One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power (26 page)

A test of the fleet's ability to conduct advanced base operations, FP XVIII (April–May 1937) required Black (U.S.) to recapture the Hawaiian Islands and Johnston Island from White (Japan) as the initial phase of an offensive across the Pacific.
⁵⁸
Although naval aviation played a role in all of the problem's six “periods,” it was particularly important in two.

Period 2 (23–25 April), a joint Army-Navy exercise, tested the defenses of Hawaii and the effectiveness of independent carrier operations. On the 23rd, fleet aircraft conducted surprise reconnaissance and attacks across Oahu, while a strong task force
subjected the island of Hawaii to a combined air-surface bombardment, followed by a successful simulated landing. Meanwhile, defending patrol bombers attempted to locate the main body of the attacking fleet, while the Air Corps responded vigorously to the air attacks. As, once again, no agreement had been made on how to assess casualties during air combats, no results were declared. The following day, defending reconnaissance aircraft located the fleet as it approached Oahu. A series of air attacks on the fleet followed, during which Army airmen claimed considerable success, but did not prevent the fleet from executing major raids across Oahu by carrier aircraft and battleship-cruiser floatplanes, providing cover for the approach of a simulated landing force and its escorts. The maneuvers ended before a “landing” could take place. Both Army and Navy commanders expressed their satisfaction with the exercises, but no major recommendations resulted and no formal report seems to have been made.

The most important phase of the problem was Period 4 (4–9 May), a Black offensive against White bases in the Hawaiian chain. White's Vice Admiral William T. Tarrant had
Ranger
(74 aircraft), two seaplane tenders, plus battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, while Black's Admiral Claude C. Bloch, among the least imaginative of the Navy's senior officers, had
Lexington
and
Saratoga
(162 aircraft) and three aircraft tenders, and was roughly equal to White in other combatants.

ComAirRons Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne urged Bloch to use his carriers to build two fast task forces, to seek the enemy's carrier, arguing that “once an enemy carrier is within striking distance of our Fleet no security remains until it, its squadrons, or both, are destroyed, and our carriers, if with the main body, are at a tremendous initial disadvantage in conducting necessary operations.”
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Bloch, wishing to provide air cover for his main body and believing carriers highly vulnerable to air attack, disregarded Horne, limiting the carriers to reconnaissance, screening, and fleet defense, thus losing the benefit of their very high speed. In contrast, although not an aviator, Vice Admiral Tarrant, acting on the advice of his air chief, Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, decided to operate
Ranger
autonomously.

On 4 May White was spread throughout the Hawaiian chain, with seaplane tenders stationed at several islands from Midway to Hawaii. Black was concentrated about one hundred miles southwest of Midway, near the 180th meridian, formed into two task forces, a main body with
Lexington
and the bulk of the fleet, and an expeditionary force, including
Saratoga
, carrying Marines to capture Midway. Both sides initiated aggressive air patrols.

White flying boats detected the Black main body very early on the 4th, ascertaining its speed and course. Meanwhile, the Black expeditionary force reached Midway, conducted air and gunnery attacks, landed Marines, and on the 5th an aircraft tender began operations. On the 6th, Bloch dispatched
Lexington
, an aircraft tender, and a small force to capture French Frigate Shoals. White's aggressive air patrolling paid
off, and by mid-morning Tarrant had a clear picture of the location and strength of the Black main body and began to make movements accordingly. Meanwhile, around noon, Black's
Lexington
Task Force captured French Frigate Shoals, though White resistance resulted in serious damage to the carrier.

By mid-morning on the 7th, as the
Lexington
Task Force rejoined the Black main body, reconnaissance contacts between the two fleets became more frequent. By 1320 the two fleets were close enough for Black battleships to open fire on White heavy cruisers, initiating a long-range skirmish that lasted several hours. White's carrier
Ranger
, operating autonomously, provided support to the surface forces, heavily damaging
Saratoga
and some of Black's transports. Overnight, White essayed several well-executed cruiser-destroyer attacks, with patrol bombers taking advantage of moonrise to make low altitude strike. Black's losses were heavy, with an aircraft tender and eight other vessels “sunk” and both carriers, two battleships, and four other ships taking varying degrees of damage, while White suffered several heavy cruisers and destroyers damaged.

