One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power (69 page)

Thus, into the 1920s the Navy combined institutional awareness with outside pressure to focus on the importance of aviation. Further, technology was catching up to the promises of effectiveness, and land- and sea-based aircraft were coming into their own. The Navy was still a few years away from carrier-based aviation in a definitive role at the same time that LTA technology was being eclipsed.
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The Navy
continued development of aircraft technology as well as serious study on the importance of aviation to the Navy.

Organizationally, the Navy attempted to conceptualize the role of naval aviation. By 1921, in an effort to retain its aviation arm, the Navy instituted the Bureau of Aeronautics. Citing the importance of the air arm to the Navy, and with the support of the secretary as well as the president, the proposal was signed into effect on 12 July 1921.
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Rear Admiral William Moffett became the first Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), who was tasked with advising the CNO on “all aeronautic planning, operation[s], and administration.”
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Friction emerged over procurement, with competition between BuAer, Plans, and Material divisions; however, coordination within the Navy—even with overlap—allowed Navy aviation to proceed with renewed importance.

But, what to do with airplanes in a purely naval role remained the dominant question. The Navy was willing to let the Army continue its pursuit of “strategic” bombing as an Army role; the focus was instead on what airplanes could do for the Navy. By 1931 the Navy thought it had a compromise that everyone could work with. In a meeting between the CNO, Admiral William Pratt, and Chief of Staff of the Army General Douglas MacArthur—later known as the Pratt-MacArthur Agreement—it was decided that naval aviation would be “based on the fleet and move with it as an important element in solving the primary missions confronting the fleet . . . thus assuring the fleet absolute freedom of action without any responsibility for coast defense.”
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The presupposition was that the Navy would control all of the air over the water, the Army over the land; each service would stay on its own side of the coast. An immediate issue was that the Navy was still in the experimental phases with their first few aircraft carriers,
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and it was unclear that the Army would attend to coastal defense when called upon.
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With these limitations in mind, the Navy continued development of sea-based aircraft and retained a considerable number of land-based planes for use.
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In subsequent meetings, there was a lack of consensus about the jurisdiction over coastal defense.
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Throughout the 1930s the Army and Navy bickered over who would watch the coasts in case of enemy action close to the continental United States. The Army, as supported by the Joint Staff in the Drum Board report (1933), indicated that the coasts were the Army's responsibility, even if under Navy command.
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Likewise, Navy aircraft operating within a two hundred- to three hundred-mile distance from the coast may fall under an Army commander, again, as proposed by the Joint Board in 1935.
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However, it is important to note that while the Joint Board considered it an important issue (with meetings and publications up to and including 1939), and the Navy wanted the Army to commit, the Army did not consider it an important task in their doctrinal writings.
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The Army was more concerned with the doctrines of strategic bombing and slightly less concerned
with support of the land forces; there was little writing or intellectual time given to coastal patrol. Interestingly, the Army was so concerned with its monopoly on land-based aircraft that the Secretary of War brought the issue to the president when he found out that the Navy was deploying (land-based) torpedo bombers to Coco Solo and Pearl Harbor. The secretary asked the president to deny future purchases of land-based aircraft for the Navy, citing conflict of interest and duplication of effort.
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Even though the Navy was allowed to continue procurement of land-based aircraft, the dilemma continued, with frequent heated conversations between the Army and Navy over jurisdiction and procurement.

However, even with inter-Service rivalries with the Army, the naval air arm prospered in the 1930s. Government spending, while curtailed due to the Depression, was forthcoming: bases were built and expanded and aircraft technology evolved. The Hepburn Board (1938) asked for funds for planes and bases; the Navy realized that their duties to protect the fleet and provide necessary aviation assets were important.
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However, the funds were not up to the tasks as proposed, and the Navy lacked another important component: pilots and aircrew. When the government did finally relent and provide the necessary funds, there was little time to prepare, so that the old maxim held true: “When there is time, there is no money; when there is money, there is little time.” Navy aviation faced a crisis in 1939 when wars on two continents boiled over. When the Germans invaded Poland in September 1939, the Navy began “neutrality patrols” in the Atlantic and Caribbean with a mere 90 planes,
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some 700 frontline aircraft in total in the Pacific, flying from land bases and aircraft carriers.
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It was simply not enough, and war was at hand. Germany boasted an overoptimistic force of 5,000 aircraft,
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the Japanese were thought to have as many as 900 naval aircraft and 1,800 Army aircraft.
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The United States in general, and the Navy in particular, found themselves behind in aircraft production and pilot training as war exploded across the globe.

In spring 1940 the president stepped in to address the situation. In May, Franklin Roosevelt ordered funds for 50,000 aircraft for the Army and Navy. In order to facilitate production at undreamed of levels, the National Defense Advisory Committee was formed to rethink American production. Industry was encouraged with contracts and funding, and the massive buildup for war began. The Navy, with only 1,741 aircraft in June 1940, prepared to accept thousands of planes rather than dozens, Congress authorized 4,500 new aircraft on the 14th, raised it to 10,000 on the 15th, and when France fell at the end of the month, funded 15,000. The immediate problem was the ability to produce the numbers necessary, but at least the Navy did not have to worry about money. The diverse inventory included multiple types for carrier aviation, but also included flying boats like the Consolidated PBY Catalina and PB2Y Coronado as well as the Martin PBM Mariner. The Navy asked for and eventually received (after bitter haggling with the Army) their version
of the Consolidated B-24 Liberator (Navy designation PB4Y-1) as well as other land planes from the Army such as the Lockheed Hudson and Vega Ventura. The race against time was on; the Navy prepared as best it could for imminent hostilities against Germany—for the control of the Atlantic and protection of shipping headed to Britain as well as a potential conflict in the Pacific against Japan. When war came in December 1941, in addition to the reinvention of American industry, the Navy had 5,260 aircraft of all types as well as 6,750 pilots available.
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P-3 Orion conducting ship surveillance in mid-Pacific, September 1974
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After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Navy was forced to fundamentally reconceptualize doctrine. With the great battleship fleet either sunk or damaged, the only tool left to fight the war was naval aviation. Emphasis was placed on air power assets in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters of war.

