One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power (71 page)

Consolidated B-24 Liberator designated by the U.S. Navy as the PB4Y-1
.

The only combat-related mission left to the Navy that could not be filled by carrier aircraft was long-range ASW patrol. For this mission, the Navy relied on the venerable Lockheed P-3 Orion.
⁷⁰
Throughout the Cold War, the P-3 remained the workhorse of the Navy, flying patrols around the globe searching for Soviet submarines. Designed as a long-range patrol plane, the four-turboprop engine aircraft was packed with electronics and anti-submarine weapons to find and potentially destroy enemy subs. Distinguishable by its long “tail,” the magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) boom extends to the rear, making the aircraft easily distinguishable. The eleven-man crew typically flew extended long-range patrols—up to eighteen hours at a time—searching the seas for Soviet subs and enemy warships. The P-3 could maintain altitude and speed—cruising speed of 378 mph—by flying on only three or even two engines, thus extending range and conserving fuel. The plane was designed to fly low and slow, searching the seas for the enemy.

The last land-based Navy aircraft in the inventory (excepting a few transports and VIP “limousines”), the P-3 Orion continues to provide essential long-range capabilities to the Navy into the twenty-first century. Even after the fall of Communism, the Orion continues service for the Navy, extending the Navy's reach across the oceans of the world. The P-3 saw service in the 1991 Gulf War, as one of the first combat components on site after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Upgraded P-3s were instrumental in
identifying and targeting Iraqi surface ships in the Persian Gulf during Operation Outlaw Hunter. The Navy's P-3s provided electronic and targeting information in the protection of U.S. and Saudi equipment in the combat area.
⁷¹

The need for the Navy's land-based long-range patrol capability was assured and continued into the twenty-first century. As the Navy began to shop around for a new airframe, an unfortunate incident occurred on patrol off the coast of China. In April 2001 a P-3C had an unfortunate midair collision with a Chinese PLA Naval Air Force J-811 (some reports say J-8D) fighter/interceptor, killing the Chinese pilot. The American crew made an emergency landing at an airfield on Hainan and were immediately detained. The international incident was compounded by the death of the Chinese pilot and the fact that the P-3 was an electronics warfare aircraft. The American crew of twenty-four was returned to the United States a week after the crash; the P-3 was held (and undoubtedly studied) for three months.
⁷²
The Hainan Island incident—as it became known—was reminiscent of the Gary Powers incident in 1960, when his U-2 spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union.

After the events of 9/11, Navy P-3s were employed in the War on Terror as long-range mobile electronics platforms to combat conventional and terrorist threats. With the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, Navy P-3s once again provided invaluable effects for the Navy and the U.S. military as a whole. In Afghanistan, Navy P-3s, equipped with new electronics packages, were equipped for anti-surface warfare improvement platforms (AIP) to combat threats in there. Flying out of Kandahar, they provide electronics intelligence and targeting information for ground troops and air support platforms.
⁷³
In Iraq, after 2003, the Navy provides P-3s for both the land battles and maritime patrol operations in the Persian Gulf on a regular basis. In the troubled waters off Somalia, Navy P-3s patrol for Somali pirates, protecting merchant ships and helping with the anti-piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa. As part of Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Combined Task Force 150 (part of the U.S. Sixth Fleet), the P-3s continue to combat Somali pirates as part of the efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom–Horn of Africa.

Into the twenty-first century, the Navy preserves the mission of long-range land-based maritime patrol with the aging P-3 fleet.
⁷⁴
Now operating twelve squadrons of P-3s, the Navy is searching for a new aerial platform to replace the forty-seven-year-old design. Currently the Navy is considering the MMA (multi mission aircraft) from Boeing (Navy designation P-8 Poseidon) as a replacement for the P-3. Based on the Boeing 737, the aircraft will provide the same mission capabilities as the P-3 with a new all-jet design.
⁷⁵
Although there are some detractors for the new airframe, the program is needed to replace the aging aircraft. The most commonly cited deficiency in the MMA is that the jet will not be able to fly low and slow for anti-submarine and anti-shipping duties. Nonetheless, the Navy is determined to continue the role in a new airframe with improved qualities.

Today the Navy continues to preserve the patrol mission with land-based naval aircraft. All other missions from World War II have been given over to the Air Force and carrier aircraft, but the long-range ASW and anti-shipping roles have been maintained. The Navy will continue these roles well into the twenty-first century with a mix of old and new aircraft, some land based, some from carriers as needed. The legacy of land- and sea-based Navy aircraft has been missions born of necessity and marked with adaptation and innovation. Into the future, the Navy will continue to employ land-based aircraft to protect the fleet and provide comprehensive mission support in the spirit of jointness for the U.S. military as a whole. The future of U.S. Navy aviation still has a place for land-based aircraft to maintain the Navy's missions around the globe.

NOTES

    
1
.
  
Carl von Clausewitz discusses the grammar and logic of warfare in his epic tome,
On War
, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

    
2
.
  