At 0441 on the 8th, a general battleline action began, lasting for about an hour. As the battleships exchanged fire, White patrol bombers attempted several attacks, but were badly handled by Black carrier fighters. Though White inflicted heavy damage on Black, leaving
Lexington
in almost sinking condition, it suffered in turn, “losing” the surface action. Breaking off, White retired on Lahaina Roads, while conducting patrol bomber attacks against the new Black base at French Frigate Shoals. The problem was declared at an end at noon.

Critiquing the exercise, Admiral Bloch praised the work of carrier aircraft in scouting and defending against White patrol bombers and submarines, but made scant mention of their offensive potential.
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Defending his decision to keep the carriers close to the battleline, he asserted that by being with the main body they benefited from “mutual support,” noting that “75% of the damaged assessed on
Lexington
was due to gun and torpedo fire,” which hardly proves his point. Discussing Admiral Horne's proposal to use the carriers independently, drawing their security from their high speed, evasive tactics, and offensive ability, he asserted that “evasive tactics” would result “in a private war between the opposing air forces, often with complete disregard of the part of the air forces were intended to play in the furtherance of the plans” of the Fleet Commander. He further claimed that “evasive tactics were fallacious and untenable” against tender-based or shore-based long-range aircraft, an odd assertion given that he had just praised the performance of his carrier aircraft for their role in the defense of the fleet against those threats. While Bloch was right about the vulnerability of carriers to air attack, he failed to recognize that the best way to secure the fleet—and one's own carriers—from air attack was to ensure the loss of the enemy's carriers.

Horne made some valuable recommendations on the need for all-weather carrier aircraft, increased training in night air operations, improved availability of aviation fuel, and, naturally, greater autonomy for carriers.
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Other observers noted that the new PBY patrol bombers had been less effective than expected in long-range mass attacks, but excellent for reconnaissance.

This Fleet Problem is the only one for which there is a hint of command interference in a dissenting opinion. Aviation officers later claimed that “after the exercise, when Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne . . . circulated a paper calling for independent carrier operations, Admiral Bloch had him recall all copies.” This assertion cannot be proven, but suggests a high degree of dissatisfaction with Bloch's handling of the critique.
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Certainly, Bloch's appointment as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet in January 1938 probably came as a shock to naval airmen.

FP XIX (March–April 1938) was a general test of the fleet's abilities, held in several parts.
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For Part II, Black had to concentrate off Southern California, defended by White. Black, commanded by Vice Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, had
Lexington
and
Saratoga
, six battleships, and various other vessels. Kalbfus spurned the advice of his friend Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, who commanded the two carriers, and formed two task forces, each of a carrier, three battleships, and some cruisers and destroyers, approaching Southern California from the northwest and south, respectively. In contrast White's Vice Admiral Tarrant, as he had done the previous year, built a task force around
Ranger
, put his four battleships in a supporting role, and reserved his strong contingent of PBYs for offensive operations.

The outcome was decidedly in White's favor. At the start of the maneuvers, on 16 March, Tarrant sent the
Ranger
Task Force northwest from San Diego–San Pedro, following with his slower battleships. Contact occurred on the 17th, and aircraft from
Ranger
promptly hit
Lexington
, an attack followed immediately with a mass strike by thirty-six PBYs, which put the Black carrier out of action. Soon afterward, White's battleships caught
Saratoga
and, despite her much greater speed, promptly sank her.

