One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power (43 page)

NOTES

    
1
.
  
For more details of ships and of carrier designs see the author's
U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983), and Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark Mandeles,
American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999). For British development see also this author's
British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and Their Aircraft
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press and London: Conway Maritime Press, 1988).

    
2
.
  
On 7 October 1915 Captain Mark L. Bristol of the Office of Naval Aeronautics (predecessor of the Bureau of Aeronautics) reported that the British had converted several ships into carriers; he suggested both converting a U.S. merchant ship and considering building a special aircraft ship. Asked for characteristics, the General Board demurred pending the results of the
North Carolina
trials (NARA GB [General Board] 420-7 in RG 80; file 28 October 1915). The General Board was responsible both for war planning (until formation of the OpNav War Plans Division) and (until 1945) for drawing up the characteristics of ships to be built. Given preliminary characteristics, the C&R preliminary design section (and then of its successor the Bureau of Ships) prepared “spring styles” (names after women's clothing styles appearing in the spring) from which the board could choose as a guide to preparing final characteristics. The board also held hearings on characteristics, transcripts of which (almost all from after 1917) have been preserved.

    
3
.
  
GB 420, 17 January 1925, enclosing the report of the special board appointed by the Secretary of the Navy on 23 September 1924 to review the needs of the Navy. The huge number overstated the importance of aircraft. It reflected their rapid development (often a model went from concept to production in a few months), which caused each combatant to buy generation after generation of aircraft. Aircraft were also quickly expended, so vast numbers built reflected much smaller numbers in service at any one time. By way of contrast, World War II was fought by no more than two or three generations of aircraft.

    
4
.
  
The characteristics proposed by the Aviation Division on 23 June 1918 (in GB 420-7, folder 1916–1924) called for a hull at least 700 × 80 feet (about 15,000 tons) with a clear upper deck divided into a 250-foot forward part, a 150-foot amidships part, and a 300-foot after part, its bridge built over the deck so that airplanes could pass underneath, carrying a mast set amidships so as not to interfere with launching aircraft (as yet there was no thought of an island set to one side of the hull). Speed should be at least thirty knots so that the ship could work with battle cruisers. Uptakes should come up to the ends of the superstructure. Aircraft would be stowed, their wings folded, on the two lower decks and carried up to the main deck. Armament would be limited to four 4-inch anti-aircraft guns at the corners of the superstructure (these guns were suggested because they would be powerful enough to deal with both aircraft and with surfaced submarines; no such dual-purpose weapons then existed, but the idea suggests the extent to which a larger number of single-purpose [AA or surface] guns would have complicated the ship's arrangement). A sketch produced by the Bureau of Ordnance (not the constructors) in July 1918 shows a substantial superstructure about three-quarters of the way forward, bridging the upper deck. This seems to have been much the concept embodied in HMS
Furious
, then being rebuilt as a full carrier with separate landing-on and flying-off decks connected by awkward paths (the U.S. solution, the clear path under the bridge, would have been better). The power plant shown was a big diesel, which would produce less exhaust than a steam plant. A seaplane-handling crane is a prominent feature. Formal characteristics for a FY20
carrier, submitted by the General Board on 10 October 1918, repeated much of what the Aviation Division wanted, but called for funnels and masts to be placed out to the sides of the hull, perhaps hinged outboard. The bridge should be a special design, perhaps a fore and aft bridge outboard (i.e., an island) clear of the flight deck. Full speed was now set at thirty-five knots, the speed planned for the new U.S. battle cruisers and scout cruisers. Reviewing the proposed characteristics, Goodall pointed out that the ship should have good underwater protection and protection against cruiser fire, that her guns were too weak, and that she should have a torpedo battery to deal with heavy enemy ships that she might unexpectedly encounter (as she could not possibly fly off aircraft quickly enough). “Although such a ship should not by any means be regarded as a fighting ship, it should be sufficiently powerfully armed to be able to brush aside light vessels of the enemy, so that its machines can be flown off in comparatively advanced positions.” Goodall guessed that she should be about 800 feet long (22,000 tons). By May 1920 characteristics had been rewritten to show sixteen 6-inch/53 (i.e., light cruiser) guns in anti-torpedo (anti-destroyer) batteries, plus one twin torpedo tube on each side. Aviation chief Captain T. T. Craven wanted the ship designed so that “the entire allowance of airplanes can be placed in the air from stowage as quickly as possible.”