Sir Julian Corbett,
Principles of Maritime Strategy
(New York: AMS Press, 1972), and Alfred Thayer Mahan,
Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783
(Boston: Little Brown, 1918).

    
3
.
  
It is this author's contention that naval warfare traced a distinctly evolutionary track of the superiority of capital ships from the ancient triremes to the
Dreadnought
-class battleships of World War I. Aviation and submarine technology showed the potential to radically (disruptively) alter the naval strategy paradigm.

    
4
.
  
See chapter 4, this volume, on lighter-than-air naval aviation.

    
5
.
  
See chapters 9 and 15, this volume, on U.S. Navy carrier aviation.

    
6
.
  
Note that up to 1947 when the War Department was reorganized, there were only two Services, the Army and the Navy. Each procured air assets for specific roles related to the land and sea, respectively.

    
7
.
  
Archibald Turnbull,
History of United States Naval Aviation
(Manchester, NH: Ayer Company Publishing, 1971), p. 33.

    
8
.
  
Ibid., pp. 33–34. See also chapter 2, this volume, by Dr. Stephen Stein on the early days of the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics.

    
9
.
  
Ibid., p. 34.

  
10
.
  
See specifically chapter 4, this volume, Dr. John Jackson's excellent overview of U.S. Navy LTA.

  
11
.
  
Naval Appropriations Act, March 1915, $1 million, and further monies throughout the war for all types of naval aviation and R&D.

  
12
.
  
In Turnbull,
History
, p. 63, Commander Mustin, to the Navy General Board in 1916, argued that the “Navy be given a separate flying corps similar to the Marine Corps.”

  
13
.
  
Ibid., pp. 91–92.

  
14
.
  
Officially in April 1917.

  
15
.
  
Turnbull,
History
, pp. 137–38.

  
16
.
  
Of the total number of naval officers (6,716) and men (30,693) by the end of the war. Added to these figures were another 282 officers and 2,180 Marines in aviation roles.

  
17
.
  
Only one was completed: the USS
Wright
(AZ-1, later AV-1).

  
18
.
  
Wilbur Morrison,
Pilots, Man Your Planes
(Ashland, OR: Hellgate Publishing, 1999), pp. 40–41.

  
19
.
  
See specifically letters from the CNO to the President of the NWC in the U.S. Naval War College Archives (hereafter NWC Archives), Record Group 8, Box 30, multiple files.

  
20
.
  
Specifically NWC Archives RG8, Box 30, File 9.

  
21
.
  
Ibid.

  
22
.
  
See specifically documents in the NWC Archives in RG8, RG15 (lectures), and RG64.

  
23
.
  
See specifically his ideas on air power in William Mitchell,
Winged Defense
, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2006).

  
24
.
  
Among the many books on Mitchell, the (anti-) Navy demonstrations, and Mitchell's subsequent falling-out with both the U.S. Navy and Army, see specifically Alfred Hurley,
Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Airpower
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

  
25
.
  
See specifically the devastating losses of Navy dirigibles during this time, and subsequent abandonment of this technology. Mitchell enters the picture again, when he publicly excoriated the U.S. Navy as incompetent in aerial technology and employment.

  
26
.
  
“The Bureau of Aeronautics,” in Turnbull,
History
, pp. 186–92.

  
27
.
  
Ibid., p. 190.

  
28
.
  
Pratt-MacArthur Agreement, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), USAF Collection, IRIS No. 123080 (AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL).

  
29
.
  
CV-1 USS
Langley
, CV-2 USS
Lexington
, and CV-3 USS
Saratoga
were on the Navy register, but the Navy still relied heavily on battleships (BB) for power projection. To say that carrier aircraft development was still in its embryonic phases would not be an understatement. See specifically Thomas Hone et al.,
American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999).

  
30
.
  
Turnbull,
History
, pp. 277–79, gives an excellent account.

  
31
.
  
NWC Archives, RG8, Box 31, File 11: multiple listings for Navy procurement of aircraft, first citation 1922.

  
32
.
  
AFHRA, USAF Collection, IRIS No. 467748, “Alleged 100 Mile Limitation on Army Aviation in Coast Defense, 1931,” compiled and published (as a classified document) 1 November 1946 (Maxwell AFB, AL).

  
33
.
  
Ibid., pp. 1–2.

  
34
.
  
Cited in ibid., p. 2.

  
35
.
  
See multiple Army Air doctrinal documents from the interwar periods, including “Employment of the Air Forces for the Army” (1935) as well as AWPD-1, where the issue did not even warrant mention.

  
36
.
  
As recounted in Turnbull,
History
, p. 279, from the winter 1929/30.

  
37
.
  
Ibid., pp. 300–301. Admiral Arthur Hepburn recommended the expansion of naval aviation including planes and bases. See specifically his report for expansion of the eleven existing bases and construction of sixteen new ones, including bases in the Pacific.