The sides were reorganized for Part V (25–30 March), which postulated that after a major defeat by Blue (Japan), Red (U.S.) had regrouped to defend Hawaii. Blue, under Kalbfus, had most of the fleet, three carriers, nine battleships, and so forth. In contrast, Red had only four cruisers, some two dozen destroyers, fourteen submarines, and about seventy-two PBYs, including those assigned to the 14th Naval District, and, on paper, Army aircraft based in Hawaii. Having learned from his experience in Part II, Blue commander Kalbfus listened to King, who planned a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor. King directed
Saratoga
to the northwest of Hawaii, and then, running in behind a convenient weather front, the carrier launched an attack very early on 29 March from one hundred miles north of the island, hitting local air bases with devastating effect.
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While the air attacks were under way,
Saratoga
ran in
closer to shore, to facilitate recovery of the aircraft, which was completed by 0835. Quickly refueling and rearming his fighters, King had enough of them airborne in time to beat off a counterattack by PBYs from Oahu, which suffered heavily.
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This set the stage for successful Blue landings on Oahu.

Part IX (25–28 April), postulated a Purple (Japan) offensive bypassing Hawaii to hit the Green (U.S.) West Coast, at a time when the bulk of Green's fleet was otherwise occupied; although the attacking fleet was larger, the scenario was similar to that of FP XIV, though with decidedly different results. Purple, under Kalbfus, had
Saratoga, Lexington
, and
Ranger
, plus battleships and some surrogate battle cruisers, cruisers, and destroyers. Including surrogates, Green was somewhat stronger in surface combatants and had some submarines, all based primarily at San Pedro and Mare Island, plus fifty-four flying boats on the West Coast and seventy-two in Hawaii, and a constructive “main body” near the southern end of Baja California.

Kalbfus again released the carriers to King for independent operations, and before dawn on 28 April they “raided” Mare Island, and then eluded pursuing Green destroyers, taking little damage. The raid drew the Green battle fleet northward from the San Pedro area, into an ambush by Purple's surface forces, supported by the carriers that had moved south at high speed, bringing the problem to an end.

Twice during FP XIX fast carrier task forces had executed surprise raids on major bases, Pearl Harbor and Mare Island, providing “excellent experience . . . in planning and executing a fast carrier task force attack against shore objectives.”
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FP XX (20–27 February 1939) assumed that White, a European fascist power, had secured a foothold in the Lesser Antilles, sparking a response from Black (U.S.).
⁶⁷
The problem was the first to involve four carriers,
Lexington, Ranger, Yorktown
, and
Enterprise
. As a result, while the fleet was concentrating in the Caribbean, Vice Admiral Ernest J. King conducted special maneuvers in the use of large carrier task forces; this was the largest concentration of American carriers to operate together until October 1943.
⁶⁸

For the Fleet Problem, Black's Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, an aviator, had
Ranger
plus five aircraft tenders as well as several battleships and cruisers, and numerous destroyers, auxiliaries, and a contingent of Marines; White's Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus had
Lexington, Yorktown
, and
Enterprise
plus about the same proportion of surface combatants, as well as numerous submarines, and target ship
Utah
, a surrogate for a troop convoy, with the mission of reinforcing the White foothold in the Lesser Antilles. In the air, White was stronger in attack aircraft, with some 220 carrier planes plus some 48 battleship and cruiser floatplanes, but Black had more aircraft overall—72 carrier planes, nearly 60 floatplanes, 102 PBYs, and 62 land-based Marine aircraft.

Both Admirals made air power the central focus of their plans, each in his own way. Andrews, an aviator, deciding that his objective was the destruction of the
White fleet, held the bulk of his fleet southwest of Puerto Rico, covered by patrol bombers based there, in Haiti, and the Virgin Islands, and formed a cruiser scouting line, backed by
Ranger
, to probe for the enemy planning to bring about a day surface action within range of his carrier and patrol bombers. In contrast, Kalbfus planned to keep out of reach of Black's air force, to concentrate on getting his convoy through, but was willing to use it as “bait” to entice enemy action. He placed the convoy and
Lexington
ahead of his battle fleet, with his second carrier between the battleships and the bait, and his third carrier covering the exposed right flank of the fleet as it advanced into the Caribbean. He reasoned that if Black committed its air power against the convoy, his carriers would be able to protect it, while reducing enemy air resources; and should Black surface forces intervene, his air forces would punish them while he brought up his battleships. Although relatively creative, Kalbfus' plan elicited objections from Vice Admiral Ernest J. King, overall air commander, who wanted to use the carriers more aggressively.