheuner, “Der Gleichheitsgedanke,” 253; Lammers, “Staatsführung im Dritten Reich,” 9 ff.; Schmitt,
Staat, Bewegung, Volk
(1933), 46; Koellreuter,
Volk und Staat
, in particular 9, 16 ff.; Höhn, “Form und Formalismus im Rechtsleben.”

111.
Huber, “Bedeutungswandel der Grundrechte,” 30, 32 ff., 79 ff., 89 ff., 93 ff.

112.
Cf. instead of many others Hegel,
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts
(1955), 207 f., 212 f. (secs. 257 ff.); Hegel,
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte
(1961), 87 f.

113.
Krüger, “Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungswirklichkeit,” 228; and the sources mentioned in introduction, III, 1, of this volume (“The Führer Principle”). The same view was expressed by the Reich Supreme Court in its judgment of September 8 and 22, 1938 (
JW
[1938]: 2955 ff.), which stated that even though many measures (taken by the state) gave “the impression” that “the state does not act in accordance with justice and legality, but arbitrarily,” this could be ruled out for the simple reason that “the state … is the arbiter of its own justice”; cf. Fraenkel,
Der Doppelstaat
, 89, 93.

114.
Best,
Jahrbuch der Akademie für Deutsches Recht
(1937), 132 ff., 132.

115.
Huber, “Bedeutungswandel der Grundrechte,” 30, 32 f., 91 ff.

116.
“One side of the triangle is formed by the ‘Labor Front.’ This is the social community, where there are no classes, where everyone helps everyone else. Here, everyone feels safe, receiving the community’s support and advice, engaging in its leisure activities. Here, everyone is valued equally highly. Here, equality prevails…. The second side is that of the professional organization. Here, the individual is ranked separately and called upon to work for the community according to his abilities and qualities. Here, skill is the deciding factor. Here, people are valued according to their skills…. The third side is formed by the Party, which through one or other of its many organizations embraces every German who is not in some way unworthy. In the Party, everyone is called upon to take part in the leadership of the nation. Here, devotion and strength of will are decisive. Here, every Party comrade is equal, but he must accept the rank accorded him, which is immutable” (Rauschning,
Gespräche mit Hitler
, 178 ff.).

117.
For further details see Scheuner, “Der Gleichheitsgedanke,” 250, 253, 255, 259 f.

118.
Ibid., 275 f.

119.
Speech by Hitler to the congress of the German Workers’ Front on May 10, 1933, quoted in Scheuner, “Die nationale Revolution,” 261 ff., 270 n. 23.

120.
Ibid., 270.

121.
Kluge and Krüger,
Verfassung und Verwaltung:
“To be a national comrade (
Volksgenosse
) does not mean one has inalienable rights”; rather it is “a responsibility and a duty”; rights derive from this only as an “assertion of equality of duty” of all other national comrades (164). For an account of the individual as the bearer of duties (“special tasks”), see Vogel,
Vom Wesen des ständischen Rechts
, 16 ff., 19 ff.

122.
The duties in question were military service (sec. 1, WehrG of May 21, 1935), personal duty of commitment (Reich Requisition Law of July 13, 1938,
RGBl.
I 887; in the version of September 1, 1939,
RGBl.
I 1639, 1645), duty of service for tasks of special national importance (order of February 13, 1939,
RGBl.
I 206), labor service duty, air raid protection (Law on Air Raid Precautions of 26 June 1935,
RGBl.
I 827), duty to provide assistance in accidents (sec. 330c
Penal Code
), fire protection duty (law of November 23, 1938,
RGBl.
I 1662), “preferential charges” (contributions for special services), and “community levies” (taxes and charges). In addition there was the “moral” obligation to deliver, to collect funds, to donate, etc. (Kluge and Krüger,
Verfassung und Verwaltung
, 357 f.).