One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power (51 page)

The tenor of the board's deliberations demonstrated a shift in the direction the Navy was pursuing. As the board was chartered by Admiral King as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and included a substantial number of Navy members, the former policy could have been preserved or at least the requirements set forth could have impeded development rather than focus the effort on creating an effective weapons system. While the initial test had been arranged by Igor Sikorsky before the board began functioning, the initial meetings, conducted to consider the implications of the test on
Bunker Hill
, demonstrated the synergistic effects of an interagency team. The obstructionism of the Bureau of Aeronautics was transformed into a more constructive conservatism, grounding the project's sound logistic and operational principles. The enthusiasm of the Coast Guard and the Maritime Commission was tempered, avoiding attempts to overstate the effectiveness of the new technology, an all too common fault of advocates of any new weapon system or doctrine. In the end, the board sought to define the doctrinal parameters within which the helicopters would be utilized and to ensure the decisions were made on the ability to operate effectively over the longer term.

The immediate result of these deliberations was to schedule three additional tests. Modern flight tests are still conducted in a “build up” fashion, beginning with familiarization and relatively simple tasks and expanding the operating envelope by stages. This process minimizes the additional risk incurred with each progressively more difficult phase of testing. The design of this series of tests employed this same philosophy. The first test was to be conducted in calm water, replicating Gregory's success on the
Bunker Hill
and familiarizing the new helicopter pilots with the necessary procedures. These airmen would, in turn, conduct further tests. The second phase was designed to explore the effects of ship motion in a seaway on the operability of helicopters. The third phase, what today would be termed operational
test and evaluation, involved conducting operations from a vessel in convoy to and from Europe.
²¹

The merchant vessel SS
James Parker
, the former SS
Panama
, was a troop transport. Fitted with a trapezoidal platform on the stern, she foreshadowed the flight deck configuration of most future vessels operating helicopters.
²²
On a short run from New York to the Virginia Capes, she was the platform for three days of testing in the Chesapeake Bay. The tests were successful in their stated aim with ninety-eight flights completed by the embarked helicopters, the XR-4 used in the original test on
Bunker Hill
and the improved YR-4A version.

The second phase of the tests was conducted aboard MV
Daghestan
, a bulk freighter acquired by the British under Lend-Lease. The “seaway” in question was the Long Island Sound. While the sound has a fearsome reputation as a dangerous body of water in a storm, the sea was smooth for the majority of the test. A team of twenty-six pilots and observers, led by Coast Guard Lieutenant Commander Frank Erickson, conducted over three hundred launches and recoveries in November 1943. The only deficiency noted was one familiar to a later generation of helicopter pilots—starting and stopping the rotor blades in high winds proved difficult or impossible unless the ship maneuvered to reduce the apparent wind over the deck.
²³
The “success” triggered the third and most challenging phase of the test series. The unfortunate choice of the Long Island Sound as the test location would have serious implications for Lieutenant (jg.) Stewart “Stu” Graham, Coast Guard Helicopter Pilot Number Two, who would lead the next effort.

The third phase, an operational test under combat conditions as part of a convoy, followed in January 1944. Stu Graham would embark with the British Helicopter Service Trial Unit and two YR-4B helicopters aboard
Daghestan
. The test proved to be a grueling trial. High sea states, high winds, and convoy doctrine that precluded the
Daghestan
from varying from her assigned course and position in the convoy effectively grounded Graham for all but two days of the voyage. The ship rolled, pitched, and yawed. Her bulk cargo of grain shifted in the hold, giving it a permanent list of 5 degrees. In the end, the helicopters did very little patrolling. The brief windows of opportunity for flying were spent demonstrating that the helicopters could launch and recover under open-sea conditions. The fragile nature of the aircraft and the limited utility due to operational restrictions led the board to recommend that no further ship-based helicopter operations be conducted until a more robust aircraft became available. Admiral Waesche reluctantly agreed, downgrading the R-4, re-designated the HNS-1, to service as a training aircraft. This setback did not dampen Frank Erickson's determination to demonstrate the potential of the helicopter.