EUROPE, THE NORTH ATLANTIC, AND THE FIGHT AGAINST GERMANY

In the Battle of the Atlantic, the Navy took immediate action to secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to supply Britain and keep it in the war. After the fall of France, the British relied heavily on the United States for materials (both civilian and military) for their struggle against Nazi Germany. The enemy retaliated with the naval Battle of the Atlantic, sending German U-boats to sink Allied merchant ships to starve out Britain. The combined U.S. and British response was threefold:
the convoy system for merchant shipping, surface escorts for the fleets, and air cover from long-range aircraft. As early as summer 1942 Patrol Squadron (VP) 73, flying PBY Catalinas, was sent from Quonset Point, Rhode Island, to Iceland to fly anti-submarine patrols across the North Atlantic.
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However, there were immediate problems: the “Cats” were ineffective at night, they could not shadow the fleets throughout their journey, and there were too few aircraft necessary for the task. Further squadrons were dispatched to Atlantic bases to provide protection for the convoys; Fleet Air Wing (FAW) 7 was established at Dunkeswell, England, made up of VP-103, 105, and 110. Another three squadrons were eventually sent to provide this invaluable service.

A point of friction emerged between the Army and Navy. The Navy wanted a more robust airframe for attacking U-boats, the Army was reluctant to give up strategic resources to the Navy. The Navy had requested B-24s; the Army became concerned that the Navy wanted to infringe on their mission of strategic bombing. Eventually, with the Navy's promise to confine themselves to anti-submarine patrol, the Army relented and began to supply B-24s to the Navy—which were re-designated PB4Y-1.
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The Navy complained that the airframes were either too old or unfit for Army use, a rumor that was uncontested by the Army, but nonetheless false.

In the ensuing Battle of the Atlantic, the land- and sea-based naval aircraft were invaluable in the final outcomes: both the defeat of the German U-boat threat and the successful supply of Britain and later the Soviets. Combining endurance and effect with new technologies, the Navy planes turned the tide against the German submarine forces and allowed the United States to build up in Britain for the invasion of Normandy and liberation of Europe. During the Battle of the Atlantic, the new technologies of centemetric radar, sonar (on ships), improved ordnance, Leigh Lights, and aircraft improvements overcame traditional problems of night and bad weather to defeat the U-boat threat. In the end, American production, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) doctrine, and technology all combined to destroy the German submarines and win the battle. These successes were built on as the Navy developed an operable ASW doctrine that outlasted the war.

U.S. NAVY LAND- AND SEA-BASED AIRCRAFT IN THE PACIFIC

The history of Navy air power in the Pacific War is usually footnoted by the role of land- and sea-based platforms; the bulk of the research and writing is devoted to the successes of carrier aviation against the Japanese. While carrier-borne aviation was a key component to American victory, no small part was played by the men and machines that were based on the land and sea. The same structure was followed in the Pacific as in the Atlantic, with VP squadrons—and later VB and VPB (for Bombing and Patrol/Bomber)—ringed around the Pacific and advanced as the
Navy and Marine Corps conquered islands. The role of Navy aircraft in the Pacific was even more strategic than in the Atlantic. Heavy bombers (land based) and seaplanes were used in the role of observation, mapping, photography, and patrol, and also took part in operational and strategic bombing missions as U.S. troops advanced across the Pacific toward Japan. The vast expanses of the Pacific were overcome by the Navy's long-range bombers and seaplanes. The Catalinas, Coronados, and Mariners were used in a number of roles, employing their long-range capabilities, playing a key role in rescuing downed airmen, and spotting for Japanese fleet movements. One especially interesting example are the Catalinas of VP-12, one of the famed “Black Cat” squadrons who painted their planes flat black and conducted nighttime commerce raiding and bombing missions.
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Their counterparts, the land-based Navy squadrons, flew B-24s (Navy designation PB4Y-1), B-25s (PBJ-1), and B-17s (PB-1).
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The Navy bombers were used in similar ASW and anti-shipping roles, as well as on missions to prepare battlefields for invasion throughout the Pacific campaign. One example among many is the pre-invasion bombing of Guadalcanal by Navy bombers, then the subsequent re-supply of the island with similar aircraft. The “heavies” were some of the first aircraft to use Henderson field after it was captured, helping secure the hard-fought island for American forces.
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Organizationally, the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics went through additional transformation during the war in order to bring naval aviation under a more coherent leadership. In August 1943, in response to the argument that aviation was not receiving proper treatment within the Navy, a deputy chief was added to the staff of the CNO: the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air).
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The Chief of BuAer Rear Admiral John “Slew” McCain, became the DCNO (Air) and was “charged with the preparation, readiness, and logistics support of the naval aeronautic operating forces included within several fleets, seagoing forces and sea frontier forces of the United States Navy, and with the coordination and direction of the effort to this end of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department.”
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BuAer became a technical bureau; operations fell under the guidance of the new DCNO (Air). The chain of command was altered slightly so that the CNO (and his offices) had increasingly more jurisdiction over aviation assets.