    
5
.
  
The 1920 program as drafted in September 1918 envisaged carriers (NARA RG 38: GB [General Board] 420-2, 10 September 1918); in its discussion of auxiliaries the General Board wrote that “the need for airplane carriers of high speed to accompany the fleet for the purpose of extending its scouting area has arisen from the experiences of the present war. The General Board recommends that the design and construction of such vessels be not delayed.” A list of ships to be completed by 30 June 1925 (i.e., by the end of FY25) included six carriers. This paper included a large aircraft program, but it was limited to large seaplanes, dirigibles, and kite-balloons, plus land-based aircraft then being operated in England, Ireland, and France. No carriers were included in the FY20 program. A 12 October 1919 General Board (GB 420-2) summary of future U.S. naval policy called for one carrier per squadron of capital ships, for a total of seven to work with twelve first-line battleships, and sixteen battle cruisers (seven squadrons, four ships each). That is, at this point carriers were envisaged as supporting arms for capital ships. They were still described as auxiliaries, on a par with destroyer and submarine tenders. The October summary ended with a proposed FY21 building program including two carriers (as well as two battleships, a battle cruiser, ten more scout cruisers, and lesser units). The carriers were expected to be expensive: hull and machinery would cost $20 million, compared to $21 million for a battleship or $23 million for a battle cruiser (but the armor and armament of the gun ships would add considerably; total cost for a carrier was $23 million, compared to $39.5 million for a battleship). Nothing was bought. In November 1920, looking toward the FY22 program, the General Board also vigorously pressed for carriers, arguing that “it is now perfectly evident that the Navy skilled in the use of airplanes and well provided with the most modern types will have a great advantage in war over a Navy not trained in their use or not well supplied [with them]. It is not too much to say that the influence of airplanes upon scouting and information gathering duties may revolutionize former naval practice.” On this basis the General Board asked for two to be laid down in FY22 and then one in each of FY23 and FY24 (its recommendations were in the context of a proposed three-year program). In July 1921 the board associated the figure of two with the need for at least one carrier with each fleet, Atlantic and Pacific, urgently recommending that two carriers by authorized in the FY23 program.

    
6
.
  
GB 420-7 File 1916-24, dated 6 May 1920, supporting plans to build fast U.S. carriers. According to the memo, “recent reports” show that the Royal Navy is developing carrier tactics in the Mediterranean with three ships (including the seaplane carrier
Pegasus
), the carrier
Argus
is assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, and a carrier (the seaplane carrier
Ark Royal
)
is assigned to the China Fleet;
Furious
is inactive at Rosyth, and
Hermes
is being completed. Until well into the 1930s the Royal Navy operated the most numerous carrier fleet in the world—but by far not the largest sea-based air arm.

    
7
.
  
The conversion was proposed in May 1920; a converted scout would support a 500 × 60-foot flight deck, and her hangar could accommodate twelve fighters and six torpedo bombers. Increased tonnage would reduce speed from thirty-five to thirty-one knots and the battery would be cut to four 6-inch guns. Conversion plans were submitted on 12 November 1920. The General Board rejected the idea in December 1920.

    
8
.
  
GB (General Board) 420 of 3 February 1921 (in NARA RG 80), calling for a hull 812 × 80 × 30 feet, supporting an 800 × 106-foot flight deck, 46 feet above water. Armament (16 × 6-inch in twin mounts and two triple torpedo tubes) and cruiser-level protection were specified, but not the number of aircraft. However, a 20 November 1920 paper in the same file estimates aircraft capacity for either monoplanes or biplanes, which might be fully or partly assembled (in the hangar). The hangar was to be 290 × 80 feet, i.e., a cavity within the hull rather than a long open space, as in later U.S. carriers, with 45 × 50-foot hatches or elevators at either end. Given assumed airplane dimensions, capacity was estimated. The stowage (hangar) deck could accommodate thirty-five fighters and twenty-three torpedo bombers; half as many again would be carried disassembled in the hold, as replacements for crashed airplanes, for a total of fifty-two fighters and thirty-six torpedo planes. Nothing in these papers suggests any attempt to work out the tactics and hence the ideal numbers of these aircraft. Prior to writing the characteristics, the board issued a memo on carriers, noting that they were a new kind of ship and summarizing British experience. Both the flush-deck
Argus
and the island-equipped HMS
Eagle
had shown excellent results. Their flight decks were 540 × 68 feet and 660 × 100 feet, respectively, and their respective speeds twenty and twenty-four knots. The board noted that HMS
Hermes
had been designed with an island in 1917 before any experience had been gained (it presumably did not know that
Argus
had been tested with a dummy island). In the board's view, none of the British carriers was entirely satisfactory; “it is desired to give the Naval Air Service the highest type of carrier possible with which to experiment in the construction and operation of heavier than air aircraft.” General Board files also include a 20,000-tonner sketched in November 1920 as a basis for discussion: 660 × 69 × 23 feet (20,000 tons) with a flight deck 650 × 86 feet (104 feet over sponsons) and two stowage spaces 125 × 64 feet forward and 300 × 55 feet aft, both with 20-foot clear height, each with one elevator, making thirty knots using cruiser machinery (90,000 SHP). She would have a 5-inch belt, considerable by light cruiser standards, and a 2.5-inch protective deck. Stowage on the handling (hangar) deck was given as forty-eight fighters (sixteen ready for flight) and twenty-four torpedo bombers (eight ready for flight), with 40 percent more aircraft stowed in the hold disassembled (figures were developed by filling the spaces involved with airplane silhouettes). Speed was thirty-five knots.

    
9
.
  
GB 420-7 dated 27 June 1921. C&R had submitted alternative sketches with a flush deck (A) and with an island (B) on 12 May. In support of its island design, the bureau commented that so long a ship might not need a flush deck. It now seemed that a carrier should be able to fly aircraft on and off simultaneously, and the deck was so long that she could do so while leaving a neutral area abeam the island. The bureau also pointed out that a flush-deck carrier presented real design problems, not only of disposing of smoke but also of leading air into the boilers from a position forward of the uptakes, which required ducting that would interfere with the forward elevator and also reduce crew spaces. The need to provide telescoping masts, housing radio masts, search lights, and the like (including a pilot house) might well demand unattractive compromises. The same issues arose when the U.S. Navy tried to build huge flush-decked carriers after World War II. The bureau pointed out that permanent masts would give longer radio
range, an important consideration. These designs had clipper bows carried up to the flight deck, to cut through the waves (i.e., keep the flight deck dry). The forward end of the flight deck was squared off so that both of an airplane's wheels would leave the deck at the same time. The open stern was offered to provide cranes to handle seaplanes (a solution the Royal Navy had already adopted in
Eagle
and
Hermes
); it would be closed by a roller curtain 20 × 30 feet. The bureau doubted that a lee could be created aft for seaplane handling, and it pointed out that the open stern would lead directly into the large unobstructed hangar; in a following sea water might easily pour in. The curtain would provide a degree of safety, but the ship would have to be maneuvered carefully if it was open. An island design could provide a big crane abaft the island. A flush-decker could also have cranes, but they would be more difficult to place. Based on hangar area, the B design would accommodate thirty-eight fighters and nineteen torpedo bombers, the former fully assembled and the latter with wings folded (Type A had slightly less hangar area, due to the ducting for uptakes and downtakes).