Newly promoted and assigned as the Commanding Officer of Air Station Floyd Bennett Field, Commander Frank Erickson continued to apply his drive
and imagination to the development of the helicopter. In December, before the
Daghestan
debacle, the Chief of Naval Operations had directed the establishment of a separate helicopter training program, to be established at Floyd Bennett Field. Erickson found himself in charge of establishing a naval helicopter training program. Having trained Graham and others, he had the credentials. His fertile imagination put in place various innovations. A 40-foot by 69-foot movable platform was developed to simulate ship motion ashore. Pilots could experience worst-case conditions in an environment where a stable landing surface was readily available in the event of mechanical problems or student difficulties. The Royal Navy still maintains a similar device today, used primarily for flight test; while mechanically more sophisticated, it is essentially the same device invented by Erickson and his command.

Erickson had been instrumental in equipping the test aircraft with float-type landing gear. He continued to pursue a variety of other innovations. Under Erickson's direction, and frequently with him at the controls, various new devices were introduced. Development of an autopilot for the HNS-1 was begun in 1944. In a parallel effort, the Hayes dunking sonar, originally developed for blimps, was successfully mated to the XHOS-1 helicopter, the newest Sikorsky variant. In March 1945 the tests were reported complete and successful. Unfortunately by the time an effective antisubmarine helicopter had been developed, the submarine threat in the Atlantic had been extinguished, as would be the Nazi regime that spawned that threat. A sling for carrying a stretcher was demonstrated and a hydraulic rescue hoist was also developed, but the Navy was still not interested in the helicopter as a rescue vehicle. Budget cuts, programmatic cuts, and further delays were on the horizon, but the concept had been proven. It would require further crises to spur further development.

EARLY HELICOPTER OPERATIONS: SOMEONE ELSE'S SOLUTION

Erickson's innovations charted the course for Navy helicopters for over half a century. In possession of these fragile, awkward aircraft, the Bureau of Aeronautics included them in a series of postwar tests. In the changing strategic environment, these tests were part of an effort to demonstrate the capability of the carrier to operate in the arctic regions, where potential crises involving the United States and the Soviet Union were expected to play out. The embarked HNS-1 helicopters, wearing Coast Guard colors and flown by Coast Guard pilots, demonstrated an ability to cope with the extreme conditions. The confluence of events again furthered development of Navy helicopters.

Following the conclusion of World War II, the Coast Guard successfully navigated the delicate passage between operational control of the Navy and its administrative home waters within the Department of the Treasury. In doing so, Coast Guard helicopters also departed the Navy inventory. In response, the Navy acknowledged
the potential of these assets, establishing Helicopter Development Squadron THREE (VX-3) to “study and evaluate the adaptability of helicopters to naval purposes.”
²⁴
The critical fact remained the need to adapt equipment that had not been designed for shipboard operations to that most demanding environment. During the war, the Coast Guard leadership had been skeptical of the Navy's commitment to rescue operations. It proved to be an inaccurate assessment in the long term. Plane guard, providing an airborne alert for conducting the rescue of downed aviators, was the principal mission delegated to the helicopters. “Study” by VX-3 led to evaluation, including assigning a detachment of HOS-3 helicopters to the spring Atlantic Fleet exercise of 1947. During this period, the helicopters conducted twenty-two plane guard missions, leading to six rescues. A contemporaneous article in the
Proceedings
of the Naval Institute extolled the superiority of the helicopter as a rescue platform, as well as its versatility in performing numerous other missions.
²⁵

The deployment proved a fateful one, leading to the establishment of two helicopter utility squadrons. These squadrons would form the nucleus around which the rotary-wing community would grow over the ensuing seven decades. The Helicopter Utility Squadron TWO (HU-2) would be assigned the responsibility of training future rotary-wing naval aviators, assuming this responsibility from VX-3, which was disestablished at the same time HU-2 began operations. This would raise questions regarding the standardization of helicopter training. Some aviators, like Lieutenant William Knapp, the first Navy helicopter pilot to be so designated, were trained by the Coast Guard. Others obtained their qualifications through VX-3, while still others were designated after receiving training at Helicopter Utility Squadron ONE, or at the Naval Air Technical Center at Patuxent River, Maryland, or from the Sikorsky Aircraft Company directly. Standards for the qualification of aviators as helicopter pilots were issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in June 1948. These standards provided for the recognition of these variously obtained qualifications but placed the responsibility for future qualifications on HU-2.
²⁶
Providing this training while simultaneously supporting detachments for utility and search and rescue missions would prove a daunting task, so daunting, in fact, that it would rapidly become apparent that a dedicated training establishment would be required.

A new command, in a new location, would assume the responsibilities of training Navy helicopter pilots. As Pensacola, Florida, assumed a larger role in the peacetime naval aviation training establishment, it was only logical that dedicated helicopter training would be transferred south as well. In December 1950, Helicopter Training Unit ONE (HTU-1) was established at Ellyson Field. In January of the following year, the training and qualification responsibilities of HU-2 were reassigned to HTU-1.
²⁷
The subsequent evolution of the training mission would see various re-designations of this command, but Helicopter Training Squadron EIGHT
(HT-8) still provides “advanced helicopter flight instruction to all U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard helicopter flight students.”
²⁸

Strategic considerations would shape the future development of rotary-wing aviation. In 1946, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman focused on a new maritime strategy. Forward, offensive operations dominated the new strategy and anti-submarine warfare was central to the operational concept. The introduction of the German Type XXI submarines at the end of World War II had sparked a revolution in submarine warfare.
²⁹
The acquisition of numerous Type XXI boats by the Soviet Union at the end of the war, combined with tensions between the emerging superpowers, would have a dramatic impact. Sherman focused on offensive operations against the bases for hostile submarines, but the lessons of the recently concluded conflict were not lost. The difficulty inherent in degrading the submarine threat at the source was recognized, but so too was the reduced effectiveness of aircraft as ASW assets as a result of the Type XXI–induced revolution. During the war, the mere presence of an aircraft was enough to disrupt submarine attacks. The new generation of submarine was far less vulnerable.
³⁰
New technologies would be required to augment the defensive measures that would facilitate Sherman's offensive posture. Frank Erickson's foresight in mating the dunking sonar to the helicopter would provide part of the answer.

The Hayes dunking sonar used in World War II experiments would evolve, as would the underpowered helicopters. In the immediate postwar years, twin rotor–configured aircraft like the McDonnell XHJD-1 and the Piasecki H-21 would garner increasing attention. Sikorsky Aircraft would develop a competing model based on the earlier successful configuration of a single main rotor. Originally developed to compete for the Air Force rescue helicopter contract, the S-55 was adapted for a Navy operational investigation of helicopter ASW using dipping sonar. Designated the HO4S-series in naval service, it was underpowered and could carry either the dipping sonar or antisubmarine torpedoes, but not both simultaneously. Naval rotary-wing aviation continued to be an exercise in adapting equipment originally intended for other purposes. In spite of this handicap, the project would succeed and would set the stage for the next generation of ASW helicopters.

Concurrent with the demonstration of the ASW capabilities of the Sikorsky variant, Piasecki would also enter the competition with a tandem-rotor variant, the HUP series aircraft. When Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron ONE (HS-1), the first squadron of its type, was established in October 1951, it was equipped with HUP-1/2 aircraft. As with the rapid development that occurred in all naval aviation communities during the decade following the end of World War II, the early HS squadrons would experience a rapid transition through a series of airframes including the HUP and the Sikorsky HRS, HO4S, and HSS-1 helicopters. This rapid evolution would slow with the introduction of this last model beginning in 1955.
³¹
Representing the highest evolution of the piston-engine helicopter, the night-capable HSS-1N Sea Bat (Sikorsky S-58) would remain the standard antisubmarine helicopter until the advent of the turbine-engine helicopters in the following decade. Following the transition to turbines, the Sea Bat, by then re-designated the H-34-series, would continue to serve as a search and rescue platform as well as in the Marine Corps. Various foreign navies would continue to fly it for